

PROPHETS OF THE REVOLUTION

PROFILES OF LATIN
AMERICAN LEADERS



ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

Who are the leaders who have shaped the modern history of Latin America? What have they done to encourage or discourage democracy? What have they contributed to the economic and cultural growth of Latin America? These are the significant questions covered in

PROPHETS OF THE REVOLUTION

Dr. Alexander says, "The best guarantee against the triumph of fascism or totalitarianism in Latin America is the growth of indigenous movements of social reform which can carry out the changes long overdue in the region . . . Political democracy can be solidly established in most of these countries only if the social and economic revolution begun is accomplished."

Through twelve portraits of famous Latin American leaders this book traces the development of the Latin American Revolution. It includes such figures as José Martí, Simón Bolívar, Andrés Bello, José Martí, and Ordoñez. The first "prophet of the revolution," Rómulo Betancourt, Luis Muñoz Marín, Vargas, Perón, and Castro, and describes the changes each has brought about in the modern history of his nation.

The men discussed in these pages differ greatly in social background and physical

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Prophets of the Revolution



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Prophets of the Revolution



By Robert J. Alexander

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Prophets of the Revolution

Profiles of Latin American Leaders



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To Margaret Alexander Rado

Preface



This volume is the product of two decades of research in Latin American affairs. My interest in the other twenty American republics was first aroused while I was a student at Columbia University in the late 1930's and was fortunate enough to take several courses with Dr. Frank Tannenbaum. At that time Dr. Tannenbaum was intimately connected with the events transpiring in Mexico under the leadership of President Lázaro Cárdenas, and had a vast knowledge of affairs in the other Latin American nations as well. Because of his personal contacts and sympathy with the changes taking place throughout Latin America, Dr. Tannenbaum was able to arouse a lasting interest in the area not only in me but in scores of other students who were lucky enough to come under his influence. Many of the younger generation of Latin American scholars in this country owe him a lasting debt of gratitude.

My first field of research in Latin American affairs was the trade-union and Socialist movements of the area. However, investigations in these fields inevitably led to a wide interest in the economic, social, and political problems of Latin America. They led, too, to a realization that Latin American social reform was not following any guidelines laid down in Europe or anywhere else but rather was opening new paths of its own. It became clear to me that in their attempt to modernize their countries, raise the productivity and the levels of living of their peoples, and develop new political institutions, many Latin American political leaders were learning by doing rather than by trying to pattern their ideas and policies on those first adopted elsewhere. Indeed, the Latin Americans have frequently been pioneers in the fields of economic development, social legislation, and modern constitutional law.

Although there is a great deal of variation in the approaches which individual Latin American political leaders have taken to the task of bringing their nations into the twentieth century, it seemed

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to me that the areas of agreement among many of them were broader than their divergences. This fact is the basic inspiration of the present volume. I hope that in its pages I have been able to present more or less adequately the main guidelines which have been followed by the outstanding figures in what I have chosen to call the "Latin American Revolution."

I have been fortunate to know a number of the people whose careers I have traced in the following pages. I consider José Figueres, Rómulo Betancourt and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre among my best Latin American friends. I have had the chance to converse at greater or less length with Arturo Alessandri, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, Juan Perón, and Luis Muñoz Marín. I have heard Fidel Castro speak on several occasions. Unfortunately, I was never able to meet Getulio Vargas or Lázaro Cárdenas, and José Batlle y Ordóñez died while I was still too young to be interested in him or in Latin America. However, I have long been a student of the careers of these last three and hope that I have been able to understand what it was they were trying to accomplish, and how they have gone about carrying out their objectives.

I am indebted to many people who have helped to make this book possible. Eight of the men here discussed have submitted to my questioning, and I must here thank them for their patience. Mrs. Frances Mastroianni, of Rutgers University, has spent long hours in typing this manuscript, and Robert De Maria of The Macmillan Company, has spent even more time in editing the book. I am also grateful to Clarence Senior for his extensive and excellent criticisms of the manuscript. And as always, my wife, Joan Alexander, has helped to develop it from the stage of a nebulous idea to printed volume by listening patiently to long discussions of the work, and by contributing insights of her own, drawn from her personal contacts with some of the people treated in it and from her general observations on things Latin American. Much of what is good in this work is due to the people I have mentioned; all of the errors are my own.

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Introduction



"Revolution" is a respectable word in Latin America. Leading public figures pledge their loyalty to one revolution or another. The word is used in the names of political parties in a dozen countries. The "Party of Revolutionary Institutions" rules Mexico, the "National Revolutionary Movement" has been governing Bolivia for nearly a decade.

The average United States citizen is not unacquainted with what he believes to be the Latin American proclivity for revolutions. About the only time he reads about the other American republics in his newspapers is when the government of one or another of them is overthrown. "Revolutions," therefore, seem to him to be endemic in the area.

However, the word "revolution" is used very differently in the two hemispheres. What the North American reads about in his press as "revolutions" in Latin America are more often than not mere *coups d'état* or military uprisings by discontented colonels or generals. In contrast, when the Latin American uses the word he means a fundamental alteration of the political, social, and economic life of his country. It is this type of revolution that we are talking about in the present volume.

The men discussed in these pages have all sought to lead their countries through a process of basic transformation, to bring them into the twentieth century, if you will. They have sought to destroy old institutions and to put new ones in their place. They have attempted to break old and rigid traditions in politics and in social and economic organization. They have sought to make agrarian reform, modernized agriculture, manufacturing industry, labor unions, social insurance, and other innovations a part of the life of their nations.

Furthermore, these men have all been indigenous social re-

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formers. Although they have not been unaware of events taking place elsewhere in the world, and have occasionally borrowed ideas from outside the hemisphere, they have sought to bring about a revolution cut to the cloth of their own particular nations. They have been nationalists in politics and in intellectual inspiration. A few of them have interpreted nationalism as loyalty to a concept of Latin America as a single nation. Though several of them aligned themselves with political currents from outside the hemisphere, they have not been subservient to the dictates or the ideas of any extra-Latin American power or political movement.

Of course, the Latin American Revolution is part of a worldwide movement. In recent years virtually all the "underdeveloped" countries of the world have sought to catch up with the nations of Western Europe and North America which preceded them in the path of industrialization, and to adapt their economic, social, and political institutions to this change. However, in many ways the Latin American countries were pioneers in this movement. They were already independent while most of the countries of Africa and Asia were still colonies, and thus were able to strike out on original paths while their counterparts in these continents were still struggling against imperial rule. The reforms of José Batlle in Uruguay and the reforms of the early years of the Mexican Revolution preceded the Bolsheviks' coming to power in Russia by at least half a decade. Most Latin American nations had experimented with social security and labor legislation and were attempting to industrialize while the present leaders of Asian and African nations were still languishing in colonial jails.

The men whose lives and work are sketched in this volume have varied greatly in personal characteristics. Physically, some, like Arturo Alessandri and Getulio Vargas, were short men who seemed driven by a kind of Napoleonic determination to make people forget this fact. Others, like Perón, were large men whose physical attraction was a factor in their success. Intellectually, some of these men have been remarkable thinkers and philosophers, as is Haya de la Torre, while others have been relatively unconcerned with ideas.

In social backgrounds, too, these men differ profoundly. Two of them, José Batlle y Ordóñez and Hernán Siles, were sons of former

presidents and were men of influence from their youth. Others, like Lázaro Cárdenas and Rómulo Betancourt, came up from very humble beginnings.

However, all the "Prophets of the Revolution" have some characteristics in common. They are all men of action, and have spent a large part of their lives in the rough-and-tumble of politics. All are men of strong character with an ability to influence and lead others. And all have played key roles in changing the direction of their countries' history.

It has long been the author's contention that the best guarantee against the triumph of fascist or communist totalitarianism in Latin America is the growth of indigenous movements of social reform which can carry out the changes long overdue in the region, and direct the process of economic development and industrialization which will make possible the improvement in the standards of living of the people of the area. Political democracy can be solidly established in most of these countries only if the social and economic revolution becomes an accomplished fact.

However, the pages which follow indicate that democracy is not an inevitable result of social revolution. Although most of the men we discuss were convinced democrats, three were not: Vargas, Perón, and Castro. Furthermore, Vargas and Castro showed themselves willing to throw in their lot with the particular brand of totalitarianism which was in the ascendant at the time they were in power—Nazi-Fascism in the case of Vargas, Communism in the case of Castro.

Indeed, the essence of the revolutionary drama being acted out in Latin America today is contained in these contrasting attitudes of Vargas, Perón, and Castro on the one hand and the other revolutionary leaders on the other. The major question facing Latin America today is whether the necessary social and economic changes can be brought about through the instruments of political democracy and without alliance with totalitarianism on a world scale. Perón and Vargas posed this question ten to twenty years ago, Fidel Castro poses it today.

It is within the foregoing frame of reference that we have chosen the twelve men who are discussed in the present volume. There is, we believe, a certain logic both in selection of the men for discussion

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and in the order in which they are presented in the pages that follow.

José Batlle y Ordóñez was chronologically the first of the Prophets of the Revolution. He was an initiator of labor reform and social security even before World War I, and an experimenter with the use of government institutions for the development of the nation's economy during the same period. He was also a pioneer in attempting to deal with the age-old problem of dictatorship in Latin America and in seeking a formula which would establish a healthy system of political democracy. He set up the framework for his country's development during his own generation and the one that came after him. He is undoubtedly the father of modern Uruguay.

Lázaro Cárdenas, although he did not become president of Mexico until 1934, represents the culmination of a great movement for reform, the Mexican Revolution. He finished the work of transforming the institutional structure of Mexico and laid the basis for the remarkable economic expansion of that country during the past two decades.

Arturo Alessandri belongs to a generation younger than that of Batlle but older than that of most of the other men discussed in this volume. His most significant contributions to the recasting of Chilean economic, social, and political life were made during the 1920's, though he continued to be a powerful force in his country's civic affairs until his death in 1950.

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre has been the philosopher of the whole movement for social revolution in Latin America. The parties headed by Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, José Figueres in Costa Rica, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles in Bolivia freely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Haya de la Torre and the Peruvian Aprista movement. Perón adopted many of the ideas of Aprismo without bothering to credit their origin. Within Peru, his native country, Haya de la Torre has been the most important political figure for more than a generation.

Rómulo Betancourt, José Figueres, and Luis Muñoz Marín, of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico respectively, have been contemporaries and close friends. Each in his own country has headed a political movement which has pushed forward social and economic change within a framework of political democracy. Each

has been by all odds the outstanding political figure of his generation in his native country, and each has had the qualities of a thinker and a philosopher as well as those of an expert politician.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles have headed a political group whose program and policies have borrowed much from both the Mexican Revolution and the Aprista movement. They have given leadership to a movement for social change in Bolivia which is the most fundamental alteration in the *status quo* to occur in any Latin American country since the Mexican Revolution.

Finally, Getulio Vargas, Juan Domingo Perón and Fidel Castro, though included among those who have led in the process of recasting the fundamental economic, social, and political institutions of their respective nations, have differed profoundly from all the rest in one essential respect. Unlike all the others, they have not been convinced democrats. Each was at one time dictator of his nation, though Vargas in the last phases of his career governed in a democratic manner. However, both Perón and Vargas were responsible for transferring power from the rural aristocracy to the urban middle and working classes and made labor organization, labor legislation, and social security integral parts of their governments' policies. They both adopted for the first time in their respective nations an avowed policy of government support for industrialization. Fidel Castro's impact on the economy, society and political life of his country can certainly not be gainsaid.

There may be other men whose importance in transforming their individual Latin American countries has been equal to that of those whom we are discussing, but we do not believe so. However, it is perhaps only right that we explain why some leading figures in recent Latin American political history have not been included in this volume.

We have not discussed any leader of the Mexican Revolution other than Lázaro Cárdenas because at best their contribution to that movement was a partial one. It was Cárdenas who brought the great movements of agrarian reform, labor and social legislation, and economic nationalism to fruition and who launched the process of industrialization on a large scale.

Several Central American figures other than José Figueres might conceivably have a claim for recognition in these pages. José Arevalo,

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ex-President of Guatemala, and President Ramón Villeda Morales of Honduras come immediately to mind. Yet Arevalo bears much of the responsibility for the abortion of the very promising Guatemalan Revolution because of his inability to form a political party of defined Latin American social revolutionary ideology which might have been able to prevent the Guatemalan movement from being made captive and ultimately being sacrificed by the Communists. Villeda Morales is too newly arrived on the scene for us to know whether or not he will measure up to the opportunities presented to him in the most underdeveloped of the Central American republics.

There is no one in Colombia who really rates discussion in the present book. The Liberal Party presidents of the 1930's began a certain process of social change, but they failed to attack the country's fundamental problems. Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, had he lived, might have developed into the type of leader we are discussing here, but he was assassinated at a time when it was difficult to say whether he was going to lead a real revolution or was merely a popular demagogue. It is too early to say whether Alberto Lleras Camargo will bring about these changes.

Arturo Frondizi, elected president of Argentina in 1958, may in time develop into the type of man we are discussing. If he can mend the damage which Perón did to the economy of Argentina, he may well be able to build a solid foundation for political democracy and a strong national economy on the basis of the social and political changes which Perón himself left as his heritage, as well as pushing these changes still further. However, Frondizi's achievements in this regard remain to be accomplished and are not a matter for historical analysis.

Two dictators, Somoza of Nicaragua and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, have brought about some of the changes which constitute the binding theme of this book. They both started the process of economic development, and both established social institutions which under democratic regimes may yet be of benefit in the fulfillment of the Latin American Revolution. Yet both these men treated their country so much like a personal plantation that they really belong in the ranks of the old-fashioned military *caudillos* rather than in those of the modern social revolutionaries of

Latin America. Furthermore, Trujillo, at least, maintained such an absolute tyranny that it is doubtful if the Dominican Republic can learn the ways of democracy within the next generation.

Finally, one might mention Luiz Carlos Prestes of Brazil and Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico. Prestes achieved almost legendary fame as a precursor and missionary of social change in Brazil in the 1920's. Lombardo Toledano presided over the first successful hemispheric confederation of organized workers, and undoubtedly contributed for a while to the strengthening of one of the strongest forces working for social revolution in Latin America, the labor movement. However, both these men are excluded from the pages of our book because they are not indigenous social reformers. Rather, they are part of the international communist movement. Their success would not mean further progress in the Latin American Revolution, but would mean rather that that revolution would be warped so as to fit the mold established by international communism.

We hope that the pages which follow will give the reader a better understanding of the basic forces now at work in the Latin American nations. The problems with which the twelve men here discussed have had to deal are of importance not only to their respective countries but to the hemisphere as a whole. If relations between their nations and the United States are to be established on a firm basis of friendship and cooperation, the first prerequisite is that North Americans have some comprehension of the problems which face the Latin American countries and the various ways by which Latin American political leaders have sought to solve these problems.

José Batlle y Ordóñez, the Pioneer



Seldom has a nation been as much influenced by the career of one man as was the Republic of Uruguay by the lifework of José Batlle y Ordóñez. Largely through his inspiration and leadership, this little nation on the northern side of the Río de la Plata estuary was converted from one of the most turbulent and backward of the Latin American nations into the model state of the hemisphere. Batlle's imprint was so great that the lessons learned during his long tutelage were still the most powerful single force in the country's political life a generation after he had passed from the scene.

However, Batlle's influence was not limited to his native country. The social and economic experiments which he launched there were closely watched throughout Latin America. He was the pioneer in the ideas of economic nationalism, social reform, and effective political democracy which became the widely accepted program of political groups and leaders throughout the hemisphere.

Throughout the colonial period Uruguay had been the scene of a long struggle between the Portuguese and Spanish empires in America. Lying, as it did, on the borderline between these dominions, it passed back and forth between them throughout the three centuries of Iberian domination of that part of the world. These struggles continued even after the South American nations had broken away from their European mother countries, and Uruguay became the battleground in the clash between the new Empire of Brazil and the Confederation of the Río de la Plata, which was in time to become the Republic of Argentina.

It was not until 1833 that the formal independence of the Republic of Uruguay was recognized by Brazil and Argentina, and the new nation became in effect a buffer state between its two more powerful neighbors. However, even this recognition did not bring

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peace to the country. The struggles which had formerly been carried on between two alien powers were now continued between rival political factions within the new republic. The whole history of Uruguay during the nineteenth century is the story of an intense struggle for power between the Colorado Party, which came to be representative of the city of Montevideo and a few of the provincial towns, and the Blanco Party, which was dominant in the countryside.)

This internecine struggle frequently broke out in open violence in revolutions and even civil wars. Seldom did a president come into office legally and give up his post to an elected successor. The typical successful politician of the time was a man who was as capable of leading an army in a civil war as he was of making a speech from a party platform. Attempts at compromise between the rival factions were frequent, but, even when they succeeded, the agreements arrived at were seldom kept for long.

This constant internal warfare was fed by foreign influences. Both the Argentines and the Brazilians were constantly meddling in the country's affairs, backing one party or the other. In the 1860's the famous Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López did the same thing, with the result that Uruguay was dragged into the famous and debilitating War of the Triple Alliance as an ally of Argentina and Brazil against Paraguay.

Several times the country suffered under severe personal dictatorships. The atmosphere was not conducive to the development of a normal democratic political life, and the overthrow of one tyrant was not infrequently followed by the installation of another.

It was in this atmosphere that José Batlle y Ordóñez was born and brought up. He was the son of a famous Colorado *caudillo*, General Lorenzo Batlle, who was one of the principal leaders of his party in the civil wars and served as president of the republic in the 1860's. Young José Batlle, born in 1856, was well aware of the nature of his country's political life, and very early declared his belief in the necessity of putting an end to the constant quarreling and to the use of force and in the need for establishing sound foundations for a democratic regime.

✓ José Batlle's first love was philosophy. As a very young man in 1879 he formed part of a group of university students and recent

graduates who established the Philosophical Section of the Ateneo, a debating society in which all the then fashionable streams of philosophical thought were continually and passionately discussed. He and his associates were highly critical of the popular positivist philosophy, and published a short-lived periodical, *El Espíritu Nuevo*, which defended a deistic "spiritual rationalism" opposed both to positivism and Catholicism.

It was during these early philosophical discussions that José Batlle hammered out the personal philosophy which was to guide him throughout his political career. His firm belief in political democracy and in civil peace became cornerstones of his long career.

Batlle's philosophical studies and disputations were interrupted in November, 1879, when he went to Europe for two years. In the Old World he became acquainted with the political ideas which were then gaining force there, particularly nationalism and socialism. Although his nationalism always remained reasonable and constructive and he never became an avowed advocate of socialism, Batlle was undoubtedly deeply influenced in his thinking by his studies and experiences during these two years in Europe. Upon his return in 1881 Batlle turned to political problems rather than to philosophy.

Meanwhile slow but fundamental changes were coming about in the economic life of his native country. The end of the Corn Laws in Great Britain in 1846 had thrown open the gates of that nation to foodstuffs and raw materials from all over the world. The Rio de la Plata area was particularly influenced by this development, and both Uruguay and its neighbor Argentina soon became important suppliers of these products to the British market.

Uruguay became one of the most important sources of wool for the British textile industry as well as a supplier of meat for the British family table. The grazing industry, which had existed in a somewhat desultory fashion ever since colonial times, received new impetus by the end of the nineteenth century. As the raising of cattle and sheep grew more profitable it became necessary to have facilities to get these products to the port of Montevideo, whence they could be shipped to their markets overseas. Hence, with the help of British investors the development of the railroads began,

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thus ending the isolation of large parts of the country from the outside world and bringing civilizing and tranquilizing influences to these sections of the nation. By the turn of the century a packing-house industry had begun to develop in Montevideo, Salta, and one or two other towns.

The economic developments had their inevitable political repercussions. The metropolis began to overshadow the culturally and politically backward hinterland. The urban middle class was strengthened, and a small wage-earning working class developed in the capital and other towns. Immigrant workers from Spain and Italy brought with them the new doctrines of anarchism, socialism, and trade-unionism which were by then gaining ground in their native lands.

The Colorado Party, as the traditional political spokesman for the metropolis, stood to gain from these developments. However, it could do so only if it found a leadership that could make it a spokesman for the new social and economic groups which were coming more and more to dominate Montevideo. José Batlle y Ordóñez provided such leadership.

In 1886 Batlle established a newspaper, *El Día*, which became his personal vehicle and the voice of the younger and more progressive wing of the Colorado Party. Although the newspaper faced a very precarious financial situation during its first years and was subjected to hostile treatment from various governments which Batlle very strongly criticized, it soon became recognized as one of the best journals published in the republic.

Batlle became increasingly involved in practical political activity. As the son of Lorenzo Batlle he had a ready-made position in the councils of the Colorado Party if he wanted to assume it. However, he very soon created a position of his own through his consistent opposition to President Idiarte Borda's dictatorship in the middle 1890's and through his criticism of the role of the military in the country's political life.

In 1897 Juan Lindolfo Cuestas became president. He had pledged himself to the elimination of the military from politics and to the respect for the rights of the opposition. An agreement had been reached in 1896 to put an end, for the time being at least, to the bitter quarrels between the Colorados and the Blancos by giving the

latter control of six provinces (departments), while the Colorados remained in charge of the other provinces and of the national government in Montevideo. Local private armies of various Blanco *caudillos* were supposed to be disbanded, though this in fact did not happen.

Batlle played an important role in the administration of President Cuestos. He served as a member of the Council of State and as president of the Senate. In the latter capacity he was for a while Acting President of the Republic when the chief executive was out of the country. His reputation as the leading figure among the younger generation of Colorado leaders rose steadily during the 1890's and early years of the present century.

José Batlle was one of the leading candidates in the presidential election of 1903. He had widespread support from the rank and file of the Colorado Party, but in those days the president was elected by Congress, not by the people. In order to obtain the presidency, therefore, it was necessary to get the adherence of a majority of the members of the legislative branch. During the negotiations which preceded the actual casting of ballots Batlle himself stayed in the background. However, through the skillful maneuvering of his faithful lieutenant Domingo Arenas, Batlle finally was successful. He lined up a majority of the Colorado members of Congress as well as a significant minority of the opposition Blanco Party who were opposed to the leadership of that party's *caudillo* Aparicio Saravia.

One of the first problems that faced Batlle as president was the traditional quarrel of his party with the Blancos. Saravia, the principal Blanco leader and a Gaucho *caudillo* of the old style, a veteran of many military uprisings and civil wars, was restive under the continued control of the Colorados over the central government. For his part, Batlle was anxious to put an end to the arrangement whereby several of the most important provinces were ruled by Blanco officials and constituted virtually a separate nation.

These conflicting attitudes of the traditional parties flared into civil war again shortly after Batlle's inauguration. Although he was anxious to halt the unending series of *coups d'état* and rebellions which had been Uruguay's fate since independence, and hoped to do so through establishing a democratic atmosphere in which the opposition could express itself freely and bid for power through

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the electoral process, he had no alternative but to fight back once Saravia had raised the Blanco forces in outright military insurrection against his government. Indeed, his own son joined the national army which went out to meet the Blancos, and was wounded on the field of battle. After a short campaign the forces of the government were victorious. This was the last civil war Uruguay was to suffer and one of the last armed movements against the government. Under Batlle a new and more peaceful pattern was to be set.

The first four-year term of Batlle was taken up largely with a consolidation of the democratic regime which he had guaranteed to provide. There was the greatest freedom for friends and enemies of the government alike. They could express their opinions in the press and from the tribune, and carry on political agitation, so long as it did not degenerate into overt rebellion against the constituted government.

At the same time the Batlle government began openly to encourage the growth of the labor movement. Since his early days as publisher of *El Día*, Batlle had defended the right of the workers to organize and to bargain with their employers. He had argued that the workers were in the weaker position, and if it was they who appeared to be the aggressive party through launching strikes, this was only because all the employers had to do to win out against the workers' demands was to sit tight and refuse to meet them. It took no positive action on the employers' part to defend their interests, whereas to obtain justice the workers frequently had to withhold their labor from the employers.

As president, Batlle reiterated his belief in the right of the workers to defend their interests. In his first instructions to the police in 1904 Batlle started with the phrase: "The workers have the right to declare themselves on strike."¹ He defended this right so long as he remained president.

The labor movement at this time was largely controlled by anarchosyndicalists who, in theory at least, were strongly opposed to any kind of government. However, Batlle succeeded in winning the confidence and support of many of them, and during his second term in office was able to draw into his administration a number of men who had started out as anarchist labor leaders.

Aside from his sympathetic attitude toward the labor movement, Batlle gave some other indications during his first term of office of the path toward social reform which he would ultimately take. In the field of education he sponsored the establishment of a women's university in Montevideo, a very advanced move at a time when few women were even daring to think of the possibility of receiving an advanced education. He also started a program for extending primary education to all parts of the country, particularly the rural areas, a program which was to have its fruits a couple of generations later when Uruguay came to enjoy one of the highest literacy rates in Latin America.

In December, 1906, three months before the expiration of his first term, Batlle sent to Congress a proposal for a law limiting the working day. It would have established the nine-hour day immediately and the eight-hour day within a year for manual workers, and a limit of eleven hours the first year and ten the second for white-collar employees. The law was not passed at that time, and, in fact, it was ten years before the eight-hour day finally became the law of the land.² However, Uruguay, under Batlle's inspiration, was the first country in America to adopt this measure.

Although he failed during his first presidential term to get Congress to adopt the eight-hour day, Batlle did succeed in one important step on behalf of labor. Before his exit from the presidency a new Ministry of Labor and Industry was established for the first time. In this, too, Uruguay was a pioneer in America.

By the end of Batlle's first four-year term the country was quieter and more orderly than it had been in many decades. The question of the presidential succession, which in previous years had caused so much dissension and had frequently even been the cause for revolts, was peaceably solved by the election of Claudio Williman, a Colorado Party member who had served in Batlle's cabinet.

In order not to embarrass his successor Batlle left Uruguay soon after giving up the presidency and spent the next three years in Europe. He traveled widely in the major countries of that continent as well as in Switzerland. His was a study tour, and he sought as much information as possible about various reform movements which were then gaining influence in the Old World.

Perhaps his principal preoccupation was to find in the Old

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World an answer to the perennial Latin American problem of preventing the chief executive from absorbing the powers of all three branches of government. In this connection he was particularly impressed with the success of the collegiate government of Switzerland, with its nine-man executive council in place of a president, and the system of having one of the nine serve each year as presiding officer and titular head of state. In the years that followed, Batlle was to spend much time and energy in trying to convince his fellow countrymen of the virtues of this type of government.

Meanwhile the administration of President Williman had been decidedly unpopular with the urban masses, who constituted the chief electoral force of the Colorado Party. The workers and many of the Colorado political leaders as well looked back with considerable yearning to the days when Batlle had been president. Upon his return from Europe in 1910 he was the virtually unanimous choice of his party for another term, to run from 1911 until 1915.

It was during this second period as president that José Batlle began to carry out the program of reform which was continued by his immediate successors and upon which his fame is based. This was an exceedingly varied program, extending into many fields.

During Batlle's second administration he proposed a series of labor and social laws. Not all of these were passed during the four years of his presidency, though all owe their origin directly or indirectly to Batlle. To understand the pioneering nature of Batlle's proposals, one must remember that they were made several years before the leaders of the Mexican Revolution assembled in the Constitutional Convention of Querétaro and directed the country's legislature to enact an extensive body of labor laws, a decade before Chile adopted the hemisphere's first labor code, and two decades before the labor and social security legislation of the New Deal in the United States.

Batlle's proposals included a comprehensive workmen's compensation scheme, which was enacted into law in July, 1914; a law providing for an obligatory day of rest each week; legislation providing leave with pay for women workers for a month before and a month after giving birth; and the famous "law of the chair," which provided that employers must have available chairs upon which their women workers could sit while working. A year after

Batlle left the presidency his suggestion of a limitation of the work day for all workers in industry and commerce to eight hours was finally passed into law.

An extensive social security system was established. This included the enactment of workmen's compensation for workers who were injured or fell sick on the job. It also included a series of retirement funds for different groups of workers, which came to include under their coverage virtually everyone working for wages in the republic.

In his social security legislation Batlle set a bad precedent which was followed by a number of other Latin American nations. Instead of establishing a single over-all system to cover all employed workers the government set up the social security system on the basis of numerous separate funds, each covering a specific group of workers. This resulted in an excessively large bureaucracy and a situation in which entirely too much of the money collected was spent upon costs of administration. However, it proved easier from a political point of view to establish the social security system on this piecemeal basis.

Throughout his administration Batlle continued his policy of friendship toward the trade unions. He refused to allow the police to be used as allies of the employers in their conflicts with their workers, and he used his influence to get employers to deal justly with their employees' organizations.

Typical of his attitude toward the labor movement was an incident which occurred soon after he took office for the second time. The trolley-car workers of Montevideo had been on strike for some time, and the principal central labor group of the time, the Federación Obrera Regional Uruguay, decided to call a three-day general strike in solidarity with them. In connection with this general walkout the FORU organized a demonstration in the Plaza Independencia and invited Batlle to address the meeting. The Socialist newspaper *El Socialista* reported that "Citizen Batlle y Ordóñez acceded to the request and told the workers that they had been right to unite and organize and that they would be supported by the public authorities in the exercise of their rights so long as they acted legally. The demonstration then broke up in the midst of great enthusiasm."³

However, it is worthy of note that Batlle, though favorable to

labor, did not enact any legislation designed to tie the trade-union movement to the government's apron strings. He did not adopt the system which subsequently became popular in the Latin American countries of providing for legal registration of the unions and of forcing the employers to deal with registered workers' organizations. Apparently Batlle believed that it was not the government's business to determine who did and who did not represent the workers, or to meddle in the internal affairs of the labor organizations. As a result of this attitude the Uruguayan trade-union movement has remained one of the few in Latin America which are not enmeshed in laws which can be used to put them under the thumb of government labor officials.

Like many Latin American politicians of the succeeding generation, Batlle was a nationalist as well as being aware of social problems. His nationalism was expressed principally in the field of economic policy, where he favored establishment of a more diversified and independent economy.

With the development of the grazing and meat-packing industries the Uruguayan economy had flourished, but at the same time it had become much more unstable than it had been previously, and large segments of it came under the control of foreign investors. The country's prosperity came to depend upon the prices of meat and wool, which tended to fluctuate widely and violently. When these prices rose, the country's economy boomed; when they fell, the nation was thrown into a tailspin. At the same time the packing houses, railroads, public utilities, and much of the insurance and banking business was in the hands of companies with their headquarters in Europe or North America.

Batlle did not want to do anything to undermine the grazing industry, but he felt that it should be supplemented by more extensive agriculture and manufacturing. He also felt that the fundamental institutions of the economy should be placed in the hands of Uruguayans as quickly as possible.

Batlle undertook energetic measures to encourage agriculture. Agricultural experiment stations were established in various parts of the country. Reforestation was undertaken. The importation of agricultural machinery was encouraged by the removal of all tariff duties upon them. Finally, a law was passed allowing the president

to expropriate a number of large haciendas and to raise by means of bonds a sum to be used for purchasing them from their owners. The law provided that the haciendas thus acquired were to be subdivided and sold to small farmers, who could finance their purchases through the newly nationalized Mortgage Bank.

Batlle undertook to encourage the growth of manufacturing. One step in this direction was the extension of tariff protection. Among those receiving this protection were manufacturers of shoes, glass, wine, cement, and dairy products. At the same time raw materials needed for Uruguayan industries were freed from all import duties, and other raw materials which were imported for the purpose of processing and reexport were given the benefit of a "draw-back"; that is, the duties paid were given back to the importer when the processed products were exported.

The Batlle administration established several research organizations to help new industries. One of these was the Industrial Chemicals Institute, which, according to the law that created it, was "to perfect the technical procedures of our industrial establishments, promote the organization of new industries, and provide information related to improvements in technology." Another was the Fishing Institute, which had much the same purposes.⁴

During Batlle's second administration and in ensuing periods when the government remained largely in the hands of people under his influence, a wide program of nationalization was carried out. The ports were placed under a special government administration, and their operation was reorganized. The telephone and electric-light system was put in the hands of a government-owned corporation. A government insurance company was established which operated in various fields and was given a monopoly in several, notably workmen's compensation insurance.

The banking system was reorganized, with the government taking full ownership of the Central Bank and using its influence to encourage the growth of Uruguayan-owned industries. The old Mortgage Bank was nationalized, and its operations were greatly extended to aid and encourage agriculture. Government firms were established to monopolize the tobacco industry and to set up and operate cement, chemical, and petroleum-refining industries. Much later, in the 1940's, the railroads were almost completely nation-

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alized. A government-owned National Packing House was established in competition with the private firms, thus applying what Franklin D. Roosevelt a generation later called the "yardstick principle" to the country's basic industry.

Batlle thus was also a pioneer in a development which after his death was to become general throughout Latin America, that is, the use of the economic power of the government to encourage the diversification of the national economy and the development of manufacturing. This program of Batlle's was not inspired by any ideological bias in favor of socialism. After his death, however, even the Uruguayan Socialists admitted that it was a program with which they had no basic disagreement. Batlle's inspiration was nationalist. He sought to develop and broaden the economy of Uruguay, and realized that the only institution which was able to undertake this task with some chance of success was the government. The example which he gave was followed during and after the Great Depression by most of the countries of Latin America, and, indeed, was followed after World War II by leaders of the underdeveloped countries in all parts of the world.

Luis Hierro Gambardella has underlined the nationalist objectives of Batlle's program of establishing state-owned industries. He says:

The State organizes as an instrument of the nation to impede the escape of public wealth, produced by the installation of foreign companies. This, then, is another of the fundamental lines of Batllista doctrine: The public services under the control of the State are the maximum assurance of their control by the nation. Where monopolies are controlled by foreign capital this is reason enough for the State to intervene and nationalize them.⁵

Batlle himself explained in his newspaper *El Día* his philosophy concerning the nationalized industries. Writing on June 30, 1923, he said:

The industrial activities of the State must not be a source of profit, but rather of low prices, of welfare. In those activities which tend towards human degeneration, such as alcohol and tobacco, one can demand a profit, but not so in public services of credit, social security, consumption, transport, etc., the best return of which consists in the

quality and cheapness of their services—once they have been financially consolidated—that is their contribution to general welfare. To make expensive the consumption of alcoholic drinks and tobacco is to reduce their consumption and therefore to improve health, but we seek to reduce the price and increase the facilities of other public services rather than trying to restrict them. The enemies of State industrialism well know that the funds they try to take from the autonomous agencies are now being used for the consolidation, the progress and the rapid growth of the institutions which now possess them.⁶

Later in the same year, on November 10, Batlle wrote in *El Día*:

The tendency for the industrial enterprises of the State to increase is characteristic of the present epoch. It obeys, fundamentally, three causes. First, a fiscal cause, which is the need for new resources to cover the constantly increasing costs of national progress. Second, a social cause, that of limiting the profits of capitalism, the dividends of which come from the money of the people. Finally, a political cause, which consists of the unquestionable need in democratic society to tie as closely as possible the social activity of the State to the masses of the nation of which the State is the juridical expression.⁷

Education was another fundamental aspect of Batlle's government program. His approach has been followed in only a few Latin American countries to this day. He took education to the countryside instead of concentrating all efforts in the urban areas. He also sponsored a program for developing vocational education, thus attempting to adapt the educational system to the new needs of an expanding economy.

Batlle looked upon education not only as a weapon against ignorance and misery but also as a means of social and economic reform. It was his principal arm in the struggle against one of the greatest evils of Uruguay's traditional society—the large landholdings, or latifundia. Most rural areas were in the hands of a relatively small number of proprietors of huge cattle and sheep *estancias* whose employees were miserably paid and lived in a kind of semifeudal dependence on their employers.

Batlle never made an all-out attack on the problem of latifundia. Perhaps this was part of the price for getting the Blanco Party, the

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spokesman for the large landholders, to give up its belief in revolution and to accept democratic agitation and the ballot box as the legitimate methods of changing governments. However, Batlle did push through labor legislation favorable to rural workers, including a minimum-wage law covering them.

Perhaps Batlle hoped in time to undermine the latifundia system through the extension of education. Through his program of building schools in the countryside there were soon primary schools in virtually every village and small town in the interior and at least one secondary institution in every province. He felt that if the children of the workers learned to read, write, and cipher and became familiar with their country's history and their duties as citizens, they would be less willing to continue to live under the traditional latifundia system.

Batlle also attempted to reform the relations between State and Church. He himself had never been a practicing Catholic since childhood, and although he believed in a deity he was not an active member of any religious organization. In principle he was in favor of separation of Church and State, which was finally established in the Constitution of 1917. During his period in the presidency he greatly reduced the government's financial contributions to the Church and ended the custom of having Church dignitaries participate in all official ceremonial occasions.

He also supported the passage of laws legalizing divorce when requested by either marriage partner. He likewise sponsored legislation protecting the rights of illegitimate children.

Batlle's most important contribution to Uruguayan life was the establishment of a pattern of democratic government which has been followed with only a few exceptions by all his successors. In both his first and second administrations Batlle acted as a convinced democrat. He sponsored legislation for a secret ballot, proportional representation, municipal autonomy, and other democratic safeguards. Even more important, however, was the fact that he gave the greatest possible freedom to people of all political colors to express their points of view and to present them to the public. By his administration the press was untrammelled, the parliamentary tribune was unfettered, and the freedom of assembly was respected.

This was an innovation in Uruguayan politics. However, even more

startling was the spectacle of a Uruguayan president seriously suggesting not only that the powers of his office be curtailed but also that the office itself be abolished. During the third year of his second administration Batlle formally proposed that the constitution be amended to abolish the presidency and to put in its place a council of government on the Swiss model.

Batlle's original idea was that the powers of the president should be shared by members of the council. These members should consist of representatives of the largest party and of the principal opposition party. Batlle believed that this arrangement would serve to let the opposition know the details of what was going on in the government, and thus would put them in a position to check any arbitrary actions which might be contemplated by the majority group. At the same time it would give a certain degree of participation and responsibility to the opposition party and thus dissuade it from attempting to change the government by force. Undoubtedly he looked upon this measure, in part, as a means of bringing the still restless Blanco Party into full participation in the kind of democratic regime which he was trying to establish and make secure.

Batlle believed passionately in this solution for the problem of dictatorship in Uruguay and in Latin America in general. He put forward the suggestion while he was still president in spite of the fact that it aroused the most intense opposition among his own supporters and led to a split in his party. A number of his ministers resigned because of their disagreement with Batlle's proposal, which came to be known as the *colegiado*, and several of his closest collaborators were turned into violent political opponents.

Those who opposed Batlle on the collegiate-presidency issue broke away from the main branch of the Partido Colorado and formed rival groups under different leaders. Batlle's followers meanwhile reorganized as the Partido Colorado Batllista, which during most of the following half-century remained the largest single political party in the country.

The Partido Colorado Batllista during most of this period was the principal spokesman for the urban masses of Montevideo and some of the interior towns. Its program might be compared with that of a European social democratic party, and, indeed, its existence is the principal reason why the Socialist Party of Uruguay, which was

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organized in 1910, never became more than a minor factor in the nation's politics. The Partido Colorado Batllista left little room for parties further to the left. The Socialists were never able to win the support of more than 10 per cent of the national electorate. After the appearance of the Communist Party in the early 1920's the Socialists and Communists tended to divide between themselves the backing of a minority of the Montevideo working class. When the Socialist vote rose, that of the Communists fell, and vice versa. However, neither of them was ever able to make serious inroads in the labor following of the Batllista Party.

Batlle proposed a constitutional convention for the purpose of making the changes which he suggested. However, he was unable to get this approved during his term in the presidency. It was not until 1917 that a constitutional convention finally met to deliberate on the *colegiado* and other suggestions which had been made to modify the country's basic document.

Although Batlle was a delegate to the 1917 constitutional convention, he stayed in the background during its deliberations. He felt that the issue had become such a personal one with many of the opponents of the *colegiado* that his appearance on the floor to advocate the abolition of the presidency would only serve to secure its defeat.

The opposition to the suggestion was very strong in the convention. Other proposals backed by Batlle, such as separation of Church and State, were readily accepted, but the *colegiado* had very hard sledding among the delegates. However, through a series of complicated negotiations with the anti-Batllistas, Batlle was able to get at least part of what he had advocated. He accepted a compromise as better than nothing and as a first step toward the achievement of the kind of regime which he wished.

The final arrangement was to maintain the presidency but to supplement it with a council of government. The powers which had formerly been held solely by the president were to be divided between him and the council. Some cabinet members were to report to the chief executive, others to the council. However, control of finances, defense, and foreign affairs was kept in the hands of the president.

Although Batlle had been only partially successful in gaining ac-

ceptance for his project of a collegiate form of government, he felt that it was one of the principal achievements of his career. Ironically enough, it resulted in his bitter political enemies, the Blancos, coming closer to national political power than they had been in seventy-five years. Although the presidency continued to be held by the Partido Colorado Batllista during the rest of Batlle's life, the Council of Government was controlled during most of the 1920's by the Blancos. However, Batlle did not complain, but merely insisted on the necessity for his party to reinforce and amplify the program which he had laid down for it during the years of his presidency.

The *colegiado* lasted until 1933, five years after Batlle's death. At that time, when Uruguay was suffering from the effects of the world depression and the economic situation was exceedingly grave, President Gabriel Terra, a member of the Colorado Batllista Party and a former close associate of Batlle, engineered a *coup d'état* in which he abolished the *colegiado* and proclaimed himself dictator. Terra made his coup in alliance with the Blanco Party, and a new constitution drawn up subsequently not only reinstated a one-man presidency but also provided for equal representation of the two major parties in the Senate, thus giving the Blancos an absolute veto over virtually all measures proposed by Terra or his successors. After five years of troubled rule Terra gave way to General Alfredo Baldomir in 1938, and three years later Baldomir made a coup of his own, changing the constitution so as to eliminate the provision for parity in the senate.

In the 1942 election the Colorado Batllistas again returned to power, and four years later a second experiment with the *colegiado* was undertaken. This new attempt to work out Batlle's old idea had the support of both the Colorado and Blanco parties. It provided for the abolition of the presidency and the substitution of a nine-man council of government. Six of the members of this council would be chosen from the majority party, three from the opposition. The proposal, adopted in a referendum held simultaneously with the presidential election of 1946, provided that the man elected as president in 1946 would serve as chairman of the council of government during the balance of his term, but that in subsequent four-year periods the chairmanship would rotate among four of the six majority members of the council.

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The leader of the opposition to this second *colegiado* experiment was Luis Batlle Berres, nephew of José Batlle y Ordóñez. He was elected vice president in 1946 and succeeded to the presidency in the following year upon the death of his running mate Tomás Berreta. Although he served loyally as a member of the council of government from 1946 until 1958, Batlle Berres maintained a constant stream of criticism against the system. However, in a referendum held in 1958 on the subject of abolishing the *colegiado*, he was defeated by the voters. As this is being written Uruguay continues to be governed by the multiple presidency, José Batlle's old dream. It is the only country in the New World to adopt this idea.

With the exception of the Terra dictatorship between 1933 and 1938 the presidency of Uruguay remained in the hands of the Partido Colorado Batllista for thirty years after Batlle's death in 1928. His party continued to be the principal representative of the middle and working classes of Montevideo and the smaller cities and towns of the interior. During most of this period the Batllistas were the strongest party in congress, when they did not constitute an absolute majority of that body.

During the years in which they remained in control of the country the Batllistas continued to add to the basic structure which José Batlle had laid down during the period of his leadership. The social security system was gradually enlarged, as was the body of labor legislation. During the late 1940's, under the leadership of José Batlle's nephew, Luis Batlle Berres, the Batllista policy of using the power of the State for diversifying the national economy found expression in two programs. One of these was a policy of exceedingly high tariffs to protect manufacturing industries which had developed during World War II. The second was a program for stimulating and protecting agriculture, particularly the growing of wheat. Uruguay had always been a grazing rather than an agricultural nation. However, under threats of the Perón regime to cut off Argentine wheat in reprisal for Uruguay's hospitality to refugees from the Argentine dictatorship, Luis Batlle Berres pushed large-scale wheat growing in his country.

Although they thus continued in the path laid down by José Batlle, the latter-day Batllistas failed to recognize the crisis in the country's affairs which developed after World War II. They failed

to realize that they had blindly followed Batlle's program without taking into consideration the basic economy which had to bear its cost.

To an outside observer this crisis seemed to have several facets. First, many of the industries which had grown up during the crisis of World War II were highly uneconomic and supplied Uruguay with their products only at an exceedingly high cost. Second, the agricultural protection program of Batlle Berres also went to extremes. The wheat produced was higher in cost than that grown across the Rio de la Plata, which in itself might not be an argument against its protection. However, the prices offered by the Uruguayan government for grain grown within the country were so high that they encouraged the production of more wheat than the country itself could consume, and there was little chance of shipping the product abroad in competition with grain from Argentina, the United States, and other major producers. The government thus found itself caught in a vicious circle of subsidizing the growth of wheat which it could not dispose of. Furthermore, much land which had been devoted to grazing was turned into wheat production, bringing about a crisis in the grazing industry.

Meanwhile the social security system had become larger than the nation's economy could support. It became possible in a number of industries for workers to retire in their forties, and an excessively large part of the population was found on the rolls of the pension receivers though most of them continued to work in other jobs. At the same time few, even among those who really had to live on their pensions, received amounts large enough to make it possible for them to live at a minimum level of decency.

Government employment rolls had grown excessively large, while hourly pay remained frugal in the extreme. The result was that most government employees held two or more jobs, working at their government employment only part of the day and often not doing a very efficient job while in the government office.

Throughout the 1950's this crisis continued to grow worse. It called for drastic reorganization of the nation's economy, through reasonable reduction of subsidies to industry and agriculture, establishment of reasonable retirement age in the social security system and the raising of pensions to the level of decency, and a rationaliza-

tion of government employment to provide full-time jobs at full-time pay.

However, no political leader of the Partido Colorado Batllista had the kind of courage and vision which the founder of their party had shown a generation earlier. Rather than urging the kind of program which would cope with the crisis, they continued to rely on the prestige which their party and its founder had among the urban middle and working classes and to promise to do more of what Batlle had made popular when they were still children.

Rather than seeking solutions to the country's pressing problems, the Batllista leaders fell to quarreling among themselves. The result was that in the late 1940's they split into two groups. One, the so-called Partido Colorado Batllista List No. 14, was led by José Batlle's son, César Batlle Pacheco. The other, the Partido Colorado Batllista List No. 15, was under the leadership of the older Batlle's nephew, Luis Batlle Berres.*

The upshot of this was growing discontent against the Colorado Batllista government, which culminated in November, 1958, in the defeat of the Colorados at the polls for the first time in almost a century. The election of that month was won by the Partido Blanco, in alliance with a new political figure, Benito Nardone, a radio commentator who had become immensely popular among the lower classes in the countryside because of his acid attacks on the government.

However, this very defeat of the Partido Colorado Batllista was a tribute to José Batlle y Ordóñez. In spite of the tremendous shock experienced by the Batllista leaders in learning that they had been defeated by the voters, there was never any question about their willingness to turn power over to the victors. They had learned well Batlle's lesson in political democracy. Uruguay, in spite of its eco-

* Both of these parties, as well as the anti-Batllista Colorados, officially remained only factions of the Partido Colorado. Under Uruguay's peculiar electoral system all factions of each party could run separate lists of candidates, and the votes cast for all these lists were added together to determine whether the Colorados or the Blancos had won. The presidency or majority in the Council of Government then was given to that faction within the majority party which had gotten the most votes. However, all factions of both major parties were represented in Congress in proportion to the vote each individual group had received.

nomic and social difficulties, remained one of the few secure political democracies in Latin America—thanks largely to the heritage of José Batlle y Ordóñez.

Batlle's influence over his countrymen was certainly due not only to his ideas but to his personality as well. He was a man of exceptionally strong character and of devotion to his ideas and ideals. He was capable of arousing both the most profound loyalty and the most passionate dislike.

Batlle's long-time political associate, elected president of Uruguay with Batlle's support in the 1920's, José Serrato, has given a thumbnail sketch of his old friend. He has written:

. . . I always saw Batlle y Ordóñez in the same moral line: honesty in the extreme . . . just to the point of obsession, patriot to the depths of his spirit, exemplary democrat.

No circumstance, no promise, no ambition ever made him falter in his duty or in his respect for himself.

He had the natural habit of command; he possessed good manners which were never violated even in moments of greatest frustration and anger (I think no one ever heard him utter a crude word); and he had for his collaborators, his friends, and even his enemies the same scrupulous consideration and courtesy which he demanded for himself.

No one ever gave more prestige to his ministers, or stimulated with more fervor the projects which he considered good, no matter where they came from, or defended with such jealousy the prestige of republican dignity. Neither the peddler of influence, the crafty but mediocre, the audacious ignoramus, the self-inflated "leader," the electoral manipulator, nor the blowhard ever occupied under the influence of Batlle y Ordóñez the posts which only capable, meritorious, and worthy citizens should obtain.

He liked loyalty, not submission.

Those are mistaken who attempt to present him as sharp, intolerant, and authoritarian. He neither repelled nor refused to hear arguments opposed to his position, nor did he attempt to impose his way by means of coercion or violence. He did not exclude from his consideration and friendship those who didn't think as he did.⁸

Batlle was a figure of importance for all of Latin America. Largely through his efforts his country was converted from a backward, chaotic, and relatively unimportant nation into a land studied

and admired by political thinkers and leaders from all over the hemisphere. He was a pioneer advocate of programs of social reform, government encouragement of rapid economic growth, and nationalism which were to become common among the political leaders of all of the nations of Latin America during the generation after his death.

Above all, Batlle was a convinced and fervent democrat. He never was one who believed that democracy should or must be sacrificed in order to attain social and economic progress. Quite the contrary, he gave ample demonstration of the fact that it is possible to carry out the broadest program of social and economic change while strengthening and extending political democracy, even in a country which had had little experience with effective democratic government.

Lázaro Cárdenas and the Fulfillment of the Mexican Revolution



Very early in the morning of a day in the late 1930's the members of the village band of a small Mexican pueblo planted themselves self-consciously and importantly under a window of one of the better houses in town. All duly arranged in their customary positions, they suddenly began to play, loud enough to awaken the whole town and the countryside for miles around. Shortly after they began, a long-faced man stepped out onto the balcony just above where the band was playing and waved to the musicians.

He stayed there watching them until the music ceased, whereupon the leader of the band, taking off his wide-brimmed sombrero and shuffling from one foot to the other, made a short speech. The gist of his words was that the band had come to honor "el señor Presidente," and they hoped that he would be kind enough to notice that many of their instruments were very much worn out, which caused some of the musicians occasionally to hit a sour note, and that they would be very grateful if "el señor Presidente" could see his way clear to making funds available to replace the worn-out instruments.

The man to whom this little speech was addressed thanked the bandleader and his instrumentalists, and assured them that he would do his best to see to it that they received the new pieces they needed. Stepping back into his bedroom, he called one of his aides and gave instructions that the proper authorities be notified to make funds available for reequipping this village band.

The man standing in the balcony was General Lázaro Cárdenas, President of Mexico, and the incident is characteristic of the close

contact which General Cárdenas maintained with the people of Mexico before and during his presidency. It also symbolizes the reasons for his tremendous popularity with the humble folk of his country and explains in part why he was able to do more to fulfill the promise of the Mexican Revolution than had all his predecessors combined.

Lázaro Cárdenas was undoubtedly the outstanding figure of the Mexican Revolution. His career spanned the three periods of that great upheaval: the destruction of old institutions, the establishment of foundations for new ones, and the building of a new institutional framework on these foundations. Like most of the leaders of the movement, he had risen to high rank through participation in the almost continuous warfare of the first decade of the Revolution, when the institutions and individuals of the old regime were swept from the face of Mexico. He had held important posts in the revolutionary regime, including a state governorship and cabinet positions in the Federal administration, during the succeeding fifteen years, in which the painful job was begun of building the bases of new institutions to replace those which the holocaust of 1910-20 had destroyed.

During his own presidency, from 1934 to 1940, Cárdenas stamped out the last remnants of the chaotic violence of the first part of the Revolution. At the same time he completed the task of building solid foundations for a new way of things which characterized its second phase. Finally, he began the process of economic development and political maturation which has characterized the Mexican Revolution during the last two decades. Since leaving the presidency he has been the veritable watchdog of the revolutionary institutions and morale, and has remained the single strongest private citizen in the nation, though appearing only infrequently before the public.

The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 as a purely political movement to bring to an end the long personal dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, who had ruled the country since 1876. It was led in the beginning by Francisco Madero, a liberal-minded large landowner from the northern part of the country, who had little vision that the movement he began would go farther than to carry into practice his slogan "Effective Suffrage! No Reelection!" However, the Revolution soon slipped from the grasp of Madero. There had rallied to his banner large groups of peasant soldiers who wanted to convert the

political movement into a process of fundamental social change. They demanded land for the landless peasants and an end to the age-old peonage system. They demanded that the Indian and mestizo masses be given real participation in the government of the country.

Some of these peasant soldiers refused to lay down their arms even after Madero had won and had been inaugurated as president of Mexico early in 1911. Under the leadership of such people as Emiliano Zapata, in the State of Morelos southwest of Mexico City, and Pancho Villa, in the northern State of Chihuahua, they continued the struggle to transform the Revolution into a movement to right the age-old wrongs from which the Mexican people had suffered since the coming of the Spaniards four centuries before.

With the assassination of President Madero in February, 1913, and the seizure of power by the ruthless and reactionary Victoriano Huerta, the peasant rebels were joined by the supporters of the murdered president, and the Revolution began to take the form which its more radical leaders had advocated. The armies of Zapata, Villa, and General Venustiano Carranza, who had raised the banner of "constitutionalism" against Huerta, marched toward the capital, from which they drove the usurper during the last days of 1914.

However, the victory of the constitutionalist forces did not end this struggle. It was impossible to compromise the personal and ideological differences among the Zapata, Villa, and Carranza forces. As a result Villa remained for some time in control of Mexico City, Zapata withdrew to his stronghold in the State of Morelos, and Carranza was forced into a defensive position along the Gulf coast, in the State of Vera Cruz.

Out of Carranza's desperation came the first legal steps to transform the Mexican Revolution into a basic movement for social change. Forced to bid for the support of the peasants and the city workers against Villa and Zapata, Carranza, under the prodding of his principal field commander, Alvaro Obregón, issued a series of fundamental decrees early in 1915. One of these constituted the first timid approach to the agrarian reform and authorized the restoration to peasant villages of land which had been illegally seized from them during the Díaz period and subsequently. A second recognized the legitimacy of the trade-union movement and authorized the workers' organizations to function freely behind the lines of the

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constitutional army, in return for which the trade-union movement agreed to raise military forces to help Carranza.

The military victory of the Carranza forces gave legal validity to these decrees. They were confirmed and broadened by the Constitution of 1917. Thus the aspirations of the social revolutionaries became part of the basic law of the land.

The constitutional convention which met in Querétaro in December, 1916, was composed of two principal groups: the self-made soldiers who had been carrying on the battles of the Revolution on many fronts, and the civilian lawyers. It was the revolutionary soldiers who were the more radical of these two elements. They insisted on writing into the new constitution provisions for the division of the great landed estates which had come down from colonial times and had grown to include most of the country's arable land during the Díaz regime. They added to the new document a long list of labor reforms, providing Mexico with one of the most advanced codes of social legislation then to be found in the world. It was these same soldiers who insisted on asserting the rights of the Mexican nation to the subsoil resources to the exclusion of both national and foreign individuals.

Carranza survived the writing of this constitution by only three years. When early in 1920 he attempted to impose a hand-picked successor, he was deserted by most of the army under its old leader Alvaro Obregón. After a short provisional regime of Adolfo de la Huerta, Obregón was elected president. With his inauguration the second phase of the Mexican Revolution got under way.

During the next two administrations, those of Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, the bases of some of the fundamental institutions of the new regime were established. These administrations protected and fostered the growth of the labor movement, subsidizing the workers' organizations and giving important political posts to their leaders. A legal procedure for redistribution of the land was established, and institutions were founded to make this procedure effective. A large irrigation program was gotten under way. The national banking system, which had been virtually destroyed during the ten years of armed conflict, was reorganized, and at its pinnacle was established the Banco de Mexico, S.A.

In 1928 the threat of revolutionary chaos again arose suddenly.

The constitution had been changed in the previous year to allow the reelection of Alvaro Obregón to the presidency after he had been out of office only one term. However, he never took office, since he was assassinated by a fanatical young Catholic student who was outraged by the anticlerical policies of the Obregón and Calles regimes. General Calles took immediate charge of the situation, and for the next six years remained the strong man of the Mexican regime, though he never again assumed the presidency. Three men served during this period, the lawyer Emilio Portes Gil, and Generals Ortíz Rubio and Abelardo L. Rodríguez.

As the election of 1934 approached, General Calles selected General Lázaro Cárdenas to be the candidate of the government party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, for the presidency of the republic. This assured his election. But Calles little knew the changes which Cárdenas would bring about during his six years in the presidential palace.

The period 1928-34 had been chaotic. Not only were there three chief executives in this short span, but there was one serious attempt at military revolt, and government policies changed abruptly with the installation of each new president. Portes Gil had pushed the program of agrarian reform and other revolutionary measures energetically. His successor, Ortíz Rubio, virtually brought the agrarian program to a halt. General Abelardo Rodríguez renewed the land reform, but on a more modest basis than it had been carried out in the 1920's.

The fact was that the group around General Calles had become conservative. They felt that the time had come to halt the progress of the Revolution. They themselves had become rich and had private interests to protect and so were opposed to any further radical measures on the part of the government. The Revolution had reached a dead end with them.

However, although he had been a part of the same group, General Lázaro Cárdenas felt differently. He believed that the promises of the Revolution to the peasants and urban workers were still largely unfulfilled, and that it was necessary for the government once again to adopt an active policy of carrying out the principal reforms gotten under way during the early years of the movement.

General Cárdenas was a Zapotec Indian from the State of

Michoacán. He had had only three years of formal schooling, and at the age of twelve had had to go to work to provide for a widowed mother and younger brothers and sisters. At the age of sixteen he had joined the ranks of the revolutionaries, walking halfway across Mexico to join the army of General Calles during the Carranza days. He had been a good soldier and a strong leader of his men, and had risen rapidly in the ranks. During the 1920's he had been governor of the State of Michoacán and had served in the president's cabinet.

Unlike many of the "Socialist millionaires" of the Calles group, Cárdenas had not lost contact with the people and had not forgotten the real aims of the Mexican Revolution. He remembered too well his own experiences and the poverty and injustice surrounding his boyhood days, and, unlike many of his contemporaries, he had apparently evolved a philosophy of his own and a conception of what were the basic purposes of the Revolution.

Cárdenas was not a talkative man and had kept his own counsel. There are those who argue that during the years before he came to the presidency he labored under an inferiority complex and felt that his own merits had not received sufficient recognition. These people say that therefore, when he came to the presidency, he was determined to make a record which would be long remembered.

It is certain that ex-President Calles did not expect that Cárdenas would be the kind of chief executive that he turned out to be. Had he had such suspicions, Calles would certainly not have placed Cárdenas in the presidential post. However, Cárdenas had given some evidence during the long campaign preceding his formal election that he was a man of a rather different stripe from his recent predecessors. He took the campaigning for office seriously, though there was absolutely no doubt about his victory. He used the campaign as a means of establishing contacts with the people throughout the country and of explaining in some detail what it was that he planned to do once he was in the president's office.

The first thing the new chief executive had to do was to free himself from the control of ex-President Calles. This meant that he had to get complete control of the Army, which hitherto had been in the hands of the ex-president, and he had to build up counterweights to the Army upon which he could call if he had difficulties with Calles' followers there. Cárdenas took two measures in this

direction. First, he followed a policy of quietly and unspectacularly shifting army commands. He placed in the lower ranks of key garrisons junior officers on whose loyalty he could completely count. When this process had been accomplished, he did the same thing with the middle ranks of officers, and when the backing of this group was assured, it was a relatively easy matter to remove the generals and colonels who still felt more loyalty to the past president than to the incumbent.

At the same time that he was quietly shifting army commands Cárdenas was building up auxiliary armed forces. During his interminable tours around the country after taking office Cárdenas met with local peasant and trade-union leaders, outlined to them his program and his difficulties, and provided them with small arms to be used in support of the government in case of a clash with the Army.

Once the Federal Army was well in hand, Cárdenas had to suppress the last remnants of the "private armies" which were under the control of various self-made generals of the Revolution. During the military phase of the Revolution each general had gathered around him a larger or smaller force which was personally loyal to him rather than to the government or the Revolution. During the 1920's it was customary that when a general was shifted from one command to another, his troops went along with him. It was a long time before the control of the President over the armed forces was sufficient that the military commander could be thought of as distinct from the force which was under his command.

By the time Cárdenas came to power most of these personal armies had been eliminated. However, a handful of them still remained, and they constituted a threat of some importance to his control of the country. He dealt with different military leaders in different ways. A few he sent abroad on honorary diplomatic missions which were, in fact, equivalent to exile. Others he gave cabinet posts or other positions.

It was not until 1938 that he was able to eliminate the last of these figures, Saturnino Cedillo, the absolute boss of the State of San Luis Potosí and the commander of a personal army of loyal followers in that state. Cárdenas moved against Cedillo with caution. He kept him in his cabinet as Secretary of Agriculture as long as possible.

Meanwhile he armed large numbers of peasants and trade-unionists in San Luis Potosí who were friendly to the President rather than to the boss of the state. At the same time he quietly moved elements of the regular Federal Army into the state under commanders who were responsible to Mexico City and not to the state capital. Finally, when Cedillo was forced into open rebellion early in 1938, it was a comparatively easy thing for Cárdenas to take the field himself at the head of the Federal troops, aided by the workers' and peasants' militia and to force Cedillo's flight into the hills, where he was soon afterward killed by one of his own men.

However, Cárdenas was not carrying out these actions merely to establish his own personal power or even to establish the power of the Federal government over that of the states or over the Army. Rather, he was acting to assure the success of the social and economic program he had launched soon after taking office. Cárdenas was determined to push toward completion the work of dividing up the land in accordance with the agrarian reform program of the Mexican Revolution. Immediately upon taking power he speeded up the process of expropriating land, and during his six years in office twice as much land was turned over to the peasants as had been given to them in the twenty-four years before he became president.

Some of Cárdenas' applications of the agrarian reform law were spectacular. For instance, he restored lands to the Yaquis, an Indian tribe in the northwestern State of Sonora who had been despoiled over and over again by preceding regimes. Under Díaz the Yaquis had risen in revolt against their oppressors, and after their defeat had been deported en masse to the far-off State of Yucatán in the extreme southeastern part of the republic. In the succeeding decades a sizable proportion of them had drifted back to their original homeland, but they remained without land until President Cárdenas finally restored their traditional holdings to them.

Another case was that of the Laguna region, at the time the country's largest cotton-growing area. There the land of a dried-up lake was very fertile, but it had to be irrigated. Over the years it had come into the hands of a number of large companies and landholding families, many of them foreigners. The workers on these lands lived in great poverty, and the owners, living in Mexico City or abroad, drained virtually all the income from the region.

Early in the Cárdenas administration the agricultural workers in the Laguna area began to organize into peasant unions. They met bitter resistance from the landowners and their straw bosses, and finally the workers went out on strike in 1936. After this walkout had gone on for some time, General Cárdenas suddenly settled the problem by expropriating the land and decreeing that it should be turned over to the farm workers. Shortly afterward he personally visited the region, and in conferences with leaders of the local agricultural laborers worked out the framework for the establishment of a communal agricultural experiment which has been one of the most interesting developments in recent Mexican history.

Cárdenas by no means completed the agrarian reform in Mexico. Indeed, it is still going on. However, by the end of his administration approximately a third of the population of Mexico had received land under the program. About 51 per cent of the rural population consisted of members of the *ejidos* established by the agrarian reform, and they had approximately 47 per cent of all land used for crops in all of Mexico.

Not only did Cárdenas greatly speed up the process of distributing land, but he made two fundamental alterations in the program. First, in 1935 he decreed that landless villages included within the boundaries of existing plantations which had not previously been eligible to receive land could ask for and be given it.

In the second place, he ended for the time being the somewhat schizophrenic attitude of the agrarian reformers concerning the way in which the land given to the peasants should be organized. One group had favored giving land outright to the peasants as their personal property. Others felt that the land should be given only to the local community and, although granted by the community to individuals for their use, should be inalienable, that is, not subject to sale, barter, or mortgage. Cárdenas sided with the latter group, and virtually all the land distributed by him was given to the communal groups known as *ejidos*. In some cases, as in the Laguna cotton-growing region, Cárdenas encouraged actual cultivation by the community as a group rather than by the individuals who received use title to the land from the *ejido*.

The extensive application of the agrarian reform program by the Cárdenas administration brought foreign conflicts, because much

of the land taken by the government had been owned by nationals of other countries, particularly the United States. Cárdenas and the Mexican government maintained that under the Constitution of 1917 and the agrarian reform laws the Mexican government had every right to take over these lands, which in many cases were being held illegally by their foreign owners. This position of Cárdenas was upheld by the Roosevelt administration in the United States, which requested only that the Americans involved be reasonably and justly compensated for the lands which were taken away from them.

Cárdenas also fulfilled his promises to strengthen the organized-labor movement. During the six years before Cárdenas' assumption of power the trade unions had been in a chaotic situation. The Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), which had been exceedingly powerful and had been favored by the administrations of Generals Obregón and Calles, was riven by bitter and violent internecine struggles. When Cárdenas was inaugurated the trade-union movement was divided into at least half a dozen different central labor bodies, each of which was more concerned with fighting its rivals than with dealing with the employers. The administrations preceding Cárdenas had encouraged rather than discouraged this disunity among the organized workers.

Cárdenas took steps to end this situation. He encouraged Vicente Lombardo Toledano, onetime official of the CROM and in 1935 head of his own trade-union group, to take the leadership in the reestablishment of a single large central labor federation. As a result of his efforts and of Cárdenas' support Lombardo Toledano was successful in bringing together most of the existing labor groups to form a new organization, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM).

The CTM became one of the bulwarks of the Cárdenas regime. Not only did it bring together once again most of the unions in an organization closely associated with the government, it likewise became an integral part of the government political party when President Cárdenas reorganized that group. Finally, the members of the CTM were provided with arms, thus giving an additional military bulwark in case the President had trouble with the official armed forces.

President Cárdenas aided Mexican labor to achieve an important position in the Latin American labor movement, and in the world

labor movement. In September, 1938, the CTM played host to a congress of Latin American trade unions which established the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), of which Lombardo Toledano became president. The funds for this meeting were undoubtedly supplied by the Cárdenas government, which was anxious at that moment, because of the international crisis over the expropriation of the oil industry, to rally as much hemispheric support for its position as it could muster. In addition to the Latin American delegates attending the meeting there were numerous fraternal representatives, including John L. Lewis of the Congress of Industrial Organizations of the United States, Léon Jouhaux of the French Confédération Générale du Travail, and Ramón González Peña of the Spanish Unión General de Trabajadores, as well as observers from the International Federation of Trade Unions and the International Labor Organization.

Although the CTAL became a purely Communist organization during the war and postwar years and the CTM withdrew from it in 1948, it began as a coalition of virtually all labor forces in the hemisphere. Unions under Socialist, Aprista, Liberal, and Communist influence were represented in the Mexico City Congress and became members of the CTAL during its first years. This founding convention of the CTAL was undoubtedly a feather in the caps of both the Mexican labor movement and the Cárdenas government.

The agrarian and labor policies of Cárdenas aroused the strong opposition of ex-President Calles and those closely associated with him. Calles began making speeches and writing articles warning the President of the "danger" of the policy which he was following. Cárdenas bided his time, did nothing until he was sure that the control of the Army and the government was safely in his own hands. Then one day, early in the morning, ex-President Calles and Luis Morones, head of the old CROM and one of Calles' chief political lieutenants, were placed on an airplane and sent off to Los Angeles, California. Calles never returned alive from exile, though Morones came back a few years later to head the CROM once more.

Meanwhile Cárdenas was following a policy of Mexican nationalism. The Revolution from the beginning had had a nationalist tinge. It had sought to make the Indian and mestizo masses effective members of the nation, and it had asserted the rights of Mexico and

the Mexicans in relation to foreign residents and foreign interests in Mexico, and in relation to foreign governments.

Cárdenas pushed this aspect of the program of the Revolution with vigor. Not only did he insist on expropriating land which belonged to foreigners, but he also carried out policies which transferred other important parts of the national economy from the hands of aliens to those of Mexicans.

His first move in this direction was the expropriation of the National Railways of Mexico, which had been owned largely by foreign interests. At first he experimented with turning the railway over to the Railroad Workers Union. However, within a few months it became obvious that the leaders of the union were totally unequipped to handle this job, and the government took over the road, establishing an autonomous corporation to run it. The executive body of the corporation contained representatives of the workers but was not controlled by them.

From 1936 to March, 1938, there had been a long-drawn-out labor dispute in the oil industry, which was largely owned by British and United States firms. This dispute had dragged through the Mexican courts, and finally the position of the workers had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Mexico. In paid advertisements in the newspapers the foreign companies then announced that they did not feel themselves bound by this decision and did not intend to carry out its provisions. They reportedly took this position as the result of recommendations of an ex-president of Mexico who was then their lawyer, and obviously neither they nor he expected President Cárdenas' next move.

In the face of the defiance of the foreign oil companies Cárdenas called a meeting in the National Palace of high government officials and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, then head of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico. In the presence of this group President Cárdenas signed a decree expropriating the country's oil industry and turning it over to the workers. He invited the CTM to draw up the details of this labor administration of the industry. Within a few days their plan was ready, and it was soon afterward put into execution. However, the oil workers proved as incapable of conducting the affairs of a major industry as the railroad workers. Before the end of the Cárdenas administration the petroleum industry

had been reorganized as an autonomous government corporation, *Petróleos Mexicanos*, the top officials of which were appointed by the President.

The expropriation of the oil industry caused considerable difficulties for the Mexican government abroad. The British, whose interests in Mexican petroleum had been the largest, broke off diplomatic relations over the issue. The United States government, while recognizing the right of Mexico to expropriate the industry, insisted that the oil companies receive "fair" compensation, and the issue of how much the companies should actually receive was not finally settled until near the end of World War II. Meanwhile the United States and British oil companies were sufficiently powerful to force firms producing oil field and refinery equipment to refuse to sell anything to *Petróleos Mexicanos*. This boycott ended only with the settlement of the compensation issue in the middle 1940's.

In addition to changing the structure of the country's agriculture and asserting the right of the nation to control its own economic life President Cárdenas took steps toward strengthening and diversifying the economy. The agrarian reform itself put significant amounts of purchasing power in the hands of large numbers of peasants for the first time and thus greatly enlarged the national market.

The Cárdenas administration amplified the nation's banking system. The Banco de Mexico was converted into a true central bank and was given more extensive powers to regulate the private banking institutions. At the same time Cárdenas began the policy of channeling the bank's resources toward economic development.

Besides, he added two significant institutions to the national banking system. One was the Banco Ejidal, designed to meet the credit needs of the agrarian communities created by the agrarian reform. Although it first tried to service virtually all the *ejidos*, in later years it devoted its efforts to offering credit only to the most efficient and economical of the communities. The second new bank was the Nacional Financiera, a government institution set up to encourage industrialization. It undertook to make credit available to those who wished to establish new manufacturing enterprises or to enlarge old ones. It has played an important role in the rapid process of industrialization which has taken place during the past two decades or so.

The Cárdenas government took some important steps toward the democratization of Mexican political life. Under Cárdenas' administration Mexico became the refuge of political exiles from all over the world. There was the widest degree of freedom of speech and a general observance also of the freedom of organization.

At the same time the government party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, which had been founded by ex-President Calles in 1928, was reorganized to make it more fully representative of the elements backing the Mexican Revolution. Instead of membership on an individual basis, consisting mainly of government employees and aspiring politicians, the party adopted a collegiate form of organization, with three affiliated groups belonging directly to it. First was the so-called Labor Bloc, which consisted of all those central labor groups and individual unions allied with the government, but of which the CTM was the principal base.

The second group to be a component part of the party, now rechristened the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM), was the National Peasants Confederation. This organization, made up of federations of the *ejido* communities established by the agrarian reform and of unions of agricultural laborers, was set up with the help and encouragement of President Cárdenas. Its purposes were to give the peasants a more adequate instrument for defense of their rights and to rally the peasantry behind the revolutionary regime.

The third element making up the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano was the so-called "Bloc of Popular Organizations," which consisted of the Government Employees Federation and of groups of business and professional men who were supporters of the administration. It also included a strong women's organization which came to play an increasingly important part. Although in the beginning the popular Bloc was the least effective of the three wings of the PRM, in later years it became the most representative and influential of the three segments of the party, and by the late 1950's was undoubtedly the most powerful of the three groups.

At the time Cárdenas reorganized the party he included the Army as its fourth component part. However, during the administration of his successor, General Avila Camacho, the Army sector was abolished, and since that time the active military men have stayed in the background in Mexican politics.

It was during the Cárdenas administration that the complicated process of give-and-take which constitutes Mexico's essay in democracy took more or less its present shape. Neither Cardenas nor his successors have suppressed parties opposed to that of the government, and there have been several of these with more or less long lives, including the Partido Acción Nacional, a right-wing opponent of the regime; the Communist Party; the Workers and Peasants Party (a dissident Communist group); and the semi-Communist Partido Popular, organized by Vicente Lombardo Toledano in 1947. These parties carry on a more or less active day-to-day existence, run candidates in elections, and conduct an active and constant propaganda campaign against the administration.

In addition to these opposition groups there arose in the presidential elections of 1940, 1946, and 1952 dissidents from the government party which, in fact, offered the major opposition to the government's nominees for office. These groups, too, carried on exceedingly violent campaigns against the administration and its party, and upon two occasions, 1940 and 1952, threatened revolutionary action if they were defeated at the polls, but they failed in both cases to make their threats effective.

In spite of the numerous opposition groups there has never been any doubt in any election as to who would win. It is probably true that the government nominee would have won easily, with the possible exception of the 1940 poll, even if the government had done nothing to interfere with the choice of the voters. However, to be doubly sure, the administration in each case has "controlled" the election. Frank Tannenbaum has indicated the nature of this control. He says:

. . . the outcome of the election is never in doubt. The opposition candidates, in spite of an active campaign, have no expectation of being elected. They know that their people will not be permitted to vote; that if they do vote, their votes will not be counted; that if counted and sent into the final test in Congress, they will be disregarded; and, finally, that if elected by some strange accident, they could not govern. . . .⁹

Although this passage is a closer description of the situation in the 1920's and early 1930's than in later periods, it is still near

enough to the truth to constitute one side of the picture. It should be noted, however, that beginning in the Cárdenas administration, opposition parties were conceded victories in congressional elections in areas where their strength tended to be overwhelming.

In spite of the assured victories of the government party in Mexican elections, the situation during and since the Cárdenas administration has been considerably more democratic than would at first appear to be the case. The fact is that the important contests, over both issues and officeholders, take place within the government party.

The process of reaching a decision, whether it be a matter of legislation or government policy or the election of a new president, is a complicated one. The initiative may be taken by any of the three elements which constitute the government party—known since the middle 1940's as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional—or by a government official or other important figure in or around the regime. A measure or a candidacy then undergoes wide discussion, and a consensus is usually reached among the various elements which make up the government coalition before the president, whose word is final, makes the decision.

Many elements in the population participate in this process of decision making. They include the country's principal labor organizations, the leading peasant organizations, particularly the National Peasants Confederation, the powerful Government Employees Federation, the Army, the Bloc of Popular Organizations, and the ex-presidents. On important issues concerning economic policy there is usually consultation with the official organizations representing the industrialists, the leading merchants, and professional people. Each of these groups is in a position to make its voice heard and its weight felt. In recent years even the Church has been consulted informally on issues in which it has a vital interest.

Thus there is a wider degree of democracy than might appear at first glance. Since the days of Cárdenas, although the president has had the final word on most matters, the government of Mexico has not been authoritarian nor, in any sense, a one-man regime. The power of the official party and of the various interest groups which make it up—and by the late 1950's these included virtually every important element except the Catholic Church—has grown steadily.

As a result the individual power of the president has diminished.¹⁰

In December, 1940, when his term of office came to an end, Lázaro Cárdenas retired from the presidency, giving way to his friend and elected successor General Manuel Avila Camacho. However, Cárdenas did not as a result disappear from the national scene. He remained for long the single most important figure in Mexican political life, with probably more actual influence than the president himself.

Cárdenas' continued influence is explained by many factors. First, he was idolized by the peasants, among whom his name was linked with that of Benito Juárez, the great Indian president of Mexico in the middle of the nineteenth century, and Emiliano Zapata, the apostle of the agrarian reform in the early days of the Mexican Revolution. Cárdenas, they felt, was the man responsible for giving them the land.

The workers, too, were dedicated to him, since he had helped to rebuild the labor movement of Mexico. However, with the decline of the influence of Vicente Lombardo Toledano in the trade unions the influence of Cárdenas also tended to decline.

Cárdenas' grip on the loyalty of the officers and men of the Army continued long after he ceased to be president. He had built up a leadership in the Army which owed its position to him, and the officers continued to feel that their destinies were linked to his for a long time after he ceased to be their commander in chief.

Cárdenas' strongest link with the people probably came from his widespread acquaintance with ordinary citizens. Throughout his administration he had continued the practice which he had established during his election campaign of traveling far and wide across the nation. Many a humble peasant had had the honor of sharing his simple meal with the President. Many a minor trade-union official or rank-and-filer had discussed his personal problems and those of his organization with Cárdenas. He had the successful politician's gift for remembering names and faces, and there were men in all ranks of life in all parts of the republic who regarded him as their personal friend or at least as their acquaintance. It was many years before the importance of this personal contact of Cárdenas with the people of Mexico began to diminish.

With the entry of Mexico into World War II, a little more than

a year after his exit from the presidency, Cárdenas was summoned back into service by President Avila Camacho as Minister of Defense, a post which he held for the duration of the conflict. Although he was again in the public eye in his new post, Cárdenas tried to remain as much as possible in the background to allow his successor the freest opportunity to exercise his authority.

As Minister of War, Cárdenas improved the caliber of the nation's armed forces. He cooperated fully with the United States and Mexico's other allies, and, with his approval and encouragement, Mexico became the only Latin American country to participate actively in the war in the Pacific. A Mexican air-force group played its part in the Philippine Islands campaign.

After the war Cárdenas resigned as Minister of Defense. Though he did not again hold public office, he continued to be a power behind the scenes in Mexican politics. He issued somewhat oracular statements to the press, and he was consulted by the President concerning matters of great importance.

As the end of the term of President Miguel Alemán approached in the early 1950's the question arose for the first time in several decades of the possible reelection of the President. The old labor leader Luis Morones raised the issue two years before the expiration of Alemán's term, and there were rumors that the chief executive was not entirely unreceptive to the idea.

There is no doubt that Cárdenas was consulted not only about the possibility of reelection but also about the general problem of the succession. There is a story, probably apocryphal, of a meeting between Cárdenas and President Alemán. The President did most of the talking, explaining to Cárdenas the things which he had accomplished so far in his administration, the things he still had left to do, and the fact that he was afraid that he would not be able to accomplish his whole task before his term was up. He ended by asking Cárdenas what he thought of the idea of his running for reelection. The ex-President is supposed to have replied somewhat along these lines: "Well, Señor Presidente, if we are going to violate the constitution, I think perhaps that I shall run for the presidency again." This comment, the story goes, ended any further discussion of Alemán's reelection. The incumbent knew too well that if there

were to be a contest between himself and Cárdenas, the latter would win without any difficulty.

Whether or not this incident actually occurred, it is certain that Cárdenas counseled Alemán about the need for the selection of a successor of a different type from Alemán and from outside his special circle of friends. Although the Alemán administration had accomplished a great deal, particularly in the field of irrigation, electric power production, and public works, it had been particularly marred by scandals and corruption. There was a rising discontent against the administration by the time its term of office was drawing to a close, and there was even some fear of violence if the Alemán group continued in power even without Alemán as the leading figure.

Cárdenas is widely reputed to have personally suggested the choice of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines as Alemán's successor. Ruiz Cortines was a lifelong government official, a man of modest demeanor and unquestioned honesty. It was jocularly said of him that he "had no brothers," a reference to the fact that in past administrations the most outrageous graft had generally been attributed to the closest relatives of the chief executive. Cárdenas and others believed that Ruiz Cortines would be able to limit considerably, even if he could not completely eliminate, the corruption which had become so widespread and was threatening to endanger the Mexican Revolution itself.

Ruiz Cortines' principal opponent was General Heriberto Henríquez, an old comrade-in-arms of Cárdenas and his onetime cabinet minister. Henríquez claimed the backing of the ex-President. However, since Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a third nominee, also claimed the support of Cárdenas, little popular credence was given to either claim. Cárdenas himself said nothing. Ruiz Cortines won the usual easy victory which is reserved for government-backed nominees in Mexico.

During the early part of the Ruiz Cortines administration Lázaro Cárdenas became involved in a public controversy over the country's agrarian policy. There were many, including old-time supporters of the agrarian reform, who felt that the country had outgrown the reform, at least on the basis in which it had reached

maturity during the Cárdenas administration. According to these people, Mexican agriculture was lagging very much behind the development of industry. The agrarian reform, they argued, had contributed to a division of important agricultural areas into excessively small plots from which their occupants could not draw a sufficiently large income to provide them with adequate purchasing power. This was not only holding down their ability to buy but was also limiting the market for manufacturing industries, thus hampering the growth of the nation's economy.

These people argued that the principal rural problem was no longer the large hacienda but rather increasing the country's productivity. They cited figures to show that the productivity of the *ejido* was far below that of the average small individual landholding. Therefore, they argued, the *ejido*, with its embargo on the sale and mortgaging of land, should give way to the individual peasant landholding. This would permit the more efficient members of the *ejido* to buy out their less efficient neighbors, thus creating larger and more productive units of cultivation. Rural income would be higher, and production would be greater, thus stimulating the urban economy through a larger rural market and through lower agricultural prices and more diversified production. Although they did not feel it likely that the old hacienda destroyed by the agrarian reform would make its reappearance, they urged that, to protect the nation against that eventuality, a top limit should be set to the size of all farms.

There were those who strongly opposed this point of view and who supported the *ejido*. They had various explanations for the lower productivity of the *ejido* but argued that this was not the most important feature of the situation. Rather, they maintained, it was the fact that the *ejido* form gave the peasant protection against possible despoilment at the hands of avaricious moneylenders and land grabbers.

This controversy went on for many months, in scholarly journals, the daily press, and in public lectures and discussions. It was finally brought to a halt, at least for the time being, by a statement from ex-President Cárdenas to the effect that he was unalterably opposed to any move to abolish or reduce the importance of the *ejido*, that it was the core of the agrarian reform program, which

itself was the heart of the Mexican Revolution. His words were sufficient to decide the situation for a while at least.

This incident reflects the still decisive influence of Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexican public affairs in the early 1950's. It also reflects his continued adherence to the philosophy and program which he had put into effect a decade and a half before. There are those who argue that it also indicates the general's failure to keep up with the fast-changing pattern of Mexico's economic, social, and political life.

Cárdenas' influence in Mexican public life continued to be great, but there were many among his old followers who were puzzled and disappointed by his attitude toward world affairs. Although during his presidency Cárdenas had given the Mexican Communists full freedom to function, as he had to every other political group, he had by no means been a pro-Communist. He had greatly agitated the Stalinists by giving refuge to Trotsky in 1937. He had clamped down on the Communists when they openly favored the Axis during the first phase of World War II.

Nevertheless, during the late 1940's and thereafter Cárdenas on several occasions allowed his name to be used in campaigns by the Communists. He signed several of the "peace petitions" circulated by the international Communist movement. He figured as a member of the executive of the World Peace Council, which was under their leadership and control. He accepted the Stalin Peace Prize. In 1958 he made an extensive tour of both the Soviet Union and China. Early in 1961 he presided over a Communist-organized "peace" conference held in Mexico City.

Lázaro Cárdenas had certainly not become a Communist. Perhaps only he himself knows why he had been willing to allow himself to be used by the Communist movement on a world scale. One possible explanation is that always, as a Mexican nationalist, he has been fundamentally antagonistic to the predominant influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly to its very great influence in his own country's affairs. In his later years, as he retreated further and further from actual exercise of power and responsibility, he perhaps has felt that he can give vent to his antagonism toward the United States by giving at least some aid and comfort to its enemies. Or perhaps, in spite of his wiliness and ability in Mexican politics, he has remained somewhat naïve concerning

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political trends in the outside world and has really been convinced that the Communists were working for peace and their opponents for war.

Approaching his seventies, Lázaro Cárdenas remains the Grand Old Man of the Mexican Revolution. He played a key role in pushing to fruition the program of fundamental social change which that Revolution stood for. He won the confidence and love of the average Mexican citizen to a degree unmatched by any other leading Mexican political figure in the century. He continues to symbolize the Mexican Revolution.

Arturo Alessandri, the Lion of Tarapacá



The atmosphere in the neoclassical Congress building in Santiago, Chile, on September 8, 1924, was tense. The galleries of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were filled with members of the armed forces. The legislators were faced with a long list of bills which the President had sent to them for immediate action. The urgency of their passage was emphasized by the visitors who were watching Congress at work. There was little discussion of the laws which were passed that day. No sooner was a bill read by the clerk in one house than it was immediately adopted and sent to the other house for approval. Only one legislator, Senator Pedro León Ugalde dared to challenge his colleagues' untoward behavior. He delivered a ringing speech denouncing the military men in the galleries and excoriating with almost equal fervor his fellow legislators who were so busily engaged in doing the soldiers' bidding.

It was in this atmosphere that the legislation which forms the basis of the famous Chilean Labor Code was passed. The man, however, who was most responsible for this legislation was not present in Congress. He waited a few blocks away in the old Spanish mint, which has been the traditional office of Chile's presidents, for news that Congress had acted upon the legislation which he had promised leaders of the Army and Navy as the price for their "returning to the barracks." Congress kept the President's side of the bargain. The military men did not keep theirs. A few days later Arturo Alessandri resigned the presidency.

It was indeed ironic that the labor and social laws which Alessandri had been advocating since he became president almost four years before, but had never been able to get Congress to pass, should have been enacted as a prelude to his ouster from the presidency. However, had it not been for these circumstances, perhaps Arturo

Alessandri would not have figured in Chilean history as the founder of his country's position of leadership in social legislation throughout the hemisphere.

The military men who forced through the basic elements of the Labor Code on September 8, 1924, and a few days later brought about Alessandri's resignation really had little interest in social problems. Their concern was that they were, they considered, underpaid and sometimes not paid at all. They had begun their mutiny a few days before September 8 with a demonstration in the congressional galleries during a discussion of a proposal to raise Congressmen's salaries, a measure the soldiers resented because of their own grievances. When Alessandri sought to rebuke the demonstrators, the chiefs of the Army and Navy expressed their solidarity with them, and the country faced a constitutional crisis.

President Alessandri finally asked the military chiefs what their price was to remove themselves once again from politics. Their reply, much to everyone's surprise, was a long list of proposed laws, including legislation which Alessandri had been urging for years, to which was appended a bill raising the pay of all army and navy personnel. The young officers who drew up the demands felt that it would be indecent to appear to be seeking only the improvement of their own conditions, hence their sudden interest in social problems.

The drama of September 8, 1924, was merely the culmination of a series of crises which the country had faced since the election of Arturo Alessandri as president in 1920. His triumph had meant a veritable revolution in the country's affairs. It meant the transfer of political power from the landed aristocracy to the middle and working classes of the cities. It meant the beginning of a process of transforming Chile from an aristocratic democracy reminiscent of Great Britain before the Reform Bill of 1830 into a modern democracy in which the common people of the urban areas have the last word.

Soon after the achievement of independence, political power in Chile had been consolidated in the hands of the rural aristocracy. Thereafter Chilean politics was marked by a stability virtually unequaled anywhere else in Latin America. The Constitution written in 1833 remained in force for almost a century. Although there were

several attempted revolutions between 1833 and 1924, only one succeeded—that against President José Manuel Balmaceda in 1891. Virtually all the presidents, most of the cabinet ministers, and the majority of the members of Congress during this period were drawn from the aristocratic families in whose hands effective power lay.

During the three decades between the revolution against Balmaceda in 1891 and the election of Alessandri in 1920 Chile had experimented with a form of parliamentary government reminiscent of France of the Third and Fourth Republics. Parties became numerous and splintered, cabinets stayed in office for only a few weeks or months at most, coalitions were made and broken rapidly and easily among the contending groups.

Alberto Edwards has written in *La Fronda Aristocrática* that this long period of parliamentary rule was a logical consequence of aristocratic control, that the landed oligarchy feared a strong president because he might do something to disturb the *status quo*. It was this fear which motivated the revolution against Balmaceda and which led to the establishment of the total sovereignty of parliament.

Sharing political power with the landlords were certain political bosses in some of the urban areas. These bosses were particularly strong in the mining areas, where they worked closely with the mineowners to prevent the mine workers from "getting out of line." When the need arose, the local bosses had the help of the national government in the form of extra police and even soldiers.

But there were economic and social forces at work which were undermining the ruling aristocracy and the political system which they supported. As a result of the War of the Pacific of 1879 Chile had seized the nitrate-rich provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacá from Bolivia and Peru. The intensive exploitation of the nitrate resources in those provinces had quickened the pace of the whole Chilean economy. The country's foreign trade increased, the cities grew rapidly, industry expanded, and the urban working class grew in numbers and militancy.

During the 1880's and 1890's the first serious organized-labor movement began among the artisans of the cities. In the years before World War I the workers of the nitrate and coal fields were partially and sporadically organized, and fought against their em-

ployers and the government momentous battles in which hundreds of workers were killed.

World War I stimulated both the country's economic development and the labor movement. Inability to obtain needed manufactured goods from the warring countries of Europe stimulated Chilean industry, particularly the production of textiles, metals, and consumer goods. At the same time, wartime inflation encouraged the labor movement and made it possible for the unions to achieve greater gains than ever before. A militant central labor organization, the *Federación Obrera de Chile*, including most of the country's organized workers, came into existence. In the maritime trades most workers were brought into a Chilean version of the Industrial Workers of the World.

The *Partido Socialista Obrero* became the spokesman in politics for part of the labor movement, particularly for the nitrate miners. The older *Partido Democrático* represented the coal miners and many of the city artisans. The *Partido Radical* came increasingly to speak for the growing white-collar middle class.

The middle and working classes were becoming increasingly restive against the rule of the rural aristocracy and its city allies, the political bosses. The first showdown between the two occurred in the northern city of Iquique in the province of Tarapacá in a senatorial election in the year 1915. Iquique had long been the personal fief of Senator Arturo del Río. In 1915 the forces of the left, representing the country's middle- and working-class groups, resolved to defeat Senator del Río for reelection. They named as their candidate a deputy belonging to a faction of the Liberal Party, Arturo Alessandri. In a hard-fought campaign marked by violence Alessandri was the victor. It was from that campaign that he acquired the nickname "the Lion of Tarapacá," a sobriquet which he did his best to live up to during the rest of his life.

A much more crucial struggle occurred four years later, during the presidential campaign. The lines were sharply drawn. On the one side, behind the candidacy of Luis Barros Borgoño, one of the country's most distinguished political leaders, stood all the forces representing the *ancien régime* united under the banner of the National Union. The aristocracy knew that it was playing for keeps, and all its forces were mustered to elect the National Union candidate.

In the other camp were all the political and social forces which had been coming to the fore during previous decades. These were marshaled in the Liberal Alliance, which consisted of one faction of the Liberals, the Radical and Democratic parties, and several smaller groups. The Alliance had only the tacit support of the Partido Socialista Obrero. The nominee of the Liberal Alliance was Arturo Alessandri.

Alessandri was by this time one of the most spectacular figures in Chilean political life. The grandson of an Italian immigrant who had come to Chile with a group of entertainers but had remained to become the Kingdom of Italy's first accredited diplomatic representative to Chile, and the son of a man who had become a gentleman farmer and had developed connections with the local aristocracy, Alessandri was a man of very complex personality. He was capable of arousing the strongest loyalty and the most violent hatred. He was extremely ambitious and was vain sometimes to the point of absurdity. He was an extraordinary orator, capable of arousing his listeners to frenzied enthusiasm. He also had the reputation of being an extremely shrewd political schemer.

Alberto Edwards has described in *La Fronda Aristocrática* (p. 24) the contradictory nature of Arturo Alessandri's personality and behavior:

. . . No one was more sincerely oligarchical than he while he was enveloped in the atmosphere of the drawing rooms of the Lazcanos and the Fernández Conchas. No one was more "popular" than he, when leaving one environment which was perhaps not the most adequate for his temperament and attitude, and entering another where he found himself surrounded by men of the Left, in the midst of the provincial middle class which was impatient to throw off the yoke, fervently applauded by the workers of the nitrate fields. His sensitive and impulsive soul was engulfed in the spirit which was revolutionary without realizing it; his heated eloquence was nothing more than a reflection of the aspirations and passions which slept beneath the apparent peace of the Republic. A breeze of renovation and of protest then began to blow from the arid pampas of the Northern desert; and the name of the tribune whose words of fire had produced this sudden awakening of a sleeping people became extraordinarily popular throughout the country. . . .

Alessandri was certainly no novice in politics. His initiation had taken place during the Revolution of 1891, when he had participated

in street demonstrations and the distribution of subversive leaflets against President Balmaceda, an activity of which he was later ashamed and for which he never tired of apologizing. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a member of the Liberal Party, while in his twenties, and he became the youngest man in the country's history to hold a post in the cabinet. He remained in the Chamber of Deputies until his elevation to the Senate in 1916 and served in several ministries.

The Liberal Alliance candidate brought all his oratorical talents to bear in the 1920 election campaign. He stumped the country, receiving a tumultuous reception from workers and middle-class audiences throughout the nation. In his speeches he put forward suggestions for widespread economic and social reforms.

Alessandri himself summed up the program which he put forward during the election campaign of 1920 under eighteen headings. These added up to a veritable social revolution. They included proposals for revising the constitution to put an end to the system of parliamentary government. They included a revision of the tax system to establish an income tax and "other taxes to improve the financial life of the country. . . ." They demanded protection and assistance for agriculture, mining, industry, and the merchant marine.

The heart of the Alessandri program, according to Don Arturo himself, was "to make the utmost efforts to establish a complete system of social legislation which regulates the relations between capital and labor, recognizing the rights and duties of both elements of production. . . ." Other labor points which Alessandri urged during his campaign included the establishment of "regulations which will provide for the remuneration of labor so as to satisfy the minimum physical and moral needs of the workers and leave a margin for honest recreation," the launching of a government housing program, and the establishment of a Ministry of Labor and Social Security.¹

Alessandri's enemies have questioned the honesty of his concern for social problems and the welfare of the country's poorer and more defenseless citizens. The famous historian Ricardo Donoso has summed up his assessment of Alessandri's career in the title of his biography of Don Arturo, *Alessandri: Agitador y Demoledor*

(*Alessandri: Agitator and Demolisher*), and gives him little credit for sincerity about anything except his own ambitions. Others have pictured him as a paladin of the humble, dedicating his life to righting wrongs regardless of what it cost him politically. Such a position is represented by another biographer of Alessandri, Luis Duran, in his work *Don Arturo*.

The author feels that the truth lies, as usual, somewhere between these two extremes. It seems to us that he was aware of his role as a man who was to be instrumental in bringing a new, more democratic and more social Chile into existence. He was sincere in his desire to right many of the wrongs which the workers and agricultural laborers were facing. However, he was even more sincere in his belief in his own destiny and in his yearning for power and, in his later years, for a great place in his country's history. Not infrequently his ambition was more important to him than his convictions concerning social and economic problems. He was also a born schemer and political manipulator. As a result, several times during his career he committed acts, some of them truly outrageous, which a man less driven by a belief in his own destiny and his own rectitude would have tried to avoid. We shall note some of these acts later in this chapter.

The election of 1920 was one of the most closely contested in the country's history. The results were so uncertain that a "Tribunal of Honor" was set up by Congress to study the returns and make the final decision. The tribunal finally decided in favor of Arturo Alessandri, and this decision was ratified by Congress. Ever since, a dispute has raged over whether or not Alessandri really had a majority of the popular vote.

The significance of the victory of Arturo Alessandri in 1920 has been summarized by Alberto Edwards in *La Fronda Aristocrática* (p. 240):

. . . The crisis of 1920 was not a simple electoral problem, as many still imagine even today. Something deeper and more fundamental had ceased to exist: the passive obedience of the masses of the country to the old oligarchic circles. As a result, the political form which characterized that sentiment of submission could not continue to exist.

It was not, then, the ambitions or jealousies of this or that politician which brought about what occurred. The Unión Nacional, in sub-

mitting the election results to a Tribunal of Honor only recognized that its apparent victory hid a profound defeat: that a regime had come to an end.

Arturo Alessandri was installed as president of Chile in December, 1920. His first cabinet was headed by Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a prominent leader of the Radical Party, the largest group among those which had backed Alessandri for the presidency. This cabinet lasted only a few months because of the stubborn opposition of conservative elements in Congress and the continuance of the parliamentary system. Throughout the nearly four years of Alessandri's first period in office, cabinets followed one another in quick succession.

Although Alessandri was not able to convince Congress to support his program between 1920 and September, 1924, he did present a number of fundamental projects, the most important of which was the proposal for a labor code. Soon after taking office Alessandri had appointed a young lawyer, Dr. Moisés Poblete Troncoso, to draw up such a code, and on June 2, 1921, Alessandri presented a revised version of Poblete Troncoso's draft to Congress. A year later the proposed law was still unpassed, and the President sent a message to Congress defending the bill in the following terms:

It is an error to attribute exclusively to subversive propaganda of agitators the workers' movements which unfortunately have been perturbing the economic production of the country. They are due to deep causes. We need to enact protective laws which support the proletariat in those cases in which it asks and demands justice. We must raise the intellectual and moral culture of the disinherited classes, through the tenacious and persistent diffusion of learning. It is indispensable to combat alcoholism and the socially important diseases which debilitate the spirit, perturb the criterion and destroy the physical vigor of the race, destroying it as a moral and economic factor. We need to support the proletariat by constructing housing, giving it a minimum wage which will meet personal and family needs, and defend it from those material forces which impel it to do debilitating work superior to its capacities.

It is also indispensable to support the proletariat in those hours of misfortune provoked by accidents, unemployment, illness, old age and also at the same time aid women, and help children who are left orphans.

It is necessary to create tribunals of conciliation and arbitration which, with a criterion of high and egalitarian justice, can resolve conflicts produced by the labor contract between the capitalist and the worker. . . .²

Alessandri was the second chief of state in the hemisphere to propose such a wide scope of labor legislation. President Batlle of Uruguay had preceded him in this, but in some ways the laws provided by Alessandri were more ample than those enacted in Uruguay.

It is interesting, and important, to know the reasons which impelled Arturo Alessandri to take the lead in establishing a system of labor legislation which was to be a model throughout the hemisphere. Undoubtedly the fact that he had had the support of the organized workers during the 1920 election played a role in inducing the President to suggest legislation on their behalf. But there were other factors that influenced his decision. In a conversation with the author on April 3, 1947, Alessandri gave two reasons for his advocacy of the labor code, reasons which appear also in several of his public documents: the really deplorable conditions under which Chilean workers lived and labored; and the fact that Chile was a member of the new International Labor Organization and duty-bound to pass some of the legislation which the ILO had recommended.

As we have noted, the principal elements of the Labor Code were finally enacted into law during the constitutional crisis of September, 1924, and as a result of that crisis Arturo Alessandri decided to resign from the presidency. He sought refuge abroad soon afterward, going to Italy, where he spent the following months.

A military junta composed of General Luis Altamirano, Admiral Francisco Nef, and General Juan Bennett took over from President Alessandri. Behind them, and with the real power in its hands, stood a junta of young officers who during the months that followed grew increasingly discontented with the administration of the government by their three superior officers. This discontent culminated on January 23, 1925, in a new *coup d'état* led by Lieutenant Colonels Carlos Ibáñez and Marmaduke Grove. The new masters of the situation sent a message to Arturo Alessandri ask-

ing him to resume the presidency until the completion of his term in December. This message was seconded by a similar cable from the leaders of the parties which had supported Alessandri. That cable ended with the statement: "Situation entirely favorable."

Arturo Alessandri embarked once more for his native country, arriving in Santiago on March 20. During the next five months the government of Alessandri enacted many projects which profoundly altered the government and influenced the future economy and social system of Chile.

First, Alessandri brought about the establishment of a new national constitution to replace the one which had been in effect since 1833. Soon after his return he named a consultative commission to study the possibility of summoning a constitutional assembly. Subsequently the membership of this commission was considerably enlarged, and Alessandri charged it with drawing up the new constitution. The project prepared by the commission was submitted to a plebiscite on August 30, 1925, and was approved by a majority of 128,381 to 6,040, with less than half the country's registered voters going to the polls.³

The new constitution abolished the system of parliamentary government which had existed since the Revolution of 1891, and established instead a system in which the members of the cabinet were responsible to the president, and their removal by congress was made exceedingly difficult. Other changes were made, with the abolition of the Council of State and provision of election of the president directly by popular vote instead of by electoral college, as previously.

There was strong opposition to what was widely regarded as the imposition of a new constitution by a *de facto* government—since Congress, which had been dissolved at the time of Alessandri's overthrow in September, 1924, was not allowed to reconvene after his return. It is worth noting that this constitution remains in force more than thirty-five years later.

Another major political change brought about by Alessandri during his 1925 government was the separation of Church and State. This was achieved through direct negotiations with top Church officials in Chile and the Vatican. It was achieved without bitterness on either side and is generally recognized as having removed the

issue of Church-State relations as a major factor in the country's politics.

A very important economic development during the period of Alessandri's restoration was the establishment of a central bank. Although the immediate occasion for this was the visit of a mission headed by Professor Edwin Kemmerer of Princeton University and its recommendation that such an institution be established, Alessandri pointed out that he had been a protagonist of the idea of a central bank for more than a decade and had sent messages to Congress urging its organization during the first four years of his administration.⁴

During the five months of his second period in office Alessandri began to put into effect the legislation passed on September 8, 1924. Unions were organized under the provisions of the law providing for their legal recognition. The social security funds for industrial workers and white-collar workers which were provided for in other laws of September 8 were established. This work was carried out under the direction of the Minister of Health and Social Security, José Santos Salas.

On October 1, 1925, Arturo Alessandri again resigned as president of Chile. The crisis which provoked his second resignation centered in the presidential candidacy of his Minister of War, Colonel Carlos Ibáñez. The nomination of Ibáñez brought about the resignation of the other members of Alessandri's cabinet, and Ibáñez then insisted that Alessandri sign no decree and take no other move which was not countersigned by him as the only remaining member of the cabinet. This demand, which Alessandri felt to be insolent, provoked him to quit the executive mansion and go into exile once again.

The political and personal feud between Arturo Alessandri and Carlos Ibáñez was of classic proportions and became a key factor in the life of the republic throughout the next quarter of a century. The feeling of Alessandri toward his opponent was graphically demonstrated by a picture which hung for many years in the waiting room of Arturo Alessandri's apartment off the Plaza de Armas in Santiago. The picture showed Alessandri and his 1925 cabinet at a social function, and Don Arturo had written across the face of it words more or less to this effect: "This picture was taken at

a fiesta at which Colonel Carlos Ibáñez assured Sra. de Alessandri that her husband would be overthrown only over his (Ibáñez') dead body. Two weeks later Colonel Ibáñez overthrew President Alessandri."

Alessandri passed the next six years in exile, principally in Europe. He spent most of his time working for the overthrow of General Ibáñez, who, after a period as Minister of Interior, assumed the presidency in the middle of 1927 and established a dictatorship. Alessandri participated in a number of conspiracies against the Ibáñez regime and helped to raise money for exiled opponents of the dictatorship.

The fall of the dictatorship of Ibáñez in July, 1931, left the country in a state of confusion. It was the middle of the Great Depression, which had had a disastrous impact on Chile. In one year the country's national income had fallen almost 50 per cent as a result of the almost complete cessation of sales of the country's principal exports, nitrates and copper. The dictatorship of Ibáñez had left most of the principal political parties in confusion, and a number of new political groups had arisen, particularly on the left.

Alessandri and all of the other political leaders who had been in exile during the Ibáñez regime returned to Chile and threw themselves into the campaign to elect a successor to Ibáñez. Arturo Alessandri was one of the principal candidates.

Five nominees were finally put forward in the 1931 presidential campaign. Juan Esteban Montero, who had succeeded Ibáñez in the presidency and was very popular for his part in bringing down the dictatorship, was endorsed by the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties and by a new group known as Unión Republicana. Manuel Hidalgo was put forward by a group of new Socialist and dissident Communist groups which had appeared in the wake of Ibáñez' downfall, while Elías Laferte was the nominee of the official Communist Party. Augusto Rivera Parga was named by a Conservative group which considered Montero too much to the left.

Finally, there was Arturo Alessandri. He was named by a so-called Convention of the Left. Although he had only the support of one minor political party, the Partido Democrático, Alessandri was immediately regarded as the principal rival of Juan Esteban

Montero. He pictured himself as a champion of the workers and middle-class people who had supported him in his first campaign for the presidency more than a decade before. The most bitter words of the campaign were exchanged between those in the Montero camp and those in the Alessandri ranks.

The result was a victory for Montero. He received some 183,000 votes, while Alessandri got approximately 100,000. The other three nominees trailed far behind the two leaders in the poll.

The administration of President Juan Esteban Montero was short-lived and turbulent. It was marked by a deepening of the economic crisis and by several attempted insurrections. These included a mutiny of the fleet in November, 1931, and an attempt by civilians to seize army barracks at the northern city of Copiapó on Christmas Day. Neither of these attempted insurrections was successful, but the insurrection on June 4, 1932, was successful. The Montero regime was overthrown and was succeeded by a short-lived "Socialist Republic."

The role of Arturo Alessandri in bringing about the downfall of Montero and the installation of a "Socialist" regime has been the cause of bitter controversy ever since June, 1932. Alessandri himself maintained that his role in these events was that of intermediary between President Montero and the rebels. He defended this assertion in his "rectifications" of a biographical sketch published by Ricardo Donoso.

Donoso himself maintained that Alessandri was one of the prime movers in the revolt. The present writer is inclined to agree with this assertion. In an interview with the author in the Senate Building in Santiago on December 26, 1946, Marmaduke Grove, the first head of the Socialist Republic, asserted that the principal figures in planning the uprising were Grove himself, Eugenio Matte, head of Nueva Acción Política, one of the Socialist parties which had appeared after the fall of Ibáñez, and Arturo Alessandri. They made contact with one another through their common membership in the Masons, of which Matte was the Chilean Grand Master. Later, Carlos Dávila, who had been Ibáñez' ambassador to Washington, was also brought into the conspiracy.

Whatever his original connections with the plot against Montero, Alessandri was given no part in the government of the Socialist Re-

public. A junta was formed, of which Colonel Marmaduque Grove, founder and chief of the Air Force, was the principal figure. It announced a program of nationalization of public utilities, public works, and a variety of other measures, but they had no time to carry out these projects, since Grove was deposed by Carlos Dávila twelve days after the June 4 Revolution. Dávila maintained the Socialist Republic for one hundred days longer, then gave way to a provisional government, which called new elections for president and congress.

Again Arturo Alessandri was a candidate. This time he was supported by his own Liberal Party as well as the Radicals and the Democrats. His principal rival was Marmaduque Grove, who was supported by the various Socialist parties and by most of the organized-labor movement. One faction of the Liberals supported Enrique Zañartu; the Conservative Party named Rodríguez de la Sotta, and Elías Laferte was again named by the Communists. Alessandri was the winner by a strong majority, with Grove coming in second.⁵

The role of Arturo Alessandri during his 1932-38 administration was very different from that in his earlier period in office. Although he had been elected as the nominee of the moderate Left, he swung increasingly to the Right during his administration. The Radicals withdrew from his cabinet, and during most of his government Alessandri relied on the Conservative and Liberal parties for most of his support.

During this administration Alessandri's role was that of the restorer of economic and political stability rather than that of social reformer and advocate of change. He brought about a reorganization of the nitrate industry, encouraged the growth of copper mining, and aided the development of manufacturing. At the same time his administration was faced by serious labor unrest, and although it enacted some new social legislation, the administration's harshness toward the trade-union movement made the second Alessandri government anathema to the workers.

Under Ibáñez the nitrate industry had been organized under a government monopoly. The industry had been in a state of crisis ever since World War I, during which the Germans developed the process of extracting nitrogen from the air. The administration of

this monopoly was inefficient and corrupt, and by the time Alessandri took office late in 1932 there was widespread sentiment in favor of abolishing it. The Alessandri government patronized the reorganization of the industry, with the extraction of the nitrates being put in the hands of three private companies—two owned by the Guggenheim interests, the third an Anglo-Chilean enterprise—with the government merely undertaking the work of selling the product abroad through the newly established Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corporation. A considerable degree of prosperity was restored to the nitrate industry after this reorganization, though it never was able to resume the key position in the Chilean economy which it had enjoyed before World War I.

It was during the Alessandri administration of the 1930's that copper mining took the place of nitrates as the principal source of Chile's foreign exchange. The extraction of copper ore was largely in the hands of the Kennecott and Anaconda companies from the United States.

The Alessandri regime generally enjoyed the support of the country's industrialists, and it took a number of steps to encourage the growth of manufacturing. In March, 1933, a law was passed providing for a sizable general increase in tariff duties. The Alessandri administration also continued and developed a policy which had been started before it took office of using "exchange restrictions, import licenses and quotas and the controls authorized by the so-called law of overproduction" as supplements to the tariff as a protection to industry.⁶

Another project of the Alessandri administration presaged the establishment of the Chilean Development Corporation by Alessandri's successor, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, in 1939. This was the organization in the nitrate provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacá of two *Institutos de Fomento Minero e Industrial* (Institutes of Mineral and Industrial Development), for the rehabilitation of this area of the republic which was particularly hard hit by the effects of the world depression. These institutes, like the later Development Corporation, were authorized to establish new industries or invest in and lend money to old ones.

Carlos Keller, in discussing the evolution of economic ideas and policy in Chile, calls the Alessandri administration of the 1930's the

beginning of "the Socialist Epoch" in Chilean economic history. He notes that in spite of the supposed adherence of the Conservative and Liberal parties to the ideas of free enterprise and economic liberalism, they in fact began the policy of using the resources of the government for aiding and directing the country's economic development and industrialization.⁷

The principal addition to social legislation enacted during the Alessandri administration of the 1930's was the law providing for preventive medicine. This law, which bears the name of its author, Eduardo Cruz Coke, provided for annual health examinations for white-collar workers, and for medical aid and subsidies for any workers found to have any of a number of diseases listed in the law. The law was passed with the blessings of the Alessandri government.

Politically the Alessandri regime of the 1930's restored constitutional government and reestablished the principle that the executive and legislative branches of government are to be chosen at the ballot box and not in the barracks or officers' club. Although Alessandri several times secured "special powers" to deal with political crises, his government was on the balance a democratic one and paved the way, after Alessandri's retirement from the presidency, for a much more rapid evolution of the reform process which Alessandri himself had started in 1920.

Alessandri was faced with a great deal of social and political unrest. There developed during his administration a number of new political groups, at least some of which were to have a very significant impact on the future of the country.

Probably the most important and certainly the most durable political group which appeared during the Alessandri administration was the Socialist Party. This was established by those groups which had supported the Socialist Republic of June 4, 1932, and subsequently had backed Marmaduque Grove as a candidate for the presidency a few months later. From its foundation the Socialist Party was a major force in the country's politics. It controlled the growing trade-union movement and had the support of the majority of the manual workers. By 1938 it was the most important popular party in Chile. The Socialists were bitter enemies of Alessandri during these years.

Another important political party to appear during the Alessandri administration of the 1930's was the Partido Nacista, or Nazi Party

of Chile. It was strongest in the southern part of the country, where the largest number of people of German extraction were to be found. Youth groups of the party roamed the streets of Santiago and other cities as the German Nazis had done before them. There were frequent clashes between these Nazi "storm troopers" and the members of the Youth Federation of the Socialist Party.

The Partido Nacista gained additional influence because of the close association with it of the ex-dictator General Carlos Ibáñez. In the presidential election campaign of 1938 the Nacistas formed the principal force in the groups which named Ibáñez as a candidate. Perhaps this close association of the Nacistas with Alessandri's most bitter enemy serves to explain the bloody nature of the suppression of an attempted revolt by the Nacistas on September 5, 1938, in the midst of the presidential campaign.

A group of young Nazis seized the headquarters of the Industrial Workers Social Security Fund, which was located across the street from the presidential palace. They were attacked by the national police and some army units, and all but a handful of those involved in the revolt were killed by the attackers, most of them after they had surrendered. Alessandri's enemies have maintained that he ordered the cold-blooded execution of most of the Nacistas after they had already surrendered. Alessandri himself always maintained that the military officers in charge of the attack were responsible for this outrage.

The incident of September 5 was decisive in determining the results of the election which occurred a few weeks later. General Ibáñez withdrew from the race and ordered his supporters to back Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the nominee of the Popular Front, who won by a narrow majority.

The Popular Front had unified most of the opponents of Alessandri, including the Radical, Socialist, Radical-Socialist, and Communist parties, a faction of the Democratic Party, and the Confederation of Workers of Chile. In a convention of delegates from all of these groups the Popular Front named a leading figure in the Radical Party, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, as its candidate for the presidency. He was a progressive landowner and vintner who was known among his supporters as "Don Tinto" (*tinto* being the Chilean name for good red wine). Aguirre Cerda was a veteran politician who had

gained particular prominence for his work on behalf of public education. Ironically he had been the first Minister of Interior (virtually prime minister) of Alessandri in 1920-21.

Alessandri did not support Aguirre Cerda. Their paths had drifted far apart in the intervening eighteen years. Alessandri by 1938 was the outstanding leader of the Right; Aguirre Cerda was the standard-bearer of the Left. The influence of the Alessandri administration was thrown behind Gustavo Ross Santa María, who had been a stalwart of Alessandri's administration after 1932 and was the candidate of the Conservative and Liberal parties.

The closeness of the vote in the 1938 presidential election was reminiscent of the situation in 1920. Feelings were violent on both sides. Powerful economic interests feared the results which would flow from the installation of a Popular Front government. There was talk about preventing Aguirre Cerda from taking office, but in a speech before the National Agricultural Society, Alessandri made the following statement:

I, gentlemen, with honest neutrality, will observe the functioning of the constitutional processes, and come what may, I will be responsible before the nation for seeing that the presidency is turned over to whosoever the constitutional processes declare has been elected President of Chile.⁸

Although some of Alessandri's enemies, notably his biographer Ricardo Donoso, have maintained that Alessandri was maneuvering to bring about a cancellation of the results of the election and the extension of his own term of office, the fact remains that Alessandri, chief spokesman for the groups opposed to Pedro Aguirre Cerda, turned over the government in due form to him after his November, 1938, election victory.

During the next five and a half years Arturo Alessandri was out of office, though never out of politics. When Pedro Aguirre Cerda died early in 1942, prompting a new presidential election, Alessandri once again played a key role. The candidates in this poll were Juan Antonio Ríos, backed by the parties which had supported the Aguirre Cerda administration; and General Carlos Ibáñez, backed by the Conservative Party and a faction of the Liberal Party. Alessandri,

declared enemy of Ibáñez, influenced the majority of the Liberal Party to support Rios (whom Alessandri didn't like either but whom he preferred to Ibáñez). Alessandri campaigned actively for Rios and deserved much of the credit for his victory. Rios won by 260,000 votes to the 204,854 received by Ibáñez.⁹

Alessandri himself became a candidate for public office again in the middle of 1944. The death of a Communist senator in an area south of Santiago paved the way for Alessandri's candidacy. He represented the opposition, running against Radical Party member Guillermo del Pedregal, nominee of the parties supporting the Rios government. Alessandri was victorious by a vote of 20,638 to 17,888. In the following year Alessandri was elected president of the Senate, a position he held until his death.

By 1945 Arturo Alessandri was the undisputed leader of the Liberal Party and was the Grand Old Man of Chilean politics. His influence, particularly among elements of the Right, was very considerable, and even many of Don Arturo's old enemies of the Left were tending to look upon him with a rather more tolerant attitude, as was attested in numerous interviews which the author had with them late in 1946 and early in 1947.

In the middle of 1946 Alessandri again played a crucial role in a presidential election. Juan Antonio Rios died early in 1946, again precipitating an election to choose his successor. An attempt was made to form a united front of the Right-wing parties. A convention was held for this purpose, but it failed to reach agreement, and the Conservative Party named Senator Eduardo Cruz Coke, author of the 1938 Preventive Medicine Law. The Liberals named Arturo Alessandri's son, Senator Fernando Alessandri, as its candidate.

During this campaign a story circulated in Santiago which epitomized Arturo Alessandri's continuing ambition and high regard for himself in spite of his advanced age. This tale concerned a meeting of right-wing politicians to discuss the problem of a candidate for president. One of those present suggested Arturo Alessandri Rodríguez, old Don Arturo's eldest son, a distinguished lawyer and long-time head of the Law School of the University of Chile. Another suggested Senator Fernando Alessandri; a third proposed Arturo Matte Larain, Don Arturo's son-in-law. Finally someone mentioned the name of Eduardo Alessandri, a leading member of the Chamber

of Deputies and also a son of old Don Arturo. The old man, who had been listening with some impatience to all this, finally spoke up and asked, "And these sons, have they no father?"

The story is undoubtedly apocryphal, but it indicates the importance which the Alessandri clan occupied in the affairs of the Liberal Party. As a matter of fact, before the Liberals finally named Fernando Alessandri, they tentatively nominated old Don Arturo, who withdrew in favor of his son.

The election was a very close one. In addition to the Conservative and Liberal nominees, Gabriel González Videla, a seasoned Radical politician, was named by the Radicals and Communists, and the Socialist Party nominated the trade-union leader and member of the Chamber of Deputies Bernardo Ibáñez. None of the four candidates got a majority of the popular vote, which meant that the final decision was thrown into the hands of Congress.

Gabriel González Videla had the largest popular vote, but Congress was controlled by the Right. If González was to obtain the presidency, he had to negotiate with elements of the Right. Arturo Alessandri, as spokesman for the Liberals, agreed to throw their votes to González, who in turn agreed to take the Liberals into his cabinet to balance the influence of the Communists, to whom González Videla was also committed to give ministries.

The first cabinet of González Videla lasted from November, 1946, until April, 1947. Early in the latter month municipal elections showed trends which were very disturbing to both the Radical and Liberal parties. The Radicals lost many votes to their Communist partners; the Liberals lost to the Conservatives who were in the opposition.

After the municipal election there was great indecision among the government parties. There were calls from both the Radical and Liberal ranks that their parties withdraw from the cabinet or that the Communists be expelled from it. No decision was made for a week. The deadlock was finally broken by Arturo Alessandri on the Sunday following the election, when he granted a page-long interview in *El Mercurio*, the Liberal daily of Santiago. After a long exposition of the nature of the Chilean Constitution of 1925, Alessandri commented, almost as if it were an afterthought, that he be-

lieved the Liberal Party should withdraw its members from President González Videla's cabinet.

Alessandri's word settled the matter. The next morning the Liberals resigned, followed by the Radicals. Only the Communists refused to quit voluntarily, and President González was forced to ask the Communist ministers for their resignations. A few months later he became their bitterest enemy.

This was Arturo Alessandri's last major intervention in Chilean politics, though he lived four more years, dying on August 24, 1950. With him died an era which had seen a fundamental change in the nature of Chile's economy, society, and politics.

Arturo Alessandri was certainly the outstanding Chilean of the first half of the twentieth century. He was an explosively controversial character whom other politicians either violently supported or bitterly opposed. Perhaps a foreigner is in a better position than most Chileans to assess the impact which Arturo Alessandri made on the life of his country.

Certainly the fundamental significance of Alessandri's career was that he was the instrument through which a social revolution of profound significance was carried out. Through him change in political power from one class to another was achieved.

The forces of which Alessandri was able to seize the leadership in 1920 had been gaining ground in Chile for a long time before the election of that year. Unlike most of the Latin American countries, Chile had built up a sizable public education system that turned out a relatively large white-collar middle class which for a long time found little employment except with the government.

The development of the nitrate industry after 1879 gave an impulse to the growth of manufacturing as well as bringing new prosperity to the country. World War I, by making it difficult for Chile to import manufactured goods from abroad, spurred the process of industrialization. These new industries strengthened the middle class and brought into existence a new wage-earning proletariat.

The growing middle class and the new proletariat was by the second decade of the twentieth century growing increasingly restive at the continued control of Chilean politics by the landowning oligarchy. The middle class found its principal spokesman in the

Radical Party and elements of the badly divided Liberal Party. The miners and industrial workers supported the Democratic and Socialist Labor parties.

Alessandri succeeded in 1920 in channeling behind himself those forces which were tending to undermine the aristocratic structure of early republican Chile. With his victory in the election of that year absolute power over the nation as a whole passed from the hands of the rural oligarchy which had controlled the country since the enactment of the Constitution of 1833. Presidential elections were decided in the cities, though the oligarchy's control of the rural regions of the country was virtually untouched. The land remained in the oligarchs' hands, and they were able to march their peasants to the polls to vote as instructed by the landowners, with the result that until the election of 1952 the rural areas remained the stronghold of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the principal defenders of the rural *status quo*.

The second aspect of great importance in Alessandri's career was his patronage of advanced labor and social legislation. We have noted that he suggested as early as 1921 that Congress enact a labor code, and that the principal elements of this code were actually passed during the crisis of September, 1924. Although some of those critical of Alessandri have sought to deny to him any of the credit for the passage of this legislation in the light of the peculiar circumstances under which it was enacted, the author thinks this criticism is unjust. He was certainly the first chief executive to propose a broad program of labor legislation, and his constant hammering on the subject made the program sufficiently popular that the military men saw fit to use it as a blind for their demand for their own pay increases. The passage of the preventive-medicine law in the Alessandri administration of the 1930's occurred without any pressure from the armed forces.

Alessandri, as the first middle-class president of Chile, as the father of that country's famous labor and social legislation, and as an early exponent of industrialization, has an assured place in his country's history. He is the prophet of the Chilean Revolution, which, though still incomplete, has been largely peaceful, and has been one of the most far-reaching movements for social, economic, and political change in all of Latin America.

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and "Indo-America"



In 1946 a small delegation of Indians from a community in the high valleys of the interior visited the headquarters of the Aprista Party in Lima, Peru. It came to obtain the help of the Aprista leaders to foil an attempt by a neighboring landlord to seize the community's land. The party's Secretary for Indian Affairs spent a long time with the visiting Indian leaders but was unable to obtain from them any proof that the land in question belonged to their group and not to their neighbor. Without such proof the party leaders could extend little help to the Indians.

After several hours of fruitless discussion with his visitors the party secretary turned them over to Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the "Chief" of the Aprista Party. Haya talked quietly with them for a few minutes in their own Quechua language, explaining who he was and what it was that he needed from the Indians. After hearing him out the leader of the group reached down into his Indian pantaloons and pulled out a document signed in the 1760's by King Carlos III of Spain granting to this community the right to hold in perpetuity the land in question.

The Indian leader, addressing Haya de la Torre, said: "Take it, Don Apra. You we trust. This is the most precious possession of our community, except our land. But you may keep it as long as you wish."

Haya assured the Indian that he would need the document only long enough to photograph it, after which it would be returned to the Indians' possession. A few minutes later the document was back in the hands of the Indians, and after a few hours they started their long trek back to the highlands.

This incident epitomizes many things about Haya de la Torre. It is characteristic of his concern for the Indian masses who make up

three-fourths of the population of Peru and a significant portion of the whole population of Latin America. It is also indicative of the wide support and respect which Haya and the Apristas have gained among the people of Peru.

Haya de la Torre, who was the founder, remains the most outstanding leader of the Partido Aprista Peruano, the first of the national revolutionary parties that have become such an important element in the political life of Latin America. But Haya de la Torre is much more than that; he is the philosopher of the whole Latin American Revolution. For nearly forty years he has been urging the need for an indigenous movement for the social, economic, and political transformation of the twenty republics which he calls "Indo-America." Over thirty years ago he developed the basic principles for such a movement. These principles, though they have been varied in detail to fit the needs of different countries, have become the backbone of the program of parties throughout the hemisphere.

Haya de la Torre was a close student of the Mexican Revolution, having lived several years in Mexico during the 1920's. He drew many of his ideas from that experience. He also was very much aware of the reform movement launched in Uruguay by José Batlle. Of the other men discussed in the present volume, Betancourt, Figueres, Paz Estenssoro, and Hernán Siles undoubtedly have been deeply influenced by the writings and programs of Haya de la Torre and are glad to acknowledge their intellectual debt to him. One other, Juan Perón, also drew heavily on the ideas of Haya and was personally acquainted with some of the Aprista leaders who were in exile in Argentina in the late 1930's and early 1950's.

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre was born in 1895 in the city of Trujillo in northern Peru. He was a member of the provincial aristocracy of that area, and his matronymic indicated his descent from Juan la Torre, one of the lieutenants of Francisco Pizarro in the conquest of Peru. Haya's father was a member of the Peruvian Congress, and an uncle became a candidate in 1920 for vice president of the republic on the ticket headed by Augusto B. Leguía in an election which was not held because Leguía seized power by force.

Haya's parents, particularly his mother, were proud of their "pure Spanish descent." However, Víctor Raúl's physiognomy was a silent witness to the fact that Indian blood as well as that of their

European conquerors ran in his veins. He himself first became aware of this fact when he visited the ruins of an ancient Indian civilization at Chan Chan near Trujillo and saw there carvings of Indian heads which he thought were remarkably like his own profile. Although his mother had no explanation for this strange coincidence, it served to arouse for the first time Víctor Raúl's interest in the Peruvian Indians.¹

Haya de la Torre's interest in the Indians was heightened during his school days in Trujillo. A number of young intellectuals and students of that city organized a cultural movement during the years before World War I which was "Indianist" in its orientation. Haya joined this movement, though he was still very young. It undoubtedly deepened his interest in and concern for the Indian masses of Peru.²

From Trujillo, Haya de la Torre went to the ancient University of San Marcos in his nation's capital, Lima. While attending the University he worked as a clerk in the office of a prominent lawyer, Eliodoro Romero, who was also a leading political figure. In this office Haya got his first on-the-spot acquaintance with politics. He was able to observe firsthand the maneuvers leading up to Augusto B. Leguía's presidential candidacy, since Romero was a leading supporter of Leguía.³

Haya became a leader of the Federation of Students of San Marcos University. In that capacity he took an active part in organizing student support for a general strike by the Local Labor Federation of Lima in favor of an eight-hour day, a strike which was successful. Soon thereafter Haya helped organize a congress at which was established the Federation of Textile Workers, the first national union to be set up in Peru.⁴

Víctor Raúl was also active in bringing about the so-called "University Reform." This movement for a reorganization of the traditional structure of Latin American universities had started in 1918 in the University of Córdoba in Argentina and quickly spread to neighboring countries. It had various objectives, including the modernization of the curricula of the universities, which still were excessively humanistic in their orientation. It also sought to establish the autonomy of the universities, freeing them from domination of both Church and State, and putting their control in the hands of the faculty members and students.

In 1920 Haya de la Torre was elected president of the Student Federation, and in that capacity he organized a national student congress, the first in Peru's history. Perhaps the chief result of this congress was a resolution to establish "popular universities" in various cities of Peru. Under Haya's leadership several of these "Universidades Populares González Prada" were set up as adult-education centers in which the university students were the teachers and members of the young trade-union movement made up the bulk of the students.

Still as president of the University Federation, Haya de la Torre signed in 1921 the first Latin American student pact with Gabriel del Mazo, president of the Argentine University Foundation. Fulfilling the terms of this agreement, Haya made a tour the following year in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile to further the propaganda for the University Reform.

The awakening of the students by the University Reform stimulated their interest in politics. Inevitably they were thrown into conflict with the dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguía. He looked with suspicion on the students "popular universities" as possible foci of political subversion and from time to time interfered with their courses. However, an open conflict between the students and the regime did not occur until May 23, 1923.

President Leguía, in a move designed to ingratiate himself with the Catholic Church, decided to "dedicate Peru to the sacred heart of Jesus" in a colorful ceremony in the streets of Lima. The Student Federation, which was strongly anticlerical, determined to demonstrate against what they considered an "outrage." In cooperation with the Local Labor Federation of Lima they organized a large meeting of protest at which Haya de la Torre was one of the chief speakers.

While the joint labor-student meeting was in progress it was fired upon by police and soldiers, and one worker and one student were killed. Thereafter the government sought the arrest of the principal leaders of both the Student Federation and the Local Labor Federation. Haya de la Torre evaded the police for four and a half months but was finally captured on October 2, 1923.

For eight days Haya was incarcerated in a prison on San Lorenzo island, near Lima. There he engaged in a hunger strike, while both

the unions and the Student Federation demonstrated in favor of his release. After eight days, when the doctors reported that Haya's physical condition was worsening and he might well die if his hunger strike continued, the young student leader was spirited out of his prison and was deported, unceremoniously, to the Republic of Panama.

With his deportation Haya began his first period of exile, which lasted almost eight years. During this time, in spite of his youth, he was to develop the fundamentals of his political philosophy and to become a leader of continental significance. For the next eight years Haya wandered back and forth in Central America, Mexico, the United States, and Europe.

While Haya was still in Panama he accepted an invitation from the University of Havana to give a series of lectures there. During his stay in Cuba he was named honorary president of the Federation of Students of Havana University and in this capacity organized a workers' education project similar to the one he had organized in Peru, this time under the name of José Martí Popular University.

By this time Haya's fame was spreading, and he was invited to Mexico by the Minister of Education, José Vasconcelos. In Mexico, Haya first worked as a "missionary teacher" in the rural areas of the republic and then served as Vasconcelos' private secretary. It was during his stay in Mexico that Haya formally established the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, which was to win continental fame under its initials APRA. The APRA was established in May, 1924.

The next year Haya de la Torre accompanied José Vasconcelos on a visit to the University of Texas. His visit to the United States lasted only a few weeks, after which he embarked on a ship of the Baltic Line for a three months' trip to Russia. There he was an observer at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International and had extensive conversations with a number of the top leaders, including Leon Trotsky, Alexander Lunatcharsky, Minister of Defense General Frunze, and others.

Later Haya de la Torre said that it was during his visit to Moscow that he became convinced that he could not become a Communist and that the program of Moscow was not the correct one for Latin America. He said that the leaders of the Soviet State and of

the Communist International showed an abysmal ignorance of conditions in Latin America, not even being able to identify the location of many of the Latin American nations. He reported that Zinoviev, then president of the Comintern, had devoted only a paragraph to all of Latin America in his report to the Fifth Congress of the International. Haya became convinced that the advocates of social revolution and national economic independence in Latin America must establish their own organizations in each country of the area, and that these organizations must be completely independent of any groups from outside the hemisphere.

From the Soviet Union, Haya went back to Western Europe, settling down in Switzerland for the purpose of writing a book on his experience in Russia. While hard at work he was arrested by the Swiss police, all his papers were seized, and Haya was jailed. He escaped and fled across the border into Italy, making his way from there to Great Britain.

In England, Haya became a student at the London School of Economics and from there went to Oxford University, where he completed his studies in economics and sociology. During his stay there Haya de la Torre participated actively in student affairs and represented the Oxford Union in a debate on the Monroe Doctrine with the University of Washington.

In February, 1927, Haya and a group of his fellow Apristas attended the World Anti-Imperialist Congress, organized by the Communists, in Brussels. It was at this meeting that a definitive break occurred between Haya de la Torre and the Communists. Although the latter had been very anxious to get Haya to attend the meeting, they were not happy with his attitude there. He rejected the idea that Communists were the natural leaders of the fight against imperialism. In his book *El Antimperialismo y el Apra* (p. 48) Haya de la Torre describes this incident:

. . . The influence and control of the Communist Party were inescapable in that assembly, which brought together the most illustrious figures in world leftism. In spite of strong Communist pressure and the atmosphere of easy optimism frequent in such assemblies, we maintained our ideological position and the character of APRA as an autonomous political organization tending towards constituting itself into a party. . . . On the key point of the participation of the bourgeoisie

and petty bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist struggle, we opposed the objections of APRA to the Communist slogans. It was then that there occurred the most dramatic polemic of the Congress. The Latin American delegation had to meet apart during five or six hours to convince us. We maintained our reserve. We made note of it when we signed the final conclusions of the Congress; and thus it appeared in the official documents published in all known languages.

Brussels defined the Aprista theoretical line and made very clear our differences with Communism. It was natural that from then on APRA was the target of sharp criticism. For Communism there could not exist another party of the Left which was not the official one of the Third International of Moscow, of Stalinist orthodoxy. Every political organization that Moscow doesn't command must be execrated and combated. After the Brussels Congress of 1927 the APRA was so treated.

In August, 1927, the Peruvian leader returned to the United States, where he remained for three months. He was a speaker at the Institute of Political Science at Williamstown, Massachusetts, and at Columbia University, after which he lectured widely for the League for Industrial Democracy.

Haya de la Torre returned to Mexico in November, 1927, invited to give a series of lectures at the National University. Afterward he made speeches in all the provincial universities as well. Meanwhile his fame brought him invitations to speak at the universities of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica in Central America. He subsequently toured that area, but was deported from El Salvador and Guatemala before his full lecture schedule had been completed.

The Aprista leader was regarded as a "dangerous revolutionary" by the dictators of the Central American republics as well as, apparently, by important officials of the United States government. When Haya reached Panama for the purpose of taking ship back to Mexico, he was arrested in the harbor of Panama City by officials of the Canal Zone, although he was not on Zone territory but in that of the Republic of Panama. He was transported across the isthmus and was held in prison until a ship left port—for Germany. Haya was made to pay \$90 for his passage and was unceremoniously placed on board this ship.

Once arrived in Germany, Haya was in trouble with the immigration authorities there since he had no visa. Although he received no help from the Peruvian authorities, his case aroused widespread interest among German intellectuals, who were successful in getting Haya's stay in Germany established on a legal basis.

Haya de la Torre remained in Germany for the next four years. Finally, in 1931, a year after the overthrow of the regime of Augusto B. Leguía, Haya returned to Peru to run as candidate of the newly organized Partido Aprista Peruano in elections to choose a successor to Leguía.

During his stay in Europe, Haya de la Torre acted as correspondent for a number of newspapers in Mexico, Argentina, and other Latin American countries. Many of his articles were subsequently collected and published in book form. The most notable of these appeared under the titles *Impresiones de la Inglaterra Imperialista y la Rusia Soviética* (Editorial Claridad, Buenos Aires, 1932), *A Donde Va Indo América?* (Editorial Ercilla, Santiago, Chile, 1934), and *Construyendo el Aprismo* (Editorial Claridad, Buenos Aires, 1933). The first consists of articles written in 1924 and 1925; the second included pieces written between 1927 and 1930, with a final "postscript" sent out by Haya from Peru in 1934; and the third also contained mainly articles of the 1927-30 period.

These books reflect the evolution of Haya's outlook and philosophy. The first part of *Impresiones*, dealing with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, is exceedingly friendly toward the Soviet Union and speaks of the Communists as "comrades" and friends. Haya's discussion of events in Great Britain is written on an orthodox Marxist level. Writing during and after the General Strike of 1926, he sees Britain in the grip of a violent class struggle which is going to destroy completely the country's political democracy. This democracy itself is of dubious value in Haya's eyes.

A Donde Va Indo América? is a quite different sort of book. Its emphasis is completely on the need for Latin America, or "Indo-America" as Haya usually refers to it, to find its own destiny. Although he does not strongly attack the Communists, he virtually ignores them, and puts his emphasis on the program of the APRA, which by that time had branches in various Latin American coun-

tries and among Peruvian exiles both in America and Europe. *Construyendo el Aprismo* has a similar focus.

More fundamental than these collections of articles was another book which Haya wrote in 1928 in Mexico but which was not published until six years later. This was *El Antimperialismo y el Apra*, which was a fundamental statement of the Aprista program for Latin America.

In *El Antimperialismo y el Apra*, Haya has moved far from orthodox Marxism. He still considers himself a Marxist but insists that when applying this philosophy to Latin America one must revise it substantially. The immediate problem of the Latin Americans is defeating the advance of imperialism and overthrowing the semifeudal classes which dominate the internal life of the Latin American countries and are, he maintains, the best allies of the imperialists.

From all these writings one can get a clear picture of the Aprista program and philosophy as Haya de la Torre developed it during the 1920's and early 1930's. The original program of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, drawn up in 1924, was extremely simple, consisting of five points:⁵

1. Action against imperialism.
2. For the political unity of Latin America.
3. For the nationalization of land and industry.
4. For the internationalization of the Panama Canal.
5. For solidarity with all oppressed peoples and classes of the world.

Haya synthesizes the implications of this program in one paragraph when he writes:

Our historic experience in Latin America, and especially the very important and contemporaneous experience of Mexico, show us that the immense power of Yankee imperialism cannot be confronted without the unity of the Latin American peoples. But since this unity is conspired against jointly by our governing classes and imperialism, and since the former aid the latter, the State, instrument of oppression by one class of another, becomes an arm of our national ruling classes and imperialism to exploit our producing classes and to keep our peoples divided. Consequently, the fight against our governing classes is indispensable; political power must be captured by the producers; pro-

duction must be socialized, and Latin America must constitute a Federation of States. This is the only road to victory over imperialism, and the political objectives of APRA as the International Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Party.⁶

In *El Antimperialismo y el Apra*, Haya de la Torre polemizes with the Communists and defends the idea that APRA must become a Latin American political party with branches in every country. It is not enough, he says, merely to protest against United States and other imperialist violations of the national sovereignty of the Latin American nations. Those who oppose these violations must be organized as a political party determined to gain power and so to organize the Latin American nations that they can confront imperialism individually and collectively.

This political party must include within its ranks various class groups. The Communists are utterly wrong, he says, in thinking that a purely workers' party is the answer for Latin America in the immediate future. Rather, the fight against imperialism and the retrograde social systems existing in the Latin American countries must be undertaken by a party which includes the new industrial working class, the peasants, and the middle class.

The middle class has an especially important role to play because it is the first group to feel the full impact of imperialism in these countries. He argues:

. . . the monopoly which imperialism imposes cannot help but bring the destruction and regression of what we call generically the middle class. Thus as industrial capitalism when it appeared in the most economically advanced countries reduced, absorbed, and proletarianized the petty bourgeoisie, only a small part of which became part of the dominant class; so—with the peculiarities of our situation—imperialism subjugates or economically destroys the middle class of the backward countries which it penetrates. The small capitalist, the small industrialist, the small rural and urban proprietor, the little miner, the small merchant, the intellectual, the white-collar worker, etc., form the middle class whose interests are attacked by imperialism. . . . According to the laws of competition and monopoly which are characteristic of capitalism, its imperialist form, which is its culminating

expression, destroys the incipient capitalists and property-owners, subjugates them, and encloses them in the tentacles of the great trusts or under the yoke of credit and mortgages. . . .

In view of all this Haya asks:

Would it be realistic, then, to refuse the alliance of the middle classes with the working and peasant classes in the anti-imperialist struggle? Certainly not. Or would it be possible that this alliance be limited to rhetorical protests, to a mere labor of resistance; or to agitations without any realistic and *political* plan? Obviously no.⁸

The Communists certainly have no answer to the needs of Latin America, says Haya. He sums up his criticisms of the Third International thus:

Will the Communist party with its headquarters and indelegable authority in Moscow be the one to conduct Indoamerica to its victory against Imperialism? Let us reflect on the map of the world, on the history of our peoples, and on the reality of our situation. The answer, even of competent Communists—of the few realists, labelled by the rest as “rightists,” “intellectuals,” “petty bourgeois,” etc.—is in the negative. The Communist Party in Indoamerica lacks the force and the authority to lead the anti-imperialist struggle. Neither in the name of the Third International, nor in the name of its Panamerican Anti-Imperialist League, which is condemned to failure, can it do anything. The anti-imperialist current among our peoples is older than the Third International and more vast than the exclusiveness of their class party. In order that one social class in Indoamerica could be able by itself to victoriously lead the anti-imperialist struggle, it would have to achieve the conditions which Marx set forth for the effective class leadership of a revolution: “For the emancipation of a people to coincide with the emancipation of a given class within bourgeois society, it is necessary that that class as such represent all of society.” And this exactly is not the case with our nascent proletarian class, and even less with the weak Communist Party in Indoamerica, which doesn’t even represent the proletariat. The anti-imperialist movement, which is and must be a movement of United Front, requires a political organization of the United Front also. The Anti-Imperialist Leagues are not enough, and the Communist Party is too much.⁹

The anti-imperialist, multiclass party must seek to gain power as a political party, and once in power must undertake to establish a new kind of state, which Haya calls the "Anti-Imperialist State." He sketches very roughly what the nature of this new type of state will be. He says:

The new organization of the State will evidently have to be something like the so-called "State Capitalism" which was so highly developed during the imperialist war of 1914-18, and which reached a truly extraordinary level of development in Germany. . . . In the Anti-Imperialist State, a State of defensive economic war, it is also indispensable to limit private initiative and control the production and circulation of wealth. The Anti-Imperialist State which must *direct* the national economy will have to deny individual or collective rights in the economic field when the use of these rights implies an imperialist danger.¹⁰

More specifically, Haya argues that the state must limit the right of the individual or private corporation to enter into contracts with foreign firms for the exploitation of the Latin American countries' natural resources. However, he does not believe that the Latin American nations, even under Aprista leadership, should forbid the importation of foreign capital. On this point he argues:

To the candid thesis of the feudal rulers subject to imperialism who proclaim that "all capital is good," is opposed the antithesis of intense radicals that "We don't need capital." The Aprista synthesis is that so long as the present economic order exists in the world, there is both necessary and good capital and other unnecessary and dangerous capital. We say that it is the State and only it—the Anti-Imperialist State—which must control the investment of capital under strict conditions, which will be met because of the necessity of excess capital of the great industrial centers to emigrate. The capitalist phase, then, must be undergone in our countries under the aegis of the Anti-Imperialist State. . . .¹¹

He argues that the foreign investors will submit to controls. On this point he writes:

. . . the foreign capital which comes to our countries needs them as much as our countries need capital. Capital emigrates from the in-

dustrial countries to those which are underdeveloped because of an inescapable economic law. To place our countries in a position of inferiority with regard to foreign capital is to be ignorant of this law and to damage our nations. To condition, to limit, to systematize the entry of foreign capital in our countries is not to reject it, as some ingenuously believe. Even among peoples where foreign capital has to support the severest restrictions it enters. Naturally, foreign capital is not going to impose restrictions on itself. This role corresponds to the states which receive the capital. But to condition or restrict investment of foreign capital, it is necessary to have a real plan, economically and financially scientific, laid down by the State of the country which receives capital. A scientific plan presupposes an internal organization of the economy which takes into account national interests, and this is organic economic nationalism.¹²

Haya elaborates still further on the way in which foreign capital should be handled when he says:

. . . What Aprismo considers ruinous for Peru is that in the name of our need for foreign capital, the country is converted into a slave of this capital, and instead of foreign capital serving the progress of the country, the country becomes its servant. But it is impossible to get the country out of its present dependence if parallel to the conditioned and methodical entry of foreign capital, subject to a scientific plan assuring its best use for the country, there is not constructed a national economic system directed towards the greatest possible increase in productivity. A country without its own economy and subject only to dependence on foreign capital is nothing more than a colony. With a nation subordinated to the yoke of foreign capital, which exploits the worker, the merchant, the small proprietor, the taxpayer and the consumer, the State lacks all support to defend its sovereignty and becomes an instrument of foreign capital which directs the economy of the country.¹³

However, there are other problems in addition to that of dealing with the foreign investor with which the Anti-Imperialist State must be concerned, according to Haya. Most of all, it must come to grips with the problem of the land and its ownership. On this point Haya de la Torre writes with respect to Peru:

. . . in the regions of very large landholdings, where the Indian communities are violently oppressed and the worker lives in the most

ominous servitude and ignorance, under economic and political tyranny, the State must gradually abolish the large landholdings, support and technically aid the communities, integrally educate the Indian and procure the best use of the riches produced for everyone. The land for him who works it and the maximum exploitation of the land and not of Man are the essential points in an agrarian program which tends to raise production scientifically.¹⁴

The Anti-Imperialist State must also assure political democracy. In this connection, writing in the early 1930's, Haya protests against the persecution to which the Aprista Party is being subjected. He says:

It would be very interesting to submit the political rulers of Peru to a public controversy over the fundamental problems of the government. Our party has suggested this to all of the men who rule or seek to rule. We do not believe that we are the possessors of absolute truth, but we are ready to discuss on the level of principle with the groups and men who oppose us. This is exactly what we ask: free discussion of the national problems by the Nation itself. We insist and shall insist on this demand now publicly formulated. We don't want to impose Aprismo by force, but we claim the right to discuss without force being used to keep us quiet. And that is what we ask of the people of Peru: that we be allowed to speak freely about the vital problems of the country, that we be permitted to call upon those who govern to debate. What less could the Partido Aprista Peruano demand than effective guarantees for a controversy in which the people will discover what is the best political orientation for Peru? ¹⁵

The Anti-Imperialist State will be organized democratically, on a different basis from that traditional in Peru and most of Latin America, according to Haya de la Torre. He says:

Aprismo advocates the principle of functional democracy as the foundation stone of the life of the State. Functional democracy is associated with economic regionalism. . . . Economic regionalism is for its part a functional form of political and administrative decentralization, economically regionalist and functionally democratic, and must be based on the sovereignty of regional or provincial councils, from which must be chosen the National Parliament or Congress as the unifier and supreme director.¹⁶

Finally, Haya gives us a quick vision of the Latin America of the future as he sees it after the victory of APRA and the establishment of the Anti-Imperialist State:

With production intensified, organized on the basis of the restoration of the agrarian community, evolved, modernized and provided with all of the elements of modern technology and organized cooperatively, Indoamerica will be the granary and stable of the world. The revindication of the Indian as a man and of his system as a method of production are imperative for economic reasons. The index of production will rise extraordinarily. Adapting the system to the man and the man to the system and extending it to all of the agrarian region of the Andean zone under the form of state cooperatives, the economic transformation of South America will accelerate prodigiously. If we try to extend the system to industry as it develops—especially to mining, adopting all of the most modern production elements and methods—we will add another factor to the vast panorama of total economic transformation, axis of anti-imperialist resistance. The base, as the reader will have noted, is in the millions of indigenous workers of the countryside and of the mines, who still keep as a sacred aspiration for the future the restoration of a social system of the past. Restored in its essence and modernized by contemporary technology, we will have used the past as has no other people to establish favorable conditions for growth in the future.¹⁷

Haya's first long exile came to an end in 1931. The year before, Augusto B. Leguía, who had exiled Haya de la Torre, was overthrown. However, for almost twelve months the military junta headed by Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Cerro which took over the government after Leguía's fall, refused to allow Haya to return to Peru. He had to remain in Germany, until he was nominated by the newly formed Partido Aprista Peruano, to run for the presidency against Sánchez Cerro.

Haya's return to Peru was memorable. In spite of his eight years of exile his memory had been kept fresh in the minds of both the students and workers of Peru. Over the years the leadership of the Student Federation continued to be in the hands of disciples of Haya de la Torre, and many of them were sent to jail or were forced by the government to go abroad to share his exile.

As for the organized-labor movement, it too remained under the

spell of Haya. Each year the Textile Workers Federation published a special edition of its periodical on the anniversary of his deportation from Peru. He frequently published articles in the same magazine. Union leaders and students continued to cooperate during the first four years in the González Prada Popular Universities, though these were outlawed in 1927 by Leguía, whose government arrested most of the student and workers' leaders, charging them with "communism."

The most important figure in this group during Haya's absence was José Carlos Mariátegui. He had been a contemporary of Haya de la Torre in the university, and after Leguía's seizure of power in 1919 Mariátegui accepted a scholarship offered by the government for travel and study in Europe. There he became a convinced Marxist.

Upon his return from Europe, Mariátegui devoted himself to studying the economic, social, and political conditions of Peru. He published a number of books, the most important of which was entitled *Seven Essays on Peruvian Reality*. He also published a periodical called *Amauta*. In this magazine Mariátegui published articles by Haya and other Apristas as well as by other Latin American leftist leaders and European Socialists and Communists.

Like Haya, Mariátegui was deeply concerned with the problems of Peru, and though more sympathetic with the Communists than was Haya, felt that communism in Peru must be cut to the national mold. With this in mind he led in the establishment of the so-called Partido Socialista del Peru, which he hoped would be the political expression of the whole leftist movement in Peru. He rejected the idea of naming the party Partido Comunista, though he did agree to its applying for membership in the Communist International.

At the 1929 Congress of Latin American Communist Parties held in Buenos Aires, Mariátegui's Socialist Party was violently attacked by orthodox Communists, and it was ordered by the International to change its name to Partido Comunista and to adopt the orthodox form of organization established by the Comintern for national Communist parties.

Mariátegui did not live long enough to make clear what his reaction to the Comintern's orders would have been. He had been ill with tuberculosis for many years and died before the Partido So-

cialista had had a chance to decide upon its future. The writer has heard statements from those who participated in the party both to the effect that Mariátegui would have gone along with the Comintern's orders and to the effect that he would have refused to do so. Many of those who ultimately became Apristas felt that had Mariátegui lived long enough to see the formal establishment of the Partido Aprista Peruano on Peruvian soil, he would have been among its founding members.

In any case, Mariátegui did much to hold together the group of students and workers who had first been united under Haya de la Torre's leadership. His memory is honored today equally by members of the Aprista Party, the Peruvian Communist Party, and the Socialist Party of Peru.

Once back in Peru, Haya de la Torre threw himself into the presidential campaign. He barnstormed throughout the country and was met by veritable adulation of workers, students, and Indian peasants. The new Aprista Party gained adherents the length and breadth of the land. Its methods of propaganda were varied and sometimes unique. Carlton Beals has told of seeing dogs whose hair had been trimmed to spell the letters APRA. Enthusiastic members of the party etched its initials in white stone high up on the mountain facing the ancient Inca capital of Cuzco.

Haya himself demonstrated that he had great capacity as an orator as well as a political thinker during this campaign. He held his audiences spellbound whether he was speaking in Spanish or in the ancient Quechua language of the Peruvian Indians. At last he had the opportunity to explain at length to his compatriots the ideas which he and his associates had developed during the long years of exile.

When the votes were counted Haya de la Torre was credited with having received 110,000, while Sánchez Cerro was officially declared the winner with 150,000. Though the Apristas claimed that they had been robbed of victory, they agreed to take the seats which had been credited as having been won by them in the Chamber of Deputies.

For less than a year after the 1931 election Haya and the Apristas were able to continue their legal political activities. However, a few months after the election President Sánchez Cerro, who had

promised during his election campaign to "crush the Apristas," outlawed the party. Many of its principal leaders were arrested; others escaped into exile. The Aprista members of Congress were expelled, and many of them were jailed.

Among the Apristas who were incarcerated by the Sánchez Cerro government was Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. He was put on trial by the regime for subversive activities, and although his conviction was a foregone conclusion, Haya used the courtroom as a tribune from which to expound his ideas and speak to the people of Peru. The proceedings of the trial were later published by the Apristas.

There was a great deal of violence not only against the Apristas but also by them in retaliation. The most sanguinary incident was a revolt by the Apristas in the northern city of Trujillo in 1932. This was ruthlessly crushed by the Sánchez Cerro regime, and hundreds of Aprista workers, students, and intellectuals were killed, many of them in cold blood after surrendering to the authorities.

This second period of persecution of the Apristas lasted until April 30, 1933, when dictator Sánchez Cerro was assassinated, allegedly by an Aprista, though members of the party denied any connection with his murder. The government was thrown into confusion, but the presidency was soon assumed by General Oscar Benavides, an ex-president and a man whom Haya de la Torre had frequently referred to as "the Peruvian Primo de Rivera."

In the beginning General Benavides sought a truce with the Apristas. Haya de la Torre and other members of his party were freed from prison, and the Aprista members of Congress were restored to their positions. For a short while the Apristas were allowed to carry on legal political activities, but within a few months Benavides followed the actions of his predecessors and once again outlawed the Aprista Party and rounded up all the Apristas upon whom he could lay his hands. This time Haya was not among them. He went into hiding and stayed in Peru during the whole of the next decade of persecution of the Aprista Party by the governments of Benavides and his successor, Manuel Prado. Haya frequently changed his residence, reportedly even spending some time in a convent. His hiding place was usually guarded by a group of young Apristas who were popularly dubbed "the buffaloes."

The unexpired presidential term of the late President Sánchez

Cerro, which was being filled out by General Benavides, expired in 1936. The president called an election to choose his successor. During this campaign the Aprista Party demonstrated that, though it was illegal, it still had the support of a very large part of the population of Peru.

In the beginning it looked as if President Benavides' candidate, Jorge Prado, would win the election without any difficulty. However, quite late in the campaign the miniscule Social Democratic Party of Peru nominated a well known lawyer, Luis Antonio Eguigeren, as its candidate. He was given no chance of success in the beginning, but Haya de la Torre and other underground Aprista leaders spread word among their followers to vote for Eguigeren.

When the counting of the vote began it early became evident that Eguigeren was running far ahead of his rival. In the face of this General Benavides ordered the suspension of all further counting of the ballots and called his puppet congress into session. It obediently agreed to take the unconstitutional step of extending the President's term for three more years. The persecution of the Apristas was intensified.

At the end of this extended term elections were finally held. Outgoing President Benavides threw his support behind Manuel Prado, a prominent banker and one of Peru's richest men. Running against him was Luis A. Flores, nominee of the Unión Nacional, a party which had been organized by Sánchez Cerro to back his 1931 presidential campaign. In the late 1930's the Unión Nacional had decidedly pro-fascist tendencies.

An interesting sidelight on the 1939 election campaign was the alliance between Benavides and Prado on the one hand and the Communist Party of Peru on the other. The Communists backed Prado, and with Benavides' approval Prado accepted the principal Communist trade-union leader, Juan P. Luna, as a candidate for Congress on his ticket.

This was not the first time that the Communists had supported a Peruvian dictatorship. The landholding-mercantile oligarchy and the army leaders who had been the principal forces behind the governments which succeeded Leguía (as behind his as well) were anxious to find some political group which could counter the appeal among the masses which the Partido Aprista Peruano enjoyed from

the date of its foundation in 1930. For this purpose they turned almost immediately to the Partido Comunista. This party had been formally established early in 1930 by a number of José Mariátegui's former associates under the leadership of Eudocio Ravines, who had at one time been the head of the group of Aprista students in Paris but had broken with Haya de la Torre in 1928.

During the Sánchez Cerro administration the government-Communist alliance began. Particularly in the trade unions the Communists were given a degree of freedom which was denied to the Apristas. One result of this was that at that time the Communists controlled the largest faction in the organized-labor movement. Although Benavides at first persecuted all factions of the labor movement, he modified this policy after the 1936 election, and the *modus vivendi* between the government and the Communists was renewed.

This alliance continued throughout the administration of President Manuel Prado. He, like his predecessors, was anxious to undermine the popularity of the Apristas. With his approval a Confederation of Workers of Peru was established in 1944 with Communist deputy Juan P. Luna as its secretary general.

The Prado dictatorship was generally more moderate than the two preceding ones. Although Prado did not legalize the Aprista Party, and forced Haya de la Torre and other Aprista leaders to remain underground, in exile, or in jail, the persecution of the Aprista Party was less intense than previously.

During the eleven years of the Benavides and Prado dictatorships the ideology and program of the Aprista Party as expounded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre went through a process of evolution. Although the basic principles of the movement were never abandoned, a fundamental change occurred in the Aprista attitude toward the United States.

Two factors influenced this change. One was the rise of totalitarianism, particularly of the racist Nazi brand, in Europe and its threat to penetrate Latin America. The second factor was the advent of the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States, and the Good Neighbor Policy proclaimed and largely followed by Roosevelt and his associates.

Haya himself has summed up the reasons for the modification

of the position of himself and the Aprista Party with regard to the United States. In an open letter written sometime in 1940 to the editor of *Diario de Costa Rica*, who had noted Haya's apparent change from an "adversary" of the United States to a "friend" of the same country, Haya wrote:

. . . the Apristas have not changed their attitude but—fortunately—the government of the United States has. The imperialist policy of the "Big Stick" of the Republicans changed radically with the arrival of President Roosevelt. And we have the right to believe that this change in attitude was much influenced by all of the anti-imperialists of our great Indo American nation: the glorious martyrdom of Sandino in Central America, and the firm policy of some of our States such as Mexico, and Argentina, Bolivia and Chile.

We Apristas have seen with profound sympathy this modification of North American government policy. This turnabout, this change of front, has been beneficial for good relations between both Americas. And even though the phenomenon of imperialism in its roots and its economic phase still exists, it has been profoundly modified by the "good neighbor" policy which has closed the way to all the North American interventionist excesses in our peoples which characterized the Republican policy in Mexico, the Antilles, Central America and Panama.¹⁸

The importance of the rise of Nazism in influencing the thinking of Haya and the other Apristas is also noted by Haya. In the paragraph following that which we have just cited he says:

Furthermore, in the face of the totalitarian danger which means an imperialism much more aggressive than those hitherto known—because of its frank policy of extermination of weak peoples and its racist philosophy of conquest of mixed peoples—we have no doubts. Our duty is to fight alongside the defenders of democracy and cooperate in its defense, demanding at the same time that the principles of democracy be applied to Inter American relations so that both economically and politically all forms of imperialism will be extinguished.

Thus Haya did not feel that he had fundamentally changed his position concerning imperialism or the basic doctrine of Aprismo. Rather, he had adapted to new circumstances. While accepting

the Good Neighbor Policy and the common threat coming from Nazism as a basis for cooperation between the two parts of America, Haya insisted in all of his writings just before and during World War II that this cooperation should be on the basis of equality.

Haya took frequent verbal pot shots at those Latin American politicians who interpreted "cooperation" with the United States as meaning immediate agreement with anything the United States asked and refusal to ask anything in return. He constantly reiterated his old theme of unity among the Latin Americans, so that they could deal on more even terms with the United States. He also suggested once again inter-Americanization of the Panama Canal. He insisted, upon various occasions, that the United States should be more careful in its selection of close friends and associates in Latin America, make more contact with the people and less with the local dictators.¹⁹

This stage in the evolution of the thinking of Haya and the other Aprista leaders culminated in the publication in 1941 of the Plan Haya de la Torre, otherwise known as the Plan for the Affirmation of Democracy in America. After setting forth the need for unity in America to work against its conquest by the Nazi racialists, it goes on to suggest a number of specific measures for strengthening political democracy on a hemispheric scale and for establishing the basis for economic cooperation between the two parts of the hemisphere.

The Plan called for the establishment of an American Committee for the Defense of Democracy composed of representatives of democratic political parties as well as representatives of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government and the universities. This committee was to have subcommittees in every country. The purpose of these organisms was to be to receive complaints concerning violations of the democratic process and civil liberties which are set forth in all of the constitutions of America. Just how it was to function and what its powers were to be were not made clear.

On the economic level the Plan called for the summoning of an economic congress in each of the republics made up of "representatives of all of the live forces of its production, distribution, and consumption: capital and labor, industry, agriculture, and com-

merce—national and *foreign* in the case of the Indo-American countries.” The purpose of these congresses would be to “study the economic reality and formulate a state plan of action with a view to its coordination within an Inter-American program.”

Complementary to this would be the establishment of a Great Inter-American Economic Congress “on the basis of resolutions adopted in each country, with a view toward Inter-American coordination.” This Inter-American Economic Congress should proceed with the establishment of a single currency for the Indo-American countries, with a value lower than the dollar “but with a stable rate of exchange with it, the guarantee and backing of which would be gold, silver, and raw materials.”

The Plan also called for the establishment of export-import banks in all of the American countries “the functions of which would not be confined to isolated loans and credits, but would convert them into directing organs, guaranteeing productive investments, balanced trade and a system of guarantees and assurances which would maintain the stability of exchange, the stimulation and extension of credits, the pushing of trade between the United States and the Indo-American States.” It also urged the establishment of an Inter-American Tariff Union, the equalization of transit fees in the Panama Canal for all American states, and other measures.²⁰

One notable omission from this Plan is any specific mention of cooperation for the industrialization of the Latin American countries. In contrast, there is specific reference to “the need for a clear delimitation of the great fields or zones of the economy of the New World: that of the United States, preponderantly industrialized and financial, and that of the Indo-American States, preponderantly agricultural, mining and of raw materials.” The statement continues, “Both zones complement one another and *each needs the other*,” but there is no insistence on the need to develop the Latin American economies away from their exclusive dependence on the production of raw materials and foodstuffs.

This document goes further than any Aprista pronouncement before or since in urging cooperation between the two parts of the hemisphere. It is virtually the only occasion on which Haya de la Torre did not call for unification of the Latin American countries as a necessary prerequisite to their dealing with the United States,

but he was urging such a necessity in articles which he was writing about the same time.

With the approaching end of World War II political conditions in Peru began to alter rapidly. As the end of President Manuel Prado's term neared, the problem of choosing a successor became increasingly pressing. Ex-President Benavides, who was then serving as Peruvian ambassador to Argentina, brought his influence to bear on Prado to permit free elections with the participation of the Aprista Party. Prado finally agreed to this.

In May, 1945, a presidential decree legalized the Aprista Party, though it forbade it to use its official name. Soon thereafter the party came out into the open, for the first time in more than a decade, under the name Partido del Pueblo (People's Party). Meanwhile hundreds of exiled leaders of the party streamed back to the country, a general amnesty was proclaimed, political prisoners were released, and those Aprista leaders who had been in hiding left their places of refuge.

The principal Aprista to come out of hiding was Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. He was greeted with wild enthusiasm at every meeting at which he spoke amidst a forest of waving white handkerchiefs, the special symbol of the Aprista Party. In the weeks that followed his return to open activity Haya made an extensive tour of the country, rallying the party's supporters, who had not seen their chief for more than ten years.

The legalization of the Aprista Party came too late for it to name a presidential candidate. However, it endorsed José Bustamante y Rivero, a well known jurist and diplomat, a conservative man but pledged to the full restoration of democratic liberties. At the same time the party nominated a full list of candidates for both chambers of parliament.

Bustamante won a smashing triumph, and the Aprista Party enjoyed a strong victory in the congressional elections, winning control of the Senate and falling only a few seats short of a majority in the lower house. With the support of a number of independents the Apristas hoped to be able to carry through the latter body most of the measures which they supported.

When Congress convened it abolished all of the repressive laws of the dictatorship. Meanwhile the Aprista Party set about an al-

most frantic process of rebuilding its ranks throughout the nation. Schools for training leaders and rank-and-filers were established. The party set up a special Peasant and Indian Bureau to help members of various Indian communities fight off attempts illegally to usurp their land.

Mobile party units consisting of a doctor, a nurse, a teacher, and one or two helpers were dispatched to various parts of the country. These units brought medical help to villages which had seldom, if ever, had the services of a doctor, while the teacher sought out those who had a minimum knowledge of reading and writing and helped them set up schools for teaching their fellow villagers. At the same time contact was established between the villagers and the Aprista Party.

During the three and a half years from 1945 to 1948 in which the Aprista Party was legal Haya de la Torre was the undisputed chief of the party. He sat on all the party's leading committees *ex officio*, and his word was listened to with great respect and was usually followed. He conferred regularly with the party's parliamentarians and with the Aprista ministers during the eleven months in 1946-47 in which the party had members in the cabinet. He met with the party's trade-union leaders, who had seized control of the Confederation of Workers of Peru from the Communists soon after the legalization of the Partido del Pueblo. He made several speaking and organizing tours in various parts of the country.

Haya also took advantage of his new freedom to make several trips abroad. During one of these, early in 1948, he spent several weeks in the United States renewing acquaintances with old friends, speaking at universities and at public meetings, and bringing the message of the Aprista Party to this country as he had done twenty years before.

However, as time went on, relations between President Bustamante y Rivero and the Aprista Party, to which he owed his election, became increasingly cold. To a considerable degree the responsibility for this was that of the Apristas and of Haya de la Torre himself. An almost impossible relationship existed between Bustamante and the Apristas, particularly between Bustamante and Haya de la Torre. There were, for practical purposes, two presidents of Peru: Bustamante in the Casa del Gobierno and Haya de la Torre in the

Casa del Pueblo, the Aprista Party headquarters. It was virtually inevitable that there would be a clash between them sooner or later.

It is difficult to blame the Apristas for their attitude. They were not only the country's majority party but were virtually the only organized party in Peru. President Bustamante owed his election to the support of the Aprista Party. They felt that he should tailor his administration to suit their wishes. It can also be argued that the Apristas were, after their long period in illegality, too anxious, that they lacked the patience which was needed at that particular moment in Peru's history.

During 1948 the situation between the Apristas and President Bustamante became acute. In January of that year the President sought to frustrate a continental labor congress called at the invitation of the Aprista-controlled Confederation of Workers of Peru to meet in Lima, and out of which came the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (CIT). Later, during the middle months of the year, it proved impossible for congress to meet because the non-Apristas, including Bustamante's personal supporters, refused to attend, thus preventing a quorum.

Finally, on October 3, 1948, the showdown between the President and his erstwhile allies occurred. A naval mutiny led by elements of the Aprista Party took place in the port of Callao. Haya de la Torre and the other top leaders of the party publicly repudiated this uprising, but this did not prevent President Bustamante from blaming the party for it and using it as an excuse to outlaw the Apristas. The government rounded up those Aprista leaders upon whom it could lay its hands.

Haya de la Torre was not among those whom the government arrested. He had gone into hiding once again, before the police could capture him, and he remained out of sight for three months. Meanwhile, late in October, 1948, President Bustamante was overthrown by a military coup led by General Manuel Odría, a declared enemy of the Apristas and, until a few months before his uprising, Minister of Defense in Bustamante's cabinet.

The Odría military dictatorship continued the search for Haya de la Torre and other Aprista leaders. The police were unable to locate Haya, but finally, his health seriously impaired, he found

refuge in the Colombian Embassy early in January, 1949. With his entry into the Embassy began one of the most dramatic and historic episodes in the highly colorful life of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre.

The Odría regime violated one of the most sacred traditions of Latin American politics in refusing to grant Haya the customary safe-conduct out of the country. The government accused Haya of a long list of common crimes and claimed that he was not in the true sense a political refugee. They continued to insist on this for more than five years, during which Haya remained in the Colombian Embassy, and the Colombians twice took the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. That tribunal both times rendered a Solomonian but highly equivocal judgment to the effect that Haya was not guilty of common crimes but the Peruvian government had the right to deny him a safe-conduct.

During all of this period Haya was a virtual prisoner in the Embassy. The Peruvian government had a trench dug around the building, with soldiers stationed in it for twenty-four hours a day. Guns were trained on the Embassy constantly, and everyone who entered or left was searched thoroughly. The Colombian government gave up trying to conduct its business in this building, renting quarters in another part of town and leaving only one official of the Embassy and his family with Haya. There was constant danger of Haya's being shot, and he was unable to approach a window for fear the troops stationed outside would fire upon him. All protests of the Colombians against this outrageous treatment of the official seat of the Embassy went unheeded.

It was not until January, 1954, that this situation was finally resolved. A *modus vivendi* was finally worked out by the government of Peru, the Embassy of Colombia, and Haya de la Torre, whereby the distinguished refugee was finally allowed to leave his Embassy "prison."

During the next two years Haya was once more in exile. He went first to Mexico, where for some months he stayed with the sizable group of Aprista refugees resident there. Then he went to Europe once again, traveling widely from Italy to Scandinavia. A constant student, he was particularly interested in the social system developed in the Scandinavian countries, hoping to find there lessons which might be applicable to his homeland. He also wrote

numerous articles for periodicals in both parts of the hemisphere, including a long account of his trials and tribulations in the Colombian Embassy in Lima which appeared in *Life* magazine.

Meanwhile the Odría dictatorship was approaching its end back home in Peru. As the close of Odría's "constitutional" term of office, to which he had had himself "elected" in 1950, approached, the eternal problem of the succession became increasingly acute. Odría first sought support to continue in office beyond his constitutional term, but he found few backers for this idea. Finally he was forced to call elections to choose a successor.

Like all previous regimes of this type in Peru, the Odría government had rested on two groups—the armed forces and the economic oligarchy. During the early years of his regime Odría had had the united backing of the Army and the almost complete support of the large landowners, the big merchants, and the important bankers. As time passed, however, he lost much of the backing of the economic royalists and the Army.

There are probably two basic reasons for the change in the attitude of the big economic interests toward Odría. One of these was the events which occurred in the neighboring republic of Bolivia after April 9, 1952. On that date a revolutionary regime seized power in Bolivia, and proceeded to nationalize the major part of the tin-mining industry, enfranchise and arm the illiterate peasants, and turn over much of the agricultural land of the highlands to the Indians.

Economic and social conditions in rural Peru were very similar to those existing in Bolivia before 1952. The Indians of Peru, who were only vaguely aware of the national boundaries which separated them from their brothers in Bolivia, were very much impressed by the benefits which the Bolivian peasants seemed to be reaping from the revolution there. This situation seemed to presage a fundamental change in Peru sooner or later.

There is little doubt that important elements in the Peruvian oligarchy read the handwriting on the wall and came to the conclusion that changes such as those occurring in Bolivia were inevitable sooner or later in Peru. They also came to the conclusion that it was in their own interest that these changes come about as peaceably and democratically as possible. This meant the old policy

of keeping the Aprista Party outside the law ought to be definitively reversed, and that the road should somehow be paved for the ascension of the Apristas to power in a democratic fashion, in the hope that the Apristas would carry out the revolution they preached in a democratic manner and with as little turbulence and bloodshed as possible.

The second factor influencing the attitude of the Peruvian oligarchy was undoubtedly the treatment which many of its members received at the hands of the Odría military regime. That government was a frankly military regime, and it had only slightly more respect for those members of the civil aristocracy who crossed it in one way or another than it had for the persecuted Apristas. Leading members of the ruling economic group were jailed and exiled by Odría because of political differences. Perhaps a number of the Peruvian oligarchs came to the conclusion that even a revolutionary group such as the Apristas was to be preferred to a continuation of an insolent military tyranny.

The election campaign of 1956 resolved itself into a race for the support of the outlawed Apristas. A few months before the election Odría had allowed the return of some Aprista exiles, notably Ramiro Prialé, the party's secretary general. Prialé quickly reorganized the bases of the party in the Lima-Callao area and soon entered into complicated negotiations with the various candidates for the presidency.

Prialé had one basic objective in his negotiations—the legalization of the Aprista Party. This was the *sine qua non* for any candidate to win Aprista backing and with it almost certain victory at the polls.

There were three candidates for president. Odría supported Hernándo Lavalle, an engineer, Haya de la Torre's predecessor as president of the Students Federation back in the period of World War I but by 1956 a very conservative figure. The second candidate was Fernando Belaúnde Terry, an architect and a member of the faculty of the University of San Marcos, a deputy during the 1945–48 period, when he had been an ally of the Apristas. The third nominee was ex-President Manuel Prado, reputedly the richest man in Peru, who was growing old, was not thought to be in very good health, and who had lived abroad during much of the Odría period.

Prialé began his negotiations with Odría and Lavalle. His demand was simple: Cancel the law which made the Aprista Party illegal. Although at first indicating that he might be willing to do this, Odría procrastinated and finally refused to legalize the Apristas before the election, though Lavalle promised to do so right afterward. Prialé did not consider Lavalle's promise sufficient guarantee in view of the equivocal attitude of his patron, Odría.

Prialé passed over Belaúnde Terry in his negotiations in spite of the fact that Belaúnde promised publicly to legalize the Apristas if he should win. There were undoubtedly two reasons for Prialé's attitude. First, he believed that Odría would not turn over power to Belaúnde, who was conducting a violently antigovernment campaign, if he were to win the election. Second, the movement which grew up around Belaúnde during the first months of 1956 represented the first significant popular challenge to the Aprista Party since its foundation more than twenty-five years before. Prialé did not want to inflate the Belaúnde movement unnecessarily.

So, once convinced that negotiations with the government candidate were fruitless, Prialé turned to Manuel Prado. The ex-President was no friend of the Apristas and had kept them illegal during all but a few weeks of his former period in office. Furthermore, he was the epitome of the oligarchy which the Apristas were pledged to remove from power. However, to counterbalance these factors were the solid promise which Prado was willing to give to legalize the Aprista Party as his first act upon taking office and the near certainty that, if Prado was elected, he would be allowed to take over the presidency.

Thus Prialé and the other Aprista leaders inside Peru agreed to throw the Party's support to Prado. However, this decision was taken only ten days before the election, and a heroic effort was needed to get the word out to the Aprista Party people throughout the country. It proved impossible to notify the party supporters in the more remote sections of Peru; in others, particularly in the South, Belaúnde Terry had been claiming Aprista support for himself, and this created considerable confusion. In some cases Aprista members were unwilling to throw their support behind Prado, whom they remembered as the persecutor of their party during his previous administration.

However, generally the word of Aprista support for Prado did get to party members and supporters in the chief centers of Aprista strength. This was shown by the large majority Prado received in the Lima-Callao area and in the northern city of Trujillo, which had always been Aprista strongholds. The party's backing was sufficient to let Prado nose out Belaúnde, who ran second, far ahead of the badly trailing Hernándo Lavalle.

Once in office, Prado proved as good as his word. His first act was to submit to congress a law legalizing the Aprista Party, which was quickly passed and signed by the President. With this law the party returned to full activity. Exiles streamed back home, party headquarters were opened to the public, the party newspaper *La Tribuna* was revived, and the job of organizing local units of the party throughout the country was undertaken with enthusiasm.

Again Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre returned home in triumph. He first landed in the northern part of the country, and his progress south to Lima was like a Roman triumph. People turned out by the hundreds of thousands to see him, listen to him, and cheer him. In Lima he was met by a crowd of a quarter of a million people in the Plaza San Martín in the center of the city.

Haya returned to his post as "chief" of the Aprista Party. However, this time it was different from the situation in 1945-48. The party had been largely reorganized by Ramiro Prialé and a small group of other leaders without the help of Haya de la Torre. Haya had had no part in the negotiations preceding the elections, negotiations that had revealed an ability for diplomacy and political maneuvering on the part of Prialé which until then had gone virtually unnoticed.

Furthermore, the party was now in a cautious and conciliatory mood, which was a far cry from the romanticism that had been one of its characteristics in the past. Although none of the idealism and willingness to sacrifice which had been such assets in the past had been lost, there was universal agreement among the leaders and rank and file alike that the essential thing was to keep a democratic government in power for the next six years so that the Aprista Party might win the 1962 elections and at last have a chance to carry out its program.

The party had learned to wait. And, although this was a pain-

ful process, all agreed that it was a necessary one. Nothing should be done by the Apristas that might be used as an excuse for another military coup. It was necessary for the party to give support to the Prado regime so that it would stay in power, but without participating in it and without becoming responsible for the mistakes which this type of "caretaker" government was almost certain to make.

In this situation the role of Haya de la Torre was fundamentally changed. He had now become the "Grand Old Man" and the philosopher of the party. Although he made several speaking tours around the country and helped in the work of rebuilding the local units of the party, he no longer participated to the degree he had done in the 1945-48 period in the day-to-day activities of the organization. Although his prestige had never been higher and the rank and file had never loved him more, he had ceased to be the effective political leader of the party. There was general agreement, in which he acquiesced, that nothing should be done which would prevent his being elected president of Peru in 1962.

Haya stayed in Peru for a little more than a year. During this period he received innumerable invitations to speak in universities and to political groups throughout Latin America and in the United States as well. In the later part of 1957 he finally decided to accept some of these invitations. He went abroad and gave a number of speeches in neighboring South American countries, after which he returned to Europe. Apparently he was to stay abroad, this time in voluntary exile, until the moment was propitious for his return for what all agreed would be the victorious campaign of 1962.

Meanwhile Haya was busy writing. He published in 1956 the first volume of a study which he entitled *Thirty Years of Aprismo*, in which he reviewed the long history of his party and the evolution of his own ideas. In this volume he insisted on the basic consistency of the line of himself and his party, which, though it had adapted to changes in the world situation and that of the Western Hemisphere, had never varied in its insistence on the assertion of the special personality of "Indo-America." It had never changed in its advocacy for unity of the Indo-American nations and for their control of the foreign capital which came there and which should come only under conditions established by the governments of the region.²¹

Two years later Haya published another book, this time a study of the philosophy of Toynbee. While in the Colombian Embassy in Lima, and subsequently, he had spent much time studying the works of the noted British historian and philosopher, and this work was the fruit of these efforts.²²

The position of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre among our Prophets of the Revolution is unique. He has been the most outstanding philosopher of the whole movement for social, economic, and political change in Latin America during the last half-century. Although not a successful politician by normal standards, he has had an immense influence throughout the Latin American republics. The leaders of many parties in numerous countries of the region acknowledge an intellectual debt to Haya.

Haya de la Torre has been the great preacher of the need for Latin American political life to seek a path of its own. He has urged the necessity for the long overdue changes in Latin American society to come in a specifically Latin American way, the need for these countries to develop political parties and institutions adapted to their own national personalities. He has argued against the too frequent tendency, as expressed in the constitutions and laws and by political leaders of Latin America during its first century of independence, to ape some other part of the world.

At the same time Haya has indicated a middle way in the difficult problems of relating Latin American economic development to the outside world. He has recognized the twin evils of foreign domination of the Latin American economies on the one hand and of utter rejection of foreign investment and aid on the other. He has stressed the need for the Latin American countries to control and direct their own activities and resources and to channel foreign investments so that they would contribute to the most rapid possible general economic development and would strengthen the national sovereignty of the Latin American nations.

Finally, Haya de la Torre has stressed the need for unity among the Latin Americans. He has urged not only spiritual and intellectual solidarity but actual abolition of economic and political frontiers among the nations of the region. Although few politicians outside Peru have gone as far as he has in urging the formation of an "Indo-American nation," there has emerged in recent decades an in-

creasingly strong feeling of group identification among the Latin American countries. And today steps are even being taken toward some kind of economic union among the Latin American nations.

Haya is probably the outstanding spokesman for a generation of political leaders and thinkers which saw the emergence of a strong feeling of Latin American nationalism and an all-but-irresistible drive toward social change and economic development. Others have written in a more orderly fashion, still others have written more realistically, but Haya de la Torre remains the most significant single spokesman for the social revolution in Latin America during the first half of the twentieth century.

Rómulo Betancourt, the Statesman of the Andes



Venezuela in 1928 was the personal property of Juan Vicente Gómez, infamous "Tyrant of the Andes." His secret police mercilessly tracked down and eliminated every critic of the regime. Gómez, his numerous progeny, and the semi-literate military men who surrounded him, had partitioned among themselves virtually all the country's wealth. The rapidly rising petroleum industry had provided new sources of illicit enrichment for the members of the ruling clique. The Gómez regime had become the classic example of a Latin American dictatorship.

Suddenly the tranquillity of the regime was shattered by a group of young university students, most of them still in their teens, who rose in revolt, seized the presidential palace, and seriously threatened to overthrow the tyranny. For a short while Caracas was in turmoil; the young student orators made inflammatory speeches in the public squares demanding the end of the dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic civilian government.

One of the principal figures in this "generation of '28" was Rómulo Betancourt, a young law student scarcely eighteen years of age. In this short-lived student rebellion the future president of Venezuela got his first political apprenticeship—as did several others whose names were to become famous in Venezuelan public affairs, such as Miguel Otero Silva, Jóvito Villalba, and Raúl Leoni.

After the first shock of the student uprising, the government recovered control of the situation, and most of the student leaders were captured and placed in Gómez' dungeons. For more than a year and a half the students remained in damp, filthy cells, their legs weighted down with ball and chain. They christened their prison "Aramathea," after Joseph of Aramathea, who helped Jesus bear his cross to Calvary.

Finally, in 1930 most of the leaders of the student revolt were allowed to go into exile. Rómulo Betancourt found refuge in the little Central American republic of Costa Rica. There he continued his studies, married a Costa Rican girl, Carmen Valverde, and joined with local students to form the Communist Party of Costa Rica. For some years he was one of the leading figures in that party. In 1935 there was a bitter controversy in the organization as to whether it should become a full-fledged member of the Communist International. Betancourt opposed this move, arguing even at that time that the Latin Americans should find their own way to social change and material progress, and not be subordinated to an international organization whose principal task was to defend the Soviet Union. When the Costa Rican Communists decided against Betancourt's position and joined the Comintern, he withdrew from the party.

There is no doubt that this short experience in the ranks of the Communist movement contributed greatly to Betancourt's political education. It made him intimately acquainted with how the Communists operated, and turned him into a convinced anti-Communist, but one who realized that the Communists are only to be defeated, in Latin American at least, if the ground is cut from under them by a political movement which can appeal to the workers, peasants, and middle class on the basis of profound social and political change and economic progress.

At the end of 1936 Juan Vicente Gómez died quietly in his bed. The presidency passed to his son-in-law and Minister of War General Eleázar López Contreras, who immediately began relaxing Gómez' tyrannical regime. López allowed the exiles to come back and for a short while permitted relative freedom of speech, assembly, and organization. At least six new political groups were formed at this time: Organización Venezolana (which included most of those who later were to form Acción Democrática Party); Partido Republicano Progresista (which included most of those who later formed the Communist Party of Venezuela); Frente Obrero, Frente Nacional de Trabajadores, a regional group in Maracaibo known as Bloque Nacional Democrático, and the Federación de Estudiantes Organización Política.

Within a few months all of these groups merged into the Partido Democrático Nacional, which was soon driven underground, when

López Contreras cracked down on the opposition. Many of its leaders were deported by the regime. In the underground the differences between those of Communist inclination and the anti-Communists became increasingly acute, and in 1938 the Communist element left the Partido Democrático Nacional to form the Partido Comunista de Venezuela. Rómulo Betancourt, who remained in Venezuela in hiding, became the principal leader of the Partido Democrático Nacional.

Betancourt himself has described the significance in the split in the ranks of the Partido Democrático Nacional. Writing in *Cuadernos Americanos* in August, 1949, he said:

The Venezuelan Left was divided into two well-defined groups. One of these based its strategy and tactics not so much on Marxist doctrine as on the successive changes ordered by the Comintern and later by the Cominform, a movement which always had the vagaries of the Kremlin as its Star of Bethlehem. The other, ours, which in the underground was the PDN and later became Acción Democrática, formed by those who, professing a revolutionary concept of the social struggle, thought as Americans and thought of themselves as Americans, did not believe that a transplanted formula or an imported line varying with the international strategy of a certain great power should be the guide to popular action to be carried out with realism and effectiveness.

Hence we advocated and organized a much more amply based party than one based only on the proletariat, since it had within its ranks men and women coming from all of the non-parasitic classes of the population, forming a movement which fought for democracy and sought to adapt it to our own time, with emphasis on social justice and economic redemption. It was a movement, finally, which was not guilty of insularity, but on the contrary, aspired to establish relations with similar groups elsewhere in America, while always refusing to subordinate national interests to the very special objectives of Russian political strategy.¹

During the next three years the opposition was persecuted by the López Contreras regime and was forced to work underground. The Communists had an advantage over the PDN people in this because they were led by a number of skilled leaders, many of them unknown to the public and to the police, who had been trained in

Moscow by the Comintern in methods of underground organization and agitation. The leadership of the PDN, on the other hand, was limited in experience and numbers, because most of its leaders had been exiled.

Unlike other Venezuelan dictatorial regimes, that of López Contreras kept very few of its opponents in jail. When an opposition leader was arrested, he was promptly deported. In 1940 Rómulo Betancourt suffered this fate; he was sent to Chile. There he was closely associated with the Socialist Party of Chile, which was at the apex of its influence. As a representative of the Partido Democrático Nacional of Venezuela he participated in a Conference of Latin American Socialist and Democratic Parties called by the Chilean Socialists.

In the middle of 1941 the presidential term of General López Contreras expired, and he chose as his successor another general, Isaías Medina Angarita. Although the president of the republic was elected by Congress at that time, and the opposition had no hope of winning against Medina Angarita, the Partido Democrático Nacional nonetheless named as its "symbolic candidate" for the presidency the country's most famous literary figure, the novelist Rómulo Gallegos. He toured the country widely, and his campaign served principally to raise the prestige of the PDN and to make clear its position as the principal opposition party to the regime in power.

With the inauguration of Medina Angarita as president of Venezuela a more democratic regime was installed. Once again the exiles were invited to return, and the opposition was given freedom to agitate and organize. Betancourt returned from his forced residence in Chile, and soon thereafter the Partido Nacional Democrático held a national convention. At this meeting the name of the party was changed to Acción Democrática (Democratic Action), a detailed program for economic, social, and political change was drawn up, and the position of Rómulo Betancourt as principal leader of the party was confirmed.

The next four years were marked by steady progress on the part of Acción Democrática. Its scattering of representatives in Congress put forth fundamental proposals for reorganization of the country's

relations with the foreign companies exploiting its oil, for changes in the agrarian sector of the economy, and for a democratization of the regime.

Acción Democrática was without doubt the principal opponent of the Medina regime. The Communists generally supported the administration, although this policy brought a split in that party's ranks. López Contreras first backed Medina but later became increasingly critical; but his influence was in the Army rather than in the general public, and he had no political party behind him.

One of the principal gains of Acción Democrática during the Medina administration was its success in capturing control of the labor movement. Since the death of Gómez the trade-union movement, particularly in the oil fields, had gained increasing strength. From the beginning it was under Communist influence, though there was a sizable Acción Democrática minority in the unions. During the first part of the Medina regime the Communists gained additional ground in the unions because of the benevolence of the administration with which they were allied.

Early in 1944 a congress was held in Caracas for the formation of a national trade-union confederation. When the congress came to discuss the executive committee for the new confederation, one of the Acción Democrática labor leaders proposed that the membership of the committee be divided equally between Communists and members of Acción Democrática. However, a Communist delegate denounced this proposal, saying that since the Communists had a majority in the congress, they should have a majority on the executive committee.

This whole discussion was in defiance of the Venezuelan Labor Law, which strictly forbade partisan political activities on the part of the unions. As a result a crisis occurred and President Medina Angarita suspended the sessions of the labor congress. He also suspended the legal recognition of a large number of unions represented at the meeting, most of them under Communist leadership. In elections which were necessary before these unions could once again get legal recognition the Communists were generally defeated, and Acción Democrática elements succeeded in getting control of a majority of the oil workers' unions and a majority in the general

labor movement. From that time until the present AD has continued to control a large majority in the Venezuelan trade-union movement.

As the 1945 presidential election approached, a political crisis developed. Acción Democrática demanded that there be a change in the constitution to provide for direct popular election of the president instead of his being named by Congress, which in effect meant his selection by the outgoing president. Failing in this demand, Acción Democrática then urged upon Medina an agreement between the administration and the opposition on a joint candidate acceptable to both sides. The man they suggested was Aníbal Escalante, Venezuelan ambassador to Washington.

At first Medina Angarita was agreeable to Escalante as a joint nominee, and Escalante himself accepted the nomination, but when he fell sick soon afterward, Medina Angarita selected Angel Biaggini without further consultation with Acción Democrática, and began to put into operation machinery to assure his election by Congress.

Meanwhile there was widespread discontent in the Army. Since the death of Gómez the control of the armed forces had continued to remain in the hands of relatively illiterate generals who had been comrades of Gómez and had helped him seize and hold power. The younger army officers, many of whom had training in the United States and other foreign countries in addition to their training in professional military schools, were restless under the domination of the leftovers of the Gómez regime. They felt that their training and professional competence were not receiving sufficient recognition.

By the middle of 1945 plans were well advanced among the army officers for a *coup d'état* against the Medina regime. Since the army men did not want to have their projected revolt appear to the public as a mere move to gain their own promotions, they looked around for civilian allies. Their logical candidate for a partnership was Acción Democrática, the principal opposition party to the Medina regime and a group which could not be accused of Communist affiliations or sympathies.

At first the Acción Democrática leaders were very hesitant to have anything to do with an army coup, but finally they did agree to listen to the propositions of the young officers. Betancourt and

other Acción Democrática leaders urged the military men to hold off until one last effort could be made to get agreement with Medina Angarita on a compromise candidate for the presidency. Further negotiations with Escalante were undertaken. When they finally broke down and Medina Angarita went forward with the candidacy of Biaggini, the Acción Democrática agreed reluctantly to join the proposed military insurrection, under certain conditions. They insisted that the government junta to be established by the rebels would contain a majority of Acción Democrática members and that of its seven members only two would be military men. They also insisted that the new regime be an Acción Democrática Party government and that the military agree not to interfere with its plans for governing the country. The young officers acquiesced on all of these points.

Meanwhile President Medina Angarita had gotten wind of what was afoot, and on October 17, 1945, he ordered the arrest of a number of the military conspirators. As a result, although the uprising had not been planned for that date, it went forward on October 18. In the streets of Caracas there was bitter fighting in which the Acción Democrática civilians joined the rebels and Communists fought for the government forces. After several hours of conflict the uprising was victorious.

At the first meeting of the victorious army men with the Acción Democrática leaders the latter insisted that the conditions under which they had joined the uprising be fulfilled. It was agreed that four Acción Democrática leaders, Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, Gonzalo Barrios, and Luis Beltrán Prieto, as well as Edmundo Fernández, a politically independent civilian, would be named to the new Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno. The military men chose as their representatives on the Junta Major Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, the senior officer in the conspiracy, and Captain Mario Vargas, an officer closely associated with Acción Democrática.

During the next thirty-seven months the government of Venezuela was in the hands of the Acción Democrática Party. Rómulo Betancourt was president of the Revolutionary Junta until it gave way to the country's first popularly elected chief executive early in 1948. During this period he was, in effect, provisional president of Venezuela. The Junta as such existed only in name. After a few

weeks of separate meetings the Junta and the Cabinet started meeting jointly, since most of the members of the Junta also held cabinet posts. The individual cabinet members reported to Betancourt as if he were president of the republic.

This procedure did not come about because of any desire on the part of Rómulo Betancourt to monopolize power in the regime. It was a natural consequence of the fact that the revolutionary government was in fact a party government and Betancourt was the acknowledged popular leader of the party.

Rómulo Betancourt had earned his position of leadership. He was not only a consummate public speaker capable of haranguing a crowd, but also a serious student of the problems of his country and his hemisphere capable of providing ideas and inspiration for a group of intellectuals; and he had the respect and affection of all his associates. He possessed great organizing ability and knew how to delegate power and responsibility to others, yet constantly remaining aware of what they were doing or failing to do. He was equally capable of drawing up long-range plans and of making quick decisions in moments of crisis.

If there were any qualities which particularly marked Rómulo Betancourt, they were a tremendous dynamism, a staunch loyalty to his friends and associates, and a firm adherence to the principles in which he believed. Although he was an inveterate pipe smoker, the look of calmness and quiet which this habit frequently gave him was misleading. His personality was vigorous and unconsciously imposed itself upon those around him.

Like most popular leaders, Betancourt had the ability to get along with people of varied backgrounds and conditions, though he often maintained a certain aloofness, which, without annoying or disconcerting those with whom he was dealing, tended to accentuate his position of leadership. This quality was akin to the trait of a good teacher who knows how to be congenial and friendly with his students without ever passing over the line beyond which familiarity breeds contempt.

Betancourt's loyalty to his friends and associates was highlighted during a conversation which the author had with him when he was in exile in Puerto Rico. When Betancourt was asked which of his several periods of exile he had borne most tolerably, he replied,

"The one in 1940 when I was in Chile," and the reason which he gave for this was that during the dictatorship of that period the regime had not jailed, tortured, or persecuted its opponents, and so he was not preoccupied with thoughts of the fate of those friends who remained in Venezuela. His loyalty to friendship and principle was demonstrated too when, during the crisis preceding the fall of the Gallegos government, Betancourt refused to take any steps which might have seemed to place him in opposition to President Gallegos, even though that might have saved the situation for his party.

Betancourt's task was a hard one. He was one of the few civilian presidents in the history of the republic. The Army had always dominated Venezuela, and throughout the *Acción Democrática* regime there were elements in the armed forces which were jealous of the civilian control of the administration and sought to put full power back once again into the hands of the army officers. So long as he remained at the head of the regime Betancourt was able to handle these military folk. A supremely capable politician, he knew when to concede in minor details, but he also knew how to crack down energetically on military dissidents when a matter of principle was at stake. His successor was not so fortunate.

Once in power, Betancourt and *Acción Democrática* proceeded to carry out the program which they had been advocating for many years. In its general outlines this program was simple, consisting of three principal points. First, the party wanted to reorganize the political structure of the state to provide the widest possible degree of democracy. Second, it sought a readjustment of the relations with the foreign oil companies so as to provide Venezuela with a larger share of the return from the exploitation of its principal known natural resource. Third, the party advocated the use of this increased return so as to create an economic and social base which would be able to survive if something happened to petroleum.

President Betancourt and his colleagues moved swiftly to fulfill the first part of the *Acción Democrática* program—the establishment of full political democracy. A new election decree provided for universal adult suffrage, thus giving the vote to illiterates. Voting was to be by lists, each party having its list printed on different colored paper. On election day the voter would choose the list of the party

he wished to support and deposit it in the ballot box. There were strict regulations to assure the secrecy of the voting process.

Meanwhile the government was encouraging the formation of political parties representing the nation's various currents of political thought. Until the 1945 Revolution the only well organized parties had been Acción Democrática and the Communists. The Medina Angarita government had an "administration party," the Partido Democrático Venezolano, which owed its existence to its role as patronage dispenser and disappeared with the fall of the Medina regime.

Some thirteen political parties were legally recognized in the months following the October, 1945, Revolution. Most of these were very small and had little impact on the country's politics. Two new parties of major importance then made their appearance. The first was the Comité Popular Electoral Independiente, which came to be known by its initials as the COPEI. This party was organized by Dr. Rafael Caldera, a young Catholic lawyer who had first been named Attorney General by the Revolutionary Junta but soon disagreed with certain actions of the regime and withdrew. The COPEI proclaimed itself a Christian Social or Christian Democratic party, although it came to have within its ranks many of the country's more conservative elements. It was the majority in the mountainous states near the Colombian border, which were strongly Catholic. It was a good deal weaker in the rest of the country.

The second major party to appear was Unión Republicana Democrática. The URD was established under the leadership of Jóvito Villalba, one of the principal figures of the 1928 student movement against Gómez and one of the founders of the predecessor of Acción Democrática, the Partido Democrático Nacional; but he had quit its ranks in 1938. He had remained an independent until after the 1945 Revolution and under the Medina regime had been named a senator with the support of the administration. His party was of the moderate left, professing greater adherence to the principles of free enterprise than did Acción Democrática. Many figures prominent in the Medina regime joined the URD. During most of the AD period it was the most bitter and violent opponent of the administration.

The Communists had split into two groups, known as the Reds and the Blacks from the colors they adopted for electoral purposes. The division between the two groups dated back to the days of the Medina regime. The Black group had favored closer cooperation with Medina than had the Reds, and an informal break had occurred between the two factions at that time. After the October, 1945, uprising there were attempts to unify the two groups, but in the end they failed and two separate parties were established. The Reds took the name Partido Comunista de Venezuela and followed a policy of trying to ingratiate themselves with the Acción Democrática regime; the Blacks became the Partido Revolucionario del Proletariado (Comunista) and were frankly hostile to the AD government.

During the Acción Democrática regime three elections were held. The first, on October 27, 1946, was for members of a constituent assembly called to write a new basic document for the nation. Acción Democrática won a sizable majority, receiving 1,099,601 votes and seating 137 members in the Assembly. COPEI came in second with 185,347 votes and 19 Assemblymen. The URD was third with 53,875 votes and 2 seats. A joint ticket of the two Communist groups received 50,837 votes and also 2 members of the constituent assembly.

Once the new constitution was written, elections were called to pick the first popularly chosen president and to name members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Acción Democrática candidate, Rómulo Gallegos, won an overwhelming victory, receiving 871,752 votes. The AD also won 38 seats in the Senate and 83 in the Chamber. Rafael Caldera, running as the COPEI nominee, received 262,204 votes, and the party elected 6 senators and 38 deputies. The URD did not name a presidential candidate but elected 1 senator and 4 deputies. The Communists again put up a joint nominee for president but ran separate tickets for congress. Dr. Gustavo Machado, the Communist presidential candidate, received 36,514 votes; the Red Communists elected 1 senator and 3 members of the Chamber, though the Blacks did not get any congressmen.

Finally, under the administration of President Rómulo Gallegos, elections were held for municipal offices throughout the country.

Once again Acción Democrática had an overwhelming victory, winning control of all state legislatures and most municipalities, except in two states.

Rómulo Betancourt has told the author that the happiest day of his life was on October 27, 1946, the day the people of Venezuela went to the polls under universal suffrage to vote for their representatives to write a new democratic constitution. He felt that this was in many ways the high point of achievement of his career. It repudiated once and for all the idea that the people of Venezuela were "unprepared" to choose their own rulers. It was a justification for democracy in a country which had suffered under military dictatorships for virtually its whole national existence.

In retrospect, however, Betancourt and other AD leaders concluded that they had probably called the citizenry to the polls too often. The constant state of campaigning for most of the three years they were in power kept political temperatures at fever pitch throughout the period, and contributed an element of instability, giving ambitious military men a chance to fish in perturbed civilian political waters, and thus contributing considerably to the ultimate overthrow of the Acción Democrática regime by the Army.

Equally significant as the efforts to establish a democratic regime were the moves of Betancourt and his colleagues in the economic and social fields. One of their first acts was to come to grips with the petroleum problem. Acción Democrática had argued for many years that Venezuela was sharing too meagerly in the exploitation of its own natural resources. So Betancourt and his Minister of Development, Juan P. Pérez Alfonso, entered into negotiations with the oil firms almost immediately after the October, 1945, Revolution.

Out of these negotiations came the famous "50-50" formula which subsequently became standard throughout the oil-producing world. It was agreed that the Venezuelan government would receive 50 per cent of the profits of the Venezuelan oil industry. Part of the government's share would come in the form of the traditional royalty, which was somewhat increased. Another part would come in the form of a new income tax. The rest would be in the form of minor duties levied on the operations of the companies. It was agreed that the oil companies would open their books to the Venezuelan govern-

ment so as to determine what the real profits from the exploitation of the country's oil were. It was also agreed that the firms would calculate the sale of crude oil to other firms—even where these were associated with a common mother company—at such rates that the profits would not all be passed on to the processing part of the business.

For its part, the Acción Democrática government promised the oil companies that the petroleum industry would not be expropriated. The Acción Democrática leaders felt that the country was in no position at that time to attempt to administer the oil business. Even twelve years after the agreement with the oil firms Betancourt held the same opinion. In his monumental study of the Venezuelan oil industry and its effects on the nation, *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo*, he wrote (p. 235):

We had always rejected the possibility of applying, in the beginning of an administration with a revolutionary orientation, a measure similar to that which is the greatest claim to fame of the Mexican regime of Lázaro Cárdenas, because there are substantial differences between the situation of Mexico when it nationalized petroleum, and that of ourselves. Petroleum was and is in the Mexican economy a factor of importance, but complementing others of considerable size. As a result, the country did not experience a serious drawback to its normal evolution when the international oil cartel and the governments in agreement with it decreed the boycott of nationalized oil. In contrast, when we took over the government, practically all of the Venezuelan economy and an appreciable part of the fiscal activity of the government depended on petroleum. Of the foreign exchange with which Venezuela paid for its imports in 1944, the year before the Revolution of October, 92 per cent came from the petroleum industry. Of the \$326,000,000 which came into the country in that year, \$300,000,000 were obtained from the exploitation of this mineral. Some 31 per cent of the income in the Government's Budget came from taxes on hydrocarbons.

Instead of nationalization of the oil industry the Acción Democrática program for petroleum was designed to get the greatest possible contribution to Venezuela itself out of the exploitation of its subsoil resources. Betancourt outlined this program in the following terms (p. 236):

1. Increase of taxes to the limit then considered reasonable within the capitalist system and the market economy.

2. Competition by Venezuela, as an autonomous force, in the international petroleum market, selling directly its royalty oil.

3. Cessation of the system of giving concessions to private firms, and planning for a State enterprise to which would be given the power of exploiting, directly or through contracts with third parties, the national reserves.

4. Industrialization of the major part of Venezuelan petroleum within the country; and the organization of a national refinery, with State or mixed capital.

5. Adequate measures for the conservation of petroleum wealth, a typical non-renewable resource; and the utilization of the gas emanating from the wells, which had traditionally been lost.

6. Reinvestment by the companies having concessions of a part of their profits in the development of the agricultural and grazing economy.

7. Substantial improvements in wages, social services and living and working conditions of the workers, white-collar workers and technicians of Venezuelan nationality working in the industry.

8. Investment of a high percentage of the income obtained from the new tax policy on petroleum, in creating a diversified and independent Venezuelan economy.

The effect of this agreement with the oil firms was to increase immensely the government's income from the oil industry. Betancourt says the following on the increase of government revenue during 1947, the last full year that he was in office (p. 247):

The increase of the income of the State for the year 1947, from petroleum was 622.1 per cent greater than the income of 1938. . . . But the increase resulting from increased production of oil was only 130.9 per cent. That is to say that in 1947 an output one and one third greater than that of 1938 represented an increase to the State 5.6 times greater.

With these increased oil revenues the Acción Democrática regime set out to try to transform the economy and social life of the country. They were anxious to build up a more diversified economy, strengthening agriculture and expanding the nation's weak manufacturing industry. Its principal weapon in the field was the Corporación Ven-

ezolana de Fomento (Venezuelan Development Corporation), set up by the AD regime on the pattern of the successful Chilean Development Corporation.

According to the statutes of the Corporación, it was to receive at least 10 per cent of the government budget each year. This provision was honored so long as Acción Democrática remained in power. Through it large sums were made available to various projects for diversifying agricultural output. As a result the country subsequently became self-sufficient in sugar and rice, and output of other crops increased considerably.

Through the Corporación de Fomento, funds were provided to the Banco Agrícola y Pecuário for the extension of credits to agriculturists. During the Acción Democrática regime such credits almost doubled. Short-term loans for financing current crops almost tripled in value, and the number of farmers receiving this type of help increased from 14,146 in 1945 to 81,093 in 1948. At the same time the Banco Agrícola y Pecuário established the policy of guaranteeing minimum prices to the agriculturist.

As a result of the policies followed by the Banco Agrícola y Pecuário during the Acción Democrática regime production of basic food products increased significantly. According to Betancourt (p. 328), the increases in certain key products were as follows:

TABLE 1

	<i>Metric Tons</i>	
	1945	1948
Sugar cane	1,950,000	2,370,000
Peas	8,000	16,000
Beans	8,000	18,017
Potatoes	9,185	16,000

In addition to augmenting the facilities of the Banco Agrícola y Pecuário, the Acción Democrática regime undertook to encourage mechanization of agriculture and built sizable irrigation projects in various parts of the country. Importation of agricultural machinery by the government increased considerably. The number of tractors brought from the United States, for instance, increased from 519 units in 1945 to 2,105 in 1948.

Rómulo Betancourt has summed up the Acción Democrática government's work in the field of agriculture in the following terms (p. 331):

We do not attempt to claim any extraordinary importance for the things actually achieved during the Government of A.D., insofar as the increase in the physical volume of agricultural production is concerned. These achievements, in terms of tons, were of limited importance, because they were achieved without the fulfillment of a profound agrarian reform, without having extended mechanization to all of the rural zones. They are important, above all, as a decisive argument to refute a thesis which was deeply imbedded in the national consciousness: that agricultural development was impossible in Venezuela, which was condemned to "enjoy the sun while it lasted"; and to feed itself only so long as there was petroleum to pay for imports from abroad of virtually everything which was consumed.

Acción Democrática's government was also firmly committed to a policy of industrialization. Betancourt has stated its objectives in this way (p. 384):

The Development Corporation, charged with fulfilling the industrialization program of the democratic regime, conceived of this process as taking place in four stages. It was not our intention to imitate that which the Government of Perón was undertaking at the same time, that is, to artificially force the process of industrialization for reasons of national prestige and for other less defensible purposes.

The first stage was to stimulate basic industries: electricity, without which development of industry is impossible; and those related to human welfare, such as foodstuffs, clothing, fuel and housing. In this first stage, it was proposed to increase and improve the technology of extractive industries other than petroleum, and stimulate certain industries related to industrial chemistry.

In the second stage were included industries complementary to those already named; in the third stage, medium heavy industries were to be pushed, and in the fourth step, the production of machines, heavy industry. But there was no rigid formula, only a working guide, to be carried out with flexibility.

In carrying out this policy the government gave particular help to the production of edible oils and canned fish, flour mills, and

a fertilizer factory. The textile industry was given special attention. The Development Corporation advanced credits of 20 million bolívars to this industry, the production of which increased approximately 25 per cent during the three years of AD rule.

A great deal of attention was paid to the electrification of the country. Betancourt notes that the number of installed plants doubled in 1946-47, rising from 322 to 600, and the number of towns served by electricity increased from 319 to 616 (p. 392). A general electrification plan was drawn up with the technical aid of Brus and Roe, Inc., of New York.

Finally, attention was centered on the possibility of establishing an iron and steel industry in Venezuela. Vast iron-ore resources had been discovered in the Orinoco River Valley, and the AD government entered into negotiations with the United States Steel Corporation. The company wanted concessions in the Cerro Bolívar area, and the proposal of the AD regime was to tie these concessions in with the construction of transportation facilities in the region and with the establishment of an iron and steel plant. These negotiations had not been completed when the *Acción Democrática* government was overthrown. Although its successor granted a concession to United States Steel, it needed seven years more of "study" before an arrangement was made with a European firm to establish a steel company under conditions which were strongly criticized after the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in 1958.

Rómulo Betancourt has summed up the results of the *Acción Democrática's* efforts to diversify the Venezuelan economy and to stimulate industrialization in the following terms (pp. 406-407):

. . . All this has relative importance in the face of a fundamental fact: we had demonstrated with deeds, in agriculture as well as in industry, that it *was* possible to stimulate specifically Venezuelan production. We showed that it was mere speculation of those who were afraid to act and were prophets of defeatism to insist that the country must continue to depend only on petroleum. If the State undertook a creative role of encouraging, orienting and stimulating specifically Venezuelan production, the industrious spirit and the will to work of the people of our land would do the rest. The results obtained in three years in the various fields of economic activity provide an impressive list of achievements to sustain this optimistic thesis.

One of the most interesting projects undertaken by the Betancourt administration was the accord between the Corporación de Fomento and Nelson Rockefeller's International Basic Economy Corporation, which was the result of the Acción Democrática regime's interest in having the oil companies invest some of their profits in the economy of Venezuela. The International Basic Economy Corporation, in which some of the oil companies had an interest, agreed to establish a number of enterprises in Venezuela which would contribute to strengthening the nation's economy. The IBEC would put up 50 per cent of the capital, and the Corporación de Fomento would contribute the other half. It was agreed that within ten years IBEC would sell its interest to Venezuelans, so that the companies would within that time become completely national in ownership.

In addition to trying to stimulate and diversify the nation's economy, the Acción Democrática regime was anxious to build up what Betancourt calls its "social capital," that is, its people. Great emphasis was laid on education and health projects. The number of children in elementary and secondary schools increased in the three years of AD rule from 142,500 to 522,000. During the three years of the AD administration some 5,000 new schoolrooms were opened. Special emphasis was given to teacher training, and enrollment in normal schools rose from 1,200 students in 5 schools to 4,500 students in 12 schools between 1945 and 1948.

Schools were built out in the countryside as well as in the capital cities of the states. For the first time thousands of rural children were given a chance to get an education. Aside from trying to make up for lost time in an area which had been virtually abandoned hitherto, the Betancourt and Gallegos governments were anxious to try to slow down the drift of people to the cities, which was damaging the nation's agriculture and undermining its economy in general. Hence it tried to take education and other social services to the rural areas.

A large hospital building program was undertaken. In 1947 alone, hospitals with 660 beds were completed, and new ones with a capacity of 1,600 beds were started. In addition, the social security system, which had been begun by Medina Angarita and which put most of its emphasis on health insurance, was extended from Car-

acas, where it had first been established, to several of the interior cities.

The government undertook a large housing program. The Medina regime had started public housing but had concentrated principally on constructing several large apartment projects in Caracas. The AD administration, on the other hand, followed a policy of building housing projects in the interior as well as in Caracas, generally building individual homes rather than apartment blocks.

During 1946-47 the Betancourt administration constructed 5,000 houses, six and a half times the capacity of Medina's El Silencio project in Caracas and twice as many as had been built since the Workers Housing Bank had originally been established in 1929. The work was gaining further momentum during 1948, when the government, through the Workers Housing Bank, invested almost 60 million bolívares in public housing.

In the field of labor relations, too, the Betancourt and Gallegos regimes followed an active policy. Soon after the Revolution the government put its weight behind large-scale wage increases. To modify the impact on prices the government undertook a program to subsidize a number of the basic necessities. As a result, although wage levels rose some 64.7 per cent between 1944 and 1948, the cost of living rose only 29.4 per cent during this period. There was thus a considerable increase in real wages.

The Acción Democrática government gave its blessing to the expansion of the trade-union movement. At the time it took power there were a few more than two hundred recognized unions in Venezuela. By the middle of 1948 there were more than nine hundred. For the first time trade-unionism spread to the countryside, where unions had never been permitted before. There were by the middle of 1948 some three hundred agricultural workers' unions. The total number of union members rose in that period from 20,000 to 125,000.

The great majority of the unions were under the leadership of members of Acción Democrática. Minority elements were controlled by the two Communist groups. Unions in various industries and trades were brought together to form federations, and a regional federation of unions was also established in each state. Finally, late in 1947 the various union groups under Acción Democrática and Red Communist control joined to establish the Confederación de

Trabajadores de Venezuela. The Black Communists remained outside this and had control of only one federation, a minority group in Caracas and vicinity. Early in 1948 the Red Communist oil workers' unions were forced out of the Federation of Petroleum Workers and set up their own federation.

Collective bargaining was encouraged. In February, 1948, the first nation-wide collective agreement was signed between the various oil companies operating in the country and the Federation of Petroleum Workers. It established unprecedentedly high wages in the nation's chief industry and provided various fringe benefits for the workers. It was widely hailed as one of the best collective agreements to be found in the oil industry anywhere in the world.

Perhaps the most important element of the international policy of the Acción Democrática government was the strengthening of economic relations with the neighboring countries of Colombia and Ecuador. The preliminary basis for a customs union of the three countries was laid, and the first step toward joint economic activity was taken with the establishment of a common merchant fleet, the Flota Mercante Gran Colombia.

The perspective which Betancourt had concerning the Flota Gran Colombia and what might come after it was shown in the message which he sent to President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia in April, 1946, upon the occasion of the Colombian government's acceptance of the idea of a joint merchant fleet. Betancourt wrote:

. . . the hour has come to go beyond the old Americanist rhetoric, substituting for it a realistic, positive and creative policy. To exalt common heroes in an historic fraternal endeavor should continue to be an emotional stimulus for Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. But along with it we must provide our peoples with those "elements of execution" which Your Excellence mentions, to consolidate in the economic field the political independence achieved by the liberating generation. We have taken a great step in this direction and we must let nothing deter our intention that other steps will follow. After the Gran Colombia fleet must come tariff agreements, the unification of public service charges, joint efforts to see that our mines and other sources of natural wealth will be safeguarded for the use of present and future generations by similar legislation. Isolated and jealous of

one another, we will continue to be weak; united we may recover the lost rank which we once had in America. . . .²

The *Acción Democrática* regime accomplished enough during its three years in office to win widespread approbation among the people. Its administration was not besmirched, as were those of some similar popular parties in nearby countries, by any significant degree of graft or corruption.

However, there have been various criticisms leveled against the *Acción Democrática* administrations, particularly that of Betancourt. Some of these are worthy of investigation. It has been argued that the regime was "demagogic" because it sponsored general wage increases throughout the economy. In reply Betancourt argued that *Acción Democrática* came to power at a period in which Venezuelan oil was in great demand, the country was quite prosperous, and the economy could well stand such wage increases. Furthermore, he maintained that they served to expand the market inside Venezuela, thus providing a securer base for the economic-development projects which the regime undertook.

Second, the Betancourt administration has been criticized for what is alleged to have been the vengeance it wreaked on members of the regime which it overthrew. It is true that President Medina, ex-President López Contreras, and various members of their administrations were forced into exile. It is also true that special courts were established to investigate and punish alleged graft and corruption which had taken place during the two previous administrations.

However, Betancourt and other members of his government have maintained that many of those who remained abroad during this period did so of their own choice, not because the AD regime forced them to do so. Betancourt has also maintained that Medina, López Contreras, and some others were unwilling to accept the decision of popular suffrage in the various elections held under *Acción Democrática* and were trying to bring about a change in the regime by conspiracies and force. Furthermore, the AD leaders have argued the mere fact that corruption was not punished under López Contreras and Medina Angarita was no reason why it should not be punished under Betancourt. *Acción Democrática*, they have main-

tained, was trying to set an example of honest government, and one part of that attempt was the establishment of severe penalties in the case of corruption.

The AD regime was also accused of roughly handling certain of its political opponents, particularly members of the Unión Republicana Democrática. Certainly various leaders of URD were jailed for short periods under Betancourt. The charges against them were that they were conspiring with military elements against the regime. Subsequently, after the experience with the military dictatorship which followed Acción Democrática, URD leaders were inclined to modify their previous criticisms of the AD regime on the score of supposed undemocratic behavior.

Finally, the AD regime, and Rómulo Betancourt personally, have been strongly attacked for the way in which they came into power in the first place. Many have argued that Acción Democrática betrayed its own democratic professions when it seized power in collaboration with a faction of the Army. The author believes that the AD's actions were justified. The Acción Democrática leaders themselves maintain that the young army officers would have overthrown Medina Angarita in any case and that, had they done so without the alliance with a strong civilian party, the tragic events which followed the November, 1948, *coup d'état* might have occurred three years earlier. Furthermore, their three years in power gave the Acción Democrática leaders a chance to prove in practice not only their professions of faith in democracy but also their belief in a program of drastic but peaceful economic and social change, and their determination to carry out such a policy. Perhaps the final argument to refute these criticisms is the fact that in three years in office they won firm enough support among the people that even after nine years of unprecedented terror against them they were able to return in 1958 as the majority party once again.

In general, the balance of the Acción Democrática tenure in office was an immensely favorable one. Under AD for the first time there existed freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and there were honest elections in which the whole adult population was able to participate. Serious attempts were started to get under way a diversification of the economy using funds made available through new arrangements with the oil companies. The welfare of the humble

citizen was the first preoccupation of the regime, and expenditures on education, public health, and housing were increased tremendously, both in absolute amounts and as percentages of total government expenditures. The Acción Democrática, under Betancourt's leadership, gave a good example of what can be done by a government of the Democratic Left to bring about necessary social changes, diversify and strengthen the economy, and build a solid foundation for political democracy.

Perhaps the greatest error of Acción Democrática under Betancourt's leadership was to bring about the election of Rómulo Gallegos as president of Venezuela. Gallegos is a world-famous novelist, an exceedingly fine and humane person, but not a capable politician. In the face of the long history of military rule in Venezuela and the restiveness of the Army under civilian control during the Betancourt regime, the first democratically elected civilian president should have been a man of political talent. He should have been someone who knew when to compromise and when to act.

Unfortunately Rómulo Gallegos was not such a politician. He was named by his party because he was its titular leader during the Betancourt period, because he was a man with a wide international reputation and because he was greatly admired and loved in Venezuela itself. He was not named because of his political experience nor, above all, for his ability to handle the Army.

Rómulo Gallegos was inaugurated early in 1948 in ceremonies attended by distinguished delegations from all of the American countries, the United States delegation being appropriately headed by the poet and essayist Archibald MacLeish. The inauguration was a splendid affair, and democracy in Venezuela seemed secure. However, only a few months later Gallegos was deposed and in exile.

The cause of Gallegos' downfall was a small group of ambitious military men headed by Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The colonel had been chief of the general staff in the early part of the Betancourt administration, but he had aroused the suspicions of Betancourt as well as of other army chiefs and had been sent off to be military attaché in Argentina. President Gallegos had let him return to Venezuela, and Pérez Jiménez soon began organizing a conspiracy against the regime.

The existence of the conspiracy was rumored during the summer

of 1948 and became public knowledge early in November. The group of army officers headed by Pérez Jiménez presented the government an ultimatum demanding that the one-party rule of Acción Democrática be ended by converting it into a party-army administration. They demanded further that "extremists" within the party be curbed.

For more than three weeks President Gallegos did little or nothing to suppress this conspiracy and arrest its principal figures. The leaders of the labor movement urged that he permit them to call a general strike in support of the regime, but this offer was turned down. Elements in the Army loyal to the regime urged him to arrest Pérez Jiménez and other conspirators. Some army people even came to ex-President Betancourt and urged him to take command and arrest Pérez Jiménez and the others, but he refused, since this would have been tantamount to overturning the Gallegos government.

Efforts were made to dissuade Pérez Jiménez and the others from their course of action. Major Mario Vargas, the army leader closest to Acción Democrática and to Betancourt, who was sick in a tuberculosis hospital in Saranac Lake, New York, flew back to Venezuela with this purpose in mind. He failed.

Finally, seeing that the President was not going to take any action against the conspirators, Vargas and Gallegos' Minister of War, Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, finally joined the movement with the hope of diverting it into less harmful channels. With their adhesion the coup against Gallegos was completed. The President was deposed and sent into exile. Other leaders of the overthrown government were also arrested and deported. The moderating influence of Delgado Chalbaud and Vargas served for little because, a few days after the overthrow of Gallegos, Acción Democrática was declared illegal. In February, 1949, after a strike in the oil fields, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela and the Federation of Petroleum Workers were outlawed, and the freedom of the labor movement was destroyed.

Meanwhile Rómulo Betancourt, after a short period in hiding, sought refuge in a foreign embassy and, after considerable international pressure was exerted on the military dictatorship, was allowed to go into exile. He went first to Washington, but a few months later moved to Havana, where he stayed until the *coup d'état* of

General Fulgencio Batista in March, 1952, when he moved to Costa Rica. He stayed there until 1955, when, because of growing pressure by the Venezuelan regime on the government of Costa Rica, he moved to Puerto Rico to avoid further embarrassing the administration of José Figueres. He remained in Puerto Rico until a couple of months before the overthrow of the military dictatorship in January, 1958.

These nine years and more were a time of trial and tribulation for Betancourt, Acción Democrática, and the people of Venezuela. The country was ruled by an increasingly tyrannical dictatorship, the party was driven deeply underground, and Betancourt was hounded from one country to another, in constant danger of being assassinated by agents of the dictatorship's secret police.

The military men, after overthrowing President Gallegos, established a three-man Military Junta, composed of Colonel Delgado Chalbaud, Lieutenant Colonel Pérez Jiménez, and Lieutenant Colonel Llovera Pérez, to run the country. So long as Delgado Chalbaud remained head of the Junta many of the fundamental policies of the Acción Democrática regime in social and economic matters were kept intact, and the dictatorship itself was relatively mild. However, in November, 1950, Colonel Delgado Chalbaud was kidnaped, taken to a place outside Caracas, and killed. The man who was officially charged with responsibility for this murder, General Rafael Urbina, was shot by the police, so that he did not live to implicate those who were in the conspiracy with him.

As a result of the death of Delgado Chalbaud, Colonel Pérez Jiménez became the dominant member of the Junta. As figurehead president of the Junta a civilian, Dr. Germán Suarez Flamerich, was chosen. With the reorganization of the Junta the regime became increasingly tyrannical. During the next few months one secretary general of the underground Acción Democrática organization, Leonardo Ruiz Pineda, was shot dead in the streets of Caracas. Another, his successor, Alberto Carnevali, was allowed to die in jail without receiving adequate medical treatment. The party was ruthlessly persecuted, and its leaders were jailed by the hundreds.

In December, 1952, the Junta made the mistake of allowing elections for a new constituent assembly. It apparently felt that the

people were sufficiently cowed that they could afford the luxury of "constitutionalizing" the regime. However, the Junta was in for a rude shock.

Acción Democrática, of course, was not allowed to participate in the elections, though its supporters were not disqualified from voting. However, there were three parties which did participate—COPEI, Unión Republicana Democrática, and a pro-government group organized for the occasion, the so-called Frente Electoral Independiente. Campaigning was relatively free, and the votes were honestly cast. However, when the results came in it began to be clear that the URD had won a strong victory, the COPEI had shown its traditional strength in the mountain states, and the pro-government FEI had come in a poor third.

The reasons for the URD victory in this election have been widely discussed and disputed since 1952. The URD leaders, naturally, claimed that the victory showed that they had the support of the great majority of the people. Acción Democrática leaders have maintained that the URD victory was due to the fact that AD supported the Unión Republicana Democrática. COPEI leaders have told the writer that in part at least the URD victory was due to the fact that the mass of the people were violently against the government and wanted to show this by voting for the more extreme of the two legal opposition groups.

Whatever the reasons for their victory, the URD leaders were not allowed to enjoy it. Pérez Jiménez executed a coup, announcing that the counting of ballots was "temporarily" suspended, that he was taking over as provisional president. Meanwhile all URD leaders were rounded up and promptly deported. Shortly afterward Pérez Jiménez announced that the FEI had won "an overwhelming victory" and that the new constitutional assembly would meet in January, 1953.

Only the FEI members of the assembly gathered, most of the representatives of the COPEI and URD who had been granted posts by Pérez Jiménez refusing to attend. The body wrote a new constitution which changed the name of the country from Estados Unidos de Venezuela to República de Venezuela and granted the president virtually dictatorial powers. Its last act was to name Colonel Pérez Jiménez as "constitutional" president.

The Pérez Jiménez regime was one of the most scandalous and tyrannical that Latin America has seen in the present century. The oil boom provided the government with vast sums of money, which were spent lavishly in imposing buildings, grand boulevards, and the world's most expensive officers' club in Caracas, and a large road-building program in the interior. Most of the projects for development of agriculture started by the AD and continued with less enthusiasm by the Military Junta under Delgado Chalbaud were brought to a halt, and the Corporación de Fomento's funds were choked off. The programs for education and public health were drastically reduced, while the military budget skyrocketed.

Corruption was rife. Firms could not do business with the government without paying graft. All the leading figures of the regime enriched themselves, and the *New York Times* reported soon after his fall that Pérez Jiménez himself had piled up a fortune estimated at \$235,000,000. Graft ran from top to bottom, and it was not unusual for a citizen to be stopped by a traffic policeman with an arbitrary demand for \$20 on pain of being brought in "for resisting an officer" if he refused to pay.

The tyranny of the Pérez Jiménez regime matched its corruption. A notorious concentration camp was established at Guasina in the jungles of the Orinoco. The descriptions of conditions there would curdle one's blood. In the jails of San Juan de los Morros and the Penitenciaría Nacional the most barbarous tortures were used. The author has talked to many who suffered them and lived to tell about it. Many other victims were not so lucky.

Members of all the political parties suffered the same treatment, though the Acción Democrática people were by far the most severely and thoroughly persecuted group. Members of all parties were deported by the thousands. By the end of the Pérez Jiménez regime no political party, not even the FEI, was allowed to function openly in Venezuela.

Nor did the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship confine its persecution of the opposition within Venezuela. A young military officer, Lieutenant León Droz Blanco, who had opposed the regime and, after being arrested and tortured, had been deported to Baranquilla, Colombia, was shot dead in the streets there. Several attempts were made on the life of Rómulo Betancourt.

In spite of its unsavory reputation the Pérez Jiménez regime enjoyed the support and acclaim of most other American governments. Late in 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower bestowed upon Pérez Jiménez the Legion of Merit for his actions "before and after becoming President." He received decorations from other governments of the hemisphere. Only Costa Rica, under José Figueres, showed any hesitation about treating Pérez Jiménez as a worthy leader of the "free world." Don Pepe's government refused to send a delegation to the Tenth Inter-American Conference when it met in Caracas in April, 1954, explaining that it could not be a guest of such a tyrant.

It was not until the last months of the regime that Pérez Jiménez began to fall into bad repute with other American rulers. The government of Argentina cut off diplomatic relations because of Pérez Jiménez' friendship for Perón, who had taken up residence in Caracas. The Chilean government broke off relations because it discovered that Pérez Jiménez' government was censoring Chilean diplomatic mail.

Throughout the Pérez Jiménez regime Rómulo Betancourt directed the struggle against it. He remained the undisputed leader of Acción Democrática and coordinated the work of the members of the party in exile with the work of those in the underground organization inside Venezuela. He was in constant correspondence with both the exiles and those remaining in the country.

At the same time Betancourt was active as a journalist and writer. He was a regular contributor to the Cuban magazine *Bohemia*, which circulates throughout Latin America, and wrote for other periodicals as well. He worked for several years on his monumental book on Venezuela called *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo*, in which he drew a detailed picture of the economic, social, and political impact of the rise of the petroleum industry on his country, and gave a detailed history of the position which his party had taken on the problem before, during, and after it had power.

Betancourt did his utmost to tell the rest of America the story of the Venezuelan dictatorship and of the people's struggle against it. He made a trip around South America in 1954, conferring with Acción Democrática exiles, talking with members of various governments, giving press interviews, and writing for the local papers. He several times presented petitions to the Human Rights Commission

of the United Nations giving names of those who had been jailed, tortured, and killed by the Pérez Jiménez regime, and asking action against the regime.

During much of his exile Rómulo Betancourt lived in territory of the United States, either on the continent or in the island of Puerto Rico. He always maintained close contacts with the United States labor movement and with the liberals, Socialists, and others interested in Latin America who made up the North American Committee of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom.

Betancourt was one of the founders of the Inter-American Association, which was established at a conference in Havana in May, 1950. There he stressed his belief in the need for unity of the liberal-minded folk of both parts of the hemisphere. In his speech closing the conference, Betancourt said:

. . . Perhaps for the first time in the history of this part of the world there has met such a numerous group of personalities of the United States and Latin America to seek, apart from the prudent conclaves of diplomacy, the road towards a better tomorrow. This shows how the idea that liberty is indivisible is gaining ground. . . . This conjunction of forces of English- and Spanish-speaking free men is an explicit recognition of the fact that in the United States there coexist and struggle with the advocates of "dollar diplomacy" strong idealistic groups which sincerely support liberty, democracy and progress for all the Americas.³

Almost seven years later, at a luncheon given in his honor by the North American Committee of the Inter-American Association, Betancourt returned once again to this theme of the need for unity among liberal forces throughout the hemisphere:

I must recognize, and I do so without difficulty and in an elemental spirit of justice, and to serve the truth loyally, that the United States labor movement together with that of Latin America has given continuous support to our efforts to obtain in Venezuela a regime of law, respectful of public liberties. And I must add more. The way in which qualified representatives of the political, intellectual and trade union world of the United States have spoken confirms a thesis defended and propagated by democratic political movements of Latin America which do not worship at the altars of chauvinistic dema-

goguery. This is that there is a radical difference between Big Capital in this country, whose investors in our countries do not show belief in the normality of democratic processes and more often than not prefer to get along with and negotiate with irresponsible and venal dictatorships rather than representative governments; and the people, the good people, of the United States. The best spokesmen for this people frequently attack the mistaken foreign policies of their government, and coincide with us sincerely on two basic questions: the right of our nations to self-determination and the adequate enjoyment of our natural resources; and the necessity that there be in them freely elected governments, respectful of human rights and imparters of social justice.⁴

Returning in the same speech to the problem of United States support of Latin American dictators, Betancourt commented:

Those people are mistaken who believe that in Latin America only the Communist minorities are resentful of the foreign policy of the United States in the area. The Communists practice what has been called with justice "strategic hatred" of everything North American. But apart from those minorities, vast political workingclass and intellectual groups of undoubted democratic orientation have felt more than once that they have been defrauded by United States policy. It is not conceivable in Latin America that the same person can call upon peoples to support struggles for liberty in Korea and give medals to dictators. It is not understood why the friendship of the dictators who will disappear is preferred to that of the peoples who will remain. A statesman of this country—Franklin Delano Roosevelt—understood that the path of Inter-American relations must be different from this and that it must be based on the express recognition of the profound democratic conviction of our peoples.

Betancourt also dealt in passing with another theme which he stressed frequently in his years of exile when discussing Inter-American relations, when he commented:

The Latin American peoples also insist that there be a plan for the development and financing of their backward economies. There is not much optimism concerning the results of the coming meeting in Washington of the personal representatives of the Chiefs of State of the continent, and it is feared that the proposed Inter-American Eco-

conomic Conference of Buenos Aires will end once again with Platonic resolutions instead of concrete and dynamic agreements. But I cannot leave this subject without saying that a large part of the fault for this situation rests with the demonstrated incapacity of the Latin American governments to draw up a common plan and present it for discussion with representatives of the United States. With honorable exceptions, the representatives of those governments come to Inter-American economic meetings to present and defend their small local problem. The lesson of Bandung has not aroused any echo as yet in Hispano America.

During his long period of exile Betancourt had time to restudy his own political history and to decide where he and his party had made mistakes and where they had acted correctly. One conclusion to which he came was that one of the weaknesses of the regime from 1945-48 had been the hostility of the civilian political parties toward one another. Having come to this conclusion Betancourt tried long and earnestly to reach an agreement with the other two principal democratic parties, COPEI and the Unión Republicana Democrática, whereby they would agree, without losing their ideological and political identity, to limit their opposition to one another exclusively to the civilian political field. He felt that they all had to learn that they might win or lose, but they should never either persecute one another or resort to conspiracy with the military in order to upset a constituted democratic regime.

These efforts finally bore fruit in January, 1958, when the leaders of all three parties—Betancourt of AD, Rafael Caldera of the COPEI, and Jóvito Villalba of the URD—were temporarily exiles in New York. There they reached an agreement to work together for the reestablishment of democratic constitutional government and pledged themselves to cooperate to preserve it at all costs once it was achieved.

Rómulo Betancourt remained an optimist throughout the nine years of the dictatorship. Sometimes the author had the feeling that Betancourt's was the forced optimism of the exile, the element which made it possible to continue to live, though on foreign soil, unable to return to a sadly abused and distraught homeland. But Betancourt always maintained his faith that sooner or later the dictatorship would be gotten rid of. He was never one of those who sub-

mitted to the easy theory that his country was "unprepared" for democracy. He continued to function always as the leader of the political party which represented the "alternate government" of his country.

Finally, in January, 1958, Betancourt's optimism was justified. After an abortive revolutionary attempt by the Venezuelan Air Force on January 1, an uprising of the people of Caracas and other principal cities finally forced the military men around Pérez Jiménez to order him on January 23 to leave the country and give up the "golden egg" which he had been hatching for so long.

Betancourt remained in New York for about a month after the Revolution of January 23, 1958. When he finally returned, he was greeted at the El Silencio Square in Caracas by a crowd of 40,000 people, the largest number that had met to receive any of the returning exiles. He immediately threw himself into the work of rebuilding Acción Democrática and of getting acquainted once again with the country from which he had been absent for more than nine years. He was accepted once again as the unquestioned leader of Acción Democrática, though he and other returning exiles agreed to leave most of the party machinery for the time being in the hands of the young former underground leaders who had carried on the struggle inside the country during the last months of the Pérez Jiménez regime.

In August, 1958, Acción Democrática held its first open congress in ten years, and Betancourt was confirmed once again as the party's principal spokesman. The party adopted a new political program which took into account the considerable economic and social changes which had occurred in Venezuela since the original party program was adopted in 1941.

Meanwhile the Provisional Government which had taken over upon the fall of Pérez Jiménez moved rapidly toward reestablishing a constitutional regime. In preparation for the election there were prolonged negotiations among the leaders of the three democratic parties seeking agreement on a joint candidate for president. However, when these negotiations finally broke down a few weeks before the election, each group named its own candidate.

As was to be expected, Rómulo Betancourt was the choice of Acción Democrática. In a hard-fought campaign, in which he made an extensive tour throughout the country, Betancourt amply de-

feated his two rivals, Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, backed by URD, and Rafael Caldera of the COPEI. Betancourt received 49 per cent of the total vote, and Acción Democrática received an absolute majority in both houses of Congress.

Upon his inauguration on February 13, 1959, Betancourt organized a coalition administration with cabinet members and other officials drawn from all three democratic parties. The new regime set about the fulfillment of a program which was essentially that of the first Betancourt administration brought up to date and now backed by all three of the nation's major parties. Early in 1960 a thoroughgoing agrarian reform law was passed, and a program for distributing land to all the nation's landless agricultural workers was gotten under way. Meanwhile the government sought to "sow petroleum" through extensive programs for economic development, irrigation, education, public health, and housing. It also began a fundamental change in petroleum policy with the establishment late in 1960 of the government-owned Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation, which took over oil concession lands given up by the international oil companies operating in the country. The ultimate objective of the new firm is to take over all concessions as they expire in the next quarter of a century.

The program of social transformation of the Betancourt regime took on added significance as a result of the Castro Revolution in Cuba. Both the Betancourt and Castro regimes were carrying out generally similar programs of agrarian change, economic development, and social reform. However, the Betancourt government was doing all this while remaining a democratic regime, elected by the people and respectful of the rights of all of the citizens, whereas the Castro regime adopted a Jacobin attitude of increasing disregard for democratic procedures and the rights of those who in any way disagreed with the regime. By the end of 1960 it appeared as if the fate of much of Latin America might well depend upon the relative success of the Betancourt and Castro methods of carrying out a social revolution.

The pro-Castro forces in Venezuela were quite frankly seeking the overthrow of Betancourt by the end of 1960. These forces included the Communists, a dissident group of expelled ADers who organized the so-called *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*,

and part of the URD, which abandoned the coalition government in November 1960.

As during the previous period when Acción Democrática was in power, a major challenge to the regime came from discontented military men. During the first year of the administration several plots were discovered, and in April, 1960, the garrison of San Cristóbal, near the frontier with Colombia, mutinied, but its example was not followed by the military in the rest of the republic. In July, 1960, President Betancourt narrowly escaped assassination, which was officially laid by the government of Venezuela at the door of the government of dictator Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

The attitude of the military had changed substantially from the period of the 1940's. Although during the Pérez Jiménez regime Betancourt had been pictured to the army officers as a veritable ogre, upon his return in 1958 he succeeded in winning wide respect among the officers and enlisted men of all the country's military services. The rise of the Castro regime almost simultaneously with the inauguration of Betancourt as president convinced many military men that it was essential for the national security of the nation that his administration succeed.

Rómulo Betancourt's career, though a stormy one, has established him as one of the principal leaders and spokesmen for the Democratic Left in Latin America. His reputation is a continental one, and his words are listened to far beyond the borders of his own country. This is due not merely to the fact that he has been president of one of the richest and fastest-growing nations of the hemisphere. Through the policies he has followed in power and through his written and spoken statements Betancourt has clearly outlined a policy which finds wide echo in Latin America.

Rómulo Betancourt has stood forth as a strong champion of political democracy, both when in opposition and when in power. He has stood for a program of economic development and diversification, and has shown in practice the possibilities of such a program. He has shown concern for the welfare of the humbler part of his country's citizenry by commencing an agrarian reform program and supporting the development of a strong trade-union movement and collective bargaining, as well as by sponsoring the extension of labor and social security legislation. Finally, he has advocated, and when

in office has put into effect, a program of moderate yet definite economic nationalism. He has conceived of a Venezuelan nationalist program as not only involving the retention for his country of the largest possible share of benefits from the exploitation of its own natural resources, but as the strengthening of his nation's economy through joint action and possible economic union with his neighbors. He has spoken as a Latin American nationalist almost as much as a Venezuelan one.

The policies and program which Rómulo Betancourt has advocated and sought to put into practice are the basic platform of the forces seeking a democratic social revolution in Latin America.

"Pepe" Figueres: Dreamer and Man of Action



Radio listeners in San José, capital of Costa Rica, who tuned in their sets at seven o'clock on the evening of July 7, 1942, were surprised to hear an unknown orator, speaking in a flat but intense voice, deliver a violent attack on the government of the day. Halfway through his planned speech the speaker suddenly hesitated, then said these final words:

The police have told me to keep quiet. I shall not be able to say that which I believe should be said. But I can sum it up in a few words: What the Government should do is get out! . . .

His talk suddenly ended, the speaker was seized, dragged from the microphone by the police, and whisked off to jail. The next day he was hurried into exile—a national hero.

This was the first appearance on the political scene of José Figueres, who was to become the principal spokesman in Central America of the Democratic Left. This speech marked the introduction to politics of the man who was twice to become president of Costa Rica and was to put an end to a long-drawn-out crisis in that country's political life, setting in motion new currents which have not yet subsided.

Costa Rica had long been known as the most democratic nation of Central America. It did not have the racial problems which plagued some of its neighbors. Its agricultural life was marked by relatively wide distribution of landownership. For over a quarter of a century two outstandingly democratic figures, Clemente González Víquez and Ricardo Jiménez had alternated in the presidency. A disciple of Jiménez, León Cortés, continued the democratic tradition from 1936 to 1940.

However, there was a fatal weakness in Costa Rica's democracy. It was the fact that this was in the finest sense of the phrase an "oligarchical democracy." The political life of the country was dominated by the well-to-do classes. Although the people in each election had a chance to choose between rival candidates selected from among the oligarchical group, they played little part in deciding who should run.

The result was that little attention was paid by the governing classes to the welfare of the workers and peasants of Costa Rica. Meanwhile the younger generation, particularly the young intellectuals, grew increasingly restless with the regime. During the 1930's a number of these youths found an outlet for their discontent in the Communist Party, which had been established by one of them, Manuel Mora, in 1929. However, many other young people were not satisfied with the foreignness of the Communist Party and did not really find their political path until the advent of Figueres.

Figueres' speech of July 7, 1942, brought him from obscurity to national prominence and created a new political figure of first rank in the small Central American republic. It was probably inevitable that the wildest of rumors should spread about who this man was. Some stories circulated that José Figueres was in fact a Spaniard, not a Costa Rican. Others reported that he had fought in the Spanish Civil War, though there was no agreement concerning which side he had served. Other rumors pictured him as a sympathizer with Hitler and Mussolini in the World War then in progress.

There was no truth in any of these stories. José Figueres was a native-born Costa Rican citizen, had spent the 1930's on his *finca* in the hill country south of San José, and had not participated on either side in the Spanish conflict. He was a strong opponent of the Axis and a supporter of the cause of the Allies.

Figueres was born in the Costa Rican town of San Ramón on September 25, 1906, the son of two immigrants from Catalonia, the northeastern province of Spain, Dr. Mariano Figueres Forges and his wife, Paquita Ferrer Minguela de Figueres, an ex-schoolteacher. After going through primary school in his native town, Pepe went to San José, where he studied in the Liceo de Costa Rica and the Seminary College.

Before he came of age Pepe Figueres had shocked his parents by

announcing that he was going to the United States to continue his studies. Although his family tried their best to change his mind, he was determined, and before long found himself in Boston. There he took courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and worked as a laborer in a local tea-packing plant. What spare time he had Figueres spent in the Boston Public Library, where he studied particularly economics and sociology. He claims to have learned his very good English by reading Herbert Spencer.

At the age of nineteen Figueres moved to New York, where he earned his living doing translations from English to Spanish and vice versa. He continued his studies in the local libraries during his three years in New York. Then in 1928 he returned home to Costa Rica to begin a career as a farmer and businessman which was to last for fourteen years before he was suddenly launched into the political seas.

In the mountains of Tarrazú, seven hours by horse from San José, there was for sale a run-down hacienda with eroded land and worn-out machinery for processing the hard fibers which had been its principal product. Figueres, with aid from his family, was able to buy this farm cheap, and he set to work to build it into one of the finest agricultural enterprises in all of Costa Rica.

José Figueres applied the most up-to-date methods of scientific agriculture to his plantation. He developed the water resources of his neighborhood and applied the knowledge of electricity and mechanics which he had learned at M.I.T. At the same time he was a model employer, providing his workers with decent housing and with medical care and a small dispensary. He built schools sufficient to guarantee primary education for all his workers' children. All this he did without an attitude of patronage which might undermine the feelings of self-esteem of the workers. As a result, those working for Figueres developed a feeling of friendship and admiration for him which some years later made them exceedingly loyal in time of crisis.

These were years of intense labor for Pepe Figueres. He built a solid reputation among the agricultural and business communities as a hardheaded and efficient businessman. But he gained little attention from the nation at large. Figueres' dedication to his work was symbolized by the name which he gave his plantation, "La Lucha Sin Fin" (The Struggle Without End).

Throughout these years of isolated work in the mountains Fi-

gueres found several occasions to visit the United States on business. On one of these trips he married a young lady from Alabama, Miss Henrietta Boggs, and in the years that followed she bore him two children.

Figueres had no intention of entering politics. However, on July 4, 1942, he was in San José attending an Independence Day celebration at the United States Embassy when a serious riot broke out in the capital. The excuse for it was the sinking by a Nazi submarine of the ship "San Pablo" in the Costa Rican port of Limón. The demonstration of protest, which was generally reported to have been organized by the Communist Party, degenerated into pilferage of stores owned by Germans and Italians throughout the city.

There was widespread indignation among the citizenry of San José over this rioting, which brought unaccustomed violence to the Costa Rican political scene. The government's halfhearted attempts to stop it seemed to many to reflect the growing influence of the Communists in the regime then in power.

Among those who were deeply moved by the rioting was the visiting farmer from the South, José Figueres. Unlike most of those who were upset by the riot, Figueres decided to do something about it. He contacted the local radio station and reserved time to make a speech three days later.

Figueres' talk was a sharp indictment of the administration of President Rafael Calderón Guardia. He started out:

Rumors preoccupy the President these days. It is said that the Government has been turned over to the Communist Party. It is said that the Government has been obliged to throw itself into the arms of that Party because the ruling classes and other groups have abandoned it in its political struggle against the party or parties which do not please it. Perhaps this is true. But the Government has no reason to play politics instead of governing, particularly in this period of war. . . .¹

Figueres then attacked the extravagance and alleged corruption of the Calderón Guardia regime. He suggested:

Let us look at finances. We all know that the Government is behind in its payments. And they tell us that it is because of the war. They think we are ingenuous. The truth is that in the two years of

this administration the Government's income has been the highest in our history. . . .

After citing how much the Calderón government had spent, Figueres went on:

That's enough figures—because it is certain that if this government completes its term, it will have cost the country perhaps one hundred million colones outside of the regular budget. But the greatest damage, which cannot be expressed in figures, is the moral damage arising from the corruption of the people through irresponsible management of public funds. . . .

This speech not only made Figueres a political figure of first rank, it converted him into Enemy No. 1 of the Calderón Guardia administration. The government kept Figueres in jail for three days, then deported him to El Salvador. Figueres became the first Costa Rican political exile in almost half a century.

The regime which José Figueres had denounced so vigorously was something new in the country's history. Dr. Calderón Guardia had been a physician whose clientele had been found largely among the poor. He had been a popular candidate, and his administration, which took office in 1940, seemed to promise a new deal for the country. However, before he had been long in office, rumors of large-scale graft, an ill from which Costa Rica had not customarily suffered, began to circulate widely. The regime lost much of its popularity by the time its term of office of four years was half over.

Faced with growing unpopularity, Calderón Guardia had turned to the Communist Party for support and at the same time had begun to enact a considerable body of social legislation. His administration established a social security system and enacted a law for the legal recognition of trade unions. However, it also began to rely more and more heavily on the Communists for arousing popular support for the regime, particularly for organizing street demonstrations, and even for engaging in occasional violence against opponents of the regime.

That it was the corruption and the Communist influence in the Calderón Guardia regime, not its social program, to which he was opposed, José Figueres soon made clear. After a short while in El Salvador and Guatemala he settled in Mexico, where he established

a business exporting agricultural implements to Costa Rica. Having been inadvertently launched into a political career, he continued in this role. In 1943 he wrote a pamphlet which was published in Costa Rica under the title *Palabras Gastadas* (Wasted Words). This pamphlet, which was dedicated to ex-President Ricardo Jiménez, was the first published expression of Figueres' political philosophy.

The "wasted words" which the author discussed were "democracy," "socialism," and "liberty." The purpose of the pamphlet was to defend these ideas and to express the author's faith in them. He sums up his defense of democracy thus:

Contrary to what we hear so often, dictatorship is fatally inefficient, because it does without the initiative of its vassals; democracy is essentially efficient, because it is the sum of the free minds of its members. Dictatorship is ephemeral, like the period of lucidity of a man; democracy is stable, as a living organism which is constantly renewed. Dictatorship is pessimistic, because it presupposes the lack of conscience of the masses and it believes in the persistence of ignorance; democracy is optimistic, because it needs the conscious action of each citizen, and it believes in the gradual advance of culture. The one degrades, the other dignifies. Dictatorship looks backwards, and is stagnant, Death. Democracy looks forward, and is evolution, splendor, Life.²

In discussing socialism Figueres makes it clear that he does not believe either in unlimited "free enterprise" or in "the class struggle." He states his opposition to the former in the following terms:

. . . What interests us today is this: capitalism or laissez faire, not admitting that the production and use of goods for the consumption of all is . . . an essentially social activity, not a private one, duplicating services without need, destroying goods by speculation and in many other ways; creating an arbitrary division of classes, prejudicial to the group, between directing groups and those engaged in productive activity . . . refining the natural egoism of the human beast, and reducing the field in which the head and heart can develop. . . .³

As to orthodox social revolutionary schools Figueres says:

Class struggle? So be it. Let it be the constructive ideas of the employer and the honest workers, against those dictated by short

range egoism of the agitator or the bourgeois. Class struggle? So be it. Let it be the struggle of those classes which play the hymn of labor with the spade, the hammer, the brain or the guitar, against the classes of parasites, both above and below. Social revolution? So be it. Let it be the revolution against inefficient methods of work, which are not good enough to cook bread enough for all, and against retrograde methods which are useful to no one. But let the struggle of ideas, the struggle of classes and the social revolution be contests among rational beings, in a democratic battlefield, where each brain is a cannon, where each enemy is a friend. And above all let it never be a fratricidal struggle among the elements necessary to production. . . .⁴

Finally, Figueres summed up his high appreciation for individual liberty when he said:

The vassal of a regime which does not respect his person, in violation of the social contract, or deprives him of the right to participate in the decision concerning the direction of the community, has been defrauded of legitimate right by the very entity which is charged with protecting the purity of contracts. And if he doesn't have within himself an altar where there burns the sacred flame of dignity, the inappeasable thirst for liberty, he may be reduced to a more miserable existence than that of his savage forebears in the untrammelled forest.⁵

Palabras Gastadas, which circulated widely in Costa Rica even before Figueres' return to his native country, served to establish contact between the exiled amateur politician and a group of young men who were seeking the establishment of a new political movement of advanced social ideas and a man to lead it. The group, composed of young university graduates and professional men, had established the Instituto de Estudios Políticos. This organization, which published a periodical called *Surco*, dedicated itself to a serious study of the principal economic, social, and political problems of the country. Its avowed purpose was stated in its first Manifesto thus:

Our ideal is to form a party of political struggle; an authentically democratic doctrinary party, which has always been lacking in Costa Rica. We wish to create an organization which defends principles, not a man. A political party the ideology of which, based on the purest

democratic norms, rigorously adequate to the national reality, and thus guaranteeing the progress of our Fatherland, but adjusted to the universal evolution of political, economic, and social ideas as well as to our own particular history.⁶

With the publication of Figueres' *Palabras Gastadas* the young men of the Instituto de Estudios Políticos saw in Figueres a kindred soul, a man who shared their general outlook and their aspirations. Furthermore, he had been proven to be a man of forceful character and decisive action who could well become the leader of a group of intellectuals without any political experience. Upon his return to Costa Rica in 1944 Figueres quickly became the leader of this group, although he was approximately ten years older than most of them.

The presidential election of 1944 intensified the crisis of Costa Rican democracy which José Figueres had highlighted in his radio speech two years earlier. Dr. Calderón Guardia supported Teodoro Picado, who enjoyed the backing of Calderón Guardia's National Republican Party and of the Communist Party, now rechristened Vanguardia Popular. Opposed to Picado was ex-President León Cortés, nominee of the Unión Nacional.

In spite of the widespread popularity of ex-President Cortés, he was defeated, and his supporters insisted that the election had been stolen by Calderón Guardia through his control of the electoral machinery. Two years later the Picado-Calderón Guardia forces were again victorious in congressional elections, which showed a sizable increase in the vote of the Communists, who got 10 per cent of the total.

The opposition to the Picado-Calderón Guardia regime was split into two factions. One group, the Unión Nacional, which was headed by Otilio Ulate, publisher of *El Diario de Costa Rica*, the country's leading newspaper, was composed principally of the country's more conservative elements, who were opposed to the social programs of the Calderón and Picado administrations as well as to their alleged corruption. The other element was the Partido Social Demócrata, led by José Figueres and consisting largely of young intellectuals of democratic left-wing persuasion.

The two opposition groups worked closely together in spite of their ideological differences. Ulate permitted the young people of the

Partido Social Demócrata to publish in his paper articles and studies written by their members. Both groups supported León Cortés in the 1944 elections, and they ran joint tickets in the 1946 congressional campaign.

As the 1948 presidential election approached, opposition protests mounted against what they conceived to be the government's intention of stealing this contest. In July, 1947, the opposition sponsored a political general strike and lockout to back up a demand for the appointment of a nonpartisan body to conduct the elections the following year. A compromise was finally worked out under which a National Election Board, composed of one representative each of the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court was appointed. Although two of these were named by the governmental National Republican-Communist coalition, the opposition apparently had faith in the individuals named to the board.

The election campaign was tense. The two nominees were Otilio Ulate for the opposition and ex-President Rafael Calderón Guardia for the pro-government forces. Campaigning was vigorous. When the votes were finally counted, the National Election Board by a majority of two to one proclaimed that Ulate had won.

The decision of the National Election Board should have resolved the issue. However, there was considerable fear on the part of the opposition that the Picado administration would not honor the certified results of the poll. José Figueres retired to La Lucha Sin Fin, where he gathered together a group of young students, professional men, and workers, and laid plans for a revolt in case Picado would not turn the government over to the president-elect. Ulate himself remained in San José.

The government was undecided what to do about the election results. There is wide difference of opinion among those who claim to know concerning who supported what position. However, it is certain that some of those in the administration were in favor of recognizing the verdict of the National Election Board and that others were opposed to this. The latter group won out.

The National Assembly, controlled by the National Republicans and Communists, was the instrument for canceling the results of the election. According to the constitution then in force the National Assembly was empowered to "certify" the results of elections.

However, until 1948 this had never been interpreted to mean that the Assembly had the power to nullify these results. Nevertheless, this time it did so, proclaiming that Calderón Guardia, not Ulate, was the victor, on the pretext that there had been widespread fraud on behalf of Ulate's candidacy—this in spite of the fact that the administration had been completely in the hands of elements favorable to Calderón.

Soon after the Assembly's decision an attempt was made either to arrest or to assassinate Otilio Ulate, and the owner of the house in which he was staying was killed, though Ulate escaped. Many of his supporters left San José to join the Figueres forces in the hills.

A two-month civil war ensued. Figueres' forces seized several commercial aircraft, and one of these planes was sent to a neighboring nation to obtain arms. His young supporters were given rudimentary military training. Once armed, they began to move toward San José. Meanwhile the forces supporting the Picado-Calderón regime were very much divided among themselves. The national army amounted to only a few hundred men at the command of Picado. The bulk of the pro-government forces consisted of armed civilians divided into three different groups loyal to Picado, to Calderón, or to the Communists. They were almost as much opposed to one another as to the rebels.

There was severe fighting in several battles, at least a thousand people being killed. Finally, early in May the government forces surrendered after a conference between government representatives and Father Benjamín Núñez, chaplain of the rebels, speaking for the Figueres forces. President Teodoro Picado and ex-President Calderón Guardia fled to Nicaragua, and the government was turned over until the end of Picado's term on May 8 to First Vice President Santos León Herrera.

Although the civil war had been fought in order to uphold the sanctity of the March, 1948, election, the rebels did not immediately put President-elect Ulate in office. The forces led by Figueres were eager to use their victory in the conflict to lay the basis for a new, more socially progressive regime.

An accord was signed on May 1 between José Figueres, leader of the rebel army, and Otilio Ulate, recognized in the document as President-elect. The pact stated the following:

1. The Revolutionary Junta will govern the country, without Congress, during a period of 18 months, from May 8. At the end of this period, it can solicit an extension for six months more, if it is considered necessary for its labors.

2. The Revolutionary Junta will convoke elections to choose representatives to a Constituent Assembly. These elections will be held on December 8 of the present year. The Assembly will be convened on the 15th of the same month.

3. The Revolutionary Junta will designate immediately a commission which will draw up a project for the Constitution, to be submitted to the Assembly.

4. The Junta will recognize and immediately will declare that on last February 8 Don Otilio Ulate Blanco was legitimately elected President of the Republic.

5. The Junta will ask the Constitutional Assembly to ratify the election of Otilio Ulate Blanco, so that he will exercise power during the first Constitutional period of the Second Republic, which in this concrete case will not exceed four years.

6. The Junta will name to the National Electoral Tribunal Messrs. Victor Guardia Quirós, Gerardo Guzmán Quirós, and José María Vargas Pacheco. As alternate member will be named Mr. Jaime Solera Benneti.

7. Both parties signing this accord promise formally that they will carry on no electoral political activities during the six months following the signature of this Pact.

The Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República, as the new governing group called itself, was presided over by José Figueres and consisted of members of the group which had first formed the Instituto de Estudios Políticos and then the Partido Social Demócrata. It brought about several important changes in the economic life of the country and laid plans for numerous others.

Two actions of the Junta indicated the direction it intended to take. Soon after taking office it issued a decree nationalizing the four institutions which made up the country's banking system and another decree imposing a 10 per cent capital levy. The first decree was intended to give the government central control over the economy and make possible its plans for expanding farming and industry. Figueres and his associates argued that the private banks had concentrated almost exclusively on financing the export-import trade and that only the largest farmers had been able to get aid from the

banks. These had taken little interest in aiding the small cultivator or in helping to stimulate manufacturing.

The second decree was for the purpose of shoring up the severely undermined finances of the government. The leaders of the deposed regime had pilfered the treasury, and had even removed vehicles and taken equipment from many government offices. The Junta promised that the capital levy would be imposed only once.

These moves greatly disappointed and alarmed the conservative elements which had supported Figueres' uprising, in spite of the fact that the Junta also issued decrees outlawing the Communist Party and the labor organization controlled by it, the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica*. However, the new government leaders made it clear that the opposition of the Figueres forces to the regime they had deposed was based on the fallen regime's corruption, not on its advanced social programs.

Another important move of the Junta Fundadora in the economic sphere was the negotiation of a new contract with the United Fruit Company. This firm was the principal producer of bananas in the country and hitherto had paid no taxes except a small impost on each stem of bananas exported. Under the new agreement the company was required to pay an income tax of 15 per cent as well as some other less important taxes.

The Junta Fundadora began a program of planned economic development. The newly nationalized banks were given additional capital and were encouraged to extend their lending operations to small farmers and businessmen. At the same time the Junta Fundadora established the *Instituto Nacional de Electricidad* as an autonomous government body to develop the country's electricity potential and ultimately to establish a nation-wide electrical grid. The development of power and light was regarded by the Junta as a prerequisite both for industrialization and for the extension of agriculture.

In addition to economic changes the Junta Fundadora sponsored the writing of a new constitution. On December 8, 1949, elections were held for a constituent assembly. However, they were a severe disappointment for the Junta. Opponents of the Junta were largely victorious, and the *Partido Social Demócrata* received only a handful of seats. A further defeat for the Junta was the Constituent

Assembly's rejection of the Junta's draft of a new constitution. The result was a new basic document which varied only in minor details from the old one which it replaced.

In spite of these defeats the Junta demonstrated its adherence to democracy by refusing to interfere with the results of the elections or with the functioning of the Constituent Assembly. On November 7, 1949, the Junta proclaimed the new constitution to be in effect, and on the following day Otilio Ulate was inaugurated as constitutional president of the republic.

With the end of the government of the Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República, José Figueres retired to private life. Once more he could devote attention to his farm, La Lucha Sin Fin, where he and his family spent much of their time. When not at La Lucha, Don Pepe was at his home in San José or was traveling abroad.

In some ways these were very difficult days for José Figueres. For one thing, he lived under constant fear of attempts at assassination by one or another of the dictators of the Caribbean area, who with some reason looked upon Figueres as a mortal enemy scheming for their overthrow. As a result both his house in San José and La Lucha were heavily guarded, and even when he traveled abroad he was accompanied by a bodyguard. Such constant tension was trying not only to Figueres but also to his wife and two small children.

Family difficulties also occurred during these years. In 1952 Señora de Figueres, the former Henrietta Boggs, obtained a divorce and returned to the United States with her two children. Although the children came for short visits, this was a period of loneliness for Don Pepe which the most frantic activity could not completely overcome.

However, during a trip to the United States early in 1953 Figueres became acquainted with another young American, Miss Karen Olsen. During a visit of Miss Olsen to Costa Rica a few months later they announced their engagement, and they were married soon after Don Pepe's election to the presidency.

Figueres had not retired from public affairs. Soon after leaving office he set to work organizing the forces which had supported the Junta Fundadora. The Partido Social Demócrata was dissolved, and a new party called Partido Liberación Nacional was established.

The avowed objective of the new Partido Liberación Nacional

was to establish an ideological party which would be capable of conducting Costa Rica along the path of modern economic and social development while at the same time conserving and expanding the country's political democracy. Figueres and other party leaders sought to break the tradition whereby political parties were organizations built around specific individuals and established for the purpose of fighting particular election campaigns rather than continuing institutions with well defined programs and policies.

The top leadership of the party consisted of Figueres and the young people who had made up the Instituto de Estudios Políticos and subsequently had played leading roles in his government. They were organized into study group which dealt at length with various problems facing the country—education, agriculture, industrialization, and relations with the United Fruit Company—and sought to work out detailed programs for dealing with each of these problems.

Figueres took an active part in this program making. A man with an exceedingly active and creative imagination as well as considerable experience with the problems which were being discussed, he frequently threw ideas and suggestions into the hopper for consideration and refinement by the group. However, he had another role. In spite of the avowed aversion of Liberación Nacional leaders to their country's traditional "personalism" in politics, they were frankly anxious to use Figueres' personal popularity as a means of gaining power for the party and consolidating its hold on the imagination of the people. So Figueres had an important role to play as the propagandist and agitator of the party's ideas among the general public. Put very simply, it may be said that his campaign for the presidency of the republic began with his retirement as head of the Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República.

However, Figueres' activities were not confined to Costa Rica during these years. Figueres was not an isolationist. He felt that his country's destiny was closely tied to the destinies of the other Latin American nations and to the hemisphere as a whole. He traveled considerably during the interim between his two terms as chief executive.

Figueres made several visits to the United States during this period. In 1951 he made a tour of various colleges under the sponsorship of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Free-

dom. Being a strong believer in democratic inter-American cooperation, he reestablished old contacts and built new ones with liberal elements in the United States. He also conferred upon occasion with State Department officials as well as with representatives of some of the United States firms doing business in Costa Rica.

One of the purposes of Figueres in his visits to the United States was to counteract the allegations of communism which were being made against him by his opponents in Costa Rica and outside. Although he had led a revolution to oust a government which was closely allied with the Communists, he had alienated powerful economic interests in the country while president of the Junta Fundadora, and some of his opponents were doing their utmost to discredit him in a United States which at that moment was in the full grip of "McCarthyism."

He was one of the founders of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom in Havana, in May, 1950. At this conference Don Pepe delivered a two-hour speech, beginning at two in the morning, in which he summed up much of his own philosophy. This speech marked his emergence as a continental leader of the Democratic Left.

Figueres started out by noting three aspects of Latin America's basic problems:

The political system adopted by America is full of imperfections in its functioning. The representative form of government is violated in many countries, where the rights of man are a dead letter in the constitutional texts. The rest of the countries don't seem to be worried by this contagious disease in our midst, in spite of the fact they fight it in the most distant parts of the earth.

The economy of America still presents a contrast between a rich and opulent minority of the population and a great mass of poverty-stricken people. The economic middle class is small. The production of wealth is small.

The culture of America offers a similar appearance: there is a brilliant intelligentsia and a large proportion of illiterates. The average cultural level is low.

Those three deficiencies of American life, the political deficiency, the economic deficiency, and the cultural deficiency, are related in terms of cause and effect, and they present the phenomenon that the effect reinforces the cause.⁷

Figueres outlined his own economic philosophy and that of the political movement of which he was the principal leader:

The National Liberation Movement of Costa Rica has found that it is possible to have general planning of the economy of the country in its present stage of development, entrusting to autonomous organizations certain general services such as credit, electricity, some principal transport facilities, the scientific control of prices, the stimulation of a balanced economic development and others allowing within these general economic lines the utmost possible activity for private enterprise. Thousands of agriculturalists sow corn for their own account, but the State regulates and protects them through its autonomous agencies and corps of technicians, guaranteeing stability of market and just prices, providing selected seed, financing machinery and costs of production, etc. Such organisms function on the basis of reserves. If there is a national surplus they export without risk of subjecting the internal consumer to a possible increase of price. Such a combination of state agencies and private producers orients the economy towards general efficiency, but subdivides among many enterprisers the job of administration. This job of administration, the desire to see that costs are less than the value of the product, is an element of great importance in economic activity. The more individuals are preoccupied with this, the greater will be the general efficiency of the labor of the community. If this whole job of administration can be given a social orientation through state organisms which provide general services in accordance with a plan, the optimum results can be obtained from the economic efforts of the nation. . . .

In discussing the particular problems of economic development of Latin America he dealt at length with the question of foreign investment in the area. He put forth certain general ideas concerning the limitations within which such investment is possible and advisable. He commented:

In the first place, we believe that we gain no advantage from private investment in firms which have definite characteristics of internal public utilities. This is not because the investors are "foreign," a word which should disappear from our vocabulary, but because we consider incompatible in our environment and given our idiosyncrasies, private profit and general welfare. If it is desired to aid us effectively in this sector of our economy, what is necessary is to give adequate financial

aid to our autonomous state organs. These entities have amply demonstrated their ability to manage credit extended to them and to provide public services with general efficiency. . . .

In the second place, we are dubious of the advantage which we can get from firms which come to Latin America exclusively to seek low wages. If our objective is to maintain a lower level of living, our own enterprisers are sufficient. The incentives to establish business in our countries should be others: the convenience of processing locally our raw materials; economy of transport; the possibility of meeting the demand from certain markets from here; the payment of lower taxes during a given period, etc. . . . The policy of the companies must be to explain to the consumer that the prices of products must have relation to the payment of just wages. That is more constructive than the tendency to induce the Latin American countries to maintain low wages so that the public in other richer countries can buy our articles more cheaply. If North American investments are to be useful, their principal aid must consist in their contribution to raising local wages . . . even though to do so it may be necessary to raise somewhat the sales price of articles coming from here. . . .

He attacked the idea that profits of North American companies operating in Latin America have been exorbitant, at least in recent years. He pointed out that they were not much in excess of profits of firms which do all of their business in the United States. Then he added:

. . . The real difference must be found in the fact that the companies which work in the United States (steel, automobiles, etc.) get from the consumer prices which signify adequate dividends for the investors, high taxes for the State, and just wages for the workers. On the other hand, the firms established in Latin America (bananas, rubber, tin, etc.), even though they take good care of the interests of their stockholders or bondholders, contribute little to the governments and see no inconvenience in buying the labor of their workers cheaply. . . .

Thus Figueres put forth three basic ideas concerning economic development and inter-American economic relations which he was to reiterate many times during the next few years: the belief in a mixed economy in which the State has a role as development planner and stabilizer; support of foreign private investment in Latin America under certain specified conditions; and the feeling that many

of Latin America's economic problems are due to the inadequate prices which it receives from the big industrial nations for its principal export products.

In passing, Figueres also noted his point of view toward communism. He commented:

Communist fanaticism insists that a total transformation of human society can be carried out in a violent way through a world social revolution. It claims that the cultured people of the Occident can impose upon themselves what the Soviet government has imposed upon the Russian peasant masses. It insists that in order to bring about a renovation of the economic system, we must abandon all moral norms, all the political conquests, all of the human rights which have been established with so much sacrifice. And as if this were not sufficient price, it insists that we must accept a world hegemony of the Soviet Union, probably imposed though a third universal war.

He also attacked the dictatorial regimes of the American hemisphere, arguing that though it might be necessary to maintain formally "friendly" relations with them, it should be made clear that

this equal treatment which the tyrants and caciques receive from the representative governments is a sad emergency, forced upon us by the danger that another tyranny may become general throughout the earth. And it is healthful for the democratic regimes to understand as clearly as possible what a great sacrifice is being imposed on various unhappy peoples of the American Hemisphere.

Relations between José Figueres and his group on the one hand and the administration of Otilio Ulate on the other grew increasingly cool. Although the Ulate government did not undo any of the principal actions of the Junta Fundadora, it showed little enthusiasm for most of them. The stress of Ulate was upon bringing about greater stability in politics and in the finances of the government.

President Ulate's term expired in November, 1953. The first months of that year, therefore, were marked by a presidential election campaign which was vigorously fought and in which the Partido Liberación Nacional candidate, naturally, was José Figueres. He conducted an extremely strenuous campaign, visiting virtually all parts of the country, talking incessantly about the plans of the party

to stimulate economic development and extend social services. Liberación Nacional now had an extensive and well-worked-out program.

In the field of agricultural production the program envisaged close cooperation among the government banking system, the Ministry of Agriculture's Technical Assistance Organization, and the Price Stabilization Board. Figueres advocated the establishment in each community of a Farmers' House in which these three groups would have their local headquarters. He envisaged a process in which the costs of production of agricultural output would be driven down by increased technology, aided by the Technical Assistance Organization. At the same time the banking system would supply the farmer with credit needed to cultivate his crop and to purchase farm implements and machinery. The Price Stabilization Board would not only guarantee a good price to the farmer but would also protect localities from the adverse effects of shortages by establishing local community stores of prime food essentials to prevent shortages which might force up local prices.

The Figueres program called for the extension of the services of the nationalized banks. It promised that every local community would have a branch of at least one of the credit institutions. This would have the dual purpose of tapping unused small savings and of encouraging local small enterprisers to expand production.

The Liberación Nacional candidate advocated an effort to industrialize the country and promised to give protection and encouragement to local manufacturing enterprises. At the same time Figueres stressed the importance of the Instituto Nacional de Electricidad, and promised to get under way several large projects and to expand the Instituto's ability to produce electricity at a low price.

In the field of social problems Figueres laid special emphasis on the expansion of public housing. He advocated the establishment of a National Housing Institute to coordinate all the housing activities of the government which hitherto had been carried on by several organisms. He also promised to increase greatly the number of workers' homes to be constructed.

All aspects of the program put forward by Figueres were to be coordinated through a general plan in which the nationalized banks were to play a key role. In his electoral platform Figueres urged

the same kind of program which he had put forth two years earlier in Havana.

Two candidates were running against José Figueres. One was Mario Echandi, who had been a member of President Ulate's cabinet and who ran as nominee of Ulate's party, Unión Nacional, though the President himself did not intervene openly in the election. The other nominee was Fernando Castro Cervantes, who had the support of ex-President Calderón Guardia and represented the elements which had been defeated in the 1948 Revolution.

Figueres was an easy victor. He was at the height of his popularity, and his campaign tours throughout the country were more like marches of triumph than like vote-seeking expeditions.

Pepe Figueres was a peculiar type to be a popular hero. Of less than average height even for a Costa Rican, he did not have an imposing presence, although his sharply etched facial features, his piercing eyes, and his determined, almost hard, lips would have attracted attention in any group. He had a physical abhorrence, almost a fear, of the milling crowds that swirled around him wherever he went. He was not a great orator, having a high-pitched and rather rasping voice.

Figueres had remained the intellectual while becoming the man of action. He had the high-flying imagination of the dreamer and the studiousness of the scholar. In private conversation Don Pepe was capable of falling almost into a trance as he talked about his ideas for Costa Rica, America, and even the world in general. In such moods his suggestions for action were not always practical, but when it came to concrete planning for programs and policy his years of successful experience as a farmer and businessman tended to mold his dreams into manageable proportions.

Different sides of Figueres' personality undoubtedly appealed to different groups in the population. Undoubtedly his successful leadership of the 1948 Revolution had created a kind of *mística* about him which appealed to the man in the street. Figueres was also capable of translating to the masses of his followers some of his own dreams of what the future held in store for his country. On the other hand, the intellectuals among his followers were enthusiastic about his ideas—which he shared with them—of building a left-wing democratic ideological party that would bring to the country many of

the social, economic, and political changes which they felt were long overdue. As is usually the case in such situations, his intellectual followers were more critical but less fickle than those who cheered Figueres at election campaign meetings.

In November, 1953, José Figueres was inaugurated as constitutional president in ceremonies attended by representatives of several score countries. The guest of honor, who received only a little less attention than the new president, was Governor Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico, who received all the honors usually accorded a chief of state.

José Figueres remained president of Costa Rica until May, 1958. During that period his government undertook an extensive program of economic development and social change which considerably altered the face of Costa Rica. Figueres frequently explained the objectives which his administration was following.

As Figueres noted many times, the government was seeking to collect the savings of the people of Costa Rica and to invest them in capitalization, by which he understood both the accumulation of capital equipment and the improvement of the quality—in terms of health, education, etc.—of the population. Before the nationalization of the banks by the Junta Fundadora the government's only means of mobilizing the country's savings had been through taxation. Subsequently the extension of the banking system into all parts of the country made it possible for the first time to gather in small savings which had gone untapped previously, and at the same time made it possible for the banks to use these savings in financing capitalization projects.

While seeking thus to develop and change the country's economy and society the Figueres regime sought also to strengthen political democracy. The establishment of an ideological party was in itself a step in this direction. However, the Figueres regime went further by establishing an impartial system to supervise elections—which in the 1958 presidential poll was strengthened by inviting United Nations representatives to observe the election. During his constitutional regime Figueres continued the work which he had begun with the Junta Fundadora in establishing a civil service law, removing public employees insofar as possible from political pressures.

The concrete program carried out by the Figueres government

can be summed up under six headings: relations with the United Fruit Company, moves to develop agriculture, the extension of electric power facilities, sponsoring of industrialization, extension of social security, and development of public housing.

Several times Don Pepe summed up the philosophy of his government in trying to carry out the economic and social development of Costa Rica. One instance was an article entitled "We Don't Want Foreign Investments," which appeared in the *New Leader* on August 31, 1953. He summed up the case against foreign investment as a means of development thus:

Foreign ownership of a large segment of a country's economy or territory constitutes "economic occupation." This is no wild fancy, I know. I am a citizen of a "banana republic." I know how it feels to have a state within a state; to play host to a privileged business that does not abide by the law of the land, but by the terms of its own "concession," by the terms of economic occupation. Please do not offer us as a remedy the very grievances of which we complain!

Is it that the company's directors are wicked, or deliberate exploiters? Is it that the U.S. Government is imperialistic? Is it that Latin Americans are all venal, or stupid, or both? I think not. . . .

Large ownership is . . . a means of limiting local authority, especially when it operates under "contract laws" or discriminatory "concessions" such as the colonial companies have exacted from the weak nations. It would be wise if the U.S. withdrew the economic occupation. . . .

If investment capital is not to come from private foreign firms, where will it come from? Figueres asks this question and answers it thus:

. . . Permanent capital should come from their own savings. Transient capital could come from temporary investments, or from loans granted to the proper development institutions. If some countries, because of feudalism or corruption, cannot capitalize a part of their income and grow thereby, they cannot grow from foreign investments either. . . . Costa Rica, for example, is not thinking of an electronics industry or of nuclear reactors. Let the industrial nations, especially the U.S., continue to lead. We can contribute our modest part to the general effort of supporting mankind by supplying beef. We have the

land, and the rain, and the hands. All this is our own capital. We have only to add an investment of \$100, \$200, or \$300 per worker, and this amount we can save.

In arguing for providing the underdeveloped countries with higher income so that they could save more and invest more Figueres said:

Of course, the capacity to save varies with the national income. And the income of most underdeveloped countries depends, to a great extent on the prices of their exports, of raw materials, minerals, agricultural products. Far more than foreign investments, the underdeveloped countries need stabilization of the world markets. The so-called law of supply and demand is the law of the strong. Economics should be an ethical science. Prices can be stabilized, and they should be in a civilized world. Every nation, like every man, has a right to know how much she is earning, how much she will be paid for the work of her people, when this work is applied to her natural resources, in supplying a part of the world's needs.

Figueres summed up his argument thus:

To summarize the formula for underdeveloped nations: Pay them for their products; tell them how to produce more; tell them how to save, and to grow from earnings; if absolutely essential, grant loans to proper agencies or make temporary investments; but do not try to own them!

Once in office, José Figueres sought to carry out the policy implied in this article. His government consistently offered proposals in international economic conferences for the establishment of "buffer stocks" of the principal mineral and agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs as a means for achieving the stabilization of prices which he advocated. In internal affairs he sought to start the process of converting Costa Rica's principal foreign company, the United Fruit Company, which was running a virtual state within a state, into a mere purchaser of fruit and shipper of it abroad. His administration also sought to increase internal savings and channel them into economic and social development.

Even before he was inaugurated José Figueres entered into negotiations with the United Fruit Company. The company was cooperative, and soon after taking office the Costa Rican government announced a new agreement with the UFCO whereby the company would pay income taxes of 30 per cent of their net profits as well as import duties on goods not essential for the operation of their banana-growing enterprise. At the same time the company agreed that it would give up control of its hospitals and schools whenever the government requested it to do so. This conformed to Figueres' belief that the United Fruit Company should in time reduce its activities in Costa Rica merely to shipping bananas abroad.

This agreement became a standard for the United Fruit Company's operations throughout Central America. The same terms were subsequently offered by the company to Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama and were accepted by those countries.

The Figueres government also undertook to reestablish the banana industry on the east coast of Costa Rica, where it had been abandoned by the United Fruit Company in the late 1920's under the onslaught of the so-called Panama disease. As a result of these efforts the Standard Fruit Company undertook to establish plantations on the Atlantic Coast.

The government's activities in other branches of agriculture have been summed up by Figueres himself in his book *Cartas a Un Ciudadano*, published in 1956. He wrote as follows (p. 92):

Agricultural methods are being improved by technical means and by economic means. In the cultivation of grains, seeds are being used which are selected by the Ministry of Agriculture, the purchase of machinery and fertilizers and the control of plagues are being financed by loans from the State Banks. The propagation of agricultural information has been well accepted by our peasants. The system of price stabilization is being perfected. The resources of the Rural Credit Boards have just been increased by 22,000,000 colones, which will probably be used during 1956.

In coffee and sugar cane, intensive fertilization, irrigation, new varieties, and other recently introduced practices are doubling and even tripling production per acre. The financing of both crops, which requires 80,000,000 colones a year, is being carried out by the National Banking System. . . .

Figueres, himself a scientific farmer of considerable note, was peculiarly interested in the problem of increasing Costa Rica's agricultural output. He undertook personally the work of enlisting the interest in and support of new methods of cultivation among the peasantry. His efforts brought considerable success.

One of the fundamental efforts of the Figueres administration was in the field of electric power. Figueres, in his report to Congress on May 1, 1956, pointed out that between independence and 1953 electric power plants generating a total of 40,000 kilowatts had been established. However, between 1953 and the time he spoke, there had entered into operation or been placed under construction plants with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. Most of this program of electrification was being undertaken by the Instituto Nacional de Electricidad and included several large projects to harness the country's hydroelectric resources.

The Figueres government looked upon the extension of the country's electrical resources not only as a means of stimulating agricultural production and the well-being of the citizenry but also as a means for establishing a solid basis for industrialization. It took other steps to encourage the establishment of manufacturing firms. A few months after taking office the administration pushed through the Legislative Assembly a new tariff law raising imposts on a wide range of goods which the government felt could be produced in Costa Rica. This law was the first step in a general revision of the country's tariff structure.

At the same time the resources of the nationalized banks were used to aid new and old industrial firms. According to Figueres' *Cartas a Un Ciudadano* (p. 94) by 1956 the banks had lent some 24,000,000 colones to over four hundred firms for the purchase of machinery. The banking system had received a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the purpose of further amplifying their loans to manufacturing enterprises.

The Figueres government's activities in the field of social security were restricted largely to the construction of several hospitals used by the Social Security Institute. When Figueres came to office the Instituto still was owed a debt by the government, a debt which had been accumulated before 1948, when the administrations had frequently failed to pay sums which the government was obligated

to provide to the Instituto. The Figueres regime was forced to spend considerable sums which might have been used for other purposes to repay these debts and thus build up a safe reserve for the Instituto.

Public housing was one of the principal things emphasized by the Figueres regime. Previous to 1953 the government's housing activities had been relatively modest and had been conducted by several dispersed institutions. With President Figueres' support a law was passed in 1954 establishing the National Housing Institute. It carried out a program of constructing individual homes, and in a speech on January 29, 1958, President Figueres announced that the Instituto had built homes for 12,000 citizens, of whom 3,000 had become owners of their own houses. The program had been extended to sixty-four separate municipalities.

Figueres had always emphasized the necessity for general education as a secure base for political democracy. In his report to Congress on May 1, 1957, he summed up his administration's problem in the educational field:

Until now, the number of student teachers graduating each year has been very much inferior to the always increasing needs of our schools. It has been necessary to fill posts with untrained teachers. . . .

We saw that the difficulty must be faced on three fronts: first, bring more students to the normal schools. Second, provide better facilities for qualifying teachers without certificates, particularly in the countryside. Third, to prevent teachers from leaving the profession in search of better-paid jobs.

To achieve the last of these objectives an entirely new pay scale for teachers was adopted providing for increases over a period of five years. At the same time a Professional Institute was established to give special courses for teachers without certificates, thus enabling them to become better teachers as well as to obtain better salaries.

The number of normal-school students was vastly increased. President Figueres reported that there were 2,000 such students in May, 1957, as compared with 6,400 teachers actually in the classrooms.

The Figueres administration also enacted a new basic education law. President Figueres outlined it thus:

The new law, starting with certain philosophic definitions, establishes new teaching programs. It establishes middle schools, and gives emphasis to vocational training. . . . It proposes a minimum of three years of academic culture for all citizens, so that future workers will have the opportunity of acquiring, before specialization, an acceptable level of general education.

Finally, the administration considerably increased the number of classrooms available. President Figueres commented on this:

. . . It is worth while mentioning certain figures which reveal our rhythm of educational progress, and our future potentialities; never has any administration constructed 350 classrooms. Now, in the year 1956 alone, 450 have been built.

Foreign affairs engaged a good deal of Pepe Figueres' attention. He made no secret of the fact that he and his government were hostile toward the dictatorships which dominated many Latin American countries during much of his term in office. His government gave asylum to refugees from dictatorial regimes in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cuba, and other countries. Rómulo Betancourt, ex-President of Venezuela, who arrived in Costa Rica some months before Figueres' election and stayed there during the first two years of his administration was one of these.

Figueres made his government's position clear in March, 1955, when he refused to name a delegation to attend the Tenth Inter-American Conference, which met in Caracas, Venezuela. He indicated in doing so that he had no objection to the conference, but objected only to the place in which it was being held and the nature of the host government, that of dictator Pérez Jiménez.

Figueres followed a policy of friendship toward the United States. However, he frequently urged the United States government to change its policy toward Latin America, particularly in terms of its attitude toward dictatorships in the area and in its economic

policies. In an article which appeared in the *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. IX, No. 1, 1955) he set forth his position thus:

a) The Latin American peoples are ripe for democracy. They have heard so much such a long time about representative government, free elections, respect for the dignity of man, division of governmental powers, and all that goes with the democratic creed, that you could no more erase those political aspirations than you could eradicate the Christian faith.

b) You cannot isolate the problems of democracy in Latin America, or elsewhere, from the economic and social struggle, from educational limitations, or even from the world-wide politico-military conflicts.

c) Theoretically, the development of Latin America—economic, social, cultural, political—may take place in two different manners: either as a separate continent and civilization, independent of the United States, or as a part of the general hemispheric effort. In my opinion, the only possible course is the second.

d) A general hemispheric development implies for Latin America the acceptance, nay, the demand of United States' leadership. It also implies the exercise of such leadership by the United States along democratic, Western lines of conduct.

e) The two main contributions of the United States should be precisely its most characteristic national virtues or aptitudes: its political genius, or the ability of its citizens to live together in mutual respect and govern themselves with a common purpose, and its production methods, or the capacity of its economy to produce goods and services at an unprecedented rate.

The principal difficulties in the foreign field which the Figueres regime experienced came from neighboring Nicaragua. That republic's dictator, Anastasio Somoza, was acting as host to ex-Presidents Calderón Guardia and Picado, and two expeditions were organized with his blessing for the purpose of attempting to overthrow the Figueres regime. Both were turned back by the Costa Rican citizens' militia organized after the Revolution of 1948. During the second attack, in January, 1955, the Organization of American States came to the Figueres government's defense, and the United States government sold the Costa Rican government two airplanes for one dollar apiece to help turn back the invading forces.

During his four and a half years in the presidency Pepe Figueres was the best exponent of the policies and actions of his own government. Aside from state papers, such as his annual messages to Congress, Figueres wrote frequent articles for the local press as well as for periodicals in several foreign countries, including the United States. He also found time to write a book entitled *Cartas a Un Ciudadano* (Letters to a Citizen), in which he discoursed at length on his own political philosophy and the policies which were being followed by his government. We have cited passages from this work, which was circulated widely in Costa Rica and abroad.

In spite of the accomplishments of the Figueres regime and the prestige which it enjoyed abroad, Don Pepe and his associates were defeated in the presidential election of 1958. Although the leaders of Liberación Nacional had attempted to form an ideological party, it was personal rivalries that brought about the defeat of the party in this election. Jorge Rossi, who had been Figueres' first Minister of Finance, was anxious for Liberación Nacional's nomination for the presidency. However, the party's convention late in 1957 gave the nomination to Francisco Orlich, the Minister of Public Works and one of Figueres' oldest friends. Figueres took little part in deciding the party's candidate but threw his support to Orlich once he had been chosen.

Rossi refused to accept the party's designation of Orlich and campaigned as an independent. Also in the race was Mario Echandi, who had run unsuccessfully in 1953. He received the backing of ex-Presidents Rafael Calderón Guardia and Otilio Ulate as well as of the Communists. Echandi ran on a platform favoring free enterprise and promising to end the "socialistic" experiments of the Figueres regime and its "alienation" of friendly governments, namely those of the dictatorial regimes.

The split in the Liberación Nacional forces threw the election to Echandi. Although he received less than 50 per cent of the total vote, he did receive more votes than Francisco Orlich, the runner-up, and got more than the constitutional 40 per cent needed for election in a three-cornered race. However, Echandi did not get a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The Liberación Nacional ticket received nineteen seats there, the supporters of Rossi four, and one independent Figuerista was also elected. Dr. Calderón

Guardia's National Republican Party won eleven seats in the Assembly, and Echandi's National Union party received only ten.

With the defeat of his party and the end of his presidential term Pepe Figueres returned once again to private life. However, before doing so he gave his Latin American contemporaries a lesson in democratic procedure. He refused to accede to demands of some of his own followers that he interfere with the results of the presidential election. Rather, he said that he would demonstrate what a good democrat did when he was defeated, and would show how democratic opposition was conducted.

Figueres returned to the leadership of the Liberación Nacional Party. In that post his first job was to rebuild the divided ranks of the organization and to spread a more solid type of party organization throughout the country. In spite of the efforts of the Liberación Nacional leaders the party had remained to too great a degree a personal vehicle for electing Pepe Figueres and his friends. Figueres' job was to build a party organization which could remain active between elections and to train and teach the lower-rank leadership and the rank and file the ideology which was supposed to be the basis of the party.

As leader of the opposition he also had the task of providing constructive criticism of the incumbent and seeing to it that the opposition remained within constitutional bounds so long as the President behaved constitutionally. His role in the opposition may yet do more to spread a true understanding of the meaning of democracy in Latin America than did his tenure in office.

Luis Muñoz Marín and the "Puerto Rican Miracle"



Early in 1938 a has-been politician who had quarreled with virtually all the powerful figures on the island, and had been thrown out of his party, began scouring Puerto Rico, going from one small town to the next, talking to the common folk, the mountain farmer, the sugar-cane worker, the schoolteacher, and the small shopkeeper. Ten years later this same "has-been" became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico, and ten years later still he had brought about changes in the economic, social, and political status of that island which made it almost unrecognizable.

The politician who was counted "dead" by his colleagues in 1938 was Luis Muñoz Marín, certainly the outstanding Puerto Rican of his generation. He it is who has brought "the revolution" to the island of Puerto Rico, and who has been chiefly responsible not only for a remarkable economic transformation of the country but also for instilling in its people a consciousness of their own dignity and importance which they had never before possessed.

Puerto Rico in the 1930's was an unhappy island. Its principal source of income was the production of sugar cane, almost all of which was sold to the continental United States. Its people were poverty-stricken, and the rapidly growing population was far outstripping any possibilities for employment at home. The island was plagued with large-scale permanent unemployment and underemployment, and the prospects were for the standard of living of the people to continue to go constantly downward.

Although formal political democracy existed, it had little real meaning for the great majority of the people, and vote selling was almost universal. There was widespread discontent with the colonial status of Puerto Rico and resentment against the long series of appointed governors, some of them good, some bad, and some

indifferent, but all alien to Puerto Rico and unable really to serve the needs of the people of the island. The government of the "mother country," the United States, had showed little concern for the problems of the island, and the people themselves had little hope that they could rise out of the abyss in which they found themselves and into which they seemed to be constantly sinking more deeply.

The island had come under the control of the United States as a result of the short Spanish-American War of 1898. At the time of the transfer of sovereignty there were about one million Puerto Ricans, and the economy of the island was a rather varied one. Tobacco and coffee were cultivated in the mountains, and sugar along the coasts, although it had not yet preempted the whole of the littoral as it was to do subsequently. Many of the people of the small towns earned their livelihood in artistic needlework, which had a wide market.

The American occupation brought four important changes to the island. First was the rapid growth of the sugar industry. As a possession of the United States, Puerto Rico came within the American tariff wall, and her sugar industry thus obtained a protection which other countries did not enjoy. At the same time the demand in the United States for sugar increased by leaps and bounds after the turn of the century. As a result both United States and Puerto Rican interests began a very rapid expansion of the sugar-growing industry. Although Puerto Rico was not so well endowed by nature for the cultivation of sugar as was Cuba, this product became the principal source of income for the inhabitants of the island. However, Puerto Rico became excessively dependent for its well-being on the market for this product in the United States, and when, as during the Great Depression, United States demand for sugar fell off, the island suffered bitterly.

The second important result of the transfer of Puerto Rico from Spain to the United States was the birth and development of a trade-union movement and a Socialist Party as its political spokesman. Santiago Iglesias, a native of Spain, was the father of trade-unionism in Puerto Rico, and soon after American occupation he established the *Federación Libre de Trabajadores*, which became affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Under American rule the trade unions had much more freedom to operate than they had possessed

under the Spaniards, and although the movement grew slowly, by World War I it had come to include the workers in the all-important sugar industry.

Along with the Federación Libre, Iglesias formed the Partido Socialista as the political expression of the labor movement. He himself was elected to the insular Senate in 1916 and during the next twenty years was the principal political spokesman for the more humble citizenry of the island. His party and the union movement he organized were of key importance—in spite of themselves—in the rise to power of Luis Muñoz Marín.

United States authorities in Puerto Rico brought about two other very important changes in the island: improvements in health and education. Through the installation of modern public-health methods the death rate of Puerto Rico was drastically reduced during the first years of American occupation, although it remained high compared with continental standards. However, this reduction of the death rate was not an unmixed blessing, since it brought a very rapid increase in the population of Puerto Rico and engendered very serious economic problems, the gravest of which was the unemployment of a large part of the island's adult population.

In addition to public-health programs the United States authorities were also concerned with education. A public-school system was established which slowly extended across the island. At the same time a number of American churches established mission schools which also contributed to the educational effort. However, education also was not completely beneficial to the Puerto Ricans. It was seriously hampered by a long-continued struggle over the question of what language should be used in instructing the students. The result was that during some years teaching was in Spanish, during other periods the attempt was made to instruct the children in English, a language which neither they nor their teachers understood. The result of this confusion is still visible in the Puerto Rican school system, though Spanish has now been firmly established as the language of instruction in the island's primary and secondary schools.

During the first fifty years of United States rule over Puerto Rico the government was in the hands of a governor appointed by the President of the United States. This colonial position of the island rankled with the Puerto Ricans, and "status" was the dom-

inant theme of the island's politics until the emergence of Luis Muñoz Marín in the early 1940's.

Even before United States occupation the Puerto Ricans had struggled for autonomy. In 1868, at the time of the first War of Independence of Cuba, an armed struggle was also attempted in Puerto Rico in the so-called "Grito de Lares." However, the newly proclaimed "Republic of Puerto Rico" was quickly suppressed by Spanish authorities, who, nevertheless, acted more reasonably toward Puerto Rico than they did toward its sister island. The emancipation of the slaves proclaimed by the revolutionaries of 1868 was confirmed shortly afterward by the Spanish authorities, which deprived the independence movement of Puerto Rico of the almost unanimous backing of the Negroes which the Cuban wars of independence enjoyed. Thereafter the struggle of Puerto Rico against the mother country followed a more pacific course.

In 1888 the principal leaders of the struggle for independence were jailed for a short time in Morro Castle in San Juan harbor, and a year later the principal figure in the struggle for self-government, Baldorioty y Castro, died. The new chief of this movement, a young man named Luis Muñoz Rivera, took a different tack from that of his predecessor and tried to reach an agreement with important political elements in Spain itself. In pursuit of this policy a delegation from the Partido Autonomista went to Spain in 1896 and signed with the Spanish Liberal Party an agreement which promised self-government for the island in the eventuality of the Liberals' achieving power. When that came to pass in the following year, the Spanish Liberals were as good as their word, and Puerto Rico was granted an autonomy statute.

Luis Muñoz Rivera became head of the newly autonomous Puerto Rican government in 1897. However, he was in power only a few months when American troops invaded the island, proclaiming as they did so that they had come to "liberate" Puerto Rico. In general, the attitude of the Puerto Ricans at that time was favorable to the transfer of sovereignty, but it meant starting the struggle for autonomy all over again.

Luis Muñoz Rivera was again in the vanguard of the fight. As leader of the Federal Party—a faction of the old Autonomist Party—he fought for greater autonomy for the island. The first Organic

Act, establishing civil government in Puerto Rico after a two-year rule by the Army, was passed in 1900. It provided for a two-house legislature consisting of an upper house appointed by the President and the Governor and an elected lower house. It also provided that virtually all the administrative authorities would either be appointed directly by the President of the United States or indirectly, through the Governor, who was himself named by the United States chief executive. It established the post of Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, a member of the United States House of Representatives with a voice but without a vote.

In 1916 Luis Muñoz Rivera, then Resident Commissioner, fought in Washington for a new Organic Act, which was passed a year later, after his death. It granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans, and according to *La Nueva Constitución de Puerto Rico* published by the University of Puerto Rico in 1954, it established "a bill of rights with the protection of security, liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States; a completely elective legislature, with more control over local matters . . . and a reduction of the number of presidential appointments. . . ."

This second Organic Act, known popularly as the Jones Act, did not by any means completely satisfy most politically vocal Puerto Ricans. These continued as before to be divided between the advocates of United States statehood for the island, who were found in the Republican and Socialist parties, and the supporters of independence, who were largely in Muñoz Rivera's party, which after his death took the name Partido Liberal.

In the 1930's there arose a more extreme group of independence advocates, led by a fanatical visionary, Pedro Albizu Campos, who established and led the Partido Nacionalista. This party, after running candidates in the election of 1932, when it received approximately 10,000 votes, came to the conclusion that it could not win the people to independence by legal electoral action. Instead it opted for "heroic sacrifice," by which it meant terrorism against both United States and Puerto Rican officials in the island. These terroristic methods alienated many of the party's supporters. However, both it and the Liberal Party were subsequently to provide many members for the party of Luis Muñoz Marín.

Luis Muñoz Marín was the son of Luis Muñoz Rivera. He was educated in the United States while his father was Resident Commissioner. His first flight into politics startled and shocked many of his father's supporters because he made his debut as a member of Santiago Iglesias' Socialist Party, which at that time definitely represented "the other side of the tracks." This part of Muñoz Marín's political career was not notably successful.

For a number of years in the 1920's Luis Muñoz Marín lived in the United States and was a familiar figure in Greenwich Village and among the radical intelligentsia of New York. He earned a poor living as a free-lance journalist, writing for the *Nation* and other periodicals. It was not until the early 1930's that he returned to Puerto Rico and joined his father's old party, the Partido Liberal.

During the 1930's Muñoz Marín was an important figure in the Partido Liberal, which was the principal opposition party to the ruling coalition of Republican and Socialist parties. This alliance of the Republicans and Socialists was a peculiar phenomenon, since it represented the coalition of the party of the large sugar interests and the party which drew its principal support from the sugar workers. The chief bond of unity between them was the fact that they both favored statehood.

Muñoz Marín, though a supporter of independence, was also strongly in favor of the New Deal and favored Puerto Rico's making the utmost use of the programs which the Roosevelt administration devised for aiding the island. He enthusiastically backed the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, which was the principal New Deal vehicle for Puerto Rico, and became a familiar figure in Washington, where he lobbied extensively with both members of Congress and administrative officials to get more aid for the island. It was undoubtedly during these years that the good contacts which he was to have later with congressional leaders first began to develop, and it was then, too, that the ideas which he was to embody in the program of the Popular Democratic Party first began to take shape.

Muñoz' good relations with the United States government and his frank support of the Roosevelt administration's efforts in Puerto Rico won him the jealousy and enmity of powerful figures in the Liberal Party leadership. The growing conflict between Muñoz and

the Liberal chiefs came to a head in 1937 and resulted in his expulsion from the party, although he was one of its principal spokesmen in the insular Senate.

Muñoz Marín was not discouraged by his treatment at the hands of the Liberal Party leaders. Upon being expelled he threw them a challenge that within two years he would have behind him the overwhelming majority of the party's supporters. He more than made good on this promise. In 1938 he established the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) and set out on a pilgrimage throughout the island to find what it was the people were concerned about and what it was they wanted. It was as the head of this party that he fought the election campaign of 1940.

The 1940 campaign was spectacular. The old coalition parties were discredited. They had dominated the legislature since 1932 and had become soft and removed from contact with the masses. Most serious was the situation of the Socialist Party. Until its election victory of 1932 it had been principally a party of workingmen closely allied with the trade-union movement. After 1932 it was invaded by large numbers of professional people who were anxious to get jobs in the administration. At the same time its principal leaders were removed from direct contact with their supporters, Iglesias going to Washington as Resident Commissioner and lesser leaders going to San Juan as members of the legislature or officials of the administration. By 1940 the Socialist Party was dying.

The first effect of the decline of the Socialist Party was to strengthen the Communist Party, which had been formed early in the 1930's. In the late 1930's it made considerable headway in the labor movement and was on the way to becoming an important force in the island. However, the rise of Muñoz Marín stunted the growth of the Communist Party as it killed the Socialist Party.

The Liberals were not much better off than the parties of the Coalition. They had lost their most outstanding figure in Muñoz Marín, and they were without any real program which could appeal to the people.

The new phenomenon was the Popular Democratic Party. It was different for a number of reasons. First, it refused to discuss the question of the status of the island, an attitude which was unheard of in

Puerto Rican politics. Muñoz and other leaders of the party took the position that the status question could wait, that what was needed immediately was a program for the economic and social rehabilitation of the island to make it possible to sustain whatever kind of status was finally decided upon. The poverty, illness, and ignorance of the people, not the political question, were to be the party's first concern.

Another new angle in the PPD's electoral campaign was its insistence on the necessity for the people to vote honestly. Muñoz and other leaders of the party toured the island urging the *jibaros* (the country folk) and the city workers not to waste their votes by selling them to the highest bidder, as had frequently been done in the past. They urged the people to vote for the candidates who they felt could best represent them, and then to keep track of how those who were elected behaved themselves. This was the first time in many years that any party had seriously challenged the vote buying which was then endemic in Puerto Rican politics.

In the third place, the Populares had a concrete social and economic program to put before the voters. They promised an agrarian reform, an effort for the economic development of the island, the establishment of social security. To fulfill the first promise they said that all that was necessary was to enforce a provision of the first Organic Act of 1900, which had forbidden any corporation to own more than 500 acres of land in Puerto Rico. As for the second point, they urged that the resources of the government of the island be used to establish a basis for economic development by unifying the electric power companies, establishing an island-wide grid, and increasing electrical resources through hydroelectric and other projects.

To the surprise of everyone except the Populares this campaign was highly successful. The PPD in its first try at the polls won a majority in the insular Senate and came only three short of a majority in the House of Representatives. For the next two years the Populares were forced to juggle with the three independents who held the balance of power, but after 1942 the party won a majority which it was to keep for two decades. Indeed, by 1948 the party had almost all members of both houses. As a result, when the 1952 Constitution was written, the Populares, who constituted an overwhelm-

ing majority of the delegates, insisted on putting in a provision guaranteeing to minority parties at least one third of the seats in both houses of the legislature.

The advent of the Populares to power in the insular legislature in 1940 coincided with the appointment of New Dealer Rexford Guy Tugwell as governor. He had come to Puerto Rico originally as president of the university and had already established many contacts before he assumed the governorship.

During the next six years Tugwell and Luis Muñoz Marín were to constitute a team which got under way the program of change which has subsequently made the island famous. Tugwell, an experienced administrator and a social reformer himself, was able to guide the first stages of this program and to help the development of the exceedingly efficient corps of technicians and administrators who have been the keystone of the transformation which Puerto Rico has undergone since 1940.

During the war years the program backed by Tugwell and Muñoz was faced with tremendous difficulties. The United States was producing for the war effort and had little to spare to help Puerto Rico. Furthermore, for almost a year, during 1942-43, the sea lanes connecting the island with the mainland were hazardous in the extreme because of German submarine activity in the Caribbean and along the Atlantic Coast.

During this period the government's efforts were perforce confined to a limited range of activities. The promised agrarian reform was gotten under way. Although an attempt was made to have the Supreme Court declare the anti-corporation section of the 1900 Organic Act unconstitutional, this failed, and thereafter numerous sections of land were taken from the corporations which possessed more than the limit. This land was organized into so-called "proportional profit farms," on which the workers were given a share in the profits. It was on some of these farms, too, that experiments got under way for the growing of products other than sugar, the most successful of which was pineapples.

The government also undertook to carry out its promise to consolidate the island's electric power system. Two existing private companies were bought out, and the Water Resources Authority was established to control all electric energy production and distribution

on the island. The authority began a policy, still in effect, of developing resources ahead of actual needs, with a view to possible economic expansion of the island.

Finally, a beginning was made with an industrialization program. The Puerto Rican Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) was established in 1942, and it undertook to construct a number of plants which were very much needed during the war emergency. It took over a cement plant originally built by the Puerto Rican Recovery Administration and constructed a factory to produce the bottles in which Puerto Rican rum was shipped to the United States. This was of particular importance since a large part of the Puerto Rican sugar crop was shipped to the continent during the war years as rum because of the transportation shortages. The PRIDCO also established a paper-box factory to make the boxes in which the bottles of rum were shipped. In addition, a shoe factory was set up by the Industrial Development Company.

By the time the war was over the program of social and economic change in Puerto Rico had begun to gain momentum. However, after the war the basis of the program was changed. Muñoz and other leaders came to realize that the government did not have resources sufficient to carry out as large an economic development program as it wished. Teodoro Moscoso, first president of PRIDCO, has summed up this attitude of the government officials at that time thus:

The lesson of the first five years of PRIDCO (1942-47) was that government capital and government know-how were too scarce and too limited to do a job that could even begin to meet the needs of the people. . . . We took two basic decisions: first, to use government funds, not as a principal ingredient, but as a catalyst; and second, to use tax incentives to attract private capital and the production and sales know-how that come with it. This took some doing, just to make the change-over. . . .¹

The upshot of this change in policy was that PRIDCO sold to private interests the factories which it had established, and the government set out on an effort to entice private entrepreneurs to build plants in Puerto Rico. As part of this program the legislature of Puerto Rico passed a law providing tax exemption for a period of ten years for firms establishing new industries or expanding old ones

in the island. In addition the PRIDCO—and after 1950 the Economic Development Administration, to which this work was transferred—carried on an active promotion campaign in the United States designed to interest continental industrialists in establishing branch plants in Puerto Rico.

By the late 1950's this program had borne notable fruits. By the middle of 1957 some 579 new manufacturing plants had been established in the island, and 446 of these were still in operation. The new plants were contributing approximately \$100,000,000 to the national income by the end of 1957 and were providing approximately 35,000 jobs.²

Not only were new industries being established in Puerto Rico but the island's manufacturing was also becoming more diversified. In the beginning most of the firms establishing on the island were in industries employing relatively large numbers of low-cost labor and relatively little capital equipment. By the later 1950's, however, the island had entered the phase of heavier industry, with extensive chemical, metallurgical, and electronics plants being set up. The construction of petroleum refineries was paving the way for a petrochemical industry and many subsidiary manufacturing enterprises.

Along with manufacturing, other phases of the economy were rejuvenated after 1940. After 1955 particular attention was given by the government to the modernization of the island's distribution system, and supermarkets enjoying the advantages of tax exemption began to appear in the major cities and towns.

Throughout the period the government carried on an extensive program of school construction and teacher training with the avowed purpose of having every school-age child in school by 1960. Hospital facilities were extended throughout the country, the effect of which was demonstrated by the fact that by 1958 more than half of the children born in the island were born in a hospital, compared with fewer than 25 per cent some years earlier.

By 1947 the program of economic and social development was well under way, and Muñoz Marín turned his attention once more to the problem of the island's status with regard to the United States. His first move was successfully to urge President Truman to propose to Congress a law whereby Puerto Rico would elect its own governor. As a result of this law the voters of the island went to the polls in

November, 1948, and chose Luis Muñoz Marín as the first elected chief executive of the island.

Muñoz had not as yet definitely retreated from his former position in favor of ultimate independence for Puerto Rico. However, in 1948 there were already evidences that he was changing his mind. This was shown in his attitude toward the avowed advocates of independence. There existed at this time the Congress for Independence, which rallied large segments of popular opinion behind it. The Congress was not a political party, and members of the Partido Popular Democrático were active in it. However, early in 1948 the Popular Party, under Muñoz' leadership, reached the decision that membership in the Congress and in the Party were incompatible with one another, and PPD members were forced to choose.

The upshot of this was the withdrawal of many Populares from the Congress for Independence and the launching by those who remained of a new political party, the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño. This party differed from its predecessor, the Nationalist Party, in its endorsement of constitutional political action as opposed to violence as the means for achieving independence. Its leaders proclaimed their party's intention of declaring the island's independence as soon as the party achieved a majority in the Puerto Rican Legislature.

In its first try at the polls the Partido Independentista came in third, trailing the Populares and the old Republican Party, which had now modified its name to Partido Estadista Republicano to demonstrate its adherence to statehood for the island. However, in the next election, in 1952, the Independentistas outstripped the Republicans and became the second largest party. They were flushed with victory and enthusiasm, and saw themselves winning control of the country within another couple of elections.

However, in 1956 the Partido Independentista suffered a serious defeat, receiving only a little more than 10 per cent of the total vote and coming in a poor third. This defeat brought a serious internal crisis and threatened the extinction of the PIP as a legally recognized party, since, if it fell below 10 per cent of the popular vote in the next poll, it would no longer have legal recognition. This occurred in the 1960 election, in which the Independentistas received only six per cent of the total vote.

Meanwhile Luis Muñoz Marín had become an advocate of a third position, which was neither independence nor statehood. Upon his urging and with the endorsement of President Truman, the United States Congress on July 3, 1950, passed Law 600, which provided for the reorganization of the Puerto Rican government on a new basis. It granted the people of the island the right to write their own constitution, in the following terms:

. . . Congress . . . recognizing fully the principle of government by consent of the governed, approves this Law with the character of a compact, so that the People of Puerto Rico may organize a government based on a constitution adopted by themselves.³

In conformity with Law 600 a referendum was held to determine whether or not a constitution should be written. Once approved, the constitutional assembly was elected, and during the early weeks of 1952 it drew up the Constitution for the Commonwealth (Estado Libre Asociado) of Puerto Rico.

The Constitution recognized the existence of a "compact" between the Federal government and Puerto Rico. Its first article declared:

There is constituted the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. Its political power emanates from the people and will be exercised in conformity with their will, within the terms of the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America.

The spirit which was intended to permeate the new government was set forth in the preamble of the Constitution:

We consider that the determining factors in our life are citizenship in the United States of America and the aspiration continually to enrich our democracy through the individual and collective use of its rights and prerogatives; loyalty to the postulates of the Federal Constitution; the coexistence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures of the American hemisphere; the desire for education; the faith in justice; the devotion for a full, laborious and pacific life; loyalty to the values of the human being regardless of social position, racial differences and economic interests; and the hope for a better world based on these principles.

Muñoz and his party thus adopted the position of being opposed both to complete independence and to statehood. They favored the continued association with the United States which, during a controversy over the island's status arising from the admission of Alaska into the Union in 1958, Muñoz Marín declared to be "eternal." At the same time they favored the widest possible degree of autonomy for the island.

Muñoz and others in the leadership of his party frequently expressed their desire to see the commonwealth status "grow." What this growth consists of was seldom publicly stated, but its essence seems to the writer to consist of two things. First, a relatively minor point, Muñoz and his followers wished to see a direct appeal from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to that of the United States instead of through the Circuit Court of Appeals of Boston, as has been traditional. Second, Muñoz Marín and his supporters have favored some kind of arrangement which would permit the Legislature of Puerto Rico to declare null and void in the island any law passed by the United States Congress which they did not want to see applied to Puerto Rico.

Independentista critics of Muñoz Marín have centered their attention on the claim that the commonwealth status has not really fundamentally changed the situation of Puerto Rico. They have argued that the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is essentially unilateral, that the constitution of the island was written in pursuance of an act of Congress and could theoretically be revoked by another act of Congress. Sovereignty, the independence advocates maintain, has remained in the United States.

Muñoz and his supporters, on the other hand, have based their position on the phrase in Law 600 which says that this law has "the character of a compact," and have insisted that in fact Puerto Rico is "associated" with the United States, not subordinate to it. Luis Muñoz Marín's position was well stated in an article which he wrote for the San Juan newspaper *El Mundo* on July 6, 1958. He said:

. . . Not even I who am its founder can think that the Partido Popular Democrático is so perfect that hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans vote in favor of it in spite of being against its principal political contribution to the history of Puerto Rico and of the United

States, the Estado Libre Asociado. I am profoundly proud that Puerto Rico has had the honor of creating a new political form in the American Union. Millions of our fellow citizens of the United States are profoundly proud of this. . . .

The spirit of our people has resisted and will resist the senseless attempt to make us ashamed of ourselves, discrediting the political status which we have chosen. Those who attempt this cite with approval any statement by anyone who knows little or nothing of what the Estado Libre Asociado is, while at the same time ignoring the honorable attitude of those persons who gave the creative vigor of their intelligence, their love for the dignity of the Puerto Rican people and their decision to continue it with increasing prosperity, of those who established the Estado Libre Asociado. I am happy that Alaska has achieved the honorable end which it sought. But I must say with legitimate pride as a Puerto Rican that Puerto Rico has done much more than add a new star to forty-eight others. It has added a new manner and dimension to the United States, while at the same time placing itself in the most favorable position for resolving the great difficulties of its own people.

The Puerto Rican advocates of statehood agree that Muñoz Marín's assertion that association of the island with the United States is "permanent," but allege that any other kind of association than full statehood is "degrading" and "undignified." They also point out that the commonwealth as it existed after 1952 still left the island subject to legislation by the United States Congress, in which Puerto Rico had no voting representation. They therefore have urged the Puerto Ricans to seek to become a state, which would give them two senators and at least half a dozen members in the House of Representatives.

Muñoz' reply to his statehood critics is that, although Puerto Rico wants to be "associated" with the United States, it does not want to be "integrated" with it. The writer heard the governor deliver a speech on July 17, 1958, on the ninety-ninth anniversary of his father's birth, in which he answered his statehood opponents, arguing that Puerto Rico had a cultural tradition and customs which were different from those of their fellow citizens on the continent, and that they had no desire to forego these and become just like other Americans. They wanted to maintain their identity, he said, but at the same time remain United States citizens. They were, he

said, participating in a unique experiment in self-government and international association of which both they and continental United States citizens should be proud.

The commonwealth status' greatest asset has been the support of Muñoz Marín. So long as he remains active in politics and throws his weight behind the Estado Libre Asociado it is certain to remain the Puerto Rican form of government, because he has won a degree of ascendancy over the voters of the island seldom equaled in democratic lands. By the early 1950's the most sanguine of Luis Muñoz Marín's opponents had ceased to think in terms of defeating "Don Luis." Plans of all opposition politicians were made in terms of what would happen when he had passed from the political scene.

However, the admission of Hawaii into the Union in the summer of 1959 forced Muñoz and his party to modify their position slightly. Hawaii's admission seemed to answer one of the arguments most frequently offered by opponents of statehood for Puerto Rico: that Congress would never approve the admission of a state lying off the shores of the American continent or one whose inhabitants were not in their majority Caucasian. In September the Popular Party for the first time publicly admitted that Puerto Rico might find it worth while to become a state when its per capita income reached that of the poorest of the fifty states. In an apparent effort to stop further discussion of the issue for a while at least, Muñoz backed a measure passed by the Legislature early in 1960 providing for a referendum on the status question sometime after the 1960 election.

The support for Muñoz Marín comes from the most varied sections of the populace. Certainly the backbone of his supporters has consisted of the *jibaros*, the simple country folk in the mountains and valleys of the interior of the island. The hill farmer, the small tobacco or coffee grower, and the ubiquitous small merchant supplying the needs of the country man are the people who have come to adore Muñoz.

The support of the *jibaro* for Muñoz Marín is not something inspired by the governor's actual accomplishments on their behalf. Indeed, it is the more remote country folk who have felt least the impact of the economic and social policies of the Muñoz government that back him most completely. Their support for Don Luis is a kind of personal allegiance, a loyalty not unlike the traditional relation-

ship between master and servant of colonial Spanish America. It is the kind of relationship which explains the persistent strength of personalism in Latin American politics.

Another key source of backing for Muñoz Marín has been the workers in the sugar fields and in the cities and towns who had originally been taught the virtues of organization and political action by Santiago Iglesias. With the decline of the Socialist Party, Muñoz Marín's Popular Democratic Party took over almost *in toto* the rank and file of the former's supporters. The ex-Socialists, particularly those who had some degree of leadership in the old Socialist Party, constitute a considerably less unconditional and more critical kind of supporters than do the unlettered *jibaros*. Their support has been kept by the government's program of social legislation and by the results of the industrialization program.

Muñoz Marín has also drawn a considerable degree of support from the highly educated professional classes. His backers in this group are nowhere near as numerous as those in the other two categories, but they have been of crucial importance in making it possible to carry out his government's program. It is from their ranks that a large part of the administrative staff for the government's development effort has been drawn. One is likely to find in this group a larger percentage than in the others of people who have both understanding and admiration for the capacity and intelligence of Muñoz. These people, although being more or less critical of certain aspects of Muñoz' behavior or program, have supported him and have been inspired by him.

Luis Muñoz Marín is not a great political philosopher. Although he has a tremendously active mind, which ranges widely over the field of ideas, he is an activist rather than a man of ideas. He has never written long theoretical treatises such as those of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre; nor has he attempted to draw together his own basic ideology, as have Pepe Figueres and Rómulo Betancourt; nor has he even gone out of his way, as Perón did, to try to develop a logical justification for his actions in more or less abstract terms.

Muñoz is that rare combination of an idealist and a tremendously successful practical politician. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, of whom he was a great admirer, Muñoz Marín combines the ability to win the support of the masses with the capacity to listen carefully to the

ideas of others and take those which he thinks most useful to carry out the rather broad general aims he is seeking to achieve.

He is a consummate politician. If Muñoz had not had a real genius for politics, his other virtues probably would not have mattered. He has had an ability to get the most diverse kinds of people to work together in harmony, and to get support for himself and his program from the most disparate and unexpected quarters.

Muñoz Marín's personality is his greatest asset. He is a heavy-set man with an "old-shoe" quality of friendliness. In the old days he was known to be very fond of a good time and was notoriously careless about his personal appearance, but in recent years he has become much more the proper gentleman without ever losing the common touch.

Muñoz is an impressive public speaker, and his oratory has a special quality of making his listeners feel that he is talking to each one of them individually. He is as good a listener as he is a talker, and he has a homely touch which puts at ease a *jibaro* from the hills as quickly as a visiting foreign dignitary or member of the United States Congress.

Muñoz Marín is perhaps at his best in personal conversation. His own wide experience with poverty and defeat as well as with success gives him an understanding of the problems of others. His powers of persuasion have become legendary in Puerto Rico, and violent opponents have been known to come away from an interview with Muñoz vastly impressed with his knowledge, his earnestness, and his willingness to listen to their side of the story.

His political ability has undoubtedly been reinforced by his experience as a citizen of two worlds, the United States and Latin America. Muñoz' long residence and schooling in the United States have given him an ability to speak English with virtually no Spanish accent and to understand the ideas and motivations of his continental fellow citizens. But at the same time he has a deep understanding of and a sentimental devotion to the people of his native island.

Muñoz' political prowess is best demonstrated in the nature of his administration. There are few people who could have gotten the two groups which have been the chief elements in his government to work together. He has known how to yoke as a team a group of hard-bitten politicians, interested in the jobs and other emoluments which

are the chief preoccupation of professional politicians everywhere, with the group of technically trained, skilled, and idealistic technicians who have been the actual executors of most of the programs of the Puerto Rican government since 1940.

There is no doubt that the Popular Democratic Party has had a highly efficient political machine based on local professional leaders—bosses if you will. These professional politicians, drawn from the ranks of the old Liberal, Socialist, and Nationalist parties, and from among people who had not previously been active in any party, have included people of distinction within the government as well as thousands of local folk whose names are not known outside their own districts. These are the people who have kept the party organization alive, who have gotten out the vote, who have administered such patronage as there was to hand out. They are the people, too, who have filled the seats in the island legislature and in the city councils and mayors' offices throughout the island.

Muñoz' relations with the politicians of his party have been peculiar. During much of the Partido Popular Democrático's tenure in office the hold of any local politician upon his supporters has depended upon his maintaining good relations with Muñoz. The party's followers were more loyal to Don Luis than to any local leader. However, Muñoz has been able to keep his local leaders aware of this fact without making it galling to them. He has kept their loyalty, admiration, and enthusiasm.

At the same time Muñoz has had the enthusiastic cooperation of thousands of technicians in the administration. He has been constantly willing to listen to their advice, though not always accepting it, and has made them feel that they have had a significant part in a really worth-while experiment. He has also protected them from the appetites of the professional politicians. There has been no spoils system in the administrative side of the insular government. The posts in the economic and social departments and in the various agencies of the development program have been filled by the best talent available, and they have never been regarded as political plums available to "worthy Populares."

Muñoz' political acumen has been shown, too, in his handling of groups which were potentially hostile to his regime and in his avoidance of unnecessary controversies and conflicts which might have

diverted his program from the essentials and have weakened popular support of it. This is demonstrated in the case of the Catholic Church. Eighty to 85 per cent of the population of Puerto Rico is Catholic, although only a relatively small proportion are very active church members. The hostility of the Church could have hampered Muñoz' program considerably by arousing opposition in Puerto Rico and by engendering hostile forces in the United States which could have seriously interfered with his government's policies.

Muñoz, although he is a divorced man and has a reputation for not being a believing Catholic, succeeded until 1960 in maintaining more or less cordial relations with the Church. The traditional struggle between clerical and anticlerical forces, which is more or less potent in virtually all the Latin American nations, had comparatively little importance in Puerto Rico.

However, in 1960 the Church hierarchy undertook to sponsor the formation of a purely Catholic Party, the Partido Acción Cristiana. It did not receive enough votes to become a legal party in the 1960 election, and its future remains in doubt. Although strongly opposing the new party, Muñoz has made it clear that he has no quarrel with the Church as such.

Finally, Muñoz' political ability has been shown in his relations with the Federal government. Long before becoming governor he made it a policy to get to know key figures in both the legislative and administrative sides of Washington. He is the island's most effective lobbyist when issues concerning Puerto Rico are being discussed in the Federal regime.

There was considerable fear in Puerto Rico of the effects on the island of the victory of the Republican Party in the United States election of 1952. Puerto Rican progress during the previous twenty years had been made under the Democrats, and the Puerto Rican regime itself was generally rated both in the island and on the continent as "New Dealish."

In spite of these fears the Puerto Rican regime suffered no adverse effects from the advent of the Republicans to power. Whether correctly or not, this fact is widely attributed in Puerto Rico to Muñoz Marín's contacts in Washington with Republicans as well as Democrats.

The second great asset of Muñoz Marín has been his unbounded

energy. He has kept track of virtually everything which has been going on in the government as well as in political life. Although he has not sought to centralize the administration in his own hands, and has delegated much authority both in the government and in the party to able assistants, he has never lost interest in any aspect of public affairs in Puerto Rico.

The Governor is constantly reviewing and checking on various phases of the widespread program of development, and it is by no means unusual for some administrative branch to receive word that the Governor thinks that such and such a project ought to be tried or that the standard way of doing something should be adjusted in one way or another. At the same time he has never lost contact with the mass of the people to whom he owes his long tenure in power. There are few politicians in the island sanguine enough to think that they can outmaneuver Muñoz Marín, and admiration for his wide knowledge and acquaintanceship as well as for his ability as a political manipulator is widespread even among his strongest opponents. This ability Muñoz maintains because he does not relax his interest in the minutiae of day-to-day politics.

The third great asset of Muñoz Marín has been his ability to listen to the ideas of others and to adapt them to the long-term objectives which he has sought to carry out. In the late 1930's he gathered around himself a remarkable group of young intellectuals who were in many cases very thoughtful men as well as, in some instances, very good administrators. For many years, too, Muñoz maintained close liaison with the university, particularly with the social scientists there.

Over the years Muñoz has shown a remarkable ability to "pick the brains" of these people. Although he has not been especially interested in theories, he has been exceedingly interested in finding new and better ways of fulfilling his basic objectives of fomenting production, raising standards of living, and developing the cultural capacities of his people. Hence he is reputed to have accepted the idea of Operation Bootstrap from one of his closest advisers and to have approved of the commonwealth idea as drawn up by another of his close associates.

His approach is demonstrated by his method of dealing with the problem of developing better methods of distribution in the island.

In the middle 1950's Muñoz became convinced that the old-fashioned small store, with its very small stock of a limited variety of produce, was hampering the further expansion of several sectors of the economy. His recognition of this fact was in itself witness to the way in which he follows closely the island's economic problems. Muñoz was anxious to find a way out of this problem and, in addition, to obtain advice from some of the government technicians who had been studying the problem. He went to Scandinavia in 1955 to make an on-the-spot study of the consumers' cooperative movement there, bringing back with him a Swedish cooperator to act as adviser in this field.

The result was considerable government impetus to the development of consumers' cooperative supermarkets in Puerto Rico, along with encouragement for a number of private firms to come in and establish similar establishments. As a consequence the government is now in a much better position than formerly to encourage the development of local food-growing industries which would have had difficulty under previous conditions in finding adequate stable outlets at reasonable prices. Now with the supermarket chains, cooperative and private, buying in large quantities there is an assured market for several of these food-producing projects.

Muñoz' two great failures, which may in the long run have some effect on the position he holds in Puerto Rican and hemispheric history, have been his inability to sell the idea of the commonwealth to the rank-and-file Puerto Rican and his lack of success in developing a secondary leadership capable of taking over when he is gone. There are those who feel that his failure to convince the people of Puerto Rico that the commonwealth status is a lasting solution to the status problem arises from his own lack of confidence in it. The writer has no way of knowing whether or not this is the case. However, it is obvious that, although most Puerto Ricans are willing to live with the commonwealth so long as Muñoz is for it, relatively few are convinced that it is in any way "permanent." The great bulk of the population is probably still divided between those who would choose independence and those who would opt to become a state in the Federal Union.

It is hard for an outsider to fathom exactly why Muñoz has failed in this regard. Perhaps it is because he has talked about the status as a "growing" one without specifying exactly what it is he wants it

to grow into. He leaves the end result of this growth open, so that one is free to presume that it will be one or the other of the classic alternatives. Perhaps Muñoz' failure is due to the fact, as one of his closest associates put it to the author, that the commonwealth status is a "cold" one, that it is not one about which much enthusiasm can be engendered. One can get aroused by patriotic feelings for Puerto Rico concomitant with independence. One can even get enthusiastic about the glories of being part of the United States as a duly admitted state. But the Commonwealth idea is so new and different that it is hard to get passionately attached to it. The arguments in favor of it are largely practical, not sentimental.

Muñoz' second great failure has been to develop anyone to take his place. Perhaps this is an impossible task. Certainly Muñoz' role as a liaison between more or less hard-bitten professional politicians and more or less idealistic intellectuals is a unique one. It would be hard to find anyone else who could fill that role. Muñoz himself has recognized the fact publicly that there is no one who is his logical successor. The fact raises certain doubts as to the ability of Puerto Rico to continue with the same vigor its development program once Muñoz is no longer leading it.

The net effect of the career of Luis Muñoz Marín on Puerto Rico has been threefold: he started a program of economic growth and development which in 1961 seems to have reached the point of self-perpetuation; he has strengthened and given new meaning to political democracy; and he has given Puerto Ricans a self-assurance and hope which they did not before possess. All of this represents a profound revolution in the island's economy, society, and political life. But though changing the old way of life, Muñoz has been concerned with preserving its good things. Material progress has been a means, not an end, for him. His ultimate objective is probably best expressed by his own words uttered in a commencement speech given at Harvard University on June 16, 1955:

A large question arises: Are the attitudes and habits that are associated with modern high productivity inexorably interwoven with the attitudes and manners of relentless material consumption? Can a culture be efficient in production and at the same time wise and modest in consumption? Can it be feverish in output and serene in intake? I say we are getting to the time in which it must—and if it must, it

probably can. Economists could tell us that a higher and higher rate of multiple consumption is necessary to a high rate of production, and therefore of employment and of income, and that what I am talking about would bring economies tumbling down on our heads. It need not be so, because of the evident possibility of re-gearing high productivity to higher ends. If it were so, it would most certainly be time to ponder what to do about a situation in which Serenity could bring about catastrophe.

In the Declaration of Independence of the United States the young Republic was dedicated to the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In Puerto Rico we are trying in our modest setting, to bring to a harmonious success, for the good of our souls and bodies and for the observation of our fellow citizens and of such parts of the world as may care to look Operation Bootstrap—the right to life; Operation Commonwealth—the right to liberty; and Operation Serenity—the pursuit of happiness with some hope of really catching up with her.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles, and the Bolivian National Revolution



One day late in April, 1952, a festive crowd gathered at the airport high up on the Bolivian Altiplano overlooking the city of La Paz nestled down in its crevice in the three-mile-high plain. Deafening cheers arose as an airplane hove into view, landed, and disgorged its principal passenger, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Constitutional President of the Republic. The cheering was even more deafening as Hernán Siles, the Vice President, stepped forward and gave the arriving visitor the traditional *abrazo* and welcomed him back to his native soil.

This act marked the culmination of a long struggle and the beginning of one of the most profound social transformations which any Latin American country has experienced in the twentieth century. The two men who embraced below the recently landed airplane were the people most responsible for this transformation and were to guide it through its first turbulent years.

Paz Estenssoro and Siles were the founders and leading figures in the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, a political party which for a dozen years had been calling for a fundamental change in the economic, social, and political institutions of the Republic of Bolivia. In spite of their different backgrounds they had long worked together to bring about this change and were now to have their opportunity to do so. Perhaps, had either known the difficulties which they were going to face during the next few years, they would not have undertaken the tremendous task which lay before them.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro was born of a middle-class family in the town of Tarija in the southern part of Bolivia, not far from the Argentine frontier. He went to the University of San Andrés in La Paz and ultimately became a professor there. He became a specialist

in economic affairs, particularly in the economic problems of his own country, about which he wrote several interesting books.

Hernán Siles, in contrast, was the son of one of the leading politicians of his country who, after being a deputy, senator, and cabinet member, served as president of the republic from 1926 until 1930 and died while ambassador to Peru. Siles, too, had studied at the University and had graduated shortly before the outbreak of the Chaco War between his country and Paraguay.

Both young men served in their nation's armed forces during this war, which went on from 1932 until late in 1935. They, like many of their generation who fought in the war, were tremendously disillusioned by its consequences. They saw their country's army, which had been rated one of the best in Latin America, crumble before the enemy, not because of any lack of valor on the part of the troops but because of the stupid tactics and lack of honesty and patriotism on the part of many of the high officers. They were impressed with the sufferings of the poor Indian troops brought down from the 15,000-foot plateau which had been their whole world to die in the heat and disease-ridden tropics of the barren Chaco.

The Chaco War was the catalyst that started the process of undermining the traditional social system of Bolivia. Arousing the spirit of nationalism and the social consciousness of the youth of the upper and middle classes of the cities, it also had disintegrating effects on the life of the Indians, who were the great majority of the population. For the first time they were taken out of their accustomed milieu and were shown a new and different type of world. Many of them came back unwilling to return to their old way of life and so tended to drift to the cities. Movements began among the largely Indian workers in the tin mines toward organization and defense of their interests against the mineowners.

Soon after the end of the Chaco War the Army overthrew the government of President Tejada Sorzano. The leader of the coup, Colonel David Toro, established what he called a "Socialist Republic," the main innovation of which was to establish for the first time a Ministry of Labor. After a bit more than a year in office Toro was overthrown by another military coup headed by Colonel Germán Busch.

Busch, a hero of the Chaco War, was deeply discontented with the

economic and social *status quo* but was not very clear just what he wanted to do about it. With his encouragement, however, the beginnings of a trade-union movement were made among the tin miners. He established for the first time a Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, and signed an order forcing the mining companies to sell most of their foreign exchange to the Central Bank.

One of the economic advisers to Germán Busch was young Víctor Paz Estenssoro, who was already gaining some reputation as a brilliant student of economic affairs. He was principally responsible for the decree of President Busch establishing government control over the foreign exchange earned by the mining companies. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies during the Busch regime.

President Busch committed suicide—or was murdered (the point is still discussed in Bolivia)—in the middle of 1939, and for four and a half years there was a conservatively oriented administration. It quietly left the foreign exchange decree without effect, and the trade unions made little further progress.

Meanwhile Hernán Siles joined Paz Estenssoro in the Chamber of Deputies in the election of 1940. In the following year Paz Estenssoro, Siles, and three other deputies took the lead in establishing a new political party, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). It was strongly nationalist, as its name implied, and was for some time accused of pro-Nazi sympathies, an allegation which was strongly denied by the party leaders. Part of its interpretation of Bolivian nationalism was emphasis on the importance of the country's Indian heritage. It urged that steps be taken to incorporate the Indians, who lived as virtual pariahs in their own country, into the economic, social, and political life of the nation.

The MNR constituted one of the two principal opposition parties in Congress between its foundation and December, 1943. The other major opposition group was the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, which proclaimed itself to be an "independent Marxist" organization but out of which the Communist Party of Bolivia emerged some years later. Both groups had some influence in the labor movement.

A few years after the foundation of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Víctor Paz Estenssoro summed up its objectives as follows:

We are the Revolutionary Nationalist Party. . . . We have seen that a country with a semi-colonial structure like Bolivia, in a revolutionary period, and within the present realities, must insofar as possible achieve a socialist regime which will permit the realization of social conquests appropriate to any nationalist policy, the grand objectives of which will be economic liberation and reform of the agrarian system. It is not possible to apply to Bolivia . . . principles applicable or already applied to other people in other countries. Here social phenomena are of a different nature. . . .¹

During the early 1940's discontent was rising with the government then in power. The miners were particularly aroused against the regime because of a massacre which occurred at the mining camp of Catavi in December, 1942, and they turned to the MNR for support. Paz Estenssoro and other leaders of the party in the Chamber of Deputies bore the burden of interrogating the government upon this occasion, and from this time on a firm alliance was sealed between the miners' organizations and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario.

In December, 1943, the government of General Enrique Peñaranda was overthrown by a military *coup d'état* supported by the MNR. Víctor Paz Estenssoro became Minister of Finance of the new President, Major Gualberto Villarroel. Although he resigned a few months later, in a maneuver designed to gain recognition of the new regime by the United States and other American countries, the MNR was represented in the government during most of the two and a half years Villarroel was president.

This period, from December, 1943, until July, 1946, was of key importance to the MNR and to the careers of Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles for two reasons. First, it established the party as the principal spokesman for the miners and, to a less degree, for the Indian peasants. In the second place, it paved the way for the downfall of the MNR's principal rival, the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR).

Under the inspiration of Paz Estenssoro, Siles, and other MNR leaders, the Villarroel government took several measures which were designed to aid the indigenous population. On the one hand, it encouraged the development of a strong labor movement among the tin miners, a movement which was firmly in the hands of the MNR

by the end of Villarroel's government. In addition, the Villarroel regime proclaimed the end of the forced labor service which Bolivian Indians had legally been bound to render their landlords. Finally, the government convoked a National Indian Congress, in the process of which President Villarroel, Paz Estenssoro, and other government political leaders discussed at length with the leaders of the Indians the problems which were facing that group.

During most of the period that Villarroel was in office the MNR's rival, the PIR, was one of the main forces of the opposition. Although it had first suggested that it would like to take part in the Villarroel administration, it turned sharply against the regime when the President refused to accept the PIR's conditions for entering the government. It associated closely in the opposition with the principal parties of the landowners and mining interests, the so-called Partido Unión Republicana Socialista and the Partido Liberal. Thus began the discrediting of the PIR in the eyes of the working and peasant masses of Bolivia.

The Villarroel regime came to a sudden tragic end on July 13, 1946, when elements of the population of La Paz revolted, and seized and lynched President Villarroel and several of his close associates. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and other top MNR leaders were able to take refuge in various embassies in La Paz and went into exile in Argentina, Chile, and other countries.

During the next six years the MNR was severely persecuted by the government. Paz Estenssoro spent the period in exile, most of the time in Argentina, but a year in Montevideo, Uruguay, when dictator Juan Perón decided to join the persecution of the MNR leaders. Hernán Siles was in exile in Chile part of the time but returned various times to lead the underground fight of the MNR against the regime.

The six years during which the MNR was out of power were turbulent ones. There were three presidents and a military junta successively governing the country during this period. Labor unrest was constant, and there were two revolutionary strikes and innumerable partial walkouts. Arrests of opponents of the regime occurred almost daily.

In spite of being persecuted, and its leaders being in exile, in jail, or in hiding most of the time, the MNR thrived during the six years.

Its ranks were solidified, and its contacts with the labor movement, especially the miners and factory workers, were reinforced. The party gained considerably from the fact that the PIR continued its policy of cooperating with the Liberals and the Partido Unión Republicana Socialista during most of the six-year period. By the end of this time the PIR had lost virtually all of its influence among the urban workers to the MNR.

The extent of the MNR's popular following was indicated in the presidential election of May, 1951. The MNR named Víctor Paz Estenssoro for president and Hernán Siles for vice president. They were faced with three rival slates, one of which had more or less official blessing of the incumbent government. However, when the votes began to be counted it was clear that Paz Estenssoro and Siles were running far ahead of their opponents.

The government maintained that the MNR candidates had not received the 51 per cent vote demanded by the constitution, and that therefore it should be Congress that selected the new president from the two highest candidates. However, rather than face the tremendous popular disapproval which this move would have entailed, President Mamerto Urriolagoitia preferred to turn the government over to a military junta, which governed until April 9, 1952.

By the beginning of 1952 Hernán Siles was back in Bolivia directing the fight against the junta government. His chief aid in this was Juan Lechin, head of the Mine Workers Federation and one of the principal leaders of the MNR. They entered into negotiations with General Antonio Seleme, Minister of Interior and commander of the Military Police (*carabineros*), who were almost as numerous and well armed as the national army. He was willing to help to overthrow the junta government of which he was a member in return for becoming president himself.

The conspiracy bore fruit on April 9, 1952, when a rebellion commenced in La Paz and the principal mining towns of the republic. The military police, under General Seleme's direction, provided arms for MNR supporters in La Paz, while the miners, armed with weapons they had concealed for years and with dynamite which they were used to handling in their daily work, rapidly overcame the garrisons in the principal mining areas.

By the end of the first day of fighting the struggle in La Paz

seemed to be going against the rebels. Hernán Siles and Juan Lechin suggested to General Seleme that perhaps he had better take refuge in an embassy, since he would certainly suffer severely if he were to fall into government hands. Siles and Lechin added that they would stay in the streets until all hope had gone. Seleme took their advice.

The next day, when the tide turned in favor of the rebels, General Seleme came out of the embassy once again and sought to assume command of the uprising. However, Siles informed him that, since he had abandoned the struggle, he had no right to take advantage of its approaching victory. Instead of proclaiming Seleme president, as had first been intended, it was decided to make effective the MNR's claim that it had won the 1951 election and call back Víctor Paz Estenssoro from exile.

There is no doubt that what occurred in the period between the victory of the April 9 Revolution and the return of Víctor Paz from Buenos Aires was a tribute to the integrity of Hernán Siles. He in effect had control of the nation in his hands, and it would have been simple—and in good Bolivian tradition—for him to have proclaimed himself provisional president. However, being a man of tremendous loyalty to his comrades and to his own ideals, he refused to take the easy path to power. Rather, he functioned as vice president, temporarily in charge of the government, until Víctor Paz could return from exile. In doing so he gave a lesson which not all of his associates have seen fit to heed.

With the return of Víctor Paz Estenssoro to Bolivia the real work of the Bolivian National Revolution got under way. The MNR, during its years in the political wilderness, had developed an extensive and radical program of government. It had promised to give the Indians full rights of citizenship. It had pledged to nationalize the country's largest tin-mining companies. It had said that it would carry out an agrarian reform, to give the land to the men and women who actually tilled it. Now they began to take steps to carry out this program.

One of Víctor Paz Estenssoro's first decrees extended the right to vote to all adults. Previously only those who were literate in Spanish had the franchise, and fewer than two hundred thousand voters were registered. The new decree increased this number many times

over and constituted the first step in making the Indians full-fledged participants in the civic life of the nation.

The next major step was to nationalize the tin mines. This was essential to the MNR government for several reasons. First, they had promised to do so, and not to have fulfilled this promise would have been to put in doubt all the other elements of their program. Second, so long as the existing companies remained in control of the tin mines the MNR leaders could be sure that these companies would use all their very considerable influence to get rid of the MNR regime.

Finally, the MNR leaders felt that as a matter of principle this natural resource should be in the hands of the nation. For many decades the tin companies had taken out the products of their mines while leaving very little in return. They had paid very low taxes, their wage scales had been miserable, and in general the country had benefited relatively little, while the owners of the companies had made stupendous profits. Although this situation had changed somewhat in the years following the Chaco War, it was still felt by the MNR chiefs, as well as by most other Bolivians who had any opinion at all about the problem, that the Big Three mines, those belonging to the Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild companies, should be taken over by the State.

President Víctor Paz Estenssoro first appointed a commission to study the problem a couple of months after he assumed office. This commission recommended nationalization. The project was widely debated, and finally, on October 31, 1952, a decree was issued expropriating the properties of the three companies and establishing the Corporación Minera de Bolivia, a government-owned institution, to take over these holdings.

A great deal has been said and written about the "failure" of Bolivian tin nationalization. However, this alleged failure has been grossly exaggerated. Although it would be impossible to deny the considerable decline in both production and productivity occurring since expropriation, this is at most only half the story.

First, let us note some of the bad aspects of what occurred after nationalization. There is no doubt that labor discipline declined notably after the April 9, 1952, Revolution, when the miners felt,

with some reason, that they were masters of the mines and of the nation. The mineworkers began to discharge managers instead of the other way round. This situation had only partly improved nine years after the revolution.

In the second place, the mines undoubtedly had excess personnel. A number of miners had been discharged from their jobs for trade-union and political reasons during the six years that the MNR was out of power. All these were ordered restored to their posts as soon as the revolution triumphed, while few other workers were dismissed.

Third, the mines were forced for several years to carry excessively heavy costs ensuing from the management of their company stores. Prices in these were frozen while the general price level was skyrocketing. This resulted in many workers' continuing on the mines' payrolls more for the privilege of buying goods cheaply in the commissaries than for the wages they earned. This problem was partly adjusted with President Hernán Siles' Stabilization Program at the end of 1956.

Fourth, when the mining companies withdrew, they took with them not only virtually all their foreign technicians and engineers but also most of their maps and almost every document of any value in running the mines. As a result it was necessary to promote Bolivians who admittedly were not well qualified for highly technical posts. However, the surprising thing is that these people did as well as they did, not that they did not do as well as their predecessors. In this regard the government of President Víctor Paz Estenssoro might be justly criticized for not seizing the mines provisionally as soon as they came to power, thus preventing the removal of precious documents, including maps of the operating mines and of areas which had been explored for new ones.

Another serious problem facing the nationalized mines was the sagging prices and curtailed demand for their products. Within a year of the revolution the price of tin fell from \$1.20 a pound to less than 90¢. By the end of 1957 contracts for the purchase of tungsten and other by-products of the tin mines which had been in effect with the U.S. Government for a number of years expired and were not renewed.

However, the biggest single problem facing the Corporación Minera and the Bolivian Government was the fact that they were not

able to settle the question of compensation to the old mining companies. Although a provisional agreement was negotiated in August, 1953, whereby the Corporación paid the old companies a varying amount per pound of tin mined, depending on the cost at which it was sold, no agreement was reached as to the total amount owed. This question was not resolved until the early months of 1961.

Until the question of compensation could be agreed upon, the Corporación Minera was not in a position to go ahead with any program for renovating the mines and exploring extensively for new ones. For a generation relatively little exploration work had been done by the tin-mining companies, and the result was that the percentage of tin in the ore being dug in the existing mines had declined catastrophically by 1952. It continued to fall in subsequent years. In addition, the equipment of most of the mines was very antiquated, and some of it was quite dangerous.

In order for the Corporación Minera to be able to get funds for reequipment of the mines and for extensive exploration and development, it had to be in a position to borrow considerable sums abroad. However, while the issue of compensation was still unsettled and the Corporación did not know just what its debts were, there was little possibility to obtain loans from respectable banking institutions. As a result the future of the mining industry continued to depend on the resolution of the compensation problem, and the productivity of the existing mines continued to fall.

Whatever the pros and cons of the nationalization of the mines in Bolivia, what most critics overlook is that this was only one phase of the total program of the MNR government. Of much more long-run significance for the country were the agrarian reform and the program for diversification of the nation's economy commenced during President Víctor Paz Estenssoro's first administration.

Agrarian reform was the heart of the social reform program of the MNR government. Ever since the coming of the Spaniards to the Altiplano of Bolivia in the sixteenth century there had been a struggle between the Indians and the Spaniards and their descendants for control of the land. The Indian had been the steady loser in this battle. By the middle of the twentieth century most of the land in the Altiplano was in the hands of large landowners of European and mestizo descent and was cultivated by Indians, under conditions

reminiscent of those prevailing in Europe during the Middle Ages. The Indians were granted small pieces of land to cultivate for their own account and on which to have a hut, and in return were required to till the land which was cultivated for the account of the landlord. They were also forced periodically to give a week's free personal labor service to the landowner.

As a result of this system Bolivian agriculture was not only socially retrograde but economically backward. With virtually free labor from the Indians the landowners had little or no incentive to adopt modern methods of cultivation or to use machinery.

From the beginning the MNR leaders had been "Indianist" in their orientation and had urged some change in the organization of the nation's rural economy and society. In this perhaps they were influenced by Haya de la Torre and the Aprista movement in neighboring Peru as well as by their own immediate surroundings. However, it was not until the "six years" of experience in the political wilderness that Paz Estenssoro, Siles, and the other MNR leaders finally came out frankly in favor of general redistribution of the land to the Indians.

The MNR government's first move in this direction was to organize the Indians. Peasant unions were established throughout the country, and one of the unions' principal activities was to establish armed militia groups. At the same time the MNR party established local groups in virtually every center of Indian population.

About a year after the revolution a commission was established by President Paz Estenssoro to draw up an agrarian reform law. Vice President Hernán Siles was put in charge, and the commission was composed of university people, trade-unionists, and political leaders. President Paz Estenssoro himself worked closely with the commission. After the submission of its report the cabinet discussed the project thoroughly, and finally on August 2, 1953, the agrarian reform decree was formally signed.

The new law gave outright and immediately to the Indians the small parcels of land which the landowners had allowed them to cultivate for their own benefit. In addition it provided that that part of the haciendas which had been used for the account of the landowner should also be divided among the peasants after a thorough survey and study of each particular hacienda had been made. A Na-

tional Agrarian Reform Institute was established to carry out the program.

This was the fundamental act of the MNR government. It gave to the Indians a solid economic base for the first time. In effect it liberated them from a kind of semi-serfdom to which they had long been submitted. It gave them a psychological security as small land-owners which they had not possessed for generations. Whatever may happen to the MNR regime in the future, it is unlikely that any future government will be able to undo the agrarian reform law.

Also of very great long-run importance was the MNR government's program for the economic diversification of Bolivia. The MNR leaders had for long argued that this was an absolute necessity for the future growth of the nation's economy, and had insisted that the government take steps to bring it about. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, writing the chapter on Bolivia in a book on Latin American economic thought in 1945, had written about himself and other economic thinkers of his group in Bolivia:

Those who dedicate themselves to economic problems are anti-liberal, to a greater or less degree. In the face of present realities of Bolivia—a country with a semi-colonial economy—it is necessary to oppose “laissez faire, laissez passer” (which provides all the advantages for the large firms) with the intervention of the state, in defense of collective interests. . . . To strengthen the national economy against effects of crises, during which the price of minerals falls almost vertically, it is necessary to diversify Bolivian production. This implies a protectionist policy and industrialization encouraged by the State, in opposition to the thesis of those who wish that Bolivia be exclusively a mining country and import all of its food products and manufactured goods forever. . . .

The program of economic diversification had various aspects. First, it was desired to develop other export goods which could earn foreign exchange for Bolivia to supplement the declining amounts of foreign currency coming from tin and other minerals. Oil provided the best prospects. During the first year of the MNR regime the government spent a considerable amount of its foreign exchange resources to purchase equipment for the government petroleum firm the Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales Bolivianos. Within three years

of the revolution, as a result, the YPFB had reached a production of about five times that of 1951.

However, the administration was not satisfied with this. The government and YPFB did not have the resources sufficient to push the development of the oil industry much further. Therefore the MNR leaders decided to permit international oil companies to seek out and exploit the very large oil reserves which Bolivia is presumed to possess.

The changes in the law which were required to make such international investments possible took place during the last year of the first Paz Estenssoro administration. During the first two years of the succeeding administration of Hernán Siles a dozen or more concessions were granted to foreign companies, particularly United States firms.

In addition to seeking new exports, the MNR government was anxious to develop greater production within the country of both agricultural and industrial products. For this purpose it was necessary vastly to expand the country's transportation facilities, and the government, with a great deal of aid from the United States Point Four Program, undertook a program of building new roads and establishing better maintenance of old ones. First priority was given to the highway into the eastern part of the country from Cochabamba to the city of Santa Cruz. Much of the rest of the government's efforts in this field were devoted to establishing local roads to connect outlying districts with the main trunk highways.

The Paz Estenssoro and Siles governments also sought to encourage the extension and improvement of the country's agricultural output. With the help of Point Four a series of new experiment stations was established, and a system of agricultural extension agents was set up. The government also invested considerable funds in a program of irrigation of a region east of Santa Cruz, where cotton growing was feasible. Textile manufacturing interests in the country cooperated with the government on this last aspect of the agricultural development program.

Several new manufacturing establishments of a fundamental nature were organized by the government. These included a new oil refinery, a sugar refinery near Santa Cruz, and a new cement plant. At the same time the government, again with the help of Point Four,

established a big new vocational training school in La Paz to train apprentices and other workers for the country's manufacturing plants.

In general, the industrialists did not cooperate with the government's development program. They resented fundamentally the government's attitude of friendliness toward the trade unions and the relaxation of labor discipline which resulted from this. After December, 1956, the industrialists were also adversely affected by the Stabilization Program which deprived them of the ridiculously low foreign exchange rates which they had been able to use to import their raw materials and surreptitiously to ship some of their profits abroad. The government found it very difficult to enlist the support of local industrialists in the economic development program.

In addition to the economic programs of the MNR government the regime brought about important political changes. Fundamental was the organization of the Indian peasants politically and granting them the right to vote. There was also an attempt to reorganize the armed forces in such a fashion that they would no longer be a danger to civilian control of the government.

The Army, of course, had been defeated in the three-day uprising of April, 1952. Most of the rank-and-file soldiers were sent home, and their officers were generally retired. For more than a year Bolivia had only a skeleton military force. During this period there was a lively controversy concerning whether or not to reconstitute the Army. The decision to do so was finally made a year after the revolution of April, 1952.

Several principles were followed in reorganizing the Army. Officers who had been loyal to the MNR were brought back to provide the officers corps. The military academies were opened largely to sons of workers, peasants, and middle-class people friendly to the MNR. Most of the soldiers were put to work on road building, the construction of sewage and water facilities, the establishing of the basis for a migration program to the eastern forest regions of Bolivia and other economic development projects. A large majority of the armed forces was thus kept a safe distance from the capital, La Paz.

Finally, the government decided to maintain in existence the popular militia which had been established during and after the revolution. Thus, in case the Army leaders should once again seek to

follow the traditional role of the military and try to overthrow the government, their influence would be checked by the militia.

The net result of this was positive. The MNR regime had to worry relatively little concerning the possibility that the Army would attempt to oust the government. Since 1952 there has been no serious attempt on the part of the armed forces to oust the civilian administration, an unrivaled record in the history of Bolivia.

The most serious criticism which one can make of the Paz Estenssoro administration was its treatment of the opposition. Paz Estenssoro allowed very little freedom of the press. Many of the leaders of past regimes were forced to stay in exile. Opponents of the MNR were frequently arrested, and some of them were kept in concentration camps.

In order to understand the background of the attitude of the Paz Estenssoro regime toward the opponents of the MNR, one must keep in mind that on several occasions the government issued general amnesties for its opponents. It also should be noted that the opposition continued to believe that governments should be changed in the traditional Bolivian manner, by *coup d'état* or armed revolt. Most of the opposition came to be concentrated behind the Falange Socialista Boliviana, a party patterned frankly on the Spanish Falange of Francisco Franco. Its principal program was a promise to reestablish "order" in the republic, particularly in the countryside. It issued frequent calls to the armed forces and to retired army officers to join with it to overthrow the MNR regime.

During the Paz Estenssoro administration the President was without any doubt the dominant figure in the government. He came to power as the undisputed leader of the MNR with high prestige as an economist and a political leader. He remained the unchallenged top figure in the party and the government.

Hernán Siles, vice president during the first Paz Estenssoro administration, played a leading role in the government and the MNR. He was head of the Agrarian Reform Commission and organized a Planning Commission to project the possibilities of the country's economic expansion. At the same time he came to be regarded as the leader of the more conservative faction of the government party.

Paz Estenssoro's term of office came to an end in July, 1956, and elections were held in June. Four groups of candidates were pre-

sented. The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario named Hernán Siles as its candidate for the presidency and a leader of the left wing of the party, Nuflo Chávez, who had been Minister of Peasant Affairs in the Paz Estenssoro government, as its candidate for vice president. The Falange Socialista Boliviana, and the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario also named slates for president, vice president, and congress. Finally, the remnants of the old PIR and the new Partido Comunista de Bolivia named a joint ticket.

The MNR candidates won handily in a hard-fought campaign. Although they were defeated in Sucre and had only a small majority in some of the other principal cities, the government party had an overwhelming majority in the countryside. Siles was inaugurated early in July, 1956, as the second MNR president of Bolivia.

The new chief executive was faced with exceedingly pressing problems calling for immediate solutions. Although the Paz Estenssoro regime had carried out fundamental reforms in the economic, social, and political structure of the country, it was the task of the Siles government to consolidate these. During the Paz Estenssoro administration the country had been wracked by a severe inflation, which went out of all control during the last months of his rule and the first months of Siles' term. It threatened to undermine and perhaps destroy the whole structure of the MNR regime.

With the aid of the Point Four authorities an economic adviser was brought from the United States to suggest a program for checking the inflation. This expert, George Eder, suggested to Siles the necessity for a severe policy of retrenchment. He urged that all controls be removed over the movement of foreign currencies in and out of the country; that all subsidies be ended to the company stores in the mining camps; that all price controls be abolished; and that a large increase in wages be granted, and then that wages be frozen for some considerable time.

This was a dangerous program for the Siles government to try to carry out. The exchange control system had been a source of quick profits to the country's industrialists, who received a dollar for 150 bolivianos when the general market rate was as high as 15,000. They could thus get their imported raw materials for practically nothing, and as a result production was very cheap and many

Bolivian manufactured goods were being smuggled abroad to Peru, Chile, and Brazil.

The same favored rate of foreign exchange had been given to many trade-union and political leaders on the pretext that they were going to sell the goods imported with these cheap dollars to members of unions and cooperatives, passing on to them the lower prices. However, in fact, many of these leaders had taken advantage of their privilege to get rich and to build up bank accounts abroad. These people, whose power in the MNR was very great, could be expected to oppose any attempt to deprive them of their privileges.

The ending of mining camp commissary subsidies, which resulted in increases of as much as 1000 per cent in the prices of goods sold there, also hurt a group very powerful in the MNR government, which depended to a very large extent on the political backing and the possible military assistance of the armed miners.

However, in spite of these difficulties, Siles determined to go ahead with the program which Eder had recommended to him. In order to backstop the program, he was assured of a fund of \$25,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund, Point Four, and the United States Treasury. The first move was to get Congress to authorize Siles to put such a program into effect. All of the MNR deputies and senators supported it, many of them apparently unaware of what its effects would be. However, once the program got under way, a wave of protest broke out among the trade-union leaders and politicians. This culminated in June, 1957, in a threat of a general strike to begin on July 1.

However, the strike never occurred. The labor movement split violently on this issue, and before the deadline arrived most of the important unions had voted not to support the strike, and had given qualified endorsement to the anti-inflationary program. Only the miners held out.

The mining unions had given trouble from the beginning of the Stabilization Program. When they went on strike in February, 1957, against the end of subsidized prices in their commissaries, President Siles countered by going on a hunger strike, which he did not end until the miners had returned to work. As the deadline of the July 1 strike approached, President Siles went to the principal mining camps, talked personally to the workers there, and got their virtually unanimous support. The strike collapsed completely.

Siles' move in going to the mining camps demonstrated remarkable personal courage. At one point some of the mine union leaders had threatened that he would be lynched if he went near one particular mine. He promptly went there, the union leaders were nowhere to be found, and he won over the rank and file completely.

The rest of President Siles' term was turbulent. Although his victory in the July 1, 1957, strike crisis temporarily gave him complete control of the situation, he failed to push his success to its ultimate conclusions. Instead of seeking to destroy the base of his left-wing opponents within the MNR by bringing about a reorganization of the Mine Workers Federation, as he might well have been able to do at the time, he allowed this powerful organization to remain under the control of Juan Lechin. It continued to provide a focus of opposition to the President.

Opposition to the program of stabilization began to rise again during 1958. Although prices were stable, or relatively so, for the first year and a half of the program, by the middle of 1958 they began to rise again. The situation did not, however, reach the gravity which it had had at the end of 1956, though discontent was nonetheless very widespread in the cities and mining camps.

In general the economy had not yet begun to improve fundamentally by the end of Siles' term of office. The problem of the compensation of the old mining companies had not yet been resolved, and so no major move had been made to refurbish the mining industry. The oil industry had not yet begun to produce appreciable quantities of foreign exchange, and its contributions to the national economy remained largely promises for the future.

The opposition, under the leadership of the Falange Socialista Boliviana, continued to prefer *coups d'état* to steady education of the voters as a means of seizing power. President Siles ended completely the concentration camps which Paz Estenssoro had maintained. He allowed the widest degree of freedom of the press, and by 1958 it was hard to find a paper in Bolivia which supported the government. He urged the exiles to return, and he sought to get them to adopt more peaceful and democratic means of working toward the assumption of power. His efforts largely failed, however.

A crisis occurred early in 1959 when Oscar Unzaga, head of the Falange, died. The government announced that he had committed suicide. Falangistas in Chile and Argentina said that he had been

shot by government supporters. President Siles invited a group of distinguished Chilean lawyers to make a thorough study of the claims and counterclaims surrounding Unzaga's death, and they bore out the government's version of the story.

Other problems continued to plague the Siles government. It was faced with a basic lack of skilled personnel capable of carrying out efficiently its development programs and even of running the day-to-day activities of the administration. This lack was intensified because, as a result of the difficult economic situation, many skilled professional people preferred to go abroad to earn their living, where they would be able to get a much larger and more stable income than they could do in Bolivia.

Corruption also continued to be a major worry of the MNR regime. This was nothing that had started in 1952, but it had reached a crescendo during the hyperinflation of the last years of the first Paz Estenssoro regime. Although the Stabilization Program launched in December, 1956, cut off one of the principal sources of corruption—the manipulation of the multiple exchange system—it did not succeed in ending other more orthodox forms of graft and pilfering of the state treasury.

During most of the Siles administration ex-President Víctor Paz Estenssoro served as Bolivian ambassador to London. He came back in 1958 to try to smooth over the differences between Siles and the "miners' wing" of the MNR, headed by Juan Lechin. He had moderate success, and a truce was arranged between the two factions, a truce which did not last more than a few months, however. He returned again a year later, this time to announce his candidacy in the 1960 presidential election. In June, 1960, Paz Estenssoro won the post once again in a four-cornered race in which his principal rival was Walter Guevara Arce, former foreign minister of Siles, who led a dissident MNR group known as the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Auténtico*.

During the years in which Paz Estenssoro and Siles have served as president of Bolivia the country has gone through a profound transformation, a change which no future regime will be able entirely to reverse. The Indians have been made an effective part of the life of the country, though they have not yet learned to adapt themselves completely to this new situation. It would be virtually

impossible for any future regime to try to take the land away from the Indians again. It would be difficult to deny them the right to participate in politics. It would be hard to suppress their desire to get education and to learn how to live as equals in Bolivian society.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles, the two men who have borne the principal responsibility for this process of revolutionary change in Bolivia, are among the most interesting political figures to appear on the Latin American political scene in recent decades. They are in some ways very different from one another, but each has complemented the other.

Both men are intellectuals. They have studied deeply the problems facing their country, and during long years of political activity have evolved together a program which they feel they must carry out. Both men have been equally loyal to this program once they won control of the nation. However, Paz Estenssoro has been in many ways more logically a man to carry through the "destructive" phases of a great revolution and Siles a man to consolidate the measures which his predecessor had begun.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro is more able than his colleague to arouse passionate loyalty and devotion among the masses of his followers. Although an intellectual and a mestizo, he is able through his oratory to arouse tremendous enthusiasm among the largely Indian masses of the mining areas. He likes to mingle among the workers and peasants of the country, and during his first administration was an inveterate traveler around the country, inspecting various aspects of the government program.

Paz Estenssoro has the tremendous asset as a politician of being able to remember names and faces, and he has built up an almost legendary range of friendships and acquaintances throughout the country. He took a personal part in choosing local officials of the Agrarian Reform Institute and other governmental organizations even in the remotest parts of the country, because he knew personally virtually all the people who might conceivably be qualified for these posts.

He has a decisiveness and a ruthlessness which are lacking in his friend. He also has an ability to engage in intricate political maneuvers without making lasting enemies among those with whom he is maneuvering. Some have accused him, however, of not showing

sufficient loyalty to his successor and of not using his vast personal influence sufficiently to help Siles through the almost insoluble problems which he, as Paz Estenssoro's heir, was forced to face.

Whereas the masses of the MNR tended to love and idolize Víctor Paz Estenssoro, they tended greatly to admire Hernán Siles. He was universally respected as a very brave man, not only for his leadership of the MNR underground and the actual fighting of the April, 1952, Revolution, but because of his fearlessness in challenging his opponents among the miners when he was president.

Siles is also respected for his honesty. None of the rumors concerning the president's participation in the corruption of the administration, such as were widespread in Paz Estenssoro's, circulated during Siles' term of office. Siles is extremely modest, reserved, and abstemious almost to the point of asceticism. Nor have his bona fides as a democrat been challenged except by the most extreme enemies of the MNR. His attempt to rebuild the feeling of national unity, which inevitably had to be destroyed during the first period of the revolution, won him wide respect even among the enemies of his party and his government.

Together Paz Estenssoro and Siles have led a revolution which ranks with the Mexican Revolution as one of the most profound social transformations to occur in Latin America in the twentieth century. They have sought to transform the most backward nation in South America into a modern country with a diversified economy and a democratic political life. They have sought to do so in a Bolivian and American way. They have not followed blindly patterns set for them from abroad, though they have borrowed some ideas, have studied events in other countries, particularly in America, and have received help from the United States. The failure or success of Paz Estenssoro's and Siles' efforts in the Bolivian Revolution will go far to determine whether or not other countries of the hemisphere will continue to seek their own indigenous way toward a more productive economy and a more democratic society, or whether they will succumb to the apparently easier method of totalitarian dictatorship.

Getulio Vargas, *"The Father of the Poor"*



On August 4, 1954, Getulio Vargas shot his brains out. He thus put an end to his physical existence but not to his influence on Brazil, his native country. Vargas was undoubtedly the most important Brazilian political figure of the first half of the twentieth century. He was president for nineteen years, dominated the nation's politics for nearly a quarter of a century, and his name remained a potent force in public life even after his death.

Vargas played a decisive role in bringing Brazil from the status of a semicolonial nation suffering under a tremendous psychological inferiority complex to that of a self-confident, booming country fast moving toward the position of a world power. Under his leadership the country began a process of rapid development of its natural resources and of headlong industrialization. At the same time the Brazilian people acquired an appreciation for their own abilities, both past and present, which made them shed once and for all their traditional tendency to pattern their political, economic, and cultural institutions on those of other countries.

Of course, all the changes which occurred between Vargas' accession to power in October, 1930, and his suicide in August, 1954, cannot be attributed solely to Getulio. However, he did guide them and did play an essential part in the direction which the sudden explosion of Brazilian energies took. Some of his influence was certainly negative, but much of it was also positive.

Getulio Vargas was born in Brazil's southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul. He was proud of his Gaucho background, and perhaps part of his aggressiveness and drive is explained by his upbringing in this state, which has never been characterized by the traditionalism, courtly manners, and slower pace of the older-settled and more northerly states of the Brazilian Union.

Yet Vargas was a master of his nation's psychology. One of his greatest gifts as a politician was his appreciation of the deep hold which many generations of plantation society, with its masters and slaves, still has on the thinking and feelings of large numbers of the Brazilian people. His success is to a very considerable degree explained by his ability to picture himself as a kind of supermaster of one big Brazilian plantation. As the "father of the poor," one of his favorite descriptions of himself, he sought to fill the void felt by many humble Brazilians who had torn themselves away from their traditional surroundings and society yet felt lost without the kind of protection and security which the old ways had given them.

Getulio rose through the ranks of Rio Grande do Sul politics until he was governor of his state, in the late 1920's. During his tenure in the governor's mansion he gathered around himself a group of young men of considerable intelligence and with an eagerness to break with at least some of the traditions which had characterized the "first republic."

In 1930 Vargas was the candidate for president of the republic of the Liberal Alliance, a loose coalition of parties in various Brazilian states. Running against him was Julio Prestes, a seasoned politician of the state of São Paulo, and the hand-picked nominee of retiring chief executive Washington Luiz.

The results of the election were a foregone conclusion. According to Brazilian tradition, the candidate of the outgoing president was almost certainly assured success at the polls. The election of 1930 was no exception. Julio Prestes won handily, and Getulio Vargas retired to his native state.

However, Julio Prestes never took office. Times had changed in Brazil, and the traditional system broke down. For one thing, the dominant group of politicians had made a serious mistake. For several terms the custom had been to rotate the presidency between a citizen of São Paulo and a citizen of the state of Minas Gerais. But Prestes, like his predecessor, came from São Paulo. There was serious discontent in Minas as a result.

In the second place, the candidacy of Getulio Vargas had had the sympathy of an important part of the Army, particularly of many of the younger officers. This group, which had come to be called the "Tenentes" (the lieutenants) had been restless for a decade. Upon

three different occasions, in 1922, 1924, and 1926, young officer groups had risen in revolt, and although their efforts were crushed, the discontent remained.

The most serious of these three uprisings was that of 1926, when a column of rebels roamed the interior of Brazil for almost two years before they finally crossed over into Bolivia and gave up the struggle. This was the famous Prestes Column, led by Luiz Carlos Prestes (no relation to the 1930 candidate for president), a young army captain, who had seen most of his military service in Rio Grande do Sul. Among the leaders of the Prestes Column were many young men who were to play leading roles in the Vargas government in later years, including João Alberto, Cordeiro de Farias, Juarez Tavora, Eduardo Gomes, and several others.

The Tenentes did not have a very well defined program. However, they attempted to arouse the back-country people against the rule of the landed oligarchy who had dominated the Brazilian government—and those of most of the states—since the declaration of the republic in 1889. They also waved the banner of nationalism and raised their voices in objection to what they thought was the subservience of Brazil to foreign powers and to foreigners resident in the country.

With his defeat for the presidency Vargas began plotting with his friends of the Liberal Alliance and with the Tenentes. Although the frequent voyages of important political and military figures back and forth to Rio Grande do Sul must have aroused the government's suspicions, little was done to try to thwart the revolutionary intentions of Vargas and his associates.

After long discussions it was finally decided not to accept the results of the 1930 election and to attempt a military movement against the Washington Luiz government before Julio Prestes was sworn in as the new president. This uprising began early in October, 1930. At first it moved slowly, at an almost leisurely pace. The rebel army moving up from the South had no major encounters with the Federal troops, which offered only token resistance. At the same time, insurrections occurred in some of the northern states. Finally, the government, for reasons best known to its leaders, decided not to try an all-out struggle with the insurgents. Washington Luiz was packed onto a steamer in Rio harbor and left for Europe, along with

his victorious presidential nominee, and a few days later Getulio Vargas made a triumphal entry into the capital. He became for the first time provisional president of Brazil.

Vargas soon proved himself to be a very wily politician indeed. He owed much of his victory to the Tenentes, who during the first months really held power in their hands. However, Vargas was able over a period of time to reduce and virtually destroy the influence of the Tenentes as an organized group, and before long it became clear that he was the real master of the new administration.

In some ways this was a tragedy for Brazil. Had the Tenentes been able to organize a political party with a definite program and ideology, with an appeal to moderate nationalism and to the desire for social change, the history of Brazil might have been quite different. The country might have been spared much of the turbulence of the early 1930's and the dictatorship of the latter part of the decade and the first half of the 1940's.

However, Vargas outmaneuvered the Tenentes. They were never able to pool their efforts in a single political organization which might have challenged Vargas' desire to run a one-man show. For one thing, many of the Tenentes chose to stay in the armed forces, where they were somewhat removed from the day-to-day political struggles. In the Army they tended to split, some of them putting loyalty to their early ideals as their first consideration, others feeling that military discipline and adherence to the regime in power was of paramount importance. Those Tenentes who resigned from the armed forces and frankly entered politics were atomized by Vargas' divide-and-rule policies. Like those still in the army they were split between the men who became loyal personal associates of Getulio and those who became disillusioned in his regime and turned against it, only to find that the trump cards in the political game were in the hands of the president.

Vargas came to power at the beginning of the Great Depression. He was faced by tremendous economic problems arising from the collapse of the markets for Brazil's principal exports and the reverberations of this collapse on the nation's internal economy. Getulio would probably have been forced by circumstances to establish extensive government programs to face this situation even

if he had been philosophically opposed to doing so. However, Vargas had no compunctions on this score.

The Vargas government engaged in an extensive program of buying up the country's excess production of coffee. It then turned around and dumped much of this excess into the sea or used it for somewhat peculiar purposes—coffee was even burned in Brazilian locomotives for a while.

The government also took drastic measures to bolster up the sugar industry. A Sugar and Alcohol Institute was established, and measures were taken to increase internal consumption of the crop. For instance, for years companies selling gasoline were required to mix a certain amount of sugar-produced alcohol with the fuel which they sold.

At the same time the Vargas government encouraged the growth of manufacturing industries. These would have grown even without government aid, since the country was cut off from its normal sources of supply for manufactured goods as a result of Brazil's inability to sell sufficient coffee to earn the foreign exchange with which to purchase them. However, Vargas intensified this natural trend toward manufacturing by extending protection to new industries and to expanding old ones.

As time went on, other types of encouragement were extended by Vargas to the industrialization of Brazil. There was a chronic shortage of foreign exchange from the time Vargas took office, a shortage which still exists. The government therefore undertook to ration the available foreign currency, and in this rationing it gave a high degree of priority to the importation of capital equipment and raw materials for new industries, while at the same time making it difficult to obtain foreign exchange for goods which would compete with products made by Brazilian manufacturing concerns.

Without necessarily intending to do so, high officials and favorites of the Vargas regime encouraged manufacturing in yet another way. Corruption and the accumulation of fortunes as a result of close association with the government were rife during the Vargas period—though they certainly had not commenced with Getulio's regime. Government contracts, foreign exchange privileges extended by the Banco do Brasil (which was charged with rationing the coun-

try's available foreign currency), and pure and simple rifling of the treasuries of government departments were some of the methods used by many of those associated with Getulio in order to enrich themselves. Many of these officials and favorites of the administration who made their fortunes "in the government service" invested at least part of their returns in new industries in Brazil. Thus a group of close associates of Vargas came to be numbered among the country's most important industrialists.

During the first years of his administration Vargas started a policy which was to become a cornerstone of his regime—the enactment of labor and social legislation. One of his first acts was to create a new Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor, with a close associate, Lindolfo Color, as the first occupant of the post. Soon afterward Vargas issued a decree-law providing for the first time for legal registration of trade unions. This marked a fundamental change in the attitude of the Brazilian government, which heretofore had been symbolized by the remark of one minister of the interior of the 1920's to the effect that "labor is a problem for the police."

The new law recognizing the legal status of unions did not meet with an enthusiastic response from the existing labor movement. The trade unions were under the leadership of anarchist, socialist, and communist elements. All these opposed the new law, fearing that it meant government interference in the internal affairs of the unions, which it did. Most of the old unions which sought and obtained recognition became markedly less militant thereafter than they had been before getting government authorization.

In spite of the opposition of old trade-union leaders the government-supported labor organizations spread rapidly. By 1935 most Brazilian unions had official authorization. The chief advantage of government recognition was that employers could not legally refuse to bargain with an organization which possessed it, and this was a powerful incentive to the labor groups to seek legal registration.

The foundations for a social security system were also laid by Vargas during the early years of his administration. Funds were established to cover various groups of workers—industrial workers, white-collar employees, seafarers, land transport workers, etc.—and sizable taxes were levied on both workers and employers to help

finance these. The government was also supposed to contribute its share to the resources of these funds, but neither under Vargas nor under his successors was the government faithful to its obligations toward the social security system.

During his first four years in office Vargas ruled as a virtual dictator. He was Provisional President, and there was no congress. He appointed "interventors" to run the several states in place of elected governors. Getúlio legislated by decree on the Federal level, and his interventors did the same in the states.

A signal of warning against the one-man rule of Vargas was the short-lived São Paulo War in the middle of 1932. Although Vargas had had enthusiastic supporters in São Paulo at the time he took power, the feeling soon became general among the Paulistas that he was slighting their state's interests as well as seeking to perpetuate himself in office. Although the 1932 war was officially an attempt at secession by the state of São Paulo, its principal slogan was a demand for a return to constitutional government.

Soon after the Paulista revolt was suppressed, Vargas took steps toward reestablishing a constitutional regime. Elections were called for a constituent assembly. This group met during several months of 1934 and drew up a constitution along the lines established in the Mexican Constitution of 1917; that is, considerable social and labor legislation was written into it. At the same time a novel experiment in functional representation was provided for when it was decided that some of the republic's senators should be chosen by employers, workers' organizations, and other interest groups rather than by the general electorate. Soon after the convention Vargas was chosen as the first president under the new constitution.

For three years Vargas governed as a more or less democratic chief executive, continuing most of the policies which he had inaugurated during his period as provisional president. However, there was an increasing degree of disillusionment among many of those who had supported him in the 1930 Revolution, particularly among the workers and left-wing politicians.

The discontent against Vargas reached a climax in November, 1935, when an attempt was made to overthrow the Vargas regime violently. Fighting occurred between dissident soldiers and civilians on the one hand and troops loyal to the government on the other, in

Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, and a few other cities. This revolt was organized by the National Liberation Alliance, which had been established a year earlier as a species of Popular Front. A heterogeneous group of small labor and socialist parties, some of the old Tenentes, and the Communist Party of Brazil made up the NLA. Its prestige had been greatly increased by the return from Russia—where he had resided for four years—of Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the famous Prestes Column of the 1920's and by now a full-fledged Communist. Prestes assumed the leadership of the Communist Party immediately upon his return to Brazil. He was a man with an almost mythical reputation because of his exploits in the Prestes Column and was popularly known as "the Cavalier of Hope." He had refused to support the 1930 Revolution, and after considerable wooing by both Stalinist and Trotskyite Communists, joined the former group. In 1930 he went to Russia, where he worked as an engineer and participated in Communist International planning and direction of the Communist parties of Latin America.

Prestes was the president of the National Liberation Alliance, and the rebels of November, 1935, proclaimed him president of Brazil. However, with the quick defeat of the uprising he went into hiding and was not captured by the police until January, 1936. After a spectacular trial he was sentenced to a long term in jail and remained behind bars for over nine years.

Meanwhile Getulio Vargas continued to be president of Brazil. During the latter months of 1937 an election was in progress to choose a successor to Getulio. Officially he backed one of the candidates, José Americo de Almeida, a well known writer. However, Vargas was unhappy about the prospect of having to give up the presidency. Furthermore, his government was increasingly menaced by a growing fascist organization, with German, Italian, and Portuguese connections, known as *Ação Integralista*, and led by Plinio Salgado. Although Vargas had accepted *Integralista* support in the fight against the National Liberation Alliance, the increasingly aggressive attitude of the fascist group was a growing preoccupation of Getulio and his associates.

Finally, in November, 1935, Vargas solved the election question and the *Integralista* problem by one stroke. He suspended the 1934 constitution, canceled the election, and announced that he was estab-

lishing a New State (Estado Novo) patterned after the corporate regimes of fascist Italy and Portugal. At the same time he outlawed the Ação Integralista, arrested most of its leaders, and deported Plínio Salgado to Portugal, where he remained until 1945.

What Vargas' coup of November, 1937, established was his own personal dictatorship. However, he adorned this dictatorship with all the trappings of the fascism which was then so popular and seemed to be "the wave of the future." Getúlio was always one to ride the wave which seemed most likely to keep him afloat and at the head of the government.

The Estado Novo provided, on paper at least, for complete reorganization of Brazil's economy and government. All workers and all employers were to be brought under the jurisdiction of *sindicatos*, which were to be authorized by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor, and which were to conform to an elaborate pattern to be established by the Ministry. Above these *sindicatos*, organized by economic category and municipality, were to be federations, established on a state-wide level, and bringing together municipal *sindicatos* of workers and employers respectively of a similar branch of economic activity. On the national level were to be established a series of confederations to cover the workers and employers respectively in manufacturing, commerce, land transport, sea and river transport, the free professions, and banking and insurance.

Theoretically, at least, these organizations were to have extensive control over the economy and at the same time were to serve as a basis for the political government. However, Getúlio never got around to establishing the political side of the Estado Novo framework and was contented with arrogating to himself full executive and legislative powers. On the economic side the Estado Novo framework was only partially established.

The Estado Novo was most effective in its control over the workers. All workers had to pay one day's wage a year (known as the *imposto sindical*, or trade-union tax) to the *sindicato* system. The *sindicatos* and federations were converted into largely social-welfare organizations. In order to gain recognition from the government a labor union had to have an extensive program of medical and dental aid for its members, educational activities on their behalf, and other welfare features. These were paid for by the *imposto sindical*.

What collective bargaining had existed before the installation of the Estado Novo was destroyed. In its place Vargas erected a structure of labor courts. The lowest level of these tribunals, known as the Boards of Conciliation, handled day-to-day grievances of the workers. They were an effective safety valve for workers' protests and problems, and generally tended to give the workers the benefit of the doubt.

The second level of labor courts, the Regional Labor Tribunals, which were established generally on a state-wide jurisdiction, had two basic functions. The first was to handle appeals from the decisions of the local Conciliation Boards. The second was to deal with demands put forward by unions for wage increases and other improvements in working conditions. Although these demands were relatively rare so long as the Estado Novo existed, they tended to centralize the determination of working conditions in the hands of the State instead of leaving them to the free negotiation of workers' and employers' representatives.

The highest body in the labor court system was the Superior Labor Tribunal located in Rio de Janeiro. It handled principally appeals from the Regional Tribunals, which could be made only on points of interpretation of the law and constitution, though it also occasionally dealt with demands made by national labor groups on nation-wide employers' organizations.

This system established under the Estado Novo still exists in Brazil. The great majority of workers' grievances are still handled through the Conciliation Boards, although some of the more independent unions have developed since 1945 a system of processing grievances in direct negotiation with the employers. The majority of demands by unions for wage increases and other improvements are still made to the Regional Labor Tribunals instead of directly to the employers concerned, although here too there has been some modification of the Estado Novo system and some direct collective bargaining.

One major change has occurred in the trade-union situation since the end of the Estado Novo, although it is a mere fulfillment of the system as it was originally outlined in 1937. This has been the creation of four large national labor confederations covering industrial workers, commercial employees, land transport workers, and banking and insurance workers. No such confederations had been set up

under the Estado Novo, though they were provided for in the corporate state framework decreed by Vargas.

On the employers' side the Estado Novo framework remained largely incomplete by 1945. The employers were very reluctant to join the *sindicatos* established for them under the Estado Novo because they resented the government interference in these organizations. Generally Vargas did not force them to join.

On a state-wide level the employers' *sindicatos* were brought together on a basis different from that provided for in the laws of the New State. Instead of forming federations of *sindicatos* of specific industries or branches of trade or transportation, the employers' groups generally formed only two state-wide federations in each state—one of industrial employers and the other of commercial employers. In spite of the evident violation of the law involved in this, these organizations were given recognition by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor.

While reducing the labor movement to harmless proportions Vargas sought eagerly to win the favor of the rank-and-file workers. In constant speeches he drove home the idea that he was the greatest protector of the workers. He adopted the title "Father of the Poor," and took some steps to give concrete expression to his supposed concern for the welfare of the wage- and salary-earning masses.

In 1941 Vargas issued the first minimum-wage decree establishing basic wages in different parts of the country. These wage minima have been raised half a dozen times since they were first enacted, but the system remains. Vargas also further elaborated on the social security system which he had established earlier. Laws for the protection of the workers on their jobs and giving them other benefits were enacted, so that Brazil has today one of the most complicated systems of labor legislation to be found anywhere in the world. Finally Vargas started a modest housing program.

While appealing to the workers on the basis of a social program, he also appealed to their nationalism. He constantly attacked in speeches "foreign interests" which allegedly were hindering the development of the Brazilian economy. More effective than speeches as a nationalist measure was Vargas' move to provide the country with a more diversified economy. The principal aspect of this program was the establishment of a basic iron and steel industry at Volta

Redonda in the State of Rio de Janeiro, about seventy-five miles from the national capital. This plant was built during World War II with the aid of loans from the United States Export-Import Bank, and was opened shortly after the conclusion of the world conflict. It was the first step in providing Brazil with a heavy industry upon which the development of a broad-based economy could be undertaken.

While appealing to the workers and stimulating the diversification of Brazil's economy Getulio Vargas was presiding over a rigid personal dictatorship. All political parties were outlawed with the institution of the *Estado Novo*. The press was rigidly censored, and Vargas followed the policy of having the government forcibly buy into many of the country's most important newspapers. There were rigid controls on travel within Brazil, and to go from one city to another one needed what amounted to an internal passport. Enemies of the regime were jailed, exiled, or forced into silence between 1937 and 1944.

However, although maintaining a totalitarian-like dictatorship at home, Vargas bent with the international political winds. While in the late 1930's he had expressed great admiration for the fascist powers of Europe and had entered into extensive trade relations—ultimately to Brazil's disadvantage—with Nazi Germany, Vargas was a subtle enough politician to shift his ground when it appeared wise to do so.

At one point Getulio tried to be on both sides of the fence at once. Early in 1942 there occurred an incident which showed a good deal about the opportunism of the man. Getulio delivered a speech on international affairs which was, to put it mildly, not unfriendly to the Axis, who at that time seemed to be dominant in Europe and seemed possibly to be on the road to world supremacy. However, the English version of this speech which was given to the foreign press representatives had a quite different tone and made out the Brazilian President as a strong friend of the anti-Axis powers, particularly of the United States.

However, once the United States entered World War II Vargas shifted definitely to the side of the Allies. A few months after Pearl Harbor, Brazil officially declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, using as an excuse the sinking of several Brazilian ships off the coun-

try's northeast coast. Subsequently Brazil was the only Latin American country to contribute troops to the fighting in Europe.

At the same time Vargas took energetic measures to curb the dangers represented by the presence of large colonies of Axis nationals, particularly Germans and Japanese, in the southern part of the country. It was forbidden to speak anything but Portuguese on the streets, and all signs had to be in that language. Young men of the German and Japanese parts of the country were drafted into the army and were sent to remote parts of the nation for training, not being released until they could speak, read, and write Portuguese. Attempts were made to colonize Brazilians in the regions which were predominantly Japanese and German.

Meanwhile the participation of Brazil in World War II was widely popular. The activities of the Brazilian troops on the Italian front were spectacularly reported by the press and avidly read by the public. From the Brazilian newspapers it almost appeared as if Brazilian soldiers were driving the Nazis up the Italian boot by their own efforts, unaided by the Americans, British, and other soldiers who were participating in the campaign.

Although it solidified his position in power so long as the war continued, Vargas' decision to take an active part on the side of the Allies brought what were for him unfortunate repercussions. In Brazil, as elsewhere, the struggle against the Nazis was pictured in terms of a fight for democracy against tyranny. As a result the Brazilians began to ask themselves and their ruler with increasing frequency and insistence why, if democracy was being fought for on the battlefields of Europe, it wasn't a good idea for Brazil too.

Pressure for a relaxation of the dictatorship became particularly great in the last half of 1944, when Allied victory in the war had become a certainty. Those opposed to the regime formed a broad organization known as the União Democrática Nacional (UDN) (National Democratic Union), which included people as diverse as old-line pre-Vargas politicians, landholders, intellectuals, and the Communists, and was headed by General Eduardo Gomes. Gomes was one of the old Tenentes who had stayed in the armed forces, had organized the Brazilian Air Force, and had been commander of the Northeastern military region, where the United States had several airfields, during the war.

As a result of the pressure from the UDN and other quarters Vargas slowly began to relax the reins of dictatorship. Late in 1944 he permitted real elections in the trade unions for the first time since 1937. The censorship of the press was reduced. An end was put to the internal-passport system. Finally Vargas promised that presidential elections would be held at the end of 1945, and that he would not be a candidate for reelection.

During the first months of 1945 political activity mounted. In May a general political amnesty was declared, and all political prisoners, some of whom had been in jail for a decade, were released. The UDN put forth General Eduardo Gomes as its candidate for the presidency and reorganized as a political party. Numerous other political groups suddenly made their appearance.

Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the Communist Party, was among those released in the May, 1945, amnesty. At his first public appearance after coming out of jail, before 100,000 people in the Vasco da Gama Stadium in Rio de Janeiro, Prestes shocked his listeners by saying that the Communist Party was going to support Vargas, that it thought he should stay in office until after a new constitution had been written, and that there was no hurry about presidential elections. These statements were particularly surprising in view of the fact that Vargas had virtually destroyed the Communist Party, had kept Prestes in jail for nine years, and had turned his German-born wife over to the Nazis. Of course, there was a widely held suspicion that Vargas and Prestes had made a "deal" before Prestes' release from jail, although this was denied by both men. In any case, Vargas gave the Communists a completely free hand for the rest of the time he remained in office.

However, Vargas by no means relied only on the Communists to secure his continued tenure in office. Two political parties were organized under his inspiration, the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB). They remain today two of the country's principal political organizations.

The Partido Social Democrático rallied the more conservative supporters of the Vargas regime, the *tiburoes* or sharks, as they are popularly called. Business elements allied with Getulio formed one segment of the PSD. Another consisted of a series of local political bosses who had enjoyed Vargas' favor for a number of years. The local boss had

always been a feature of Brazilian politics, and before the time of Vargas he was likely to be the biggest landholder of a district or someone closely associated with him. Most of these old bosses were swept aside by Getulio, but he put in their place people who were closely dependent upon the Federal government and its patronage and who felt a considerable degree of loyalty to Getulio Vargas. It was these people who formed the backbone of the PSD in the rural and semirural areas.

The Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, on the other hand, was organized by the top officials of the labor side of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor, led by José Segadas Vianna, Director General of Labor. Other leading figures were drawn from among the officials of the trade unions which had been established under the Estado Novo. The PTB lacked any very definite ideology, its principal stock in trade being Getulio Vargas, but it soon came to be looked upon by a majority of the country's urban workers as their particular spokesman.

The PTB undoubtedly had two basic purposes. First, it was intended to be a personal vehicle for President Vargas. In the second place, it was intended as a counterweight to the growing influence of the Communists among the workers. The Communists increased by leaps and bounds. Within a year and a half of Prestes' release from prison the party was claiming 150,000 members, whereas in May, 1945, it had consisted of no more than a few hundred. It made considerable inroads into the lower echelons of the trade-union movement and rallied many of those workers who were sick and tired of the Vargas regime. In the 1945-47 period the Communist Party of Brazil was more a pro-Prestes and an anti-Vargas party than it was an orthodox Communist Party, though in subsequent years its degree of orthodoxy considerably increased.

The trade unions had become unusually active as the result of the loosening of the dictatorship. There was a wave of strikes throughout 1945—something which had been unknown for eight years—and many wage increases were won. Congresses of unions were held in several states, and states-wide union organizations were established. Finally a provisional national trade-union group, the Movimento da Unificação dos Trabalhadores (Movement of Workers Unity) was established. It was largely under Communist leadership, although

Vargas supporters and independent elements were also active in it.

Meanwhile preparations for the December, 1945, presidential election were under way. Officially the PSD nominated General Eurico Dutra, a close military associate of Vargas, as its candidate, against UDN's General Eduardo Gomes. And officially Getulio Vargas supported the candidacy of General Dutra. However, there was considerable doubt as to whether Vargas wanted an election to be held at all. It is certain that the idea of giving up the presidency was unpalatable to Vargas. For almost a year after he promised elections he maneuvered energetically to try to negate this promise. The maneuvers ultimately brought about his first ouster from the presidency.

Early in October, 1945, United States Ambassador Adolf Berle made a speech before a group of United States businessmen in Brazil in which he congratulated Brazil on having taken the democratic road, and expressed his assurance that the election would be held in December as scheduled. Some light was thrown on President Vargas' thinking by his reaction to Berle's speech, which seemed to be one of praise for him and his regime. Vargas denounced Berle's discourse as "interference in the internal affairs of Brazil," and implied that it was none of Berle's or the United States' business whether or not elections were held.

A few weeks later Vargas began one of those shiftings of personnel which were always one of the keys to his manner of conducting the government. Among others, he dismissed João Alberto, old Tenente and long-time associate of Vargas, as Chief of the Federal District Police, and replaced him with his own brother, Benjamin Vargas.

The Army's response to this move by the President was immediate. They felt that the appointment of Benjamin Vargas was intended to pave the way for the cancellation of the scheduled elections and the perpetuation of Getulio in power. Moving quickly, the Army surrounded the presidential palace with tanks and soldiers, and on the early morning of October 25 forced Vargas to resign.

The new provisional government, headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, immediately announced that the presidential and congressional elections would be held as planned, and that, in addition, those to be elected to congress as senators and deputies would first organize a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution,

after which they would divide into their respective houses. After a few days of suspension of constitutional guarantees, full freedom of press, speech, and assembly were restored, and the electoral campaign began in earnest.

There were by then three candidates. The Communists quickly nominated an engineer who had once been Vargas' public works chief, Yeddo Fiuza, as their candidate. They had no hope of electing him, but they wanted to test their national vote-getting power.

Meanwhile Getulio Vargas retired to his farm in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, where he was left in peace by the new regime. For some time he did not speak out concerning the election. However, he headed the Partido Trabalhista ticket in several states as a candidate for senator. Finally he came out shortly before the election and endorsed the PSD candidate, General Dutra, in spite of the fact that Dutra had been one of those involved in his ouster. Vargas' endorsement was undoubtedly responsible for Dutra's victory.

For more than three years thereafter Getulio Vargas stayed in the background. Although he was senator for his native state, elected on the PTB ticket, he seldom attended meetings of the upper house and did not participate at all in the deliberations of the constituent assembly.

However, in spite of Vargas' reticence his power remained great. The vast majority of the workers were still loyal to him, while most of the rest were followers of Luiz Carlos Prestes. With the eclipse of the Communist Party after its legal banishment early in 1947 the prestige of Vargas rose even higher.

As time for the 1950 election approached there was little doubt that Getulio Vargas would again be a candidate. He had little trouble getting the nomination of the Partido Trabalhista, and the great majority of the country's most important trade-union leaders endorsed his candidacy, even though to do so was to defy the powerful Ministry of Labor. Vargas was backed also by the Communists as the least of the available evils from their point of view.

Against Vargas there were two candidates. The Partido Social Democrático, which had been dominated by Dutra during most of his administration, nominated Christiano Machado, a relative unknown. The União Democrática Nacional once again put up the name of General Eduardo Gomes. The race was a hot one.

During the campaign Vargas played both of his customary themes—his love for the workers and his desire to help them and Brazilian nationalism. He attacked the policies of the United States and implied that the Dutra government had been too subservient to that country. He promised that he would come to grips with the problem of inflation, which was getting increasingly severe and was quickly eating up whatever wage increases the workers were able to achieve. He also promised to reestablish trade-union freedom and to allow new trade-union elections, which had been suspended by the Dutra regime since 1947.

To no one's great surprise, Getulio Vargas was once again elected president of Brazil. He began his second period in office on a wave of popular enthusiasm. Great hopes had been aroused among the workers during the presidential campaign, and his *mística* (that indefinable Latin quality which is prestige but more than prestige) was higher than it had ever been before or was ever to be again during his lifetime.

However, Vargas' second period in office was at best only a partial success. He was unable to take any real measures against inflation, which became worse rather than better after he assumed office. The corruption which had always characterized his regime reached unprecedented heights. Getulio seemed to give little leadership to the government or to the nation.

Various explanations have been offered for Vargas' behavior during his second administration. Perhaps his weakness came from the fact that he was determined to live down his reputation as a dictator and to preside over a democratic government but really didn't know how to do so. Perhaps it was due to the fact that he was getting old and had lost his grip. Perhaps it was due to the fact that he didn't realize that with a free press and freedom of speech and with a functioning congress, mere demagoguery was not a sufficient program to meet the needs of the nation.

Whatever his weakness during his second period in office, Vargas remained a skillful politician. He succeeded in enticing into his cabinet representatives of the opposition União Democrática Nacional, whose main purpose for existence, presumably, was opposition to Getulio Vargas. He played one politician off against another in a skillful manner. He virtually never held cabinet meetings where

problems could be discussed and there could be an exchange of views. Rather he met individually with his ministers, keeping complete control of affairs in his own hands.

There was some indication during this period that Vargas was grooming a successor in the person of João Goulart. From Vargas' home state, this young man had been known by Vargas since childhood. Goulart was suddenly made Minister of Labor early in 1953. The new minister announced his intention of bringing about a complete housecleaning in the trade unions, and it became obvious that he was building up a personal political machine among the leaders of various union groups. Goulart was widely suspected of provoking strikes among various groups of workers so that he could step in and "settle" them to the advantage of labor, and thus win renown and political support. Getulio looked on benignly through all this.

However, the leaders of the armed forces did not take such a patronizing attitude toward the activities of João Goulart. They felt that he was "undermining law and order" and that he was dangerous. They undoubtedly also suspected that Vargas was trying to pass his own mantle on to his young protégé. After something more than a year the leaders of the armed forces brought sufficient pressure upon President Vargas that Goulart was forced to resign.

Meanwhile Brazilian nationalism was growing apace. Vargas had greatly roused nationalistic passions during his 1950 presidential campaign, and the principal question around which these passions swirled during the next few years was that of the exploitation of the country's oil resources. He had suggested that this should be entrusted to a firm owned and controlled by Brazilians and, presumably, by the Brazilian government. Once in office, Vargas was not so insistent upon this, but the campaign to establish such a firm continued anyway. A bill was introduced in congress to establish *Petroleos Brasileiros* (Petrobras), a firm in which the Brazilian government would have a majority of the stock, though private Brazilians could also be part owners. After a lengthy discussion and an intensive campaign in press and tribune this bill was passed and was approved by Vargas.

The Vargas administration of the 1950's was very active in the general field of economic development. It drew up a long-range development program based on an extensive study of the Brazilian

economy and its development problems which had been made in the late 1940's by a mixed Brazilian-United States Commission. It established a National Development Bank for the purpose of giving direction to this program. It negotiated an agreement with the United States government for a line of credit for half a billion dollars to pay some of the foreign exchange costs of the development program. This fund was to be administered through the new Development Bank, and individual projects were to be decided upon by a Mixed Brazilian-United States Commission.

Through no fault of Vargas or the Brazilian government this program was tremendously handicapped in 1953 when the Eisenhower administration in the United States decided unilaterally to cancel the loan fund after only \$180,000,000 of it had been allocated. This was done on the excuse that an Export-Import Bank loan of \$300,000,000 to clear current commercial debts to United States exporters fulfilled the terms of the original half-billion-dollar line of credit. Quite rightly, Brazilian public officials and the Brazilian press felt that the United States had gone back on its word and had thus torpedoed a very hopeful effort to clear up many of the bottlenecks in transportation, electric power, and other fields which were holding back the process of Brazilian economic development.

Insofar as the workers were concerned, Vargas carried out a number of his campaign promises. As soon as he was inaugurated, he ordered the renewal of regular trade-union elections. He ended government intervention in most of the hundreds of unions in which the Dutra government had appointed receivers. He revised the minimum-wage law in 1953. He began a study of the total reorganization of the social security system.

There are some indications that Getulio Vargas was planning some very fundamental reforms in the Brazilian economy and society shortly before his death. The famous sociologist and writer Gilberto Freyre has written that only a few days before Getulio's death he was summoned to the President's office, where Vargas offered him a new post as director of an institute he was about to establish to undertake a program of agrarian reform and colonization of Brazilians and immigrants on lands to be taken from the country's large landowners. However, death cut short whatever plans Vargas may have had in this direction.

Relations between Vargas and the military leaders had been

delicate throughout his second administration. The leaders of the armed forces had not been particularly pleased with Getulio's election in 1950, though since they regarded themselves as the guarantors of the constitution, they saw to it that he was allowed to take office, since there was no doubt about the fact that he had been elected. However, the military leaders kept a close eye on the President throughout his second term. They were determined that he should not be allowed to establish a new dictatorship—if by any chance he had such an intention.

There were several conflicts between Vargas and the military. One of the most important was that which finally resulted in the resignation of Minister of Labor João Goulart. In July, 1954, a new incident arose between the President and the military leaders. Newspaperman Carlos Lacerda, editor of the fiery anti-Vargas newspaper *Tribuna da Imprensa*, was coming home one evening accompanied by Major Rubens Florentino Vaz of the Air Force. As they approached Lacerda's house they were attacked by armed men, and Major Vaz was killed. This event aroused a tremendous scandal, and it was widely felt that the intended victim of the assassins was Carlos Lacerda, at that time the most bitter opponent of the Vargas administration. However, the armed forces, particularly the Air Force, felt that they had been attacked, and they demanded swift capture and punishment of the murderers.

The complicating factor in this situation was the fact that the first clues in the case seemed to lead to the door of Dr. Lutherio Vargas, son of the President. Thus Getulio himself became directly involved in the matter, and there were those who said that Lutherio was acting with the connivance of his father. This seems highly unlikely, but it created a very embarrassing situation for the President.

This incident brought relations between Vargas and the military chiefs to crisis stage. They already felt that the lack of direction and the ineffectiveness of the Vargas regime, combined with the continued political maneuvering and corruption, was leading to a situation of political and economic chaos, and their suspicions and fears seemed to be borne out by the murder, which some at least interpreted to be the beginning of a campaign of terrorism against those opposed to the regime.

The upshot of this situation was that late in August the top of-

ficers of the armed forces waited upon Vargas and gave him what amounted to an ultimatum. They suggested that he take an "extended vacation" until the end of his term, in effect turning the government over to Vice President João Café Filho.

For Vargas this demand meant absolute personal disaster. He was now an old man, over seventy, and if he were to be ousted once again, there was little hope that he would ever be able to regain the presidency. Furthermore, Vice President Café Filho, whose nomination had been the result of a political deal between Vargas and one of his most important rivals in 1950, was no friend of Vargas or the administration. He was an old-time opponent of Getúlio, had been jailed for some time after the 1935 National Liberation Alliance revolt, and could not be expected to keep in office those who had been closely associated with Vargas.

Since the military leaders' demand meant the end of Vargas' political career, he apparently decided to make his exit as spectacular as possible, and in a way which would assure the continuation of his influence long after his physical disappearance from the scene. He committed suicide, leaving behind him a letter emphasizing once again the themes which had been Getúlio's stock in trade throughout most of his political career: love for the workers and concern for their interests, and Brazilian nationalism. The letter, which came to light right after his body was discovered, read as follows:

Once more the forces and interests against the people are newly coordinated and raised against me. They do not accuse me, they insult me; they do not fight me, they slander me and give me no right of defense. They need to drown my voice and halt my actions so that I no longer continue to defend, as I always have defended, the people and principally the humble.

I follow the destiny that is imposed on me. After years of domination and looting by international economic and financial groups, I made myself chief of an unconquerable revolution. I began the work of liberation and I instituted a regime of social liberty. I had to resign. I returned to govern on the arms of the people.

A subterranean campaign of international groups joined with national groups revolting against the regime of workers' guarantees. The law of excess profits was stopped in Congress. Hatreds were unchained against the justice of a revision of minimum wages.

I wished to create national liberty by developing our riches through Petrobras, and a wave of sedition clouded its beginnings. Electrobras was hindered almost to despair. They do not wish the workers to be free. They do not wish the people to be independent.

I assumed the Government during an inflationary spiral that was destroying the value of work. Profits of foreign enterprises reached 500 per cent yearly. In declarations of goods that we import there existed frauds of more than \$100,000,000.

I saw the coffee crisis increase the value of our principal product. We attempted to defend its price and the reply was a violent pressure upon our economy to the point of being obliged to surrender.

I have fought month to month, day to day, hour to hour, resisting a constant aggression, unceasingly bearing it all in silence, forgetting all and renouncing myself to defend the people that now fall abandoned. I cannot give you more than my blood. If the birds of prey wish the blood of anybody, they wish to continue sucking that of the Brazilian people.

I offer my life in the holocaust. I choose this means to be with you always. When they humiliate you, you will feel my soul suffering at your side. When hunger beats at your door, you will feel in your chests the energy for the fight for yourselves and your children. When they humiliate you, you will feel in my grief the force for reaction.

My sacrifice will maintain you united, and my name will be your battle flag. Each drop of my blood will be an immortal call to your conscience and will maintain a holy vibration for resistance.

To hatred, I respond with pardon. And to those who think they have defeated me, I reply with my victory. I was the slave of the people and today I free myself for eternal life. But this people to which I was a slave no longer will be a slave to anyone. My sacrifice will remain forever in your soul, and my blood will be the price of your ransom.

I fought against the looting of Brazil, I fought against the looting of the people. I have fought bare-breasted. The hatred, infamy and calumny did not beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity and I leave life to enter history.

There are those who have argued that this epistle was not actually written by Getulio Vargas. However, it seems highly probable to this writer that he was its author, and whatever strangeness there may have been in its grammar and means of expression—arguments used to “prove” that Getulio did not write it—can be attributed to

the emotional state in which Vargas must have been when he was composing it.

It seems to us that Vargas was acting characteristically in leaving a letter such as this as his political testament. The dominating theme in his political career was the love of power, and this, combined with a certain sardonic trait in Getulio's character, make this letter quite understandable. Ousted from power for the last time, Vargas was going to make sure that his influence would continue to be felt even from the tomb. He committed a final act of vengeance against his opponents. By this letter he made sure that though Vargas could rule no longer, Vargasism would continue as a mighty power in the country—and as subsequent events proved, the governing power in the country—long after his death.

With Vargas' death, Vice President João Filho took over immediately, with the support of the armed forces. He carried out a widespread purge of Vargas' adherents and promised to put an end to Vargas' influence on the country's political life. In October, 1955, when Vargas' unexpired term was drawing to an end, Café Filho presided over an election to choose his successor.

There were four candidates in the 1955 election. The forces of Vargasism were represented by Juscelino Kubitschek of the Social Democratic Party, who had as his running mate João Goulart, who succeeded Vargas as leader of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro. Thus the two parties which Vargas had been instrumental in founding joined hands once again after his death.

The principal rival of Kubitschek was General Juarez Tavora, backed by the União Democrática Nacional, the Brazilian Socialist Party and the Christian Democratic Party. Tavora was an old Tenente who had spent most of his career in the Army (and had to take a leave of absence to run for the presidency). He was noted as a man of high moral character, had long been a critic of the Vargas regime, and promised a clean sweep if he were elected to the presidency.

The other two nominees were Adhemar de Barros, ex-governor of São Paulo, candidate of his own Partido Social Progressista, and Plínio Salgado, nominee of the Integralistas, who had reorganized after the end of the Estado Novo as the Partido da Representação

Popular. However, the real struggle was between Kubitschek and Tavora.

The campaign was noisy and vituperative. It was clear that it was a struggle between the heirs of Getulio Vargas and his traditional opponents. The atmosphere was electric, and rumors were widespread that Juarez Tavora was the chosen candidate of the armed forces leaders who had provoked Vargas' suicide, and that if he were defeated, Kubitschek would not be allowed to take office.

Kubitschek and Goulart won, nonetheless, by an ample margin. Thereafter rumors continued to circulate that President João Café Filho was maneuvering to prevent the inauguration of the victors. The situation was finally cleared up on November 11, when the majority of the armed forces leaders, under the direction of Minister of Defense Henrique Teixeira Lott, deposed President Café Filho, announcing that they were doing so to prevent any attempt to thwart the processes of constitutional government. Although the armed forces leadership was far from united behind this move, General Lott's coup was successful, and after some confusion Senate President Neuze Ramos took over for the last two and a half months of the late Getulio Vargas' term.

On January 28, 1956, Kubitschek was inaugurated as president of the republic. His regime was to a considerable degree a continuation of the Vargas administration. Many of the same faces were seen in public offices, and most of the regime's civilian support came from those who had been the adherents of the late president. Kubitschek's tenure in office was assured by the support of the large majority of the leaders of the armed forces.

Thus Vargas continued to be a force to be reckoned with even after he had passed on—as he had foreseen that he would. The Vargas era lasted for another presidential term, until the inauguration of President Janio Quadros at the end of January, 1961. Vargas still remains the idol of a considerable part of the humble folk of the nation, as was shown by the fact that the Getulista candidate for vice president was reelected in 1960, in spite of large majority for anti-Getulio Quadros for the presidency.

There is no doubt about Getulio Vargas' impact on the history of Brazil, the largest of the Latin American nations and the only

one which seems destined within the foreseeable future to become one of the world's major powers. Under his leadership political power was transferred once and for all from the landholding aristocracy, which had been dominant from the fall of the empire in 1889 until the Revolution of 1930, to the urban middle and lower classes. During his long period of preponderance in the nation's political life Brazil took giant steps in the direction of industrialization and diversification of its economy with the sympathy and help of the government. Under Vargas the urban working classes, though perhaps many of them were little better off economically than they had been before, became conscious as they had never been before of being citizens and participants in the active life of the republic.

Brazilians in general became aware of their importance as a nation and struck off on original paths not only in matters of constitutional law and government but also in the fields of economics, literature, architecture, music, and general culture. Particularly during the last decade of Vargas' life they lost the feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the nations of Europe and the United States which had characterized them throughout their history as a politically independent nation.

Certainly all these developments did not conform to any well laid plan which Vargas had followed as a ruler. He was little interested in long-range plans and philosophical problems, and perhaps was not himself fully aware of the tremendous changes over which he was presiding. He was first and foremost a practical politician whose principal preoccupation was maintaining himself in office or regaining it once he had lost power. Nonetheless, Vargas, unwittingly or no, had been instrumental in bringing about a fundamental transformation of his nation, and in the process of doing so had become a *caudilho* and almost a folk hero.

No one seemed more unlikely to be a *caudilho* than Getulio Vargas. He was a very short man who wore glasses and had a professorial countenance. He had a reputation for being a dour man, with little of the gaiety and effervescence characteristic of the average Brazilian. His sense of humor, such as it was, was sardonic. Certainly many better and more persuasive orators than Vargas were active in Brazilian politics during the period in which they were dominated by Getulio. Yet it was he, not they, who captured the imagination of great masses of the Brazilian people.

His strongest points as a politician were certainly his ability to maneuver and his opportunism. Apparently having no very firmly held political convictions himself, he had a remarkable ability to bend with the prevailing winds and almost always to outmaneuver his opponents and rivals. However, the tragic nature of his death would seem to indicate that the methods which he had traditionally used and of which he was a past master no longer served to rule a country of the kind which Brazil had become. Although his talents served him admirably to preside over a period of rapid transition, once this transition had been achieved and the Brazilian economy and government were beginning to take on a new complexity and to require new technical and political skills, Vargas lost control of the situation.

Juan Domingo Perón and "the New Argentina"



Early on the morning of October 16, 1945, an inmate was taken from his cell in the military prison on the island of Martín García, in the middle of the Río de la Plata estuary. He was carried in a small boat to the outskirts of the Argentine capital city of Buenos Aires to a military hospital. He remained there until the late afternoon, when he was whisked to the Casa Rosada, the presidential palace. A few moments later he stepped out on the balcony of the palace in company of the President. When he appeared, a throaty shout went up from the crowd of 100,000 people in the Plaza de Mayo below. Finally the man raised his hand for silence, and when the crowd had quieted down, his first words were, "I am back! We have won!"

The man was Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. The incident was his return to power after a short period of ostracism and disgrace. It marked the beginning of a ten-year dictatorship of a man who was fundamentally to alter the history of Argentina.

Perón was an accidental social revolutionist. Certainly when he and other top officers of the Argentine Army overthrew President Ramón S. Castillo on June 4, 1943, they had no intention of carrying out any fundamental changes in the Argentine economy and society. Their insurrection was prompted by the prospect of the election of a new president later in 1943 who would be pro-British in World War II then in progress. The top military leaders favored the Axis. However, in spite of their intentions in overthrowing President Castillo, the Argentine Army leaders, Perón among them, paved the way for very far-reaching changes in the institutions of Argentine society.

The basic characteristics of the Argentine society and economy of 1943 had been established during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Even before that, during the ruthless and bloody dictator-

ship of Juan Manuel Rosas between 1838 and 1852, most of the arable land of the Argentine pampas had been divided among retainers and friends of the dictator. A large landholding system thus became an integral part of the Argentine economy.

Rosas was overthrown in 1852, and for the next sixty-four years the government of the republic was in the hands of the large landowners. The regimes of this period encouraged the development of grain growing and grazing on the great plains of central Argentina. The pampas were enclosed by barbed wire, the scrawny breed of native cattle, descended from those imported by the Spaniards in colonial days, was crossed with select bulls from Great Britain, until Argentine cattle were rated among the world's best. Similar improvements were made in the corn and wheat growing in the pampas.

Argentina thus developed into one of the principal suppliers of grain and meat to Great Britain and other parts of Western Europe. In order to get these products to the ports of Buenos Aires and Rosario, an extensive rail network was developed by British investors. In order to cultivate the great areas in the center of the country, hundreds of thousands of immigrants entered the country from Spain, Italy, and other nations of Europe. Buenos Aires and Rosario, the nation's principal ports, became large cities, and the beginnings of manufacturing arose to serve some of the needs of the country's consumers, provide some of the metal products needed in the pampas, and some of the equipment for the nation's railroads.

Some of the leaders of the Conservative Party governments which ruled Argentina during this period of more than half a century were statesmen of continental renown. Such a one was President Domingo Fausto Sarmiento, a famous writer, the founder of the nation's system of public education, friend of Horace Mann, and ardent admirer of the United States. Such, too, was President Roque Saenz Pena, who sponsored a law providing for the secret ballot.

The introduction of the secret ballot brought the rule of the landowners' Conservative Party to an end. In 1916 Hipólito Irigoyen, head of the Radical Party, which had the support of the rural and urban middle classes, and of a large part of the urban working class, was elected president. However, in the following fourteen years during which the Radicals were in power the economy and social struc-

ture of Argentina changed very little. During Irigoyen's administration he was hamstrung by a congress controlled by the Conservatives. His successor, Marcelo T. de Alvear, though a Radical, was virtually as conservative as the Conservatives and was not sympathetic to any extensive program of reforms.

The period of Radical rule was brought to an abrupt end on September 6, 1930, when Hipólito Irigoyen, who had been reelected in 1928, was overthrown by an Army *coup d'état* supported by the Conservative Party and by small dissident groups of Radicals and Socialists. From 1930 to 1943 Argentina was governed by a series of dictatorships and semidictatorships dominated by the Conservatives and supported by the military. Elections outside the city of Buenos Aires were frequently a farce, and usually when the opposition won control of a province the Federal government found an excuse to "intervene" and oust its elected officials.

The Conservative regimes of 1930-43 were openly favorable to the landowning class and hostile to industrialization and to the interests of the middle and working classes. They signed agreements with the British to keep tariffs low and favored importation of manufactured goods from Great Britain. They refused to enact labor legislation which was being clamored for by the unions. They favored European investors in Argentina, even at the expense of native Argentine capitalist interests. Thus, the rule of the landlord class over the rest of the country was maintained through force and fraud and against the wishes of the great majority of the population. This situation continued until the overthrow of the last of the Conservative presidents, Ramón S. Castillo, on June 4, 1943.

However, the generals and colonels who ousted Castillo soon found that they too were exceedingly unpopular among the civilians. Traditional civilian hostility toward the intervention of the military in politics was intensified by the Army government's dissolution of Congress, its ousting of officials of some of the most important trade unions, and its severe censorship of the press. Virtually all civilians were united against the new regime. This opposition threatened the stability of the military government and made very difficult the process of "legitimizing" the Army regime.

As a result Colonel Juan Perón, who at that time was secretary to the Minister of War, joined a number of his close associates to

seek out civilian backing for the regime. They first turned to the industrialist class, which had been largely in opposition to the Castillo administration. However, the industrialists, who were generally supporters of the Radical Party, felt that as soon as new elections were called, the Radical Party would be certain to return to power, and there was no sense in compromising its prospective victory by a premature agreement with the military men.

Some of Perón's close associates had been put in charge of trade unions when the military regime ousted the elected leadership of some of the principal labor organizations. So Perón and his friends turned to the labor movement when they were rebuffed by the industrialists. After negotiation between some of the military men and those trade-union leaders who were willing to listen, the army officers agreed to try to support some of the aspirations of the labor movement, and the trade-unionists agreed to take a wait-and-see attitude toward the military regime.

Colonel Perón was put in charge of a new Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare which was given virtually cabinet rank. In this position he spent the next two years seeking to weld the labor movement into a political machine to support the regime and to back his own personal ambitions. During much of this period Perón also held the positions of Minister of War and Vice President of the Republic as well as Secretary of Labor.

Perón's campaign was carried on on various fronts. He encouraged the workers to organize, giving his personal support to many of these attempts, including that of the packing-house workers and that of the sugar plantation and refinery workers, who had never previously been able successfully to form unions. He also forced employers to accept collective agreements favorable to the unions, granting sizable wage increases and other benefits. Perón also legislated by decree a series of labor and social laws, including the establishment of social security funds for most of the country's wage and salary workers, including those employed in agriculture.

The upshot of all this activity was that Perón won the confidence and support of the majority of the members of the rapidly increasing trade-union movement. This was an extraordinary development in the light of the traditional distrust of the trade-union movement for the military. However, it has various explanations. First, the regime

of which Perón was one of the principal members was the first since the Irigoyen administration which had evidenced any concern for the interests of the workers, and the only one in the nation's history which had done anything significant on their behalf. There is no doubt that Perón as Secretary of Labor provided many material benefits for the urban and agricultural workers of Argentina, and there was a feeling of gratefulness on the part of many of those who were thus benefited.

However, an even more fundamental explanation for Perón's ability to win and keep the loyalty of the majority of Argentine workers was the fact that he gave them a feeling of self-esteem and importance which they had never felt before. He made them lose the feeling of inferiority and servility which many workers had felt toward their employers. He made them feel not only that they were important, but that they were the most important group in the community. He made them feel a part of the civic life of the nation in a way which they had never felt before.

Perón's appeal was greatest to those workers who had had least trade-union organization and the lowest social status before his arrival on the scene. Thus Perón's supporters were strongest among packing-house workers, sugar workers, agricultural laborers, and workers in the smaller cities and towns. Perón had least support among printers, maritime workers, railroad engineers, and firemen.

As a result of his success in winning the support of the rank and file of the trade unions he also won the backing of most of the national industrial unions and of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). From May 1, 1944, on, the CGT was firmly under the influence of Perón.

Throughout most of the 1943-45 period Perón's efforts to build a political machine on the basis of the trade-union movement was aided by the fact that the military dictatorship allowed little civic freedom. Many trade-unionists who opposed Perón's attempts to take over the labor movement were jailed or were forced into hiding or into seeking refuge in exile. Freedom of the press was severely limited, and the workers were allowed to read only Perón's side of the story of what was going on in the labor movement.

Perón's grip on the workers was shown by the events of October, 1945. On October 9 a group of military men opposed to or jealous of

Perón staged a *coup d'état* and forced his resignation from all his posts, and he was made a prisoner on Martín García island. However, President Edelmiro Farrell, a close associate of Perón, was not ousted from his post, and the leaders of the political parties refused to make any attempt to form a government so long as he remained in the Casa Rosada. As a result the country was virtually without a government for a whole week.

The supporters of Perón took advantage of the confusion resulting from the attitude of the anti-Peronista political parties to organize their forces and start a campaign to bring about his return from prison and reestablishment in power. Sparked by the packing-house workers of Buenos Aires and nearby cities and towns, under Cipriano Reyes, large groups of workers began to march on the capital by whatever means of conveyance they could commandeer. They virtually seized control of the streets of the city, and at the same time a general strike spread throughout the nation.

In the face of these events the Army did little to support the group which had ousted Perón. The troops stayed in the barracks, leaving the control of Buenos Aires in the hands of Perón's supporters. Finally, on October 16, the anti-Perón army and navy men gave up, and Perón was brought back to Buenos Aires and virtually assumed control of the government. Although he did not again resume his posts as Vice President, Minister of War, and Secretary of Labor, his close associates were put in these jobs, and Perón was master of the regime.

A few days after his return to power Perón did two important things. First, he married Eva Duarte, a blond movie actress whom he had known for several years. Second, he announced his candidacy for the presidency and set about to organize political parties to back him in this race.

The principal support of Perón in his first election campaign came from the labor movement. The Partido Laborista was organized for this purpose, and it included among its leaders most of the outstanding trade-union officials of Argentina. Its president was Luis Gay, onetime syndicalist and chief of the Telephone Workers Federation. Its vice president was Cipriano Reyes, principal leader of the packing-house workers unions.

In addition to the Partido Laborista, Perón sought support in

the Radical Party. Several second-rank leaders of that group, including Horacio Quijano and Juan Cooke, declared for Perón and established what they called the Renovated Radical Party. Quijano became candidate for vice president on the Perón ticket. Finally a group of "independents" added a third line upon which Perón's name appeared.

All the old parties joined in the Unión Democrática and threw their support to two leaders of the Radical Party, José Tamborini and Enrique Mosca. The Unión Democrática candidates were no match for Perón. They talked about political democracy, going all the way back to the Greeks to get arguments in its favor. Perón, in contrast, toured the country talking of the things which he had done and proposed to do on behalf of the workers. The result, on February 24, 1946, was a victory for Perón and the election of an almost two-thirds Peronista majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the total membership of the Senate except for the two members from the province of Corrientes, whom the Peronistas refused to seat.

Perón was inaugurated as president of the republic on June 4, 1946, the third anniversary of the coup which overthrew the Castillo government. He was reelected in 1951 and remained as chief executive until September 16, 1955.

The fundamental significance of the Perón regime was that it transferred political and economic power in Argentina from the rural landowning class to the lower and middle classes of the cities. The votes which Perón received in successive elections came largely from the agricultural laborer, the urban industrial and transportation worker, and, to a much less degree, from the white-collar workers and other middle-class elements. After he was overthrown, the significance of the change which he had wrought was reflected in the fact that virtually all politicians outdid themselves to win the backing of these same elements in the population, whereas few had been interested before 1943.

Economically, too, Perón dealt severe blows to the rural aristocracy. Although he did nothing significant to bring about an agrarian reform and to shift the control of the land out of the hands of those who had held it for a hundred years, he nonetheless deprived them of the key position which they had hitherto held in the economic life of the nation.

First of all, Perón forced the rural employers to accept the unionization of their workers. Those employed in the great wheat, corn, and cattle growing areas of the pampas were organized into the Federación Argentina de Seccionales Agrarias, which the Perón government authorized to participate with the employers and the government in determining the wages of the agricultural laborers handling these crops. In the wine-growing areas of western Argentina and in the sugar- and quebracho-producing regions of the north there were separate unions, which sat down as equals with the employers at the collective-bargaining table.

Second, Perón enacted extensive social and labor legislation to protect the agricultural workers, and at the expense of the employers. The Statute of the Peon, enacted while Perón was still Secretary of Labor, provided for the eight-hour day and other benefits for these workers. During his last year in office Perón pushed through Congress a law extending social security to the agricultural laborers.

Third, Perón took the sale of the country's basic agricultural export products out of the hands of private interests and centralized it in the hands of the government. The Instituto Argentino de Producción e Intercambio (IAPI) was established in March, 1946, and it was entrusted with the job of purchasing all the country's grain and vegetable-oil crops—and later its meat as well—and arranging for their sale inside and outside Argentina. The landowners were paid prices well below those in the world market throughout the Perón regime, and the profits from this enterprise stayed with the IAPI and the government.

All these measures resulted in undermining the economic and political power of the rural landowning class. However, they also had a disastrous effect on Argentina's agricultural output. According to the January, 1956, issue of the *Boletín Económico de América Latina*, published by the Economic Commission for Latin America, the total amount of land under cultivation in Argentina dropped from 21,814,000 hectares in the 1934-38 period to 17,254,000 in 1955. The amount of land under cultivation in cereals and vegetable oils dropped by 1955 to only 74.4 per cent of what it had been in 1934-38. Some observers have argued that the fall in the amount of land in use was even greater than these figures would show.

Whereas the agricultural landlord was penalized by the Perón

government, the urban industrialist was favored. Perón was anxious to build up a more diversified and more balanced economy than the country had hitherto possessed. He saw industrialization as a means of assuring the future power and greatness of his country. He favored industry in a variety of ways. During the period 1945-49, when Argentina was receiving very high prices for its exports and IAPI was making fabulous profits from this trade, the government siphoned a sizable percentage of the export profit into the purchase of capital goods, particularly for industry. He reversed the tariff policy of his predecessors and established a high protective tariff for industry. Perón also established a government-owned Industrial Bank to make loans to industrialists to expand their plant and equipment.

The social policies which Perón had begun as Secretary of Labor were continued, though on a more modest scale. The work of extending social security to all gainfully employed people was completed by 1955 with the establishment of social security institutions for agricultural workers and self-employed people. The Perón regime had an extensive housing program. A great variety of labor legislation was enacted. Higher education was made gratis and was opened to all who could qualify—though insufficient funds were provided to meet the tremendous wave of students that descended upon the universities as a result. Special educational programs for training workers for industry were established.

Of course there was another side to the Perón regime. It was a dictatorship which became increasingly totalitarian the longer Perón remained in power. The weight of the dictatorship was felt in all spheres of activity and all walks of life.

In the political arena the nature of the regime became obvious very early when Perón's adherents in the Senate refused to seat the only two opposition members elected in 1946. The freedom of opposition parties was increasingly restricted. They were forbidden the use of radio and television, their access to the press was reduced almost to zero, they were submitted to physical terror, leading opponents of the regime were ousted from their seats in Congress, and the constituencies were gerrymandered so as to reduce the opposition to only fourteen members of the Chamber of Deputies by the end of the Perón era.

Freedom of press and speech was increasingly restricted. Typical

of the government's action in this field was the suppression of the Socialist Party's weekly paper *La Vanguardia* because its printing shop was found by municipal health inspectors to be "dirty" and "dangerous," in spite of the fact that it was nationally famous for being one of the cleanest and best-run enterprises of the kind in Argentina. Scores of papers were closed down on January 1, 1950, on the grounds that they had violated a decree ordering that all papers bear the legend "Year of the Liberator San Martín" at their mast-head—a decree which was divulged only to Peronista papers. Finally, early in 1951 *La Prensa*, the country's largest newspaper and a strong opponent of Perón, was closed down by means of a strike of Peronista-controlled newsdealers, and when it "failed to reopen" it was expropriated by the Peronista congress and was turned over to the General Confederation of Labor.

The universities received the same treatment as the press. One of the principal centers of opposition to Perón consisted of the faculties and student bodies of the country's six universities. Throughout the 1943–45 period there was a running struggle between the government and the students and faculty members. Once in office as president, Perón "reorganized" the universities, putting them completely under the control of the government, thus abolishing the autonomy and faculty-student administration which they had enjoyed since 1918. All anti-Peronista faculty members were dismissed, and no dissent with government policy was permitted to any of the professors of the universities.

The trade-union movement, which was largely responsible for putting Perón in power, received much the same treatment as did the press and the universities, which had been largely opposed to the dictator. Control of trade-union affairs was entrusted by Perón to his wife, Eva Duarte de Perón, as long as she lived. During the years 1948–51 she carried out a thoroughgoing purge of the trade-union leadership, ousting virtually all those union leaders who, without giving up control of their organizations, had supported Perón during the 1943–45 period. The leadership of the CGT and of the national unions became little more than puppets of the First Lady. After her death Perón himself took over the job of strictly supervising the activities of the labor movement.

Collective bargaining became less and less real as the tenure of

Perón in office continued. Increasingly the decisions in important collective-bargaining sessions were actually made by officials of the Ministry of Labor or even by Evita or Juan Perón. Strikes were virtually forbidden unless they were called to bolster some move of the administration.

The government attempted to destroy all independent civic organizations, particularly in the economic field. The attempt was made to establish organizations of all kinds which would be subject to the control of the government. Most famous, perhaps, was the Eva Perón Social Welfare Foundation, which during the life of Evita acquired a virtual monopoly of all charitable enterprises in the country.

The dictatorship of Perón was distinctive in its sources of support. Throughout its existence it rested upon the trade-union movement and the armed forces. Upon several occasions the military turned back attempts to overthrow the Perón regime by force. On these same occasions the trade-union movement was mobilized to come to the defense of the regime and was used frequently to demonstrate against the government's opponents or to embarrass them through strike action.

Perón was certainly well aware of the elements upon which his regime was based. He was able to remind military officers of the events of October, 1945, when they seemed to be wavering in their allegiance toward him. On the other hand, he was able to use the armed forces, as he did upon occasion, when his labor supporters seemed to be getting out of hand.

However, Perón was not just an ordinary Latin American dictator. It is probably true that he was interested principally in maintaining himself in power and was willing to follow any policy which he felt would serve this purpose. However, Perón differed from the general run of Latin American dictators in the effect his regime had upon his country and in his attempt to work out a rationale to justify his regime to himself, his country, and the world in general.

Perón was also different from the ordinary Latin American dictator because of his attempt to have something to say about virtually every field of knowledge. In spite of the fact that his training and background were at best meager in these fields, Perón was not abashed to speak to meetings of actors, philosophers, political scien-

tists, or writers concerning their professions and the ideas with which they dealt. In this, perhaps, he was more like the dictators of the Fascist and Communist states than like those dictatorial regimes with which the Latin Americans are generally familiar.

There is little doubt that Perón had a very strong feeling of his role in the history of Argentina and, he hoped, of Latin America and the world as a whole. He was anxious to be regarded as the founder of a "new Argentina" which would have a much more significant place in world affairs than it had had when he first took control.

Perón and his closest advisers tried to work out a political philosophy to "explain" his movement. Professor George Blanksten has made the most thorough study of *justicialismo*, the Peronista philosophy, which he has analyzed in his book *Perón's Argentina*. Blanksten notes that (p. 283):

Justicialismo maintains that there are not two but rather four basically conflicting forces in society. These are "idealism," "materialism," "individualism," and "collectivism." Two propositions are central to the justicialist interpretation of the four forces. In the first place, each of them has a necessary and desirable role to play in society. Secondly, a constant conflict rages among the four.

Perón and his associates maintained that the domination of one or a combination of two or three of these forces over the others gives rise to some form of tyranny. Thus, the supremacy of idealism results in a technocratic dictatorship; the supremacy of idealism and collectivism was fascist and Nazi tyranny; the combination of materialism and individualism is capitalism; and the alliance of materialism and collectivism is communist tyranny.

The Peronista combination of these four elements is the so-called "Third Position," about which Perón talked at great length throughout most of his time in office. Blanksten sums up Perón's Third Position thus (p. 290):

It is an arrangement which guarantees each of the four basic forces the opportunity to exercise its proper role in society, neutralizes the conflict among the four, and prevents any one—or two—of them from dominating the others. In a sense, *Justicialismo* or the "Third Position" is the "new Argentina's" version of Aristotle's "Golden Mean" in so far

as that concept sought the avoidance of extremes. The *Peronista* who knows his doctrine defines it thus: *Justicialismo* is "that doctrine whose objective is the happiness of man in human society achieved through the harmony of materialistic, idealistic, individualistic, and collectivistic forces, each valued in a Christian way." Or thus: "It would be a concordant and balanced combination of the forces that represent the modern state, designed to avoid strife and the annihilation of one of these forces; endeavoring to conciliate them, to unite them, and to put them in parallel motion to be able to form . . . a common destiny with benefit for the . . . forces and without injury to any one of them." *Justicialismo*, then, envisages a temperate social order compounded of "just the right amounts" of idealism, materialism, individualism, and collectivism.

President Perón is quoted by Blanksten as defining the Third Position of the Peronista Party thus (p. 292):

Some say, in grave error, that it is a centrist party. A centrist party, like a rightist or leftist party, is sectarian, and we are totally anti-sectarian. For us there is nothing fixed and nothing to deny. . . . We are anti-Communist because Communists are sectarians, and anti-capitalist because capitalists are also sectarians. Our "Third Position" is not a centrist position. It is an ideological position which is in the center, on the right, or on the left according to specific circumstances.

Perón was very proud of his somewhat vague "Third Position." He is quoted by Blanksten as saying (p. 293):

When I think that we have been the first to announce this solution to men, and when I demonstrate that we have been the first to realize it, I can do no less than affirm my faith in the high destiny which God has seen fit to assign to our country. My soul is filled with emotion when I think that the day cannot be far off when all of humanity, seeking some star in the night, will fix its eyes on the flag of the Argentines.

In addition to his development of a generalized philosophical defense of his regime Perón stressed two principal issues, nationalism and the defense of the workers. A third issue, which he talked about less frequently but which we feel was fundamental to the Perón regime, was his attitude toward the problem of political democracy.

The nationalism of the Perón regime found a number of expressions. It was the motivation of the oft-mentioned desire of Perón and his followers to achieve the "economic independence" of Argentina. Nationalism lay behind the attempt of the Perón administration to exercise leadership throughout South America and even throughout the whole Latin American region. Finally it lay behind the strongly expressed opposition of Perón to the United States, which, though not consistent, was violently and frequently announced.

Throughout his administration Perón laid stress on the theme of achieving economic independence. In July, 1947, he arranged a meeting in Tucumán, where Argentine independence had originally been declared in 1816, to sign a new "Declaration of Economic Independence." This document said in part:

We, the representatives of the people and the government of the Argentine republic, invoking Divine Providence in the name and by the authority of the people we represent, solemnly declare . . . that the peoples and governments of the Argentine provinces and territories break the dominating chains which have bound them to foreign capitalism, and that they recover their right to govern their own sources of national wealth.

Perón is quoted by Blanksten (p. 238) as commenting thus on this Declaration:

Following the course of conduct and the example of San Martín, we have come to Tucumán, we have entered the historical house, we have endeavored to create a similar atmosphere, we have taken the same oath, and we are also ready to die, should it be necessary, to obtain our economic independence.

Perón conceived of many of the measures carried out by his government as being designed to achieve this economic independence. To this end the government used most of the frozen credits Argentina had piled up in Great Britain during World War II to purchase the British-owned railroads. On March 1, 1948, Perón presided over a ceremony marking the official transfer of the railroads to Argentine ownership.

The Peronista government's support of industrialization was also

conceived of in terms of achieving the country's economic independence. It was felt by the Peronistas that if Argentina had a more diversified economy, it would be less dependent for its prosperity upon the export of grains and meats to Europe, particularly to Great Britain, a dependence which they maintained served to limit the nation's political independence.

Another expression of Argentine nationalism by the Perón administration was its attempt to assume leadership of the other Latin American countries. On the one hand, Perón sought to bring his closest neighbors into an economic union with Argentina. Treaties to this effect were signed with Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia, though their effectiveness was quite limited. On the other hand, the Perón government sought to take advantage of various inter-American conferences to form a bloc of the Latin American nations.

The most spectacular attempt of Perón to assume leadership among the Latin American nations occurred during the Ninth Inter-American Conference in Bogotá in April, 1948. At that meeting the Latin American nations pressed the United States to help establish an Inter-American Development Bank. When the United States completely rejected the suggestion, Perón's representatives at the conference announced that Argentina would take the leadership in establishing the bank whether or not the United States agreed to go along with the proposal. Growing economic difficulties reduced this announcement to the proportions of any empty boast, but it was symbolic of the attempt Argentina consistently made under Perón to assume the leadership of the Latin American countries.

Perón did not confine his efforts to gain influence among the other Latin American countries to these activities, however. He used representatives of the two elements upon which his regime was based, the armed forces and the trade unions, in his efforts to seek friends abroad.

The activities of Peronista Military Attachés in the various Latin American countries are, in the nature of the case, difficult to trace directly. However, there is considerable reason for suspecting that representatives of the Argentine military had a considerable hand in *coups d'état* by army elements in Peru and Venezuela in 1948, as well as cultivating specially close relations with such dictators as Generals Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, Magloire of Haiti,

Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, and with Colonel Remón of Panama.

Much more obvious were the activities of the Labor Attachés whom Perón attached to every Argentine embassy in the hemisphere. These people, chosen largely from the secondary leadership of the trade-union movement, before they were sent to their respective diplomatic posts, were put through a special course which stressed Peronista ideas and propaganda methods.

The Peronista Labor Attachés sought to infiltrate and influence the trade-union organizations in the countries to which they were assigned. They had lavish funds at their disposal, and part of their job was to arrange all-expense tours for trade-union leaders to Buenos Aires, where they were wined and dined, shown the sights and particularly the accomplishments of the Perón administration, and usually were received by Perón and Evita.

The Labor Attachés succeeded in bringing about the establishment of Peronista trade-union movements in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, as well as establishing organizing committees in Haiti, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, and Bolivia. They also succeeded in gaining the support of the old Regional Confederation of Workers of Mexico (CROM) and of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship's pet National Labor Confederation in Venezuela.

With the help of the Labor Attachés, Perón undertook to organize a hemisphere-wide confederation, the so-called Agrupación de Trabajadores Latino Americanos Sindicalizados (ATLAS). For a short while it was a major contestant (with the communist CTAL and the democratic ORIT) for the loyalty and affiliation of the national trade-union movements of the Latin American countries.

Another aspect of the job of the Labor Attachés was their work as agents for the Eva Perón Social Welfare Foundation. Upon various occasions when disaster struck one or another of the Latin American countries the Labor Attachés distributed aid which was rushed to the spot from Buenos Aires by the Foundation. On a more prosaic level, the Labor Attachés undertook to aid various local charities, as well as to distribute gifts to poor children on Christmas and other holidays, all provided by the Welfare Foundation.

The third element of Perón's nationalism was his strong stand

against the United States. Starting with his famous "Braden or Perón" campaign during the 1945-46 presidential election, Perón carried on a long and bitter propaganda battle against the United States and all things North American for over eight years. The United States was pictured by the Peronista press and by the President himself as a greedy imperialist nation which was doing its utmost to subjugate the countries of Latin America. The supposed "materialism" of the United States, the more unpleasant aspects of race relations here, and alleged interference by the United States in the internal affairs of various Latin American countries were constant themes of propaganda by the Peronistas.

Perón and his friends had specially selected "devils" among leading North Americans against whom their propaganda was particularly directed. They seldom passed up an opportunity to talk with violent disparagement about Spruille Braden. Only less prominent in the Peronista gallery of North American rogues was Serafino Romualdi, Latin American representative of the American Federation of Labor, who was in the vanguard in the struggle against Peronista penetration of the Latin American labor movements.

There were ebbs and flows in Perón's hostility toward the United States. For a while late in 1950 and early in 1951, when a loan was being negotiated with the Export-Import Bank for \$125,000,000, the Peronistas put a damper on their campaign. Soon after, it was renewed with increased intensity. It reached a pitch of particularly shrill fury shortly before the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower to Argentina during the summer of 1953. Immediately thereafter the campaign was relaxed and finally virtually disappeared, never again to be renewed so long as Perón remained in power. By 1953 Perón had realized that his economic situation was so serious that he would need a great deal of help from the United States in order to salvage it.

Support for the aims and aspirations of labor was another constant theme sounded by Perón during his nine-year occupancy of the Casa Rosada. He talked frequently of his regime as a "laborist" government and gave long discourses on the Peronista "sindicalist" state. In several crises faced by the government the labor movement was mobilized to support the regime.

It is difficult to tell how much of Perón's protestation of national-

ism and of laborism was genuine. One is inclined to feel that he was sincerely an Argentine nationalist, that he stumbled onto the labor issue more or less by accident, but was a clever enough politician to realize its usefulness for maintaining him in power and for building up his prestige as something more than just another Latin American dictator. However, there can be little doubt about one aspect of his philosophy: Perón had little belief in political democracy.

Perón's antagonism to democratic ideals and procedures is clear from his actions. However, it is also clear from some of his public statements. Perón believed in elites. His chosen elite was the military, which he believed had a unique role of leadership to play in modern societies, particularly in Argentina.

It has been maintained that Perón was seeking to establish a corporate state somewhat along the lines of that proposed by Mussolini. There is no doubt that Perón was slowly developing during his presidency a totalitarian state to which all other aspects of society would be subordinated. Whether or not this was "fascist" is perhaps a matter of how one defines fascism. Certainly in many ways the Peronista experience did not conform to the typical fascist pattern.

The totalitarian state structure which Perón was constructing was well advanced by the time he was driven from power. Its foundation stones, of course, were the armed forces and the labor movement. The former he sought to hold constantly under his reign by frequent changes in command and occasional purges. The trade-union movement he sought to centralize completely, with the top reins of authority being in his own hands or, so long as she lived, in those of his wife. All power in the national industrial unions was put in their national officers resident in Buenos Aires. The national industrial unions themselves were subjected to the strict control of the General Confederation of Labor, which had power to "intervene" and to oust the elected officers of any one of these organizations upon the slightest show of dissidence or doubt about Perón.

At the same time collective bargaining was centralized in the Ministry of Labor, where increasingly the officials of that organization became the final arbiters of collective contract terms. This

process was reinforced by the device of having all collective agreements end on the same day.

With labor firmly in his hands Perón set out to subject other functional groups in the economy to his control. An over-all employers' group, the *Confederación General Económica* (General Economic Confederation), was established, and shortly before his overthrow Perón sponsored a law passed by Congress which required all employers in the country to pay dues to this organization whether they wanted to do so or not.

Parallel to the CGT and the CGE, Perón sought to establish the *Confederación General de Profesionales* (CGP), or General Confederation of Professional People. The teachers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, architects, and members of all other liberal professions were ultimately to be forced to belong to this organization. Since Perón characteristically used the one-step-at-a-time technique, and since he met his greatest resistance among the professional people, the work of bringing all of them into the CGP had not been completed by the time he was overthrown.

Finally there were to be the *Confederación General Universitaria* (CGU) and the *Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios*, which were to have in their ranks all the university and secondary school students. The CGU was a competitor of the older *Federación Universitaria Argentina*, established in 1918 and traditionally the representative of the university student body in all six of the national universities. It put up strenuous and consistent opposition to Perón, and he had made relatively little progress in getting students into the Peronista group by the time he was ousted, although his success among the secondary school students was markedly greater, since there was no rival group to contend with there.

All these developments seemed to presage a corporative state. Some claimed to see a further step in this direction in a Congress of Productivity held about a year before Perón fell, which met in the Chamber of Deputies and had delegates from the CGT, and the CGP. There were those who felt that this was the first step in the elimination of the politically organized Congress and its substitution by a functionally chosen Corporative Chamber strictly under the control of the Executive.

Be this as it may, the process was left incomplete by the time Perón left office in September, 1955. Whether or not Perón was ultimately seeking to establish a corporative state along fascist lines, it is certainly true that in some other respects Perón's regime had little resemblance to the classic fascist states of Europe.

First of all, Perón came to power in the face of the opposition of the principal elements of the *status quo ante* instead of with their help, as in the cases of Italy and Germany. The large landholders, the industrialists, and most other elements of the Argentine upper classes were violently opposed to Perón, and most of them remained so throughout his tenure in office.

In the second place, Perón, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, had the support on his way to power and after getting there of the organized working class. Whereas the established trade-union movements of Italy and Germany bitterly fought the Fascists and Nazis, the Argentine trade-union movement supported Perón almost from the beginning.

If Perón's was a fascist regime, it was certainly one with a difference. We should prefer to say that it was a totalitarian regime *sui generis* very greatly influenced by the situation in Argentina at the time of its development, which borrowed from other fascist regimes as well as from the Communists and other sources during its tenure in power. However, we do not feel that Perón was consciously patterning his government on that of any other country, and perhaps he himself was not sure exactly where he intended to end up. He was a great one for "playing by ear," and his main preoccupation was keeping intact the fragile and unnatural coalition which had brought him into office, and after that he was interested in carving a place for himself in history as a unique sort of Argentine and Latin American ruler.

There is no doubt about Perón's impact upon the history of his country. He fundamentally changed the balance of power in Argentina, ending forever the control over the nation by the rural landlords who had dominated it for more than a century. He gave a status to the urban and rural working class which no successor regime could take away from them, even if it wanted to. The organized-labor movement became a permanent element of key im-

portance in the power structure of Argentina, and the workingmen had a feeling of having "arrived," which never could be entirely taken away from them.

Perón may well go down in history as a tragic figure. On the one hand, he did much good for his country, bringing about long-overdue changes and making the masses of the people aware of issues which they had not paid attention to before. He confirmed the nation on the path of economic development and industrialization and made both of these elements in the national creed of virtually every Argentinean.

On the other hand, Perón, was unwilling and unable to establish the basis for a solid democracy in Argentina. Although he brought about social and economic changes which might have paved the way for a long period of democratic rule, and indeed might have made possible the withdrawal of the armed forces from the political power which they had usurped in 1930, he made no attempt to do so. Rather to the contrary, he did not want to do so.

In addition, Perón did great damage to the economy of the country, damage which may be of a short-run nature but which nonetheless forced the people of Argentina to go through after his overthrow a period of stringency and suffering for which he was directly responsible. By failing to understand that industrialization does not mean the destruction of agriculture and by allowing and encouraging tremendous waste, graft, and corruption Perón greatly weakened the country's economic base. Only heroic measures could salvage the nation from the havoc which he left.

History will have to judge the significance of Juan Domingo Perón. However, there is little doubt that he will emerge as the man who decisively changed the course of Argentine history and as the person responsible for "bringing Argentina into the twentieth century."

Fidel Castro and Fidelismo



On October 16, 1953, a young man, tall for a Cuban, stood before a special court in the city of Santiago de Cuba on trial for treason. He had an ascetic face and sad eyes, and as he began to speak to the judges his voice was husky and seemed to come with difficulty. As he continued he appeared to gain confidence from hearing the sound of his own words. His voice, though somewhat high-pitched, was sometimes matter-of-fact, though it rose and fell as he emphasized his points.

The young man went on for four hours, holding his judges spell-bound, though he defied them, the government of which they were a part, and the ruling classes of the island. They listened while he promised that he and his young friends would soon rule Cuba and that when they did they would completely reform and reorganize the country's economic, social, and political life.

The young man was Fidel Castro. This speech, which was hardly reported either inside Cuba or abroad at the time, firmly stated his intention to transform his nation. Even those who heard the speech could hardly have guessed the impact which he was soon to have on both his country and the whole of Latin America.

The advent of Fidel Castro to power in Cuba five years later completely transformed the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. Instead of a two-sided conflict between the defenders of the old order and the protagonists of a democratic social revolution this struggle became three-sided. The new contender was a group of revolutionaries who believed that their objectives could be obtained only through the establishment of a totalitarian regime and its alliance with the Communists in world affairs. This group rallied around Fidel Castro inside Cuba and throughout Latin America.

Fidel was not unique in taking this position in favor of total-

itarian revolution. Juan Perón, and to a degree Getulio Vargas, had assumed the same posture before him. However, Castro enjoyed a success in rallying a hemisphere-wide movement around his banner which eluded Perón and to which Vargas never aspired.

Fidel Castro was born of a good family of moderately wealthy landowners in the Province of Oriente in the year 1927. He had the customary upbringing of a youth of his social status, being educated at Catholic schools, including the famous Colegio de Dolores secondary school in Santiago de Cuba. During the summers he wandered widely over the hills, woods, and fields of his native Oriente.

From secondary school Fidel went to the University of Havana. There he rapidly became involved in the political life which engaged the attention of so many of the Cuban students in the 1940's. He is reported to have been a member of one of the "revolutionary" groups which then dotted the Cuban political landscape. These groups had been an outgrowth of the struggle against the Machado dictatorship (1924-33). The students who had sparked that struggle had formed several terrorist groups which responded to the force of the dictatorship with a force of their own. Once the fight against Machado had been won, many of these students continued to use the same methods, even after Cuba entered a period of democracy after 1940, frequently turning their terroristic methods against one another.

While at the university Castro developed his talents as an orator. He gave long speeches to his fellow students, who soon found that a discussion with Fidel was likely to be an entirely one-sided affair. He was active in student politics in the Law School.

Two incidents which took place during his university years have been the subject of much discussion and misunderstanding. One of these was his participation in an attempt to organize an invasion of the Dominican Republic by exiles and foreign sympathizers with the fight against the Trujillo dictatorship. This effort, which was to take off from Cayo Confites at the eastern end of Cuba, was finally frustrated when the government of President Grau San Martín prevented the departure of the expedition.

The other incident was Castro's presence in Bogotá, Colombia, in April, 1948, when the people of that city rioted violently for three days following the assassination of the national leader of the

Liberal Party, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán. The presence of Castro in the city during the "Bogotazo" is often cited as "proof" of Castro's long-time membership in a communist underground apparatus. The principal weakness of this argument, however, is the fact that it presumes the Bogotá uprising to have been a communist-engineered and directed event. The writer does not believe that the Communists actually had anything to do with the spontaneous uprising of the Bogoteños in protest against the death of their idol. Had they been its instigators, they would have emerged from the experience in a thoroughly entrenched position, if not in control of the government. Nothing of the sort occurred. Because of the utter lack of organization the Bogotazo served to do little but allow the Bogoteños to work off their frustration and anger.

One other event of importance to Castro occurred during his stay at the university. This was his marriage to a student of the School of Philosophy, Mirtha Díaz Balart, which took place on October 12, 1948. On September 1 of the following year their son "Fidelito" was born.

Once out of the university, Fidel Castro began his career as a lawyer. At the same time he joined the forces of the so-called Ortodoxo (Orthodox) Party. This party was led by an eccentric Senator, Eduardo Chibas, who had broken from the Auténtico Party in 1947, charging it and the government of President Ramón Grau San Martín with vast corruption and betrayal of the promises it had made to the people of Cuba in the years before coming to power. Chibas won particular fame as a radio orator, and it was on one of his own radio programs that he dramatically committed suicide one day in 1951.

Castro became active in Chibas' Ortodoxo Party in Havana. By early 1952 he was head of the party organization in the capital city. He seemed to be on the way to a successful political career, particularly if, as many expected, the Ortodoxos won the election scheduled for June 1, 1952.

However, this election was never held. General Fulgencio Batista, ex-dictator and ex-president and candidate in the June, 1952, election, overthrew the government of President Carlos Prío Socarras on March 10, 1952, less than three months before the election which Batista knew he could not possibly win. After some confusion

Batista took office as "Chief of State," issued a new "Constitutional Statute" to take the place temporarily of the Constitution of 1940, and reestablished the dictatorship which he had voluntarily abandoned a few years before.

The people of Cuba were never willing to accept Fulgencio Batista as the legitimate ruler of the island. The organization of the opposition to his regime began the day he seized power. This opposition took many forms and was divided into many groups.

One of the major elements of the opposition to Batista was the Auténtico Party of ex-Presidents Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prio Socarras, which had been ousted from power by Batista's coup of March 10. The Auténticos split into two groups, the one led by Grau trying to oppose Batista "constitutionally," the other, led by Prio, entering immediately into underground plotting against the dictatorship. The Prio Auténtico underground, led by Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango, one-time Minister of Education in Prio's government, plotted unceasingly with active and retired military men while bringing in sizable quantities of arms to be used in a coup against the Batista regime.

In 1955 the Auténtico underground split into two groups. One continued to be loyal to Carlos Prio and was known as the Organización Auténtica. The other was led by Dr. Sánchez Arango and took the name "Triple A."

Another major factor in the underground opposition to the Batista dictatorship consisted of the student organizations, particularly that of the University of Havana. The Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios (FEU) reestablished the underground Directorio Revolucionario, which had existed almost a generation before, during the struggle against the Machado dictatorship. In the tradition of the Cuban students' fight against tyranny the Directorio undertook acts of personal violence against officials of the Batista regime. These culminated on March 13, 1957, in an attack on the presidential palace and a near-miss attempt to kill Batista himself.

The final element in the anti-Batista opposition was the movement organized by Fidel Castro. He had begun his activities against the Batista regime virtually the moment the general seized power. Shortly afterward, in his capacity as a lawyer, Fidel entered a plea in the Supreme Court to have the Batista regime declared uncon-

stitutional and illegal and its acts unenforceable. Of course the court refused to do this.

Thereafter Fidel Castro turned his attention to insurrection as a means of getting rid of the tyranny. His first effort in this direction was made on July 26, 1953, when he and a group of followers attempted to seize the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. This was the second largest garrison in the island. The plan was to seize it, arouse the garrison, much of which was anti-Batista, and use it as a base for a civil war against the dictatorship.

This effort failed. Many of those participating in the attempt were killed, quite a few of them in cold blood after capture. Others escaped and went into hiding. Still others, including Fidel Castro, were captured and imprisoned. Castro was brought to trial on October 16, 1953, and he served as his own counsel. He delivered a long address to the court which was more in the nature of an indictment of it and the regime it served than a defense of his own actions.

This speech, which has frequently been published under the title "History Will Absolve Me!" was one of the most famous expositions of his philosophy that Fidel Castro ever made. In spite of the situation he was in at the moment, he presumed that revolution was inevitable and that it would be much more than a mere overthrow of the Batista dictatorship. He outlined in some detail the program of extensive change which such a revolution would bring about.

Castro outlined five "revolutionary laws" which the new government would proclaim. Concerning these, he said in part:

The first revolutionary law will return to the people their sovereignty and proclaim the Constitution of 1940 as the true supreme law of the State, until the people decide to modify or change it. For the purpose of reestablishing it and chastising those who have betrayed it, and there existing no popularly elected authorities to carry this out, the revolutionary movement as the momentary embodiment of sovereignty, the only source of legitimate authority, will assume all of the faculties inherent in such authority except the modification of the Constitution: the faculty to legislate, the faculty to execute, and the faculty to judge. . . .

The second revolutionary law will concede the unmortgageable and untransferrable right to the land to all the *colonos*, sub-*colonos*, renters,

sharecroppers who occupy parcels of five *caballerias* of land or less, the State indemnifying the former proprietors on the basis of the income which these lands would produce over an average of ten years.

The third revolutionary law will provide workers the right of sharing 30 per cent of the profits of all industrial, mercantile, and mining enterprises, including sugar mills. Strictly agricultural firms will be excepted from this.

The fourth revolutionary law will concede to all *colonos* the right to 50 per cent of the income from cane, and a minimum quota of 40,000 arrobas to all small *colonos* who have been established for at least three years.

The fifth revolutionary law will order the confiscation of all property obtained corruptly by members of all previous governments. . . .¹

A bit later in his discourse Castro outlined the longer-range objectives of "the first government due to popular election which would arise immediately afterward." The questions this government would have to deal with were stated thus by Castro:

The problem of the land, the problem of industrialization, the problem of housing, the problem of unemployment, the problem of education, and the problem of the people's health: these are the six points to which our efforts would have been resolutely turned, together with the conquest of the public liberties and political democracy.²

He elaborated somewhat on each of these questions, without going into too much detail. The rest of the speech was taken up with indictments of the tyrannical attitudes and actions of the Batista regime. He was particularly harsh in his criticisms of the members of the judiciary.

The judges were uninfluenced by Fidel Castro's oratory insofar as their verdict was concerned. They sentenced Fidel to twenty years in jail, and he was taken to the Isle of Pines National Penitentiary, but he stayed there only until March, 1954, when he was freed in conformity with a general-amnesty law.

After spending a short time in Havana, Castro went into exile. He went first to the United States, where he was very active among the anti-Batista exiles in New York, Miami, and elsewhere. Soon, however, he moved to Mexico, this time with definite plans for mounting an invasion and a civil war against the Batista regime.

The story of the Castro group's preparation in Mexico for armed strife in their homeland has often been told. They rented an estate in an isolated part of the republic where the small group of men who had rallied to Castro's cause were put through a course of training in guerrilla warfare at the hands of General Bayo, Cuban-born onetime officer of the Spanish Republican Army. Meanwhile arms were smuggled in from the United States and elsewhere, in part paid for by a sizable contribution from ex-President Carlos Prio Socarras. A small yacht, the "Gramma" was bought to transport the little Rebel Army from Mexico to Cuba.

In the meantime Castro's supporters inside Cuba were also very active. Forming what they now called "the 26th of July Movement," they began the difficult job of building an underground movement based on small cells in labor unions, professional societies, and neighborhoods. This apparatus became known as the Civic Movement of Resistance.

Finally, on November 25, 1956, the "Gramma" left the Mexican coast with a total of eighty-two men aboard. The boat was seriously overloaded and did not arrive off the coast south of Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountain range until December 2, two days later than had originally been planned. As a result of this delay there was little chance to coordinate the landing with an insurrection which had begun as scheduled in Santiago de Cuba two days before.

After a series of disasters only thirteen of the original eighty-two "invaders" finally reached refuge in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. Batista's propaganda services announced that all the attackers, including Fidel Castro himself, had been killed or captured. More than three months were to pass before the people of Cuba became aware that a civil war had begun in the mountains at the eastern end of the island.

The little band rallied support slowly. For the first few weeks they lived on the meagerest food provided by sympathetic peasants. They began to add to their scanty arsenal—most of their arms had gone astray during the landing—by raiding local police stations.

It was not until March, 1957, that the people of Cuba became aware of what was occurring in the Sierra Maestra. In that month Herbert Mathews, a member of the editorial staff of the *New York Times*, visited Castro in his mountain fastness, interviewed

him and his aides, had photographs taken, and then withdrew, returning to New York. His series of three articles was published soon afterward. By one of those freaks of the Batista censorship which occurred from time to time the regime did not prevent the entry of the issues of the *Times* carrying Mathews' articles. As a result word was soon broadcast throughout the republic that Fidel Castro was indeed leading a revolt against the Batista regime.

From then until the final victory of the Rebel Army on January 1, 1959, the battle increased in intensity. The area under the control of the Castro forces increased, until by the middle of 1958 they controlled most of the rural areas of the province of Oriente. Meanwhile a second front was opened in the central province of Las Villas under the direction of the Directorio Revolucionario. This front had been established in the middle of 1957 and had not had any direct connection with the forces of Fidel Castro for over a year. A few months before the final victory over Batista a third front was opened in the westernmost province of Pinar del Rio, led by elements of the Auténtico Party.

Meanwhile the various civilian undergrounds intensified their activities. Castro's 26th of July Movement established five-man cells in most of the trade unions in Havana and in many of the interior cities. It collected millions of dollars to aid the rebel armed forces through the sale of "bonds" in denominations of one peso and up. These bonds were bought by members of all ranks of society from the humblest kind of agricultural and urban worker to some of the richest of the country's industrialists.

Other underground groups were also active. Elements of the Organizacion Auténtica, Triple A, and Directorio Revolucionario were all engaged in organizing the civilian resistance to the tyranny. Instances of sabotage, terrorist attempts against the lives of Batista officials, and other acts of resistance to the regime became widespread.

The Batista regime became increasingly brutal during the last two years it remained in power. No citizen was safe from the depredation of the Military Intelligence Service and the civilian Secret Police. Homes were raided in the dead of night, and householders were taken "for investigation," never to return alive. The most refined tortures were used by the police. It has been estimated that

some 20,000 civilians were killed in cold blood by agents of the Batista regime during the two-year civil war.

During most of this period the Communist Party of Cuba stood on the sidelines. The Cuban Communists had been among Batista's closest political associates between 1937 and his first retirement from the presidency in 1944. They continued to be his allies between 1944 and his return to power in 1952.

After Batista's seizure of power on March 10, important Communist leaders suddenly appeared as members of the Batista political party, the Partido Acción Popular. Although the dictator formally outlawed the Communist Party at the end of 1952, most of the important Communist leaders continued to live unmolested in Havana and other cities and towns.

At the beginning of the Castro revolt the Communists made clear their opposition to it. When in August, 1957, and April, 1958, the Castro forces attempted to carry out a revolutionary general strike, the Communists were quite frankly against these moves. However, soon after the failure of the April, 1958, strike attempt, the Partido Socialista Popular (the name of the Cuban Communist party) made its first overtures to the rebel forces. One of the PSP's leaders, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, was sent to the Sierra Maestra to act as a liaison between the rebel forces and the Communist party apparatus. At the same time the underground trade-union organization, hitherto known as the Frente Obrero Revolucionario, was expanded to include the Communists, and changed its name to Frente Obrero Revolucionario Unido.

Fidel's relations with other opposition groups remained stormy. In his speech to the court in 1953 he had made it clear that he wanted nothing to do with the older generation of political leaders, whom he regarded as universally corrupt. It was not until the latter part of 1958 that an agreement was signed, the so-called Declaration of Caracas, providing for unity of action of all the principal groups opposing the Batista dictatorship, and agreeing on the establishment of a provisional government headed by ex-Judge Manuel Urrutia as soon as Batista was overthrown.

Meanwhile Fidel Castro had become the symbol of the struggle against the dictatorship. Starting in the middle of 1958, his voice be-

came familiar to millions of Cubans as he broadcast regularly from "Radio Rebelde," the station the rebels installed in the heart of the Sierra Maestra country. Tales circulated about his bravery, his magnanimity toward captured Batista soldiers, his plans for the rebuilding of the nation once victory had been achieved. The hopes of a whole nation, particularly of its youth, came to be centered in this young man, who became a sort of combination of David and Robin Hood and José Martí.

In the last months of 1958 the situation moved rapidly toward a victory for the rebels. By August it was impossible to go by railroad or road beyond Las Villas province in the center of the island. The rebels seized most of the rural areas and small towns of the three eastern provinces. As the last days of the year approached, the Rebel Army laid siege to Santa Clara, capital of Las Villas Province. It was the fall of this city on December 31, 1958, that convinced Batista to give up power and flee the country.

On the morning of January 1, 1959, Cuba belonged to Fidel Castro. His underground supporters took over control of Havana and other important cities. The Rebel Army moved into Santiago de Cuba, which it had been besieging for several weeks. The next day a new Provisional Government, under Manuel Urrutia, was established in Santiago, which was proclaimed provisional capital of the republic.

During the next ten days Fidel Castro made a triumphal tour from Santiago to Havana. Accompanied by elements of his Rebel Army, he was greeted by delirious crowds of hundreds of thousands anxious to see the bearded guerrilla warrior, to hear him speak, even to touch his garments. His progress was reminiscent of an ancient Roman triumph.

At that moment Fidel Castro had the enthusiastic support of all but the tiniest fraction of Cuba's seven million people. He was certainly the greatest hero Cuba had seen in the twentieth century. He was looked upon by the people as the savior of the republic, as the slayer of tyrants, as a fabulous hero. He received the kind of unlimited adulation which only someone of the very strongest character could have enjoyed without getting delusions of grandeur.

Meanwhile the new government began its work of reorganizing the life of the nation. The first cabinet of the revolutionary regime represented a coalition of the 26th of July Movement and some of

the older opponents of the Batista regime, though none of the other organized anti-Batista groups was officially represented. José Miró Cardona, onetime head of the Havana Bar Association, who had had to flee into exile in 1958, became Prime Minister. Roberto Agramonte, Orthodoxo candidate for president in the 1952 election which was never held, became Minister of State. Dr. López Fresquet, a onetime Auténtico, was named Minister of Finance. Several of the veterans of the Rebel Army also became members of the new government, including Armando Hart, as Minister of Education, Manuel Ray as Minister of Public Works, Humberto Sori Marín as Minister of Agriculture, Luis Orlando Rodríguez as Minister of Interior.

The first job of the new government was to purge the incumbent regime. This involved both punishment for those who had carried out Batista's reign of terror against the Cuban people and cleansing of the public administration of hangers-on and corrupt elements.

While in the mountains Fidel Castro had appealed time and again to the people of Cuba not to take justice into their own hands once the Batista regime had fallen. He promised that the new revolutionary government would punish all those who had murdered and tortured opponents of the dictatorship, and once victory was achieved he moved quickly to make good this promise. Military courts were established, and during the first three months of the new regime over five hundred people were executed in conformity with decisions of these courts. Although the justice was summary, there is little evidence that it was not correctly administered. If one believes in capital punishment, one is forced to agree that those executed deserved to be capitally punished.

Only in two instances were there serious grounds for questioning these trials. One was a case in which the defendant was tried in a public auditorium in an atmosphere which was akin to that of a lynch mob. Fidel Castro ordered this defendant to be tried again, but the retrial did not change the results. The second case involved a number of air force pilots who were freed of charges of bombing open cities when evidence was presented that they had purposely dropped their bombs over unoccupied regions in violation of Batista's orders. In this case Fidel ordered a retrial and dictated the sentences which were to be imposed on the aviators.

While these trials were in progress a wide purge of the public administration was undertaken. Civil service rules were suspended for a period of three months, and during this period thousands of people were removed from the public payroll because their jobs had been mere sinecures or because there were serious charges against them of corruption and malfeasance in office.

Among the more fundamental reforms undertaken by the new regime was the complete reorganization of the tax structure with the more than 150 different taxes being reduced to 21, and the whole system being made more progressive. The social security system was reorganized; the thirty or more different retirement funds were merged into a single Social Security Bank, and a single schedule of contribution and benefits was devised.

The national lottery was also reorganized, with the establishment of a unique system whereby each lottery ticket became a kind of savings bond, paying interest whether or not it contained the lucky number. The funds of the lottery were designated to be used for the construction of low-cost housing.

The trade-union movement was reorganized. On January 1 and 2 the headquarters of all the unions in the island were seized by members of the 26th of July Movement underground. Within two weeks the provisional leaders were confirmed in office by membership of the various unions. Then, between April and June in all the local unions secret elections were held in which 26th of July lists of candidates were elected in the overwhelming majority of cases. In many instances these lists defeated candidates backed by the Communist Party, and during the first six or eight months of the regime relations between the 26th of July and the Communists in the labor movement were markedly hostile. Between June and September congresses of all the national unions were held and confirmed the provisional 26th of July leaders in almost all instances.

During these first months of the new regime Fidel Castro was the heart and soul of the government. In the middle of February he became Prime Minister, in place of Dr. Miró Cardona, and so had the principal responsibility for the conduct of the government's affairs.

Fidel was the wonder of all his associates. He seemed to be working twenty-four hours a day, certainly was awake from eight-

een to twenty hours. Most of this time he was busy making speeches and supervising one aspect or another of the widespread program of his government. Working in an exceedingly disorganized fashion, he was likely to turn up almost anywhere on the island. Although he had an office in the big building on the new Civic Center at Havana which was to become the headquarters of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), he was seldom to be found there.

Castro's role was not only to supervise the wide-flung projects of the regime which he headed but also to explain his government's programs to the people. He did this not only in endless discussions with individual humble citizens throughout the island but also in frequent television appearances. In these sessions, in which he might be interviewed or in which he was the sole performer, he would sometimes go on for three, four, or even six hours at a stretch. He would alternate between earnest explanation of one or another of the government's projects and agitated denunciations of the regime's critics and opponents.

Fidel remained exceedingly popular. Wherever he appeared he would be mobbed. His friendly camaraderie with the humblest citizens and his sense of showmanship and dramatization strengthened his position with the people during these early months of the regime.

During April, 1959, Fidel took three weeks off to make a trip to the United States. Although he came to this country in an "unofficial" capacity, he was received in a generally friendly way. He spoke to large crowds in half a dozen or more cities along the eastern seacoast, including a huge meeting in Central Park in New York. His reception by United States government officials was cautious, though not unfriendly. The Cuban Minister of Finance and President of the National Bank, who accompanied Fidel, had informal discussions with United States authorities concerning possible economic aid to the new regime.

Shortly after his return from the United States, Fidel and the cabinet finally adopted the most fundamental economic change so far undertaken by the new regime, the agrarian reform. This decree, issued the last day of May, 1959, provided a maximum amount of land which any individual or corporation would be allowed to hold, setting this figure in most cases at 990 acres, though making

some exceptions in which an acreage of 3,300 would be permitted. It also provided for the division of holdings in excess of these amounts to those holding no land or less than the minimum provided in the law. Such individuals were to be able to receive 66 acres gratis and to be able to purchase 99 additional acres. Expropriated land was to be paid for in the form of government bonds at the value for which it had been assessed for tax purposes.

The National Institute of Agrarian Reform had been established even before the agrarian reform decree was issued, and had been given control of land seized from Batista and his cohorts. It immediately set to work to put the decree into effect.

During the first ten months of the Castro regime there occurred a struggle for power within the government. This struggle centered on several issues: the political policy to be followed by the regime, the nature of the agrarian reform, and the international policy which the new government should follow. One faction sought to have the Revolution continue on the path which it had taken during this early period; the other wanted to take it in a quite different direction.

When Fidel Castro first appeared in Havana he reiterated a promise which he had made frequently in the mountains: that the revolutionary administration would call elections within eighteen months and would thus return the country to a constitutional government. Although as the months wore on he became more vague on this subject, he did not explicitly go back on this promise during the first ten months of the new regime. A strong faction within the government wanted to comply with the pledge to return to a constitutional administration. However, the other group was definitely opposed to this and urged the maintenance and intensification of a revolutionary dictatorship.

The second issue centered on the agrarian reform. The decree as issued at the end of May dealt mainly with the division of land among those who were landless, although it also provided for the formation of voluntary cooperative farms in those cases in which the recipients of land under the reform so desired. Fidel himself had long urged the policy of distributing land in individual parcels to those who desired and needed it. Thus, in his famous speech before the Military Tribunal on October 16, 1953, he had said:

A revolutionary government, after settling as landowners on their own plots those hundred thousand small agriculturalists who today pay rent, would proceed to settle definitively the problem of the land. First, it would establish, as the Constitution demands, a maximum of land to be held by each type of agricultural enterprise, and acquire the excess by means of expropriation, recapturing land which had been stolen from the State, draining marshes, planting meadows and reserving large areas for forest reserves. Second, it would divide the rest of the available land among peasant families, giving preference to those which are largest, encouraging agricultural cooperatives for the common use of costly equipment, packing houses and for common professional technical direction in cultivation and stockraising, and finally providing resources, equipment, protection, and useful information to the peasantry.³

However, one element within the revolutionary government had little patience with the idea of establishing a large class of small landholders. Rather, it favored the establishment of large state-directed collective farms more or less on the model of those of the Soviet Union. This was the same faction that favored the maintenance of a revolutionary dictatorship.

Finally, there was controversy within the revolutionary ranks concerning the foreign policy which the new government should follow. One group wanted to align it with the democratic regimes in Venezuela, Colombia, and Honduras, and with revolutionary democratic parties such as Acción Democrática, the Apristas, and the MNR, which in recent years had borne the brunt of the struggle for democracy and social change in Latin America. At the same time, though they favored the establishment of a much wider degree of economic and political independence from the United States than Cuba had enjoyed in the past, they were strongly anti-Communist, both in internal Cuban politics and in international affairs.

The other faction sought to have the Castro government repudiate the links which bound it to the revolutionary democratic parties and progressive democratic regimes in other Latin American countries. They also argued that the government should make an absolute break with the United States and should take a position in world affairs parallel to, if not as part of, the Soviet bloc. They argued that it would be impossible to carry out a meaningful revolu-

tion in Cuban economic and social affairs with the blessing of the United States and that it was necessary for the success of the regime to get the full support of the Soviet Union and its bloc.

For several months Fidel Castro did not take a definite position on one side or the other in this dispute as to the future of the regime. He joined in attacks on José Figueres because Figueres took it for granted that the Castro regime would ally itself with the democratic revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America. He also brought about the dismissal of President Manuel Urrutia because of the latter's strong pronouncements against communism. On the other hand, Castro visited the United States in an evident attempt to win friends there; and he gave the go-ahead to his supporters in the labor movement who wanted to combat the attempts of the Communists to strengthen their influence there.

It was not until the early days of November, 1959, that Castro finally seems to have cast his lot with the faction among his supporters which favored the establishment of a revolutionary dictatorship and alignment with the Soviet bloc. Fidel's decision was symbolized by the disappearance of the two principal leaders of the democratic faction, Hubert Matos and Camilo Cienfuegos.

Matos was commander of the Rebel Army garrison in the city and province of Camaguey and for some time had had disagreements with the policies of Castro and the government. Finally, he officially asked Fidel that he (Matos) be retired from the Army and be given a job as a teacher, which had been his profession before the civil war. Instead of agreeing to this, Fidel ordered Matos arrested and, accompanied by his brother Raúl and by Cienfuegos, went to Camaguey to see that the job was done. A few days later Matos was tried and sentenced to twenty years in the National Penitentiary on the Isle of Pines.

Shortly after the arrest of Matos, Camilo Cienfuegos boarded a small two-motored plane to return to Havana. He was never heard of again. The official story was that this plane had been blown out to sea and had gone down without a trace. Some of his supporters claimed, however, that his plane was later seen in the airdrome of the Camp Columbia military base outside Havana and that Cienfuegos had been done away with by the government.

Whatever happened to Cienfuegos, his disappearance and that of

Matos indicated the final defeat of the democratic element within the regime. The policies advocated by the rival faction were fully adopted by Fidel and the regime.

The government began to clamp down on all opposition groups. By April, 1960, none of the groups which had participated in the struggle against Batista except the 26th of July was functioning. The 26th of July itself had not been organized by Fidel into a real political party, and the only party which was functioning openly in Cuba after the middle of 1960 was the Partido Socialista Popular.

All freedom of the press was ended. The first casualty was the weekly newspaper of the Auténtico Party which was forced to suspend publication by the simple expedient of threatening all advertisers until they stopped advertising in it. Others were "taken over" by their workers' unions. Still others were seized by forcing their publishers and editors into exile. The upshot of this was that by the middle of 1960 there existed no newspaper in Cuba which dared criticize the regime.

The labor movement was completely regimented. Although the national congress of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba (CTC), which met early in November, 1959, refused to go along with Castro's order that it include Communists in its executive committee, a "compromise" was agreed to which permitted David Salvador, the provisional secretary general of the CTC to name the new executive. The principal anti-Communist 26th of July labor leaders did not appear in this new body, and its key posts were given to the few leading 26th of July people who were pro-Communist. The new committee set up a three-man "purge" committee, the alleged purpose of which was to get rid of all those in the leadership of the thirty-four national unions "who had collaborated with Batista." This was a fallacious purpose, since these people had been removed during the first days of the Revolution. The actual function of the purge group was to remove all 26th of July labor leaders who were opposed to Communist participation in the leadership of the labor movement. The leaders of the unions of Tobacco Workers, Maritime Workers, Metal Workers, Agricultural Workers, Musicians, Actors and Artists, Construction Workers, Electrical Workers were among those who were arbitrarily removed by the purgers.

While this was going on, the freedom of the workers was seriously

limited. It was decreed that workers could apply for jobs and be employed only through the government's employment service. The right to strike was suspended. All further wage increases were indefinitely postponed. It was provided that the Ministry of Labor would handle all matters which hitherto had been dealt with through collective bargaining.

The agrarian reform also took the definite line of collectivized agriculture. Only a few thousand peasants were actually given individual land grants. The overwhelming majority became members of so-called "cooperative" farms run by managers named by the Institute of Agrarian Reform. At the same time the right of collective bargaining in these cooperatives was abolished, since the farms now "belonged" to the workers, though they continued to work for wages, with the question of what should become of the profits being postponed to an indefinite future.

At the same time, during 1960 the Castro regime expropriated virtually all private firms of any size in Cuba. They were first turned over to the Institute of Agrarian Reform, but early in 1961 were passed to the newly organized Ministry of Industries headed by Castro's leading aide, Major Ernesto Guevara, the Argentine doctor who had become one of the principal spokesmen for the regime.

In international affairs, also, the end of 1959 marked a new departure for Fidel and his regime. In November of that year he began a series of consistent and unmitigated attacks on the United States, using any and every occasion to launch a new blast against his northern neighbor. At the same time he aligned his regime unequivocally with the Soviet bloc, not only extending recognition to all the Communist countries, including Communist China, but also supporting the Soviet position on every major issue in world affairs. Fidel's policies also resulted in making Cuba much more completely dependent economically on the Soviet Union and its allies than it had ever been upon the United States in the past.

This new direction of the policies of the Castro government alienated large numbers of his supporters. Most of those who served in his cabinet during the first ten months of the regime were either in exile, in hiding, or in jail by the end of 1960. Tens of thousands of exiles sought refuge in the United States, Venezuela, and other neighboring countries. By the later months of 1960 most of these exiles, including

former close associates of Fidel, were busy trying to overthrow the Castro regime. Guerrillas were again active in various parts of the island.

One can only speculate on the factors which influenced Fidel Castro to take his regime down the path which he finally chose. Certainly the fact that the leaders of the totalitarian faction included his brother Raúl and his close friend Ernesto Guevara was of great importance. Perhaps also Castro interpreted the attitude of friendly neutrality which the United States government adopted after January 1, 1959, as one of hostility, or at least as one which made more difficult the situation of the financially hard-pressed revolutionary regime.

Certainly Castro and his associates had reason to dislike the United States. For over half a century this country had exercised what amounted to a protectorate over Cuba. During the civil war the United States had openly supported Batista, to the extent of arming him during the first fifteen months of the war. However, Castro did not adopt a policy of hostility toward the United States from the first, as might have been expected. In the beginning he apparently sought the friendship of this country.

Another factor in Castro's decision was probably his conception of himself as *the* leader of *the* Latin American revolution. His aspirations to dominate the whole movement for social and economic change in Latin America brought him into inevitable conflict with other leaders of revolutionary movements in Latin America who were not willing to accept his position of primacy. It also brought him into conflict with their policies, including both their attitude toward political democracy and their attitude toward world politics.

Whatever the reasons for his adopting the policies which he did, there can be little doubt about his popularity among wide segments of Latin American public opinion, particularly among the youth of the hemisphere. His violent attacks upon the United States were popular. His flair for showmanship, accentuated by his continuing to wear his wartime beard and uniform, underscored his position as a romantic leader of a struggle against great odds. His denunciations of all Latin American political leaders, whether conservative, liberal, or revolutionary, appealed to the frustrations which by 1959 had become widespread throughout Latin America as a result of the

apparent failure of democratic regimes in a number of countries to hasten social reform and economic development.

By the end of 1960 Fidel Castro had unequivocally taken his stand among those who, like Vargas and Perón, felt that necessary social and economic change could not come through political democracy or with the cooperation of the United States. A few months later, on May 1, 1961, Fidel proclaimed Cuba to be a "Socialist People's Republic," thus in effect making it a member of the Communist bloc. At the same time he was proclaiming the Cuban Communists to have been right in 1957-58 in opposing his guerrilla activities in the Sierra Maestra, implying that he had been wrong to undertake these activities.

Meanwhile, "Che" Guevara and other leaders of the Castro regime were promising the formation of a "single party" in Cuba through the merger of the remnants of the guerrilla elements and the Partido Socialista Popular. The establishment of such a party would complete the conversion of the indigenous Cuban revolution and regime into an orthodox Communist government.

Late in April, 1961, the Castro regime succeeded in defeating an attempted invasion of exiles, backed at least unofficially by the United States Government. Nonetheless, the future of the regime remains in doubt. However, Fidel Castro's challenge has raised grave doubts about the future of the hemisphere's democratic and Communist revolutionaries.

Prophets of the Revolution



All the men discussed in this book are leaders of the Latin American Revolution. This Revolution is part of a world-wide phenomenon. It is one aspect of the struggle of the majority of the people of the globe to free themselves from European domination.

Perhaps this struggle really began with the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775. The thirteen isolated little provinces on the North Atlantic Coast of America were the first colonies to raise successfully the banner of revolt against political control by a European empire. Leaders in many countries have turned in recent years to the fathers of the North American republic for their inspiration.

It is one of the ironies of history that the present-day revolt of the peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" countries is directed as much against the United States as it is against the nations of Western Europe. The United States has remained culturally in close association with Europe, particularly with Great Britain, and its population has been largely of European origin. The growth of the economic power and political influence of the United States has brought it to share rather than challenge the domination of the European nations over much of the rest of the globe.

Thus, though the traditional anticolonialism of this country remains an inspiration, much of its recent history and many of its recent attitudes and actions are the very things against which the revolt of the underdeveloped nations is directed. This is particularly true in Latin America, where the weight of United States power has been felt most directly and for the longest period of time.

Both economic and political factors have brought on the world revolution of our times. The association of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America with the world-wide economy which resulted from the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe and the United States and the wide dissemination of the ideas of popular

sovereignty and national self-determination which originated in Europe have both had their profound influence.

As a result of the industrialization of Western Europe and the United States these countries found themselves in great need for raw materials and foodstuffs. Some of them, notably Great Britain, had to import virtually all their raw materials and more than half their food supply. Others, such as the United States and Germany, were more self-sufficient, but also had to bring in from abroad increasingly large amounts of minerals, fibers, "dessert crops," and other products which they did not have or could not grow economically within their own frontiers.

This search for raw materials and food by the industrial powers led to the opening of mines, the establishment of plantations, and the stimulation of production of other agricultural products in scores of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Copper mines were opened in Chile, Peru, Northern Rhodesia, and other nations; petroleum wells were sunk in Burma, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia, to mention but a few; grain haciendas prospered in Argentina; wool growing was stimulated in Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, and South Africa; coffee trees were planted by the hundreds of millions in Brazil and a dozen other Latin American countries as well as in several African nations; sugar production was stimulated in Cuba, Indonesia, Puerto Rico, and various other countries.

These new mines and plantations were virtually the first contact of most of these countries with the industrial ways of Western Europe and the United States. They brought into existence a new wage-earning proletariat, with new skills and education and a new feeling of solidarity. But the secondary effects of the search for raw materials and foodstuffs were even greater. Railroads were built to get the products to market, ports were developed, towns and cities grew. A new stimulus was given to trade, and a larger market developed for the products of the artisans. Even small manufacturing industries were begun to meet the growing needs of the people of the hitherto unindustrialized countries.

For the first time the economies of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were closely associated with those of Western Europe and the United States. A decrease in economic activity in the

industrialized nations meant a decline in the demand for the minerals and agricultural products of the unindustrialized countries. A boom in the manufacturing countries had immediate effects in stimulating economic activity in the mineral and agricultural nations.

The growing susceptibility of the economies of the underdeveloped nations to changes in demand for their export products brought a new instability to these economies. They became subject to violent fluctuations, which in turn gave rise to a growing conviction that something should be done to offset these rapid and extreme changes.

However, in order for this to be possible it was obvious that those nations which were still colonies would have to achieve the right to manage their own economic affairs, and those nations which were politically independent would have to begin to follow policies which would give their nations some protection from the booms and busts exported to them by the highly industrialized parts of the world. A growing conviction became manifest among the people of the underdeveloped nations that they must themselves develop such industries as were within their capacity.

At the same time the underdeveloped nations were deeply influenced by political currents emanating from the highly industrialized nations. Many young men of the intellectual classes received their advanced education in Western Europe or the United States, where they absorbed the ideas of political democracy, the rights of man, and equality before the law, which are probably the finest heritage of present-day so-called "Western civilization." Furthermore, they saw that these principles were more or less operative in the nations of Western Europe and North America.

The young men trained in the ideas of political democracy sought to carry out these ideas in their own nations. In the countries submitted to colonial rule they raised the logical question as to why, if these principles were applicable to Western Europe, they were not equally acceptable for their own nations. Those who came from countries already independent but with regimes which were democratic in form but not in essence sought to give greater real content to democracy in their homelands.

Since World War I the impact of these economic and political currents has been felt with increasing force in the underdeveloped nations. Throughout most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America there

has arisen a movement which has sought to destroy the old order which had been dominant during the nineteenth century. This movement, though taking different forms in each country, shared everywhere four fundamental ideas: nationalism, economic development, social change, and political democracy.

The movement against European domination has been essentially nationalist. It has sought to gain political independence in the colonial countries and to fortify this independence in the nations already juridically free. It has sought to use economic development, particularly industrialization, as one weapon in establishing the "economic independence" of the nations of the underdeveloped sections of the world.

The world-wide revolution has also sought to change the social structure of the underdeveloped nations. It has sought to destroy the privileged position of the landed aristocracy, to grant protection to weaker elements in the community, and to transfer power to the middle and working classes of the cities and to the peasantry.

Finally, the revolutionary movement has usually professed belief in political democracy. However, there has been a widespread willingness to sacrifice democracy for the achievement of the other aims of the revolution, or at least to postpone the establishment of democratic institutions until an attack has been made upon the social and economic problems facing the underdeveloped nations.

This is perhaps the weakest point of the world-wide revolution of the underdeveloped countries. And it is the point at which this revolution is attacked by international Communism. There is no doubt that the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union and the boastful claims of the Chinese Communists about their achievements in the same field have made a tremendous impression on the peoples of the underdeveloped nations. The Communists promise quick economic growth and an end to ancient social injustices, though they do not say what the costs of this rapid development are, nor do they describe the new social injustices which are created by Communist regimes. Finally, they do not point out that a Communist regime is the very negation of political democracy, an ideal which few in the underdeveloped nations repudiate entirely, no matter how much they may postpone its application.

It is against this background of world-wide change that the Latin

American Revolution must be viewed and the role played in it by the men discussed in this book must be judged. The Latin American Revolution has differed from what has gone on in the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa in the fact that most of the Latin American nations achieved their juridical independence from Europe more than a century ago, but it is essentially a part of this same worldwide upsurge of the peoples of part of the world which did not share in the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Although they were juridically independent of Europe, the countries of Latin America throughout most of their first century of independence remained culturally, psychologically, and politically dependent upon the Old World, and grew increasingly dependent economically on Europe and the United States. The elite of the Latin American nations tended to copy slavishly whatever was *à la mode* in intellectual circles in France, Britain, or Spain. There tended to be an inferiority complex among Latin American intellectuals which prevented them from breaking away from the domination of European ideas and trends, and from seeking to find their own peculiar genius. Politically, too, the Latin American nations often seemed to be little more than protectorates of one or another European power or of the United States.

Furthermore, within the various Latin American countries national unity was at best tenuous. In a number of countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, loyalties to regions within the nation were for long stronger than loyalties to the country as a whole. In all of the Latin American nations there was a wide abyss separating the upper-class elite from the great mass of the population, and in some instances, such as Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, for instance, it was difficult to talk of a nation. The Indian masses of those countries had little feeling of belonging to a modern nation-state, their world being largely circumscribed by the tribe to which they belonged or the plantation on which they lived. The Indian masses spoke no Spanish; they had their own religion; their culture was that of their aboriginal ancestors, not of their Spanish conquerors. To them the concept of "nation" had little meaning.

This lack of a feeling of nationality and of nationalism was reflected in most of the international wars fought among the Latin American countries during the nineteenth century. Some of these

were virtually dynastic struggles, provoked by the attempt of a powerful *caudillo* temporarily in command of the resources of one or another of the new states to extend his personal hegemony over other areas. Such were the conflicts arising from the rule of the dictator Juan Manuel Rosas in Argentina, and the War of the Triple Alliance, in which Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina joined to curb the ambitions of Paraguayan tyrant Francisco Solano López.

Another type of war was that brought about by the attempt of elements of the ruling group in one nation to get control of valuable resources across the frontier. This was the cause of the War of the Pacific in 1879, when Chilean entrepreneurs, goaded and backed by British associates, sought successfully to seize the nitrate deposits of several of the coastal provinces of neighboring Peru and Bolivia. The war between Mexico and the United States from 1846 to 1848 was of the same type, provoked, as it was, by the desire of Southern slave-owners in the United States to extend their hegemony to parts of the neighboring republic.

Some of these conflicts served to arouse a certain feeling of nationalism. They also left behind memories which, with the subsequent development of nationalistic feelings in the various Latin American republics, were cause for irredentism. However, when these wars were actually fought, the great mass of the people in the respective republics were unmoved by the struggle, or if they were involved, it was because of loyalty to a *caudillo* rather than loyalty to a nation.

Throughout the nineteenth century the economy inherited from colonial times underwent little change. The land, principal source of wealth and income, remained in the hands of very small groups. Through their control of the economy the landowners exercised absolute domination over the social and political life of their respective countries. In some parts of America slavery was not abolished until the latter years of the nineteenth century, in others the masses have continued until very recently to live under conditions reminiscent of those of feudal Europe during the Middle Ages.

Education was a monopoly of the upper-class groups. They were European in their orientation and training. The masses of the population had little or no formal education, and their culture was that which they had inherited from their pre-Colombian ancestors or from their forebears who had been brought from Africa.

Politics during the nineteenth century was a game played by the elite. The only role which the masses were called upon to play was that of being common soldiers in the armies of the numerous civil wars which characterized political life during this period. Political loyalties tended to be to individuals rather than to parties or ideas.

The great political struggle during the nineteenth century was that over the relations between church and state. The Catholic Church had come out of the colonial period as one of the two most powerful surviving institutions, the other being the army, which was a product of the wars of independence. The Church was immensely wealthy, and dominated education and such institutions as marriages, charities, and cemeteries. Throughout the nineteenth century the struggle was waged to deprive the Church of the unique position which it had had under Spanish and Portuguese rule. In most countries the victory went to the anticlerical forces, and the lands of the Church were confiscated and were given to the lay landlords, while the State took over control of education and other functions. Here again, the masses played a largely passive role. In all probability, if their opinion had been asked, the victory in the Church-State fight would have lain with the former.

However, the same economic events which so affected the countries of Asia and Africa had their impact on Latin America. The search for minerals and agricultural products by the great industrial powers brought Latin America into the world market, gave rise to a larger internal market, and started the process of economic, social, and political transformation which during the last two or three generations has provoked what we have called the Latin American Revolution.

During the last years of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the present one, new social and economic classes began to develop. A middle class of more progressive merchants, craftsmen, and small industrialists began to appear, as did an incipient wage-earning laboring class in the mines, on the railroads, in the ports and cities which grew as a result of the entry of these nations into the world market.

These new classes generally came up from the lower social strata rather than down from the old rural and commercial oligarchy. Members of the middle class were often drawn from the people who had

Indian or Negro blood as well as European ancestry. Some few even were of pure Indian or Negro backgrounds. The new urban working class, too, was drawn largely from the countryside, where the incidence of Indian or Negro blood tended to be high. Exceptions to this general rule are found in Argentina and Uruguay, where the middle and working classes both tended to be recruited from European immigrants, and a partial exception is presented in Brazil, where immigrants were very largely represented in both the middle and working classes, but where rural migrants of mixed and Negro ancestry were also of great importance among the workers and of some importance in the new middle classes.

Culturally these new groups were not so closely linked to Europe as had been the old elite. They felt themselves to be Americans, and they had a much greater feeling of belonging to a nation than had either the old elites or the Negro and Indian rural masses. This fact was reflected in a diminution of the tendency to ape Europe and in a growing interest in native American cultural themes and techniques, new and vigorous trends appearing in painting, literature, architecture, and music. Although these new cultural movements still owed much to Europe, they relied even more on the wellsprings of the Indian, Negro, mestizo, and mulatto masses of the population for their inspiration and subject matter.

Politically, too, the scene changed as a result of the impact of the European and North American industrial revolution on Latin America. As the new social classes brought elements of Americanism and nationalism into cultural life, so did they bring them into politics.

What we have called the Latin American Revolution is essentially the eruption of the middle and working classes and, to a lesser degree, the peasantry into the political life of the Latin American countries. They have brought new methods and new ideas to Latin American politics. Elements of the urban middle and working classes have been mainly responsible for the development of meaningful political parties in many of the Latin American countries. In the past most political parties in the area were mere tools of one or another *caudillo* or strong man for the purpose of seizing and holding power. They would come into existence before an election or in the middle of a political crisis and disappear soon after this had passed.

The newer type of party is in sharp contrast to this traditional

form of political organization. The contemporary parties, in the first place, represent fairly well defined interest groups; that is, they are spokesmen for the middle and working class as well as, in some cases, of the peasantry. Second, they have fairly well defined ideologies or philosophies, varying from democratic socialism to Christian democracy to an indigenous national revolutionary philosophy. Finally, the newer type of political party has generally stood for a program of fundamental economic, social, and political change. Although there is a great variety in the details of this program as a result of philosophical and national differences among them, they all tend to agree on three basic issues, and most agree upon a fourth.

All these newer political parties are nationalist in their orientation. They emphasize the necessity of standing up for the juridical rights of their individual nations against attacks from whatever quarter. In the economic field they seek to have the basic public utilities in the hands of the nation, and to have the government more or less closely supervise the operations of foreign investors within the national boundaries. They assert the right of the Latin American nations to manage their own economies in their own interest.

Closely allied to this nationalism, and perhaps one aspect of it, is the emphasis which all these parties put on the economic development of their respective countries. They all stress the need for diversification of their nation's economies, particularly the necessity for industrialization, within the limits of the respective country's capacity.

These parties challenge the domination of their nations by the traditional rural and commercial oligarchy. Most of them favor an agrarian reform, both as a means of destroying the semifeudal system which has kept large parts of the population in servitude for centuries and as a means of fostering the economic development of their nations. All of them, too, advocate an extensive program of labor and social legislation designed to prevent the industrialization of their nations from resulting in the type of excessive exploitation which characterized the Industrial Revolution in some other lands. Thus they support laws defending the right of the workers—and peasants—to organize to protect their interests. They favor laws guaranteeing the worker a decent minimum income and making available to him such social services as education and medical care.

The great majority of these new parties have fought against two

of the greatest evils of Latin American political life—militarism and dictatorship. Although the facts of the situation have forced these parties from time to time to become entangled with the military, even to the extent of plotting with groups of officers, their influence has generally been thrown against the armed forces' meddling in and domination of politics.

The ultimate objective of most of these parties, which draw their support mainly from the middle and working classes, has been the establishment of the widest possible degree of political democracy. On many occasions they have fought strongly against dictatorial regimes, and in many countries they have shown a surprising ability to survive severe persecution at the hands of tyrannical governments. When they themselves have come to power, these parties have usually demonstrated a wide degree of appreciation for the fact that democracy means freedom for the opposition as much as or more than freedom for the members of the ruling party.

The two most important exceptions to the democratic allegiance of the middle and working-class parties of Latin America have been the Partido Peronista, founded by Juan Domingo Perón as the principal political vehicle for the maintenance of his dictatorship; and the movement of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Perón himself is not a believer in democracy, and the party which he founded and of which he remains the leader was and is totalitarian rather than democratic. Even in this case, however, it is worthy of note that many of the rank and file of the Peronista Party accept it as an expression of the working class of Argentina, while rejecting the anti-democratic precept of its top leadership. Although Castro failed to organize his followers into a disciplined political party, the movement of which he is the leader has quite frankly repudiated political democracy and all of its works.

Getulio Vargas' Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, which might be regarded as another exception, was established in the waning months of the Estado Novo dictatorship. Although it was the principal political implement of Vargas after his overthrow in 1945, it followed the evolution of its chief and has played an important and loyal role in the democratic life which Brazil has experienced since 1945.

All the men discussed in this book are representatives and leaders

of the Latin American Revolution. All but two of them were important figures in one or another of the political parties of the type we have discussed. José Batlle was the founder of the so-called Partido Colorado Batllista in Uruguay, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre established, has been the philosopher of, and still leads the Partido Aprista Peruano. Rómulo Betancourt and José Figueres founded and are still leaders of the Acción Democrática of Venezuela and Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica, respectively.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles were among the original leaders of the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, while Luis Muñoz Marín has been the guiding spirit of the Puerto Rican Popular Democratic Party since its foundation more than twenty years ago. Perón and Vargas each established a political party, the Partido Peronista in one case and the Partido Trabalhista in the other, which survived their removal from the political scene in their respective nations. Finally, Lázaro Cárdenas was probably the most outstanding figure to govern Mexico as leader of the party of the Mexican Revolution, which is currently called the Partido Revolucionario Institucional.

Only Arturo Alessandri and Fidel Castro, of all the men discussed in this volume, did not represent one of these new political groups. Although Alessandri was the first great champion in Chile of the emerging middle and working classes, his whole political career was lived within the confines of the traditional Liberal Party. Castro, though leader of an important political current in Cuba and throughout Latin America, has not molded his followers into a coherent political party.

Each of these twelve men has sought to evolve a program of social reform which he thought appropriate to his particular country. Although there is a broad area of agreement among most of them, this arises from the fact that they were all trying to achieve many of the same objectives. They were trying to break the hold of the traditional landed oligarchy on the social, economic, and political life of their nations. They were trying to find some solution to the instability which had been introduced into the economic life of their countries by their nations' association with the world market. They were all anxious to find means of increasing their nations' pro-

ductivity so as to be able to secure higher levels of living for their people. They were all searching for ways of protecting the weaker elements in the body politic.

However, each of these leaders approached the problems before him with a somewhat different emphasis, depending upon the peculiar conditions of his own country. In Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru, for instance, we find Lázaro Cárdenas, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and Haya de la Torre giving special emphasis to the problem of the Indian and his incorporation into national civic life. Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela evolved a policy with regard to the petroleum industry which was quite different from that which Cárdenas applied in Mexico because of the different circumstances in the two nations. With Alessandri the problem of social and labor legislation to protect the urban worker seemed of paramount importance, and he was less interested in some of the other elements of a social revolutionary program.

The general approaches of the twelve leaders also varied widely as a result of differences in their personalities and abilities. Vargas and Perón, for example, were political opportunists who stumbled on a program of economic, social, and political reform as a means of getting themselves into positions of power and staying there, though subsequently they may have convinced themselves that this program was their reason for seeking power in the first place. In contrast, Haya de la Torre has always been preeminently the philosopher and idealist, and his chief weakness has been his inability adequately to cope with the small problems of day-to-day political maneuvering. Figueres, too, was perhaps more successful as a thinker and philosopher than as a practical politician. Lázaro Cárdenas, Betancourt, Muñoz Marín and Batlle, on the other hand, combined high idealism with great ability as political strategists.

Many of the leaders we have discussed—notably Haya de la Torre, Paz Estenssoro and Siles, Betancourt, Figueres, and Muñoz Marín—have recognized the existence of political kinship among the movements which they have led, and have been personal friends. However, there has been no “party line” among them. Each of the men has evolved his own ideas and applied his own policies without any direction from outside.

A study of these twelve men highlights the fact that the forces

favoring revolutionary change in Latin America are fundamentally split on two key issues: political democracy and the position Latin America should assume in the world at large. The first nine are convinced democrats; Vargas, Perón, and Castro have believed in and worked toward some type of totalitarian society.

Getulio Vargas was an opportunist without democratic convictions. When the "wave of the future" seemed to be fascism, Getulio went with the tide and established a fascist-like corporate state in Brazil. However, when the situation changed, Vargas attempted to change with it, albeit not very successfully. His inability to govern effectively in a democratic fashion finally provoked his suicide.

Juan Perón was a dictator and a totalitarian by choice. Though enjoying a degree of support among the masses of the Argentine people which would have made it possible for him to govern in a democratic fashion, he chose not to do so. He sought to evolve his own form of totalitarianism and to extend his system throughout the hemisphere. He urged his followers to forego the "formalities" of democracy in order to achieve social reform and national fulfillment.

In his efforts to develop a Latin America-wide totalitarian movement under his leadership Perón suffered from three major handicaps. In the first place, he was an Argentine. Among some Latin Americans, particularly those situated nearest to the Rio de la Plata, there has always lurked a certain suspicion of the imperialistic motives of Argentine rulers, suspicions rekindled by a militant leader such as Perón.

In the second place, Perón was a general. No matter what else they may be, generals are not usually popular figures in Latin America, and Perón was never quite successful in overcoming this common prejudice against men on horseback. Finally, Perón attempted to establish a totalitarian international in Latin America at a period before the Soviet Union was willing and able to come to the assistance of such a movement which would be willing to challenge the position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Fidel Castro, coming a decade later than Perón, suffered from none of his disadvantages. He was a Cuban, not an Argentine, and no Latin American ever thought of the Cubans as being "imperialistic." Quite to the contrary, there is a tendency on the part of many South Americans to be more or less amused by the Cubans, whom they

regard as "*muy tropicales*" (very tropical). This attitude made it possible for them to overlook such peculiarities as Castro's rumpled uniform, beard, and six-hour television performances.

In the second place, Castro was not a general. Rather to the contrary, he defeated a general and, starting with thirteen men, overcame an army of thirty to forty thousand men in a little less than two years. This sole act would have assured him widespread popularity among Latin American civilians, many of whom devoutly wished that they could go and do likewise.

Finally, Castro arrived on the scene at a time when the Soviet Union was willing to move into the American picture on a large scale. It not only signed regular commercial treaties with his government but also promised to take the place of the United States as the island's principal customer and source of supply, and even threatened to use the hydrogen bomb in case of an "attack" by the United States on the Castro regime. For his part, Castro made increasingly clear his growing association, ideologically as well as politically, with Communism and the Soviet Union.

All this means that Fidel Castro constitutes a major challenge to the democratic revolutionary leaders and to the United States as well. By the middle of 1961 the future of the hemisphere depended upon the success of the democratic revolutionaries in bringing about long-needed reforms and carrying out rapid economic development, and upon the willingness of the United States to use the fullness of its influence in behalf of such rapid change and growth.

The security of Latin America against the penetration of totalitarianism, particularly against communism, lies in the success of indigenous democratic social revolutionaries such as those we have discussed in these pages. If they and others like them can succeed in bringing about the long overdue changes which Latin America needs, they can insulate their nations against siren songs coming from Moscow, Peiping, Havana, or any other Communist center. If they can bring about the shift in political power from the traditional oligarchy and the military to the middle and lower classes of city and countryside, if they can successfully pursue policies of economic development which will result in significant increases in the levels of living of the great masses of the people, neither communism nor indigenous Latin American totalitarianism will have much appeal.

The accomplishment of these social and economic objectives will

lay the groundwork for a healthy development of political democracy in Latin America. Democracy had relatively little meaning in countries in which the great majority of the people were semi-serfs and had no right to participate in the political life of the nation. It meant little to peasants, whose whole attention was taken up with scratching a miserable living out of the soil. Nor did it mean very much to urban workers who had little right to defend themselves against abuses by their employers, and had levels of wages so low as to permit them to eke out only the barest minimum of livelihood, with no protection against economic catastrophe.

These Latin American political leaders who have been trying to convert their countries into modern democratic twentieth century nations have frequently established institutional arrangements which seem strange and even antipathetical to their fellow Americans to the North. They have asserted the right of the government to expropriate private property for the purpose of redistributing it among the propertyless, as in the land reform programs in various countries. However, such actions are not new in history, nor are they necessarily unjust or wrong. Frequently in the past when a small group has accumulated in its hands most of the tangible wealth of a nation and has reduced the great majority of the people to a type of servitude, reform movements have arisen to reverse this process and to redistribute wealth and income on a more equitable basis. The French Revolution did this with the land. Also, to a certain degree reform movements such as the New Deal in the United States followed similar policies, though on a more moderate basis, because the situation which needed changing was not so extreme as in the case of the Latin American republics.

The democratic leaders of the Latin American Revolution have also undertaken expropriation by the government of foreign-owned firms on several occasions in an effort to secure greater control for the nation over its own economy. This, too, is not something which should be entirely unsympathetic to North American observers. For generations the United States has advocated the right of small nations to order their own affairs, and during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt we made it quite clear that we recognized this right among the Latin American nations even when interests of United States citizens were involved.

Finally, the Latin American democratic reformers have tended to

give the government a very much wider general role in the economy than it has traditionally had in the United States and, until recently, in Western Europe. However, they have done this because they have felt that only the government has the ability to bring about the social changes which are needed, and because only the government can mobilize the resources necessary for a rapid process of economic development.

There is no doubt that the leaders of the Latin American Revolution have made many mistakes, as have political leaders in all parts of the globe. They have sometimes built up government bureaucracies which have been inefficient and very cumbersome. They have sometimes expanded their nations' social security systems and welfare institutions to a point where these have become serious handicaps to rapid economic growth. They have occasionally submitted to pressures from groups of their followers which have resulted in injustices to other elements in the community.

However, the important fact about the first nine men discussed in this volume has been that they have sought to bring about necessary changes in a way peculiarly adapted to their own countries and to Latin America as a whole. If political leaders who seek such a way out of the problems of class realignment, economic development, and increasing living levels were to fail, the only possible gainers would be the Communists and other totalitarians.

The Communist argument, in the last analysis, is that there is only one way in which the problems of any country can be resolved, and that is through the kind of totalitarian dictatorship which has existed in Russia and China. Although the Communists sometimes seek temporary alliances for tactical reasons with the indigenous democratic social revolutionaries of Latin America, they are well aware that these native elements are their worst enemies. If democratic men of the type discussed in these pages succeed in inspiring hope and loyalty in the people of their countries, the Communists will have little hope of making headway in the Latin American area.

On the other hand, the failure and discrediting of any of the indigenous democratic social revolutionary movements opens the way for the penetration of the Communists and for those like Fidel Castro who are willing to work with the Communists, nationally and internationally. Such failure seems to confirm the argument of the

Communists that only by following the methods so successfully applied (as they maintain) in the Soviet Union and China can an underdeveloped nation rapidly expand its economy and gain its "economic independence" from the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

The Communists and other totalitarians promise many of the same things that the indigenous democratic social revolutionaries have proposed. They argue in favor of agrarian reform, labor and social legislation, and the fight against the military dictators. However, they add to these issues a consistent and bitter denunciation of the United States and all its works, and equally consistent and persevering praise for the Soviet Union and other Communist-controlled countries.

Communist advocacy of long overdue changes in Latin America is merely a tactic in their long-run struggle for power. There is no reason to believe that an agrarian reform program initiated by a totalitarian government in a Latin American country would not be followed rapidly by forced collectivization such as has occurred in the Communist nations of Europe and Asia. There is no reason to believe that totalitarian advocacy of labor and social legislation and of trade-union independence as a means of gaining adherents would in the future prevent a Latin American totalitarian government from brutally exploiting the workers and reducing their trade unions to mere branches of the state. Castro's regime provides ample evidence on these matters.

✓ If North Americans are to understand what is going on in Latin America, they must learn to distinguish between the genuine indigenous democratic social revolutionaries, such as the first nine men described in these pages, and the totalitarians, including the Communists. The former are trying to bring their countries into the twentieth century, and their ultimate objectives are not greatly different from those of liberal and progressive-minded folk in the United States and other democratic nations. The Communists and other totalitarians are the enemies of democracy and social progress not only in the United States but in Latin America as well. ✎

The people of the United States should certainly not give blanket support to any Latin American politician just because he claims to be a social reformer or social revolutionary. Certainly North Ameri-

can democrats cannot have any sympathy with the dictatorial actions of the Peróns, the Vargases, and the Castros. But neither should the democratic Latin American social reformers be confused with the Communists. Because the social reformers apply in their own countries concepts of property which differ from those in vogue in the United States, and because they have a somewhat different philosophy concerning the role of government in economic affairs than is dominant in this country, these indigenous politicians should not be irresponsibly accused of communism.

If "communism" is really to have meaning, it must have a very specific meaning. A "Communist" is one who belongs to the international political movement led by the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China and directed from those two centers.

The best hope for continued peace in the American hemisphere and for increasingly friendly relations between the two groups of countries which make up the New World is to be found in the success of the kind of social, economic, and political change which most of the men discussed in these pages have stood for. If the old institutions which have been inherited from colonial times and which have kept the great mass of the people of Latin America in one or another type of servitude can be replaced by modern concepts of the equality of all before the law, the prospect for the development of solid democratic regimes in the twenty Latin American republics will be bright. If these countries can rapidly develop their economies and pass on to their citizens the benefits of this economic growth in the form of higher levels of living, there will be little chance that the people of Latin America will decide that it is necessary to sacrifice the democracy which only a few of them have ever enjoyed in order to obtain social justice and material prosperity.

To reach their objectives democratic leaders of the Latin American Revolution need the sympathy, understanding, and help of the people and government of the United States. In extending such comprehension and aid the North Americans will not only be reinforcing their country's national security but will be giving realistic meaning to their own belief in the dignity of the individual, social justice, and political democracy.

Bibliographical Note



Much of the material in these pages was drawn from personal observation and from conversations with the men who are discussed there as well as with hundreds of other people who have been participants in or observers of their careers. However, the author has also used a wide variety of published material, some of which might be of interest to readers who desire to investigate further the problems which are raised in this book.

In writing about the career of José Batlle y Ordóñez the author has consulted Simon Hansen's *Utopia in Uruguay* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1938) and has also made extensive use of the following volumes:

Francisco Pintos: *Batlle y el Proceso Histórico del Uruguay*, Claudio García y Cía., Montevideo, 1936.

Francisco Pintos: *Historia del Uruguay*, Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, Montevideo, n.d.

Jorge Batlle (editor): *Batlle: Su Vida, Su Obra*, Empresa Editorial Acción, Montevideo, 1956.

Domingo Arena: *Batlle y los Problemas Sociales en el Uruguay*, Claudio García y Cía., Montevideo, 1939.

The career of Don Arturo Alessandri has been widely discussed by Chilean authors, and he wrote extensively about himself, and we have relied principally upon these publications. Among those which we have found most useful are the following:

Alberto Edwards Vives: *La Fronda Aristocrática* (Editorial del Pacífico, S.A., Santiago, Chile, 1945), a study of the evolution of Chilean political life from the time of independence to Alessandri's first administration, with emphasis on the importance of Alessandri's victory in 1920 as a victory for middle and working-class groups of the city over the traditional landed aristocracy.

Ricardo Donoso: *Alessandri: Agitador y Demoledor* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, D.F., 1952 and 1954), a two-volume biography

of Alessandri by a famous Chilean historian, a violent personal enemy of Alessandri. Although this work is, in the writer's opinion, highly unfair to Alessandri in its interpretations, it is a gold mine of information concerning his career.

Arturo Alessandri: *El Presidente Alessandri y Su Gobierno* (Imprenta Gutenberg, Santiago, Chile, 1926), a compilation of various articles and speeches by Alessandri during his 1920 election campaign and his first presidency.

Arturo Alessandri: *Rectificaciones al Tomo IX* (Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago, Chile, 1941), a justification of his own career by Alessandri, written in answer to attacks upon him by Ricardo Donoso, published in a history of Chile which appeared in Argentina.

Arturo Alessandri: *Recuerdos de Gobierno* (Editorial Universitaria, S.A., Santiago, Chile, 1952), memoirs of Alessandri.

Luis Durand: *Don Arturo* (Zig-Zag, S.A., Santiago, Chile, 1952), an exceedingly sympathetic biography, written almost as if it were a novel.

Finally, mention should be made of Carlos Keller's chapter on Chile in Daniel Cossio Villegas' compilation of essays entitled *El Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, D.F., 1945). This places the attitude and policies of the Alessandri administration of the 1930's in the perspective of Chilean economic history and the evolution of economic thinking in that country.

Of particular interest for a student of the career of Víctor Raúl Haya de La Torre is Harry Kantor's *The Ideology and Program of Peruvian Aprista Movement* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), a study of the various programs of the Aprista Party and the writings of Haya. The author has relied most heavily on the works of Haya de la Torre himself, none of which, unfortunately, has been translated into English. The most important of Haya's books are the following:

A Donde Va Indoamerica? (Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago, Chile, 1935).
El Antimperialismo y el Apra (Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago, Chile, 1936).
Impresiones de la Inglaterra imperialista y de la Rusia Soviética (Editorial Claridad, Buenos Aires, 1932).

La Defensa Continental (Ediciones Problemas de America, Buenos Aires, 1942).

Y Despues de la Guerra, Que? (Libreria PTCM, Lima, 1946).

Espacio-Tiempo Histórico (Ediciones La Tribuna, Lima, 1948).

Construyendo el Aprismo (Editorial Claridad, Buenos Aires, 1933).

In the case of Rómulo Betancourt we have consulted two collections of his speeches, *Pensamiento y Acción* (Mexico, D.F., 1951) and *Trayectoria Democrática de Una Revolución* (Imprenta Nacional, Caracas, 1948) as well as his masterly *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, D.F., 1956). This last is a detailed study of Venezuelan political and economic history since the early years of the twentieth century, and in it the author expands largely on his philosophy and career. It ranks him as one of the leading Latin American scholars in the field of economic policy.

In writing the chapter on José Figueres we have relied extensively on his own books and speeches. Most important of his books have been the following:

Palabras Gastadas: Democracia, Socialismo, Libertad (San José, Costa Rica, 1955, republished, first edition 1943). This was Figueres' first exposition of his political philosophy written and first published when he was in exile in Mexico.

Cartas a Un Ciudadano (Imprenta Nacional, San José, Costa Rica, 1954), a masterly discussion in simple terms of Figueres' own philosophy and what he considers the role of his political movement to be in Costa Rican and Latin American affairs.

In addition we have referred to the following speeches:

"Mensaje del señor Presidente Constitucional de la República Don José Figueres F., presentado a la Asamblea Legislativa el 1 de Mayo de 1954."

"Mensaje del señor Presidente de la República don José Figueres y Contestación del señor Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa Lic. don Gonzalo Facio, 1 de Mayo de 1955."

"Mensaje del señor Presidente de la República don José Figueres y Contestación del señor Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa Lic. don Otto Cortes Fernández, 1 de Mayo de 1956."

"Mensaje del señor Presidente de la República don José Figueres y Contestación del señor Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa Lic. don Otto Cortés Fernández, 1 de Mayo de 1957."

"Estos Diez Años: Discurso Pronunciado por el Señor Presidente de la República Don José Figueres, el Día 29 de Enero de 1958."

In all of these speeches Figueres sums up and comments on the progress of his government. The reply of Gonzalo Facio in 1955 contains interesting historical information about the movement led by Figueres,

as does Don Pepe's speech of January 29, 1958, in which he sums up what the movement has done within the first ten years after the 1948 Revolution.

A full discussion of the sources used for the chapter on Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles can be found at the end of the author's volume *The Bolivian National Revolution* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1958). However, one may mention here the article by Paz Estenssoro on the evolution of Bolivian economic ideas in Daniel Cosío Villegas' book *El Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1945), and the collection of Paz Estenssoro's speeches entitled *Discursos Parlamentarios* (La Paz, Bolivia, 1956).

Perhaps the most important source of information on the career of Luis Muñoz Marín is Earl Parker Hansen's *Transformation: The Story of Puerto Rico* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1955). Although this volume sometimes reads like an apologia for Muñoz, it has valuable insights into his character and information about his early career. Also of importance are two works by ex-Governor Guy Tugwell, *The Stricken Land* (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1947) and *The Art of Politics* (Doubleday, 1958). In the latter Tugwell compares the career of Muñoz Marín with the careers of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Fiorello La Guardia.

The author has also relied for some parts of his chapter on Muñoz Marín on *La Nueva Constitución de Puerto Rico—Informes a la Convención Constituyente preparados por la Escuela de Administración Pública de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales* (Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1954), which has much interesting information on the evolution of the political status of Puerto Rico. Of great use, too, have been various of Muñoz Marín's speeches.

The career of Juan Domingo Perón has been written about by many people in the two Americas. The following are of particular use:

George Blanksten: *Perón's Argentina* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), one of the few books which try to develop in a serious way the threads of Perón's political philosophy.

Arthur Whittaker: *The United States and Argentina* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954) which traces Perón's inter-

national policies against a background of the historical relationship between his country and the United States.

Arthur Whittaker: *Argentine Upheaval: Perón's Fall and the New Regime* (Praeger, 1956), which discusses the causes and events of Perón's fall and the provisional regime which succeeded him.

María Flores: *The Woman with a Whip* (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1952), a serious study of Evita Perón, which gives valuable insights into her relationship with her husband and his regime.

Alejandro Magnet: *Nuestros Vecinos Justicialistas* (Editorial Pacifico, Santiago, Chile, 1954), a perceptive study by a Chilean of the nature of the Argentine dictatorship and its leader.

Perón: *La Fuerza es el Derecho de las Bestias* (Santiago, Chile, 1956).

Lázaro Cárdenas and the role which he has played in the Mexican Revolution have also been widely discussed in print. Among the best books on the subject are two by Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1932) and *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread* (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1951). The first was written before Cárdenas' presidency but remains the best study of the scope and implications of the Mexican Revolution. The second has a great deal of information concerning the Cárdenas regime itself.

Also valuable is a discussion of the agrarian reform, the core of the Mexican Revolution, Eyler Simpson's *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1937). A Mexican work which contains a critical assessment of Cárdenas' continued adherence to the *ejido* form is Rodrigo García Treviño's *Precios, Salarios y Mordidas* (Mexico, D.F., 1951).

The meteoric career of Fidel Castro has probably been written about more extensively, at least in English, than any of the others discussed in this volume. Within weeks after he came to power there began a spate of books about him which has not ceased yet. Among those to which we have referred are the following:

C. Wright Mills: *Listen Yankee* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960).

R. Hart Phillips: *Cuba: Land of Paradox* (McDowell, Obolensky, New York, 1959).

Ray Brennan: *Castro, Cuba and Justice* (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1959).

Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman: *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1960).

We have also referred extensively to *Pensamiento Político, Económico y Social de Fidel Castro*, published by Editorial Lex, Havana, in 1959.

Many of the twelve men discussed here have been written about or have themselves contributed articles to periodicals published both in Latin America and the United States. Among those which are of special interest in this connection are:

The New Leader, New York, to which Betancourt and Figueres have contributed.

Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York.



José Batlle y Ordóñez the Pioneer

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2. Rama, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50.
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4. E. M. Narancio's "Batlle y la Industria" in Jorge Batlle (ed.), *Batlle, Su Vida y Su Obra* pp. 127-129.
5. Luis Hierro Gambardella's article "*Batlle y los Entes Autónomos*" in Jorge Batlle (ed.), *Batlle, Su Vida y Su Obra*, p. 182.
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8. José Serrato's "Don Jose Batlle y Ordóñez" in Jorge Batlle (ed.), *Batlle, Su Vida y Su Obra*, p. 6.

Lázaro Cárdenas and the Fulfillment of the Mexican Revolution

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2. Professor Robert Scott studies the process of evolution of the Mexican government party in great detail in his recent book *Mexican Government in Transition*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959.

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1. Arturo Alessandri, *Recuerdos de Gobierno*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, Chile, 1952, p. 38.
2. Arturo Alessandri, *op. cit.*, p. 229.
3. Ricardo Donoso, *Alessandri: Agitador y Demoledor*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, D.F., Vol. I, p. 430.
4. Arturo Alessandri, *Rectificaciones al Tomo IX*, Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago, Chile, 1941, pp. 78-87.
5. Ricardo Donoso, *Alessandri: Agitador y Demoledor*, Vol. II, p. 116.
6. George Wythe, *Industry in Latin America*, Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 216.
7. Carlos Keller's chapter on Chile in *El Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, D.F., 1945, pp. 203-216.
8. Ricardo Donoso, *Alessandri: Agitador y Demoledor*, Vol. II, p. 296.
9. Ricardo Donoso, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 358-360.

Víctor Raúl de la Torre and "Indo-America"

1. Interview with Haya de la Torre.
2. Interview with Antenor Orrego, Aprista leader and onetime leader of Trujillo "Indianist" movement.
3. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *A Donde Va Indoamerica?* Editorial Ercilla, Santiago, Chile, 1935, p. 15.
4. Interview with Arturo Sabroso, old-time Aprista labor leader, in Lima, Peru.
5. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, *El Antimperialismo y el Apra*, Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago, Chile, 1936, p. 33.
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2. Rómulo Betancourt, *Trayectoria Democrática de una Revolución*, Imprenta Nacional, Caracas, 1948, p. 463.
3. Rómulo Betancourt: *Pensamiento y Acción*, p. 243.
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"Pepe" Figueres: Dreamer and Man of Action

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2. José Figueres, *Palabras Gastadas: Democracia, Socialismo, Libertad*, San José, Costa Rica, 1955, p. 18.
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5. José Figueres, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.
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Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles and the Bolivian National Revolution

1. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Discursos Parlamentarios*, La Paz, 1956, p. 208.
2. Article on Bolivia by Paz Estenssoro in *El Pensamiento Económico Latinoamericano*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1945, p. 67.

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